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THE POLITICS OF ALLOWANCES IN WAZIRISTAN DURING THE BRITISH RAJ

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Abstract

The paper describes the nineteenth and early twentieth century British Indian Government dealings with the Wazir tribe dwelling on the North-West Frontier of the subcontinent. In view of the steady advances of Russians in Central Asia, the British Indian Government thought it necessary to control the Wazir tribe because it was essential to the security of India in the North-West Frontier. Therefore, the British evolved such an administrative system by virtue of which they could exercise influence over them. One of the main elements of arrangement was the payment of allowances and subsidies to the Wazir tribe. The paper argues that the payment of allowances to Wazir tribe created a considerable strategic space and time for the then British Empire to pursue its colonial interests and initiate the Great Game, in a recurrent competition with the 19th century expanding Czarist Empire. The paper follows a historical approach relying mainly on archival sources and an inductive interpretation of these archival sources involves, methodologically, an empiric-analytic reasoning that adds to research on the subject.

Keyword: Allowances, Waziristan, British Indian Government, Maliks.

Introduction

The late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries saw Waziristan emerging from the blurry and obscure space on the distant frontier of the British Empire into a distinct territory indirectly run by the British Indian Government. It all happened due to the fact that the British wanted to strategically manage the tribal areas of Waziristan and Afghanistan in the face of advancing Russian Empire. In contrast to other populations of India, the Wazir tribe was fiercely independent and democratic. Their dwellings on the borders implied freedom from colonial influences. The advances of the

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British Indian Empire into their territory were perceived as a danger to their freedom and way of life. The tribesmen, who prided themselves in the possession of weapons, lived by the inherited traits of *Pashtuwali*, which demanded vengeance and recompense from the perpetrators for an attempt on the person or his fraternity's honour.

Other than the good governance to keep the Wazir tribe under law to prevent disorder in the British territory, there were strategic concerns that the tribe also occupied the critical junction, which influenced the policy decisions regarding the extension and expansion of the British Empire. It was feared, if they were not managed properly, they could invade the plains alone or form alliance with hostile party. Besides, the Waziristan region bordered Afghanistan with whose inhabitants the tribesmen dwelling on the Indian side of the Durand Line had close religious, cultural and political ties and affiliations. The Wazir tribe also messed up with the traditional trade routes along with the common traffic routes of the local communities. Moreover, they blocked British reach across certain passes of great importance, especially the hills of North Waziristan that held a strategic significance for the British military. These passes were the continuous source of fret for the colonial officials as they served as bases for attacks by the native tribes. The British were conscious that raids would be causing harms to the commercial and tactical welfare of the Empire. On the other hand, the tribal community was angered by the issue of the Durand Line that officially marked the border between India and Afghanistan in 1893, creating division in tribal territory and separating the Wazir tribe into British and Afghan subjects. For instance, the region of Birmal was handed over to the Amir of Afghanistan's in exchange for repudiation of the whole Waziristan to the British Indian Government.¹

However, the delineation of border between British India and Afghanistan did not end difficulties for the British officials. There was the issue of political integration of the tribe. All these facts implied that if the Wazir tribe was coerced, they could in all likelihood turn to Afghanistan and request for the Amir's assistance in return for acknowledgement of his authority. On the other side, there was also the possibility that the Amir might manipulate the tribal people and cajole them to attack the British territory. Moreover, the Wazir tribe was scattered across such massive and intricate landscape that it was impossible for the British government to hold them through military resources. This implied that the tribe had to be won over by persuasion rather than coercion. It was decided to control the tribe by administrative methods rather than military means. Therefore, the British

¹ C. Collin Davies, *The Problem of North West Frontier 1890-1908 with a Survey of Policy Since 1849* (London: Curzon Press 1975), 161-162. First published in 1932 and reprinted in 1975.

ingeniously devised a strategy of paying allowances to the Wazir tribe in order to pursue their imperial ambitions. This research paper follows a historical approach based on primary and secondary sources. And an inductive interpretation of these sources unfolds in a comprehensive scientific way, employing both monological and dialogical approaches, and probes the subject using the “Empiric-Analytic Reason” i.e., blending the experiential and past data in a “quantitative” and “qualitative” manner set in an inductive macro-methodological framework.

