CHINESE SECURITY AND THE CARS

Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan*

The terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 have affected the functioning of the international system and altered the foreign policy focus of major powers, including China. For the US, its concept of national security has been altered to reflect terrorism as the current biggest threat. Chinese scholars argued that under the George Bush administration, the US foreign policy focus has shifted from Bill Clinton’s ‘human rights and economics diplomacy’ to national security and anti-terrorism.’ This also implies that the US now has an excuse to assert itself in international politics in the name of countering terrorists or hostile states, as the wars against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes, the pressure on Libya to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and plans to curb Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear aspirations. More specifically, this adds to the argument that the world has become unipolar as the US pursues its war on terror and evinces a unilateralist tendency in international politics. Basically, this means China now needs to reassess the ramifications of such an assertive US stance. At the same time, China acknowledges that the key trend in international relations is globalisation.Accordingly, three entanglements will then need to be resolved: globalisation and sovereignty; power politics and sovereignty; and human rights and sovereignty.2 The latter two entanglements centre primarily on the US, as the lone superpower is perceived as indulging in power politics and promoting human rights in order to undermine Chinese sovereignty.
For most parts of the Cold War era, China had maneuvered between the two hostile superpowers, leaning from one side to another to enhance its national security in the strategic triangle. Today, the room for such maneuvers has shrunk to a large extent as China often faces the US on its own. To counter US preponderance in international politics, China is now seeking to boost its ties with a former adversary, Russia. For instance, the border dispute with Russia, which had existed for over 300 years, was resolved in 2004 when both parties sealed an agreement.3 This follows from the establishment of confidence-building measures with Russia as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on their borders in 1996 and a troop-reductions accord with the aforementioned countries along those borders in 1997. Those moves in the l990s were taken by Beijing to bolster its military security on its northern and northwestern flanks, and they have finally come to fruition in relation to traditional rival Russia. They also relate to China’s desire to develop its old economic base in the northeast and the interest of Russia’s Far East region to tap into such developments. For instance, China and Russia are planning to build a highway running through the Heixiazi island in the Ussuri River, the scene of their 1969 war. The key point is that the threat from the north, posed by the former Soviet Union, no longer exists for China. In the military realm, China now aims to enhance its ties with Russia and the first-ever joint military exercise, ‘Peace Mission 2005’, was conducted in August 2005 in China’s northeast region. Beyond the sphere of tactical collaboration, the exercise carries political connotations and epitomises China’s objective of balancing against the lone superpower.5 Overall, it is clear that US unilateralism in world politics, evinced in the war on terror, has pushed China to look more earnestly for allies who share reservations about America’s assertive foreign policy.
It must be pointed out that China currently emphasizes its economic ties with Russia as part of a wider strategic partnership aimed at countering US unilateral­ism as well as fuelling its modernisation programmes. Sino-Russian trade rose over 20 per cent to US$21.23bn in 2004 and both sides have set a goal of US$60—80bn in annual bilateral trade by 2010.6 China is the fourth largest trading partner of Russia and Russia is China’s eighth largest. In additional to military equipment, China’s imports from Russia consist mainly of natural resources and raw materials. In return, China mainly sells Russia household commodities such as textiles, clothes, shoes and home electrical appliances, and these accounts for over 70 per cent of total exports. Basically, China wants from Russia military hardware to improve the capabilities of its armed forces and oil for its economic modernisation.
For Russia, stable relations with China could well be the single most important facilitator of economic development in the Russian Far East, as China is poten­tially its largest and most valuable market in Asia. Despite voiced discontent from the Russian population in the Far East towards the Chinese who have intruded into their areas, for Russia as a whole, its fragile economy can ill afford further reductions in Russo-Chinese trade. This fact can be used by China to enhance its economic security, for Siberia is rich in minerals and could be exploited jointly with Russia. Specifically, Russian energy resources are being sought by China for its economic modernisation goals. Given its projected energy requirements in the 21st century, China intends to diversify’ its supply in order to minimise over-reliance on any single source. Overall, Russia is important to China’s quest for energy security, and Sino-Russian energy co-operation in oil and gas has consid­erable potential.
At the same time, China has to compete with states such as Japan for such as Russian resources. For instance, Russia recently approved a major oil pipeline to the Pacific Ocean that enables exports to Japan and the US, thus dropping the idea of a competitor route to China. At a geopolitical level, China still struggles to come to ternis with strategic partner Russia’s choice of Japan, especially given that Russia and Japan have yet to sign a peace treaty primarily due to territorial disputes in the southern Kurile islands/Northern Territories. In reality, competi­tion including that for energy resources is endemic in international relations and China must learn how to cope with this by perhaps offering more attractive financial terms for the oil pipeline project.
Overall, Russia remains on good terms with China in Northeast Asia. In that region, China is still aligned with North Korea against the US and its Asian ally Japan. Although the ending of the Cold War has brought some modifica­tions, such as the partial removal of the Soviet factor, the overall security structure in Northeast Asia did not undergo any fundamental changes, unlike in Europe. Today, the geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of Northeast Asia cannot be overstated, for this is a sub-region of Asia where four of the world’s five recognised centres of powers — the US, Russia, China and Japan —meet and interact; where permutations of bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral power games are played out on multiple chessboards with all their complex-ides and shifting configurations.7 The US remains the sole superpower in the world and therefore in Northeast Asia as well. It has a strong influence over the region and plays an important role in shaping the strategic environment there.
The removal of East—West confrontation might portend instability in Northeast Asia; once the ‘superpower overlay’ has been lifted, it is possible that regional tensions might resurface.8 Such tensions could include those between China and Japan, which had previously been suppressed to some extent by a shared common enemy in the form of the Soviet Union. Moreover, regional tensions might attract the intervention of additional extra-regional powers such as the European Union (EU) in the long run, something that China will be keen to avoid. The possible rise or resurgence of regional hegemons in Northeast Asia, namely Japan and Russia, is also a matter of concern for China; at the very least, an economically powerful Japan will pose new problems for China and any revival of Russian nationalism will also be regarded as a threat. At the same time, the ascendancy of China itself causes concern for the smaller Asian states. All these scenarios make the region of Northeast Asia seem rather volatile, notwithstanding the ending of the Cold War.
Essentially, the ‘democratic peace’ thesis that democracies do not go to war would not apply in Northeast Asia as most of the countries there, including China, are not fully developed democracies.9 Given their political culture, authoritarian regimes in Northeast Asia, would feel less inhibited than say, western European states, in using force to settle their disputes. At present, a host of territorial disputes still exist in Northeast Asia, and this has prevented the establishment of closer ties among states in the region. One example is the Southern Kurile islands/Northern Territories issue, which still remains an obstacle to better Russo-Japanese relations. More relevant to China is the contest with Japan over the sovereignty of Diaoyu islands/Senkaku islands.
Historically, China had fought several wars to maintain its security interests in Northeast Asia. Some campaigns were successful but others were not. China fought against Japan twice in the 1894—1895 and 1937—1945 wars. China inter­vened in the Korean conflict in 1950 when American military forces came too close to its northeastern border, within striking distance of its capital. In the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, China fought a small-scale border war against the Soviet Union along the Ussuri River in 1969. Although a direct military threat has been reduced today following the demise of the Soviet Union, it is true to say that China still faces some great powers in Northeast Asia, such as the US and Japan. Moreover, Northeast Asia constitutes part of the larger Asia-Pacific region, which is vital for China’s comprehensive security. Beijing attaches great importance to stability in the Asia-Pacific region because this is a prerequisite for ensuring economic development. Essentially, China wants to use economic development as the basis to drive to truly global power status in the 21St century. The proposition here is that China is a regional power but it wants to become a global power.

China’s Security Interests

In analysing China’s security interests, one needs to examine the degree of their coherence and internal consistency. This raises the question of how much a single factor exists in the formulation of such interests. China’s security is generally taken to mean the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP); the reality is that the CCP has represented the security interests of the Chinese state since 1949, albeit largely through its monopoly of violence.
The Communist political system is in a transitional phase and one major weakness of such systems is the lack of an orderly process for the selection of new leaders. Various historical examples can be cited. For instance, after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, there was a period of political struggle, with the purge of the radical ‘Gang of Four’ eventually resulting in the ascendancy of the late Deng Xiaoping. More recently, the power transition has been comparatively stable and less violent, as the assumption of CCP leadership by Jiang Zemin in 1992 and Hu Jintao in 2002 showed. At the same time, it must be noted that because there is no truly democratic process for the selection and removal of leaders, political selections still to a large extent take place through intra-party struggles behind the scenes. Key leaders often place their own cliques in key positions while counter­ing the manoeuvres of rival leaders and their followers.
The leadership succession issue in China raises questions on the likelihood of Beijing’s security interests being dominated by internal concerns. For example, it is worth noting that during the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong paid more attention to internal affairs compared to foreign relations and external security concerns; in fact, the door to the outside was closed during most of that period. In the near future, it is possible that China’s current leaders may be pre-occupied with internal struggles in the quest to achieve political supremacy in Zhongnanhai and therefore they might have less time and energy to present a clearer security agenda to the outside world. Furthermore, it is worth noting that competitive successors to the current leadership are bound to show no hesitation in exploiting nationalism in an era of ideological bankruptcy to strengthen their claims to the throne and weaken their opponents.
In particular, it is often noted that when dealing with strictly military security issues, one can see that there are often less major disagreements within the Chinese leadership. For example, on the Taiwan issue. Beijing’s foreign policy has been unvarying in its basic orientation and goals, with a no-compromise adherence to the one-China principle. As the new generation of leaders generally lack the absolute authority of their predecessors, they will not be in a position to make compromises on issues of national sovereignty. They will be unable to move in new directions or reach compromises with foreign states as that will weaken their already limited power. Such potential developments need to be borne in mind when analysing China’s security agenda.
At the same time, although the new nationalist elites might to some extent regard the Marxist—Leninist beliefs of their elders as outmoded, they are certain to share the same conviction that China should become a truly global power. That at least will remain an enduring feature of Chinese security thinking. However, when one moves across the range towards the non-military aspects of security, one is bound to discover much more diversity in Chinese thinking. For example, on issues relating to economic security, Chinese leaders have often been engaged in debates over how to reform the loss-making state-owned enterprises, with some advocating a move to the capitalist mode of pure private ownership while others stressing the importance of some remaining state control to avoid the pitfalls of liberalisation or over-integration with the international economy.
Apart from the question of whether the leadership will assert effective authority, arguments can also be made regarding the fact that a possible confluence of institutional and ideological crisis will radically transform or even-overrun the existing order. On the internal front, this may portend a protracted and inconclusive struggle for power that can encourage powerful local elites to demand greater autonomy from the central government. For example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might intervene in the affairs of political leadership. In general, causes that produce military interventions in politics, to a certain extent, lie in the structure of society, in particular in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions.13 In actual fact, the best opportunity for the PLA to intervene might have been during the Cultural Revolution. This argument that political instability is a classic breeding ground for military intervention paints a scenario reminiscent of the final days of the Qing dynasty, which later gave way to warlordism in China. However, the view adopted here is that this is rather unlikely as China’s political leaders, with Hu Jintao as the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) since September 2004, retain control over the military and the military has shown no clear signs of breaking away from its political masters. As such, it is assumed that China will remain a unified state and there exists a fair degree of coherence in the formula­tion and articulation of China’s security interests among the military elite and the civilian leaders.
Last, it is worth pointing out the impact of security threat perceptions on actual foreign policy behaviour. This applies not only to China but to every state in the international system. There are the larger questions of information processing, cost calculation and political decision making in Beijing. Perception is essentially a cognitive process; it may provide insights into a particular way of thinking but must still be subjected to different interpretations and debates. Therefore, certain key assumptions will frame China’s security threat forecasts here. Domestic dissidence and regime factionalism will not jeopardise the CCP’s control of the country, at least not totally. Otherwise, the traditional Chinese premise of ‘internal unrest, external danger’ will significantly heighten threat perceptions than the case actually is; attendant efforts to unite the country in an event of social fragmentation will surely magnify any existing external security threats.