The British Indian Government’s Policy in Waziristan

The British Indian Government’s prime aim in the territory of Waziristan was winning the tribesmen’s loyalty and reducing their seditious influences so that in peaceful times the settled areas might be saved from their raids and transgression, and in war times they might be kept at least neutral.² The British Indian Government used two-fold policy to achieve that aim: Firstly inducement, and secondly intimidation. Obvious or direct inducements included allowances and subsidies to *Maliks*, the deployment of *khassadars* to help the *Maliks*, and presenting of direct awards for special services. Indirect inducements consisted of free access to British Indian or settled territory, military enlistment or civil employment and many other Government benefits.³ The other half of the policy, that is, instilling fear was achieved primarily through the threat of curbing all benefits, and secondarily by threat of direct action. The curbing of benefits meant blocking, withdrawal of recruitments, and suspension of all allowances. Direct action against the rebellious tribesmen was sometimes taken by domestic forces and sometimes by a regular force.

There was a stretch of land between Thal and Tochi occupied by Kabul Khel clan of the Uthmanzai Wazir tribe which was called by the British as genuine Alsatia, as it served as safe haven for the bandits and outlaws from British Indian territory.⁴ There were almost thirty fugitives hiding among the Malikshahi and Kabul Khel Wazir, and whatever offences

² Major General K. Wigram Commanding Waziristan District 30th April 1926 Headquarter Waziristan District, to C.H. Gidney, Secretary to the Hon’ble the Chief Commissioner N.W.F.P, *Notes on Waziristan*, dated Waziristan District, 30th April 1928, Confidential File No. 34/S.T. B I (Vol) I, 1926. Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.(Henceforth DALKP)

³ *Policy in Waziristan*, Note by O.K. Caroe, Resident in Waziristan, secret file No.4\89 F. R, dated 29th January, 1942.

⁴ H.S. Barnfs, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General in the North West Frontier Province No.2740, dated Simla, 8th October 1902, *Punitive Measures Against the Kabul Khel and Certain Other Tribes Implicated in Frontier Raids*, Proceedings of the Military Department, March 1903, Government of India, Simla Records, Digitized Document, National Archives of India, New Delhi.

were carried out in British Indian territory by Wazir thieves would include at least one or two of those bandits.⁵ The outlaws had practical knowledge of every inch of many villages, they were also familiar with the grazing grounds, as well as with the intricate and forsaken hill paths. They depended for their survival on the Wazir tribe, and unless they served them as guides and spies, they would lose their asylum.⁶

To curb the activities of robbers, thieves, and other criminals along the border, the British Indian government signed three agreements with Malikshahi, Miamai, and Paipali clans of Wazir tribe in 1894. The elders of those clans consented under the agreement to control their people as well as bandits residing with them and to aid search and chase parties from the settled areas in order to restore stolen properties and arrest thieves. To check further crimes committed sporadically along the unguarded border of Waziristan, the British Indian government decided to exact fines due on certain sections of the Kabul Khel and Malikshahi Wazirs inhabiting near Kurram and Kohat districts.⁷

Mr. Spencer, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Thal, released the statement of fines that were to be exacted from the clans. The Miamai, Paipali Kabul Khel and Malikshahi had to pay Rs.3125 fine (including their share of penalty for the assassination of a Havaldar of Mountain Battery).⁸ Most of the fines due to the Malikshahi and Kabul Khel Wazirs, with the exception of Saifali, had been paid to the great satisfaction of many British subjects, who had not received their due shares for a very long time.⁹ In collection of those fines, Mr. Spencer had noticed the hard work of many individual Wazir families. Rarely did any family previously help the government to recover the booty from the other unwilling possessors. But after the execution of agreement with the government, the *Maliks* and other more powerful men made great efforts to make bandits disclaim unlawful possessions, not shirking from the use of force, if necessary. As the Malikshahi, Miamai and Paipali sections of the Kabul Khel Wazir tribes had

⁵F. R. P Spencer, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Thal, *Report of Progress made in effecting a settlement of cases outstanding against the Malikshahi and Kabul Khel Waziris*, File No. 29, Foreign Frontier Department, Punjab Civil Secretariat, 1894, Serial No. 1024, Bundle No. 10, Central Record Office, N.W.F.P

⁶*Imperial Gazetteer of India Provincial series, N.W.F. Province, 1901*, 245.