Military Security

Currently, China does not face direct military threats on its northwestern flank. This can be contrasted with the past when Russia and then the Soviet Union fre­quently threatened China from Central Asia. Basically, China is no different from other states in that it needs to defend its territorial integrity and resist foreign involvement in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which is geographi­cally part of Central Asia. Historically, this enormous region north and west of China’s heartiands had represented a source of anxiety for Chinese emperors; these emperors expended considerable resources in pacifying Xinjiang and the surrounding border lands in order to bring under control the ancient oasis cities of the Silk Road. Writing in the 1930s, Owen Lattimore noted that the Chinese had effectively controlled Central Asia for only 425 out of 2000 years.’ In the mid- 18th century, China was strong and powerful and much of Central Asia was under its influence. However, as Qing dynasty weakened in the mid-19th century, China’s control over Central Asia diminished, primarily due to growing Russian influence and local Muslim-motivated rebellions. One important rebellion took place in the 1860s, in the Ili area that borders present day Kazakhstan. The upris­mg was led by Yaqub Beg, who managed to set up an East Turkestan government until it was ended by the Chinese in 1878.
In 1884 Xinjiang was formally incorporated into the Qing empire but the Manchu dynasty was weakening and it subsequently collapsed in 1911. The successor Republican government was not strong either; it had to contend with centrifugal tendencies in the form of warlordism and foreign encroachment in the form of Japan. Given this situation, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to back the Uighurs of Xinjiang in establishing a Kazakh and Uighur East Turkestan Republic in 1933. This attempt was suppressed by the Chinese government, only to be re-established in 1944 and the Soviets managed to control the Ili region until 1946. Between 1937 and 1942, when China was preoccupied with the war against Japan, Xinjiang was ruled by a Chinese warlord Sheng Shicai, with Soviet support.2 Xinjiang finally reverted to Chinese rule towards the end of the Chinese Civil War and was constituted as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the Communists took power in 1949.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, when ‘social imperialist’ Soviet Union posed a military threat following the Sino-Soviet schism, China had to station large numbers of troops in Xinjiang to serve as a defensive line against attacks.3 The Soviet Union had amassed large number of troops on the western and north­ern borders as well as in its satellite state of Mongolia, so Beijing actually faced a threat to its very existence.4 Hence, the impact of foreign military threats —especially czarist or Soviet — in Central Asia still to a certain extent influences Chinese security thinking today, notwithstanding the fact that the threat from Moscow has diminished since the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Additionally, it must be noted that security in Central Asia had been linked to the nuclear issue until 1995. Kazakhstan had inherited part of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenals, hosting two strategic missiles launch sites at Derzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobe, a nuclear test zone at Seniipalatinsk and one strategic bomber air­base. Astana eventually returned all those inherited weapons and their means of delivery to Russia through a deal backed by the US. This has made the military situation in Central Asia more stable. At a wider level, China has a fundamental interest in nuclear non-proliferation in Central Asia as it wants to maintain its nuclear monopoly in the entire Asia-Pacific. Interestingly, one of the largest Chinese nuclear testing site is located at Lop Nor in Xinjiang, which borders Central Asia.
Since the end of the Cold War, China has established confidence-building measures with Central Asian states on their land borders to enhance its military security. An important agreement on such measures was reached with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in April 1996;5 this far-reaching accord -arguably the most comprehensive arms control agreement in East Asia since the Second World War — restricts deployments and exercises along China’s western border region and was uniquely lengthy and legalistic. The following year, in April 1997, China reached a troops-reductions accord with the aforementioned countries along their common borders.6 Beijing stressed that, taken together with the 1996 document, this accord made China’s northern 7,000 km common border ‘a secure belt of mutual trust’.7 In short, those moves were undertaken by China to bolster military security on its northwestern flank.
In addition, China’s historical rivalry with Russia over Mongolia, a country which has strong historical links with Central Asia, has been largely resolved. In June 1991, the last remaining Soviet combat troops were withdrawn from Mongolia. China sees this withdrawal as a military security gain since its north­ern border has now become less vulnerable. More importantly, China’s military burden has been greatly relieved due to the disappearance of Mongolia as a springboard for Soviet invasion into China proper. It also means that the Chinese can now divert resources from military spending to promoting economic devel­opment. It is this linkage between military and economic security that holds the key to understanding China’s security agenda.
Today, China does not want to see a volatile situation in Central Asia as a sta­ble wider Asia-Pacific is vital for carrying out its economic modernisation goals. Beijing wants to see regional conflicts resolved peacefully. For instance, whilst recognising Russian special interests in Tajikistan, China had stressed that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) should be the proper forum for set­tling issues such as the Tajik civil war of 1992—1997. Such security thinking also reflects the fear of further foreign military involvement, especially a Western one, in Central Asia, which has been magnified by the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) eastwards. Interestingly, common perceptions of NATO’S policies with regard to Central Asia — driven to a large extent by the US —have helped cement some form of strategic solidarity between China and Russia. Today, both states remain apprehensive about a US-led attempt to dominate Central Asia, a tendency accentuated by American unilateralism in global politics in the light of the Iraqi War and the war on terror.

Political Security

Central Asia also looms large when it comes to analysing China’s political secu­rity. Essentially, the Western advocacy of human rights and liberal democracy is aimed at China as well as the newly independent Central Asian republics. The Soviet Union and the former eastern European states were to a certain extent viewed as having succumbed to the strategy of peaceful evolution; this is a lesson the Chinese have learned and still emphasise today. Most Central Asia states prac­tise authoritarian rule, and this is congruent with China’s illiberal system. Furthermore, the regimes in Central Asia were previously communist, and Communism still serves as the ideological basis for the current government in China. One might argue that overall, this comparison puts China in the position as a defender of authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, reducing its status as pro­gressive country in the eyes of democratic states. Basically, China shares with Central Asian states the resentment against the promotion of ideas such as human rights by the West in general and the US in particular. This does constitute some form of unity between China and Central Asian states against the perceived Western strategy of peaceful evolution.
In discussing peaceful evolution, China has often highlighted the dangers of foreign powers fomenting internal dissent in a given state in order to modify that state’s political system. The West’s criticism of the Andijon event in Uzbekistan was a case in point. Hence, Uzbekistan might shift its policy and lean more towards China instead of continuing military co-operation with the US in the light of such criticisms; for instance, it might even invite Chinese forces for joint exer­cises on its soil, especially after the military withdrawal of the US in November 2005. With regard to another Central Asian republic, Kirghizstan, the Chinese have analysed the fall of the Askar Akayev government in March 2005 and expressed concern about any potential domino effect of more democratic forces in the region.8 It is the shared commitment to resist the Western linked promotion of liberal democracy that binds China and most of the Central Asian states in ideo­logical terms.
Moreover, China has paid a lot of attention to Uighur secessionist movements in Xinjiang and it argues that these are often abetted by the West. One Chinese assessment notes that the West in general and the US in particular support sepa­ratist forces in Xinjiang and other border areas with the aim of destabilising China in mind.9 Certainly, a number of moderate and political orgamsations and media sources in the West are dedicated to publicising the Xinjiang issue: the Uighur American Association and the East Turkestan National Congress are two such organisations, while the Munich-based Eastern Turkestan Information Bulletin is a key media outlet. In general, the US government does take an interest in Xinjiang. For example, US Congress has pressed for the release of a prominent Uighur businesswoman from Xinjiang who was arrested in 2000 because of her US-based activist husband.10 In reality, one might argue that such lobby groups in the West have a marginal impact, especially in an age of fighting terror; the US needs tacit Chinese co-operation and is therefore unlikely to pursue the Uighurs’ cause in any vehement manner.
Essentially, it must be said that the separatist tendencies of the Uighurs in Xinjiang are mostly indigenous and motivated to a certain extent by Islam.11 Descended from the Turkic people of Central Asia, the Uighurs share with the subjects in Central Asian states a common religion. Muslim communities with historical links to Central Asia have already played an important role in the his­tory of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and the Gansu, Qinghai and Shaanxi provinces of China. With Communism fading away as an ideology, Islam has often served as a cohesive and galvamsing force for certain groups in Central Asian states as well as the Uighurs in China’s Xinjiang. According to Jonathan Lipman, Muslims in Xinjiang are accorded with the ‘stranger’ status by Beijing.12 Due in part to their affinity with the Turkic language and culture, they have main­tained their aspiration to autonomy and have used religious factors to mobilise armed opposition to Chinese rule. One such attempt happened as early as 1990; it was unsuccessful but Chinese leaders took it seriously and warned of the dan­ger of ‘reactionary and splittist forces’ carrying out their infiltration activities under ‘banners of nationality and religion’.13
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Uighurs in Xinjiang watched not only the 1989 Tiananmen event and the Tibetan separatist movement unfold but also saw their ethnic cousins in former Soviet Central Asia gain independence. This lifted their long cherished hopes to achieve statehood. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has certainly raised political security problems in Central Asia for China as the newly independent Central Asian republics do have at least a modicum of sympathy for the Muslim people in China’s westernmost regions. China is aware that the Uighurs could receive ideological support and military hardware from neighbouring Central Asian states today; a small number of arms have also flowed from Iran, Afghanistan and sympathetic brethren in Russia to insurgents in Xinjiang in the recent past. Today, China faces a host of Uighur insurgent groups — United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan, Xinjiang Liberation Organisation and Uighur Liberation Organisation (ULO), Wolves of Lop Nor, Free Turkistan Movement, Home of the East Turkistan Youth and Organisation for the Liberation of Uighuristan, although how big a political threat they actually pose to Beijing remains a point.14
Nevertheless, to counter any secessionist tendencies, China has often called upon the quasi-military/business conglomerate Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), known colloquially as the bingtuan, to crack down on any form of separatist activities. Originally comprising decommissioned People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops who remained as part of the ‘Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army’ after 1949 to perform the role of ‘economic vanguard’, this force has grown in ranks and it accounts for a significant proportion of Xinjiang’s economic output.15 It is evident that Beijing wants to avoid a scenario reminiscent of Soviet empire’s collapse, which ended in former Soviet autonomous republics declaring independence one after another. The basic Chinese strategy is to crack down on secessionist movements before they start to mushroom. At the same time, China emphasises that such attempts do not con­stitute an anti-Muslim campaign, lest they are perceived by neighbouring Central Asian republics as intolerance towards religious freedom. Essentially, China knows that there is a delicate balancing act to be performed as too forceful an approach against the Uighurs could invite a backlash by Islamic forces in Central Asia and even beyond.
Since the events of September 11, the Islamic movements in Central Asia have gained a global stage as the lone superpower pursues its war on terror. Four months after September 11, China issued an official document that marked its most direct attempt to justify and link its actions against the Uighurs in Xinjiang with the American campaign against Al-Qaeda.16 Beijing shrewdly seized this opportunity to link Uighur nationalist movements to Islamic militants pursued by the US, without distinguishing between the violent or non-violent groups in Xinjiang. While the US refused to endorse China’s intensified efforts to combat separatist forces directly, it did not highlight the issue specifically. It appears that Washington has recognised the value of having a strategic dialogue with China and a ‘united front’ against terrorists and therefore traded its previous patronage of the Uighur cause for Chinese co-operation on the war on terror, particularly because of the urgent need to oust the Talibans in Afghanistan. In reality, China knows that defeat of the Taliban regime and other Muslim extremists will bolster its political security in Central Asia and on the whole strengthen its grip on the region. Therefore, some form of tacit co-operation with the US to deal with Islamic extremists seems a good policy in the short term.
Since late 2002, China has enlisted the help of neighbouring Central Asian states to marginalise the Uighurs’ few remaining supporters. It applied pressure on other countries to prevent or cancel political events organised by diaspora Uighurs and pushed the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) to focus on Uighurs separatists networks.17 Earlier, China had already sought the acknowl­edgement of leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan that ‘national separation is a harmful destructive force’ and secured their full support on this issue; those leaders also promised to adopt resolute measures to oppose the sep­aratists so that they would not gain a foothold in their countries.18 Essentially, the presence of a restive Islamic minority on its western frontiers that affiliates to its neighbours has forced China to reach out to the SCO to diffuse any impending threats to its political security. It is clear that China has not become complacent after military security on its northwestern front was enhanced with the diminished Russian threat; it is aware that new political threats in the form of Islamic sepa­ratist movements may resurface to challenge its control in Xinjiang.
Closer to the Chinese capital, there is a potential for Mongolian nationalism to resurface to feel the void left by the retreat of Soviet-style communism. For instance, Ulan Bator could become a base for separatist activities inChina’s Inner Mongolia region. Specifically, increasing cross-border contact between Mongols in Mongolia and their kinsmen in China’s Inner Mongolia region could engender some form of pan-Mongolian nationalism. This has implications for China’s secu­rity interests. The Mongols do share a common history with the peoples of Central Asia, as their empire once covered the Eurasian landmass. More impor­tantly, they had conquered China proper and managed to establish the short-lived Yuan dynasty in the 13th century. Apart from keeping a close eye on any signs of Mongolian separatism, China is also concerned that Mongolia could be subject to Western influence in the long run. Therefore, a sound strategy is to establish closer ties with Mongolia in order to prevent the West from making further inroads there.
In general, the erosion of central authority, exemplified by the collapse of the Soviet empire, has forced China to rethink its control over traditionally non-Han areas such as Xinjiang. Although the dominance of the Han people in China has been more complete than the ethnic Russians’ in their vast empire, Beijing’s con­trol of its western frontiers is not as secure as it wishes. Threats of separatism by ethnic minorities to these frontiers still exist and China continues to see a long term threat to its security interests from Islamic fundamentalism and possibly even pan-Turkism.19 Essentially, China knows that it must learn some critical lessons from the disintegration of the Soviet empire and avoid a similar outcome at all costs.