⁷ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* Vol.XI, (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933), 533.

⁸ F.R.P Spencer, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Thal, *Report of the Progress made in effecting a settlement of cases*.

⁹Telegram dated 7th April, 1894, from F.B.R Spencer, Assistant Commissioner, Thal to the H. P. P. Leigh, Deputy Commissioner Kohat, *Report of Progress made in effecting settlement of cases against the Malikshahi and Kabul Khel Wazirs*, Foreign Frontier Department Civil Secretariat of Punjab File No 29, June 1894, Serial No.1024, Bundle No10, Central Record Office, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

all paid their fines due on them, therefore they requested the British Indian government to not hold them responsible for the fines against the Saifali section. The Lieutenant Governor approved as he thought that those sections who had paid their fines and were eager to be of good behavior in the future should not be blamed for the unpaid fines of others. However, the Lt. Governor was of the view that the whole sub-sections of the Saifalis should be held responsible for the unpaid fines, although much of the fine was due from only one section of Badda Khel. The Lt. Governor foresaw that it would be relatively difficult to persuade the Saifalis to pay comparatively larger amount of fines demanded from them without using force, but he was hesitant to form any final opinion before demarcation of the Afghan-Waziristan line, the northern part of which was already in the process, which was closely connected with the said section.¹⁰ As the issue of Afghan-Waziristan border was in question, therefore, Mr. Fanshaver, Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, was of the opinion that it was premature to make any proposal to the government of British India. As far as the payment of fines was concerned, it was left to the local officers to urge the whole sub-sections of the Saifali clan into the settlement with the government some time or other.¹¹

In the midst of British concerns and tribal angst, an incident ignited tensions between the rulers and the ruled. On 10 July 1897, a British political officer and his guard were assaulted by Wazir tribe in a Jirga held at Maizar in North Waziristan.¹² This assassination kicked off a series of events which climaxed in the insurrection of 1897. The revolt of 1897 led the British government to strengthen its grasp over Waziristan hills. To overcome its inadequate control, the British devised an active surveillance system. A chain of military bases was erected along the foothills, specifically near the passes usually used by the tribe. Likewise, the British retained a regiment of artillery at Datta Khel in the Tochi Agency (North

¹⁰ F. R. P, Spencer, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Thal to the Deputy Commissioner Kohat, No. 118, dated 3rd August, 1894, *Report regarding payment of the fine due from certain sections of Kabul Khel and Malik shahi Wazirs adjoining Kurram and Kohat Districts*, Foreign Frontier Department, Civil Secretariat, Government of Punjab file No.29, Serial No.1024, Bundle No.10,Central Record Office, KP.

¹¹ H. C. Fanshaver, Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab to the Commissioner and Superintendent Peshawar Division, No.758, dated Simla, 21st September, 1894, *Report regarding payment of fine due from certain sections of the Kabul Khel and Malik shahi Wazirs adjoining Kurram and the Kohat Districts*, file No.29, Foreign Frontier Department, Civil Secretariat, Government of Punjab, September 1894, Serial No.1023, Bundle No.10, Central Record Office, KP.

¹² Captain Nichols, *Notes on the Position in the Tochi Valley After the Attack on the Political Officer's Escort at Maizar*, No. 2909, Dated 8th August 1897, File number .34, Foreign Frontier Department, Civil Secretariat, Punjab Government, serial No. 2089, Bundle No. 19, The Central Record Office, KP.