Economic Security

Apart from military and political security, economic security is important to China’s national interest in Central Asia. Here, the focus is primarily on the energy security. In relation to raw material reserves, Central Asia is critical to China because it is widely regarded as second only to the Gulf in term of oil resources.20 China knows that economic competition in Central Asia will inten­sify in the coming years and is worried that more powerful foes such as the US may become more assertive in the search for oil there. In addition, China needs access to world markets to achieve economic security, and the US holds the key to this because it is the most powerful trading nation and dominates most inter­national economic organisations. In the light of this, the Chinese have often stressed that no country should be allowed to apply economic sanctions — including oil embargoes — to retaliate against the other states. This is especially of the US, which had imposed ban on oil exports to Japan during the Second World War. Furthermore, from China’s perspective, the US has often tried to impede its eco­nomic progress with the aim of preventing its ascendancy.
For China’s development programmes, access to global capital markets and international loans is important but so is the security of more energy resources; a strong economic base is key to the drive to truly global power status in the 21st century. China has become a net importer of crude oil since 1993, and it now relies heavily on the Middle East for its total imports. In terms of improving indigenous energy supplies, China expects the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang to replace its northeastern region as the new energy base, possibly supplying over one-fifth of its total oil requirements by 2010, including an output of 35 million tons and an import of 10 million tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan.21 Earlier, Beijing had managed to strike a deal with Western oil giants to construct a $2Obn 4,000 km long pipeline from Xinjiang to the eastern city of Shanghai.22
At the same time, China will seek alternative sources of energy supplies in Central Asia. This means it has to compete with countries such as Russia and the US for the region’s raw materials reserves. The competition is given further impetus by ongoing tensions in the Middle East, a traditional supply source, and will intensify if the countries in Central Asia increasingly become the major sup­pliers of energy resources to the world market. In fact, China has already taken steps to enhance its energy security interests in Central Asia. For instance, Chinese state-owned oil companies took advantage of neighbouring Kazakhstan’s incentive to reduce its economic and political dependence on Russia and are already important entrants in Kazakh energy development, having outbid rivals for controlling interest of several major oilfields in western Kazakhstan. An example is the agreement with Kazakhstan to construct a 1,240-km long oil pipeline to Xinjiang.23 China has also reached preliminary agreements on oil and gas development and other Chinese investments in Uzbekistan.24 Furthermore, gas-rich Turkmenistan has considered the construction of a gas pipeline to Kazakbstan and further onto Xinjiang.25
In general, after gaining independence, these Central Asian states want to rely less on Russia’s state-owned gas and oil monopolies in developing reserves and marketing their energy products to the wider world; in many cases, clashes over contract terms with Russia have pushed these states to try to integrate directly with the global energy markets and to solicit the assistance of international finan­cial institutions. Hence, China as well as the Western countries can seize the chance to further their economic ties with Central Asian states and secure further sources of energy supplies, reducing the economic influence of the traditional regional power Russia in the process.
Overall, China also needs to develop its northwestern region more as this is in the overall national interest. Paralleling relatively successful economic experi­ments on the east coast, such as the Shenzhen special economic zone (SEZ). China is undertaking several attempts to modemise this region. The Great Western Development Programme is the most recent large scale incarnation of several initiatives designed to bring wealth to this poorer region.26 Such develop­ment projects in the northwest bring some economic benefits for the Muslims in Xinjiang and may assuage some of the separatist tendencies, notwithstanding resentment towards such projects by the Muslim population because Han Chinese in the region could get jobs in the state industry more easily and often have a higher standard of living and status. The key question is whether China can dampen the demand for independence by the Uighurs in Xinjiang through offer­ing better material well-being. Policies aimed at reducing demand for political change have so far been successfully applied in the country as a whole, barring a few setbacks such as the 1989 Tiananmen event; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has now substituted economic performance for ideology in its quest to continue monopolising political power. To fill the ideological vacuum created by the erosion of Communism, the CCP must above all justify its legitimacy on economic performance. It needs to find new substantive validating credentials in economic achievements in Xinjiang order to appease the local population that it rules over and still retains power over.
Here lies the link between economic security and political security, each reinforces the other to strengthen the CCP’s position in China, including the north­western region. Securing key resources, such as oil, will propel the economic modernisation drive further, resulting generally in a higher standard of living for the masses; the CCP hopes that this will assuage calls for political change or in case of Xinjiang, demand for independence by certain ethnic groups. To achieve economic security or more specifically, to continue the modernisation drive, it is clear that China needs a stable and peaceful environment in Central Asia, which forms part of the wider Asia-Pacific. Any interstate conflicts or civil wars in Central Asia will impair the regional environment, which will in turn disrupt ongoing economic development programmes there as well as affect China’s overall national development plans to some extent. More importantly, China knows that any instability in Central Asia is bound to invite the interven­tion of other great powers.
From a wider perspective, Central Asia holds an important geopolitical position in the analysis of great power competition in the international system. In the pre­sent geopolitical reality, some strategic analysts have turned to Mackinder’s Heartland Theory and China Xinjiang can be included in Mackinder’s Framework.27 Although China’s population, commercial activities and political centre are currently gravitated towards the eastern coast of the Eurasian land mass, population growth may shift the centre of gravity westwards in the future. The newly independent states in Central Asia are very weak and will not be able to resist the dominance of great powers such as China, Russia or the US should they chose to exert their influence over the area. As early as 1997, the Chinese noted that Central Asia has become of high strategic significance for the US in ensuring Washington’s dominant position in leading the world; given that Central Asia links up Europe and Asia via the Caucasus, control over Central Asia could mean the con­tainment of Europe’ and have an impact on East Asia as well as containing Middle Eastern threats.28 This is accentuated by the economic importance of Central Asia.
In general, the war on terror has changed the strategic landscape in Central Asia. There now exists a tripolar structure instead of bipolar one; in addition to Russia and China, the US is now a key player in Central Asia. Basically, China sees the purpose of US involvement in Central Asia as threefold: to weaken Russian influence in this part of its former empire, to contain the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and to curtail Chinese presence.29 Although the West generally acknowledges that Central Asia is Russia’s traditional sphere of influ­ence, the NATO has stepped up its presence in Central Asia, to some extent motivated by the US. Under the auspices of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PIP) programme, the Central Asian Battalion (CentrasBat) — the joint peacekeeping force of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan — was established. Apart from advocating the eastward expansion drive of NATO, the US has actually set up military bases in countries such as Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan to support waging of the war on terror.30 Although the US withdrew from Uzbekistan in November 2005, it is possible that the lone superpower might return if there is more upheaval in the region. Basically, if the Central Asian states cannot co-opt the Islamic radical movements within, the US would have further opportunities to justify any military presence there in the name of fighting terrorists. After all, Central Asian states do to some extent value US presence as a bulwark against any Islamic separatist challenges from within.
Undoubtedly, America’s arrival in Central Asia geopolitics was given an impetus by the events of September 11, which magnified the threat of Islamic terrorisim The US staged a successful military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and is still on the hunt for Al-Qaeda in Central Asia. To a large extent, China acknowledges the US’s underlying motives but also sees an imperialist logic to such recent American military actions, believing that the war on terror serves as an excuse for America to impose itself in the world in general and Central Asia in particular. Interestingly, such thinking is also evident in certain quarters in Russia.31 Due to some commonality of strategic interests against the US, China could develop a partnership with Russia, possibly through platforms such as the SCO, to counter US advancement in Central Asia as well as American unilateral­ism in world politics.
Above all, China is aware of America’s economic motives, and they regard US military presence in Central Asia as part of a wider plot to control energy resources in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. The US does seek alternative oil sources to reduce its import dependence on Persian Gulf supplies; the plan to build a pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan in Turkey with the aim of avoiding hostile states such as Iran as well as Russia is a case in point.32
Besides the US, it must be stressed that China also competes with Russia for influence in Central Asia. This competition can be viewed as a continuation of the rivalry that has existed since czarist Russia expanded eastwards from the Urals. In many ways, Russia’s current goal is to secure its southern flank, as was the case during the Soviet era. From Moscow’s perspective, Central Asia complements Russian territory and is regarded as one of the gateways to oil-rich Middle East. Moreover, Central Asia is Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Therefore, Russia had intervened in the Tajik civil war of 1992—1997 in favour of the ruling regime, and its presence in Central Asia is still evident. Because Central Asia is Russia’s traditional stronghold, China would therefore need to invest considerable time and resources to counter Russia’s dominance there. China’s active promotion of the SCO and more importantly, its attempt to lead the regional organisation can be regarded as indications of such efforts.
In addition to the US and Russia, China could face competition for influence in Central Asia from lesser powers such as Iran and Turkey over the longer term. Iran’s influence is not extensive yet and is mainly restricted to Tajikistan, the only Persian-speaking country in Central Asia. Turkey was the first state to recognise the independence of the Soviet Central Asian Republics and the first state to open embassies in those states. The first Turkic summit was held in Ankara in October 1992 — attended by the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since then, however, the call for some form of pan-Turkism has petered out. In general, Turkey and Iran have up till now not posed a serious threat to China’s strategic interests in Central Asia. In contrast, stiff competition for influence has come from the US and Russia, therefore China has formulated its foreign policy in Central Asia primarily with those two great powers in mind.

China and the SCO

With regard to Central Asian security, China has taken an active role in promoting SCO as a credible regional organisation, largely out of self-interest. Beijing’s aims in the region are threefold: to weed out separatist activities on its western front, to counter US and Russian influence in the region, and to demonstrate that it can act as a responsible regional power inCentral Asia. Although events at Andijon in Uzbekistan and the change of power in Central Asia. Although events at Andijon in Uzbekistan and the change of power in Kirghizstan did not erode the stability in Central Asia totally, they have strengthened the need for China to use the SCO more; China still stresses the need to be vigilant so that extremist and terrorist forces will not take advantage of these situations.33 Through the SCO, China was able to secure the inauguration of the regional anti-terrorist body, which intensifies its co-operation with Central Asian states in the war against the “three forces of terrorism, extremism and separatism.34 What triggered this deviation from the traditional Chinese policy of non-intervention in a given state’s domestic affairs was the fear of a global militant Islam network allying with separatist forces in Xinjiang. In this sense, what serves the US in its war on terror now coincides with China’s predicament on its northwestern front. The manipulation of the SCO to serve the cause of eliminating separatism in Xinjiang is indicative of classic Chinese foreign policy manoeuvres, although this is not a difficult task as the other SCO members share similar concerns over separatist threats in Central Asia.
Involvement in the SCO also enables China to bypass Russia’s traditional stake in Central Asia to a certain extent. For instance, promotion of the SCO means the I Central Asian countries will be less reliant on Russia-sponsored plans for achieving state and regional security These states will then have more alternatives instead of relying on Russian proposals such as developing rapid deployment forces for co-ordinated regional counter-terrorist actions under the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Collective Security Treaty (CST) framework.35 In fact, Uzbekistan has withdrawn from the CST, and this can be regarded as gain for China vis-à-vis Russia. In general, China aims to pull the former Soviet Central Asian republics further away from the grip of their ex-overlord. The SCO has in some ways served as a device for China to increase its influence over Central Asian states while checking a return of uncontested Russian hegemony in the region.
Furthermore, the SCO serves as a platform for China to boost its regional power status and to work more closely with international organisations. For instance, the setting up of the aforementioned regional anti-terrorist body entails the formulation of legal documents that include working together with the United Nations (UN) Security Council and its anti-terrorism committee. Such actions give China an opportunity to highlight its increasing importance in international affairs. This raises optimism for the country’s further integration with international society. Such further integration can only be beneficial for the international community, which generally worries about the implications of China’s ascendancy. It is clear that China can use the SCO to show the world its credentials as an upholder of peace in Central Asia as well as its commitment to regional security through a proactive regional policy. Recently, Chinese President Hu Jintao has called on SCO members to step up co-operation, acknowledging the importance of multilateralism and advocating the replacement of notions of ‘absolute unilateral security’ in favour of some form of co-operative security.36
At the same time, participation in the SCO does not fully vindicate any strong signs of China genuinely embracing multilateralism; it largely represents a means for China to achieve its security goals rather than indicates a radical departure from China’s preference for bilateralism in international relations. Traditionally distrustful of multilateral security undertakings, China has often taken a zero-sum view of alliances, believing that mutual security pacts must have an explicitly identified enemy or they should have no reason to exist. The positive sum notion that an alliance can serve to preserve stability and deter aggression, without identifying specific enemies, is on the whole still rather alien to Chinese security thinking. In general, China still suspects that most alliances in international system, including NATO’s PfP in Central Asia, are at least partly aimed at itself.
One can also view China’s participation in the SCO as an indication of the constructive role of great power management in regional security, in this case involving at least Russia and the US.37 Great powers such as China can to a large extent dictate security patterns in Central Asia and more importantly, help prevent conflicts between Central Asian countries or even intrastate political violence. The key is how effectively China, Russia and the US can manage their differences and how far they can reach a common ground on Central Asian security issues without sacrificing their own national interests. From the Chinese perspective, consolidating its position in Central Asia and being able to induce a cultural secular, inwardly authoritarian and outwardly moderate Central Asia would be ideal. The question here is how and to what degree does Russia or the US share these objectives. In the long run, in addition to great power management, the achievement of Central Asian security must also be underpinned by the indigenous states themselves. These newly independent states must learn to take on more responsibility and act collectively to stabilise the region. An expansion of the SCO to include countries such as Pakistan, Mongolia, India and Turkmenistan in future could have this in regard.
China has key security interests in Central Asia in the 21st century, and these will increase over time. In the military realm, the region is vital as it borders an old enemy, Russia, and the lone superpower, the US, is now establishing itself there. Politically, the growth of militant Islamic in Central Asia concerns Beijing as it can spur separatist movements in Xinjiang and undermine stability on the northwestern front. In terms of economic security, China knows that it has to compete with other great powers to secure future energy supplies in resource-rich Central Asia.
In geopolitical terms, Central Asia is generally analysed as one of the key areas for great power competition. Indigenous states in the region are rather weak and are unlikely to effectively resist the intervention of more powerful countries. Adopting a Realist approach to international relations, China therefore seeks to maximise its power and influence in the region, primarily vis-à-vis Russia and the US. In doing so, China will face stiff challenges from its rivals. One way of enhancing its role in Central Asia is through diplomacy; therefore having good relations with the newly independent Central Asian states is vital.
Another route is through the SCO whereby China exerts its authority in Central Asia as well as shows the international community that its presence there is indispensable for regional security. After all, the SCO does constitute a means for China to Asia. This is especially so given that Washington tends to put less emphasis on such regional platforms as it pursues its own unilateralist agenda and Russia’s status as traditional Central Asian overlord might hamper its participa­tion in the SCO. Therefore, China will seize the opportunities offered by the SCO to step up ties with its Central Asian neighbours and project its influence, thereby enhancing its security interests in the region.

References

1.     Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1940), p. 171.
2.     Allen S. Whiting, Sinkiang: Pivot or Pawn? (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1958), p. 14.
3.     The term ‘social imperialist’ was used by the Chinese to categorise the Soviet Union as a socialist country with imperialist ambitions, just like capitalist America. China had to face two hostile superpowers in the 1960s.
4.     China fought a border war against the Soviet Union along the Ussuri River in 1969. See also John. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet dispute: a commentary and extracts from the recent polemics 1963—1967 (London: Oxford University Press. 1968), Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict. 1956-1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).
5.     ‘Five-nation border agreement signed in Shanghai’, Xinhua News Agency, 26 April in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 27 April 1996, p. G/1.
6.     China said it would further cut its troops by 500.000in 3 years on the basis of a reduction of one million troops in the 1980s. See ‘Roundup comparing security concepts’. China Radio International. 29 December 1997 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 1 January 1998, p. G/2. ‘Chinese party paper commentary hails Central Asian border accord’, Xinhua News Agency, 24 April 1997 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacjfic, 26 April 1997, p. G/1.
7.     ‘Defence minister says China’s military diplomacy “unprecedentedly active” in 1997’, Xinhua News Agency 26 December 1997, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacjfic, 30 December 1997, p. G/112.
8.     ‘Chinese agency notes Russia unusually cautious on Kirghizstan crisis’, Xinhua News Agency, 26 March 2005.
9.     ‘Chinese think-tank on Central Asia. NATO’, Zhongguo Xinwen She News Agency, Beijing, in Chinese 20 January 1998, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 21 January 1998, p. G/2.
10.   ‘China cuts Uighur’s sentence’, BBC World News. 3 March 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk l/hi/world/asia-pacific/3528535.stm).
11.   ‘Li Peng addresses national conference on nationalities affairs’, Xinhua News Agency, 20 February 1990 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 23 February 1990, p. B2/1.
12.   Jonathan N Lipman. Familiar Strangers: A history of Muslims in the Northwest China (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1997). He contrasted the Uighurs with the traditional Huis, who have been less vocal and almost non-committal towards any form of nationalism, based on their primordial religious identity. The Huis are ‘familiar strangers’: they are familiar owing to their overall cultural affiliation with mainstream Chinese culture and their alienation is a product of their belief in Islam. For another account of Hui Muslims in China, see Michael Dillon, China’s Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement and Sects (Richmond: Curzon, 1999).
13.   ‘Li Peng addresses national conference on nationalities affairs’, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 Asia-Pacific, 23 February 1990, p. B2/1.
14.   Dewardic McNeal, ‘China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism’, in US Department of State, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 17 December 2001 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7945.pdf)
15.   Abigail Sines, ‘Civilizing the Middle Kingdom’s wild west’, Central Asian Survey. vol. 21, no. 1 (March 2002), pp. 5—14.
16.   Statement from the Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, ‘East Turkistan’s terrorist forces cannot get away with impunity’, 21 January 2002, Beijing.
17.   The Shanghai Five originally comprised China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan joined in 2001 and the organisation was renamed SCO.
18.   ‘Central Asian countries promise Xinjiang military heads to suppress separatism’. Xinjiang Ribao, 3 November 1997.
19.   See, for example, William Safran, Nationalism and Ethno-regional Identities in China (London: Frank Cass, 1998) for discussion on China’s ethnic minorities.
20.   For a survey of the oil and gas resources in Central Asia, see John Roberts, ‘Caspian oil and gas: How far have we come and where are we going?’ in Sally Cummings (ed.), Oil. Transition and Security in Central Asia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 2003).
21.   ‘China’s to increase oil production in Tarim Basin’, Renmin Ribao, 10 November 2004.
22.   Chinese state-owned China Petroleum and Chemical Corp (Sinopec) and PetroChina have stakes in the joint venture with Shell. British Petroleum (BP), ExxonMobil and Russia’s Gazprom. ‘Trans-China pipeline deal signed 4 July 2002’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/ l/hi/business/20923l3.stm).
23.   ‘Kazakhs agree to China pipeline’, BBC News, 18 May 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3723249.stm).
24.   China signs Uzbek accords’. BBC News, 15 June 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/38062l7.stm).
25.   G. Christoffersen, ‘China’s intentions for Russian and Central Asian oil and gas’, National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR analysis, vol. 9, no. 2 (March 1998).
26.   China Quarterly, volume 178 (June 2004), especially Nicolas Becquelin, ‘Staged Development in Xinjiang’, pp. 358—378.
27.   Halford Mackinder, ‘The geographical pivot of history’, Geographical Journal, vol. 20, no. 4 (April 1904), p. 421. See also G. Robbins, ‘The post-Soviet heartland: Reconsidering Mackinder’, Eurasian Studies, vol. 11, no. 3 (Fall 1994), p. 35.
28.   ‘Chinese think-tank on Central Asia, NATO’, Zhongguo Xinwen She News Agency, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 January 1998, p. G/2.

1. ‘Chinese think-tank on Central Asia, NATO’, in Chinese 20 January 1998, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 January 1998, p. G/2.
2. US ambassador Stephen Young said the Ganci air base is vital to the global war on terror. See US-led anti-terror coalition needs Kirghiz air base, Interfax, 16 June 2005 in BBC monitoring.

31.   Interestingly, some Russians also share this view. Although Moscow officially supports the US in the ‘war on terror’, there are Russians who regard this war as outright US imperialism or want to support greater integration with the West while remaining still sceptical of Vladimir Putin’s policies. See John O’Loughlin. Gearoid O Tuathail and Vladimir Kolossov, Russian geopolitical storylines and public opinion in the wake of 9—11: a critical geopolitical analysis and national survey’, Communist and post-Communist Studies, vol. 37, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 281—318.
32.   See ‘Caspian pipeline “unites nations”’, BBC News, 16 October 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/37496l6.stm).
33.   Shanghai body chief urges close watch on ‘extremists’ in Central Asia, Iterates News Agency, 18 June 2005 in BBC Monitoring.
34.   This was achieved at the fourth SCO Summit Meeting in Tashkent. See Xinhua News Agency, 17 June 2004.
35.   The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) wants to build up its military capabilities to cope with new threats such as international terrorism, illegal circulation of narcotics, illegal migration and organised crime. See ‘Head of CIS Collective Security Treaty outlines priorities’, ITAR-TASS News Agency, 20 January 2005 in BBC Monitoring.
36.   ‘Hu’s speech at the fourth SCO Summit Meeting in Tashkent’, Xinhua News Agency, 17 June 2004.
37.   For the role of great power management in international relations, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977).