Waziristan) around 1900; another regiment was kept at Miranshah with a unit at Boya and a post at Idak during 1901-1902.¹³ Apart from having stringent military control, huge changes were brought about in the administrative structure. The North Waziristan Militia was raised in 1900.¹⁴

The Wazir tribe on the North-West Frontier lived in a flexible political environment where family of the *Malik* (ruling tribal chief) not only secretly shared power with him, but also exercised that power in correspondence with a specific chief's individual authority. The British initially thought that by accepting the authority of tribal *Malik* they would get a yielding mediator between the government and the tribe. Yet at times the *Malik* dared to engage in controversial activities, when he tried to use his authority to destabilize the British administrative control. The *Malik* endeavored to win the tribesmen's favor and sympathy by refusing to hand over the wrongdoers, and rebuffed the British interference in tribal matters. The *Malik's* decision to challenge the British was perhaps rooted in his desire to implant a true power base to his headship, by focusing on the milieu of tribal values and rituals, which emphasized the freedom of the tribe, radical allegiance to the clan, and denial of the foreign control. These factors were entrenched in Pashtun code of discord against foreign influence. To weaken the sway of a single powerful chief, the British opted for a number of *Maliks* and heads of sections, who generally balanced the power share in the tribe. For this purpose, the British government introduced the scheme of tribal allowances. Famous historian, Olaf Caroe, compared the whole process of reward and punishment or carrot and stick in Waziristan to the process of turning a Wolf-Pack or rather several Wolf-Packs into the faithful guardian of the sheep. The training was immensely risky; it involved calculated blend of tidbits and chastisements. Plenty of rewards had wrong effects, while the same amount of punishment reversed the whole process. Infinite patience was needed, one could not risk losing one's temper, and often there were chances to be got bitten.¹⁵

The Politics of Allowances in Waziristan

The Madda Khels belonged to the Darwesh Khel Wazir tribe and were made up of approximately 1600 warriors.¹⁶ They had two permanent

¹³ The Honble Lieut Col H.A. Dean, Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province to the Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department No.353-p dated Peshawar, 28th February 1903.

¹⁴ Charles Chenevix Trench, *The Frontier Scouts* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), 74.

¹⁵ *Policy in Waziristan* Note by O.K. Caroe, Resident in Waziristan, Secret File No. 4/89 F.R, 29 January 1942, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

¹⁶ S. E. Pears Political Agent Tochi to the Resident in Waziristan No. 1601, dated 31st October 1908, *Translation of an Agreement dated 10th July 1908, entered into by Madda Khels*, File No. 3, Political Department, Chief Commissioner Office, N.W.F.P, P-1909

communities: one residing along the Tochi River, in the neighborhood of Sharanni stretching west to the Afghan border, and the other on the bank of the Kazha River, which mingled with the Tochi River and its various streams at Paki Killa. The first one was known by the name of Gor or Ger and the second one as Kazha. However, both had the common ancestor and according to tribal traditions, both clans got equal share in everything.¹⁷ Apart from equal distribution of everything between the clans, the Madda Khels also shared equally with the Tori Khels. The same custom applied to the distribution of allowances and services bestowed by the British Indian government. Nikat and Khidmati were the two main types of allowances. Nikat signified allowance distributed as between sections on the basis of customary share in tribal loss and profits while Khidmati involved personal allowance given for the service and theoretically at least disposable at government's discretion.¹⁸

Internally, those allowances were shared by twenty-seven *Maliks*. There was also a gigantic Sirdari allowance made to the head *Malik* of the Madda Khels along with the Sillahadari of twenty-three footmen on the apparent assumption that the family had to share it with petty *Maliks* for whom no grants were otherwise announced. The very first allowances to the Madda Khels were granted by the government on November 5, 1895. This act made great impression on the *Maliks*. However, in January 1896, the surveyor of the Amir of Afghanistan visited the Madda Khel territory, and the British officials got information that the Afghans were plotting with the tribe. The *Maliks* took advantage of the scenario by telling the British officials that the situation was very grave.¹⁹

The agitation and unrest was first revealed on February 9, 1896 in the meeting of about one-hundred Madda Khel men in which government allowances were discussed. The meeting was arranged by petty *Maliks* to whom allowances were not made. However, matters got out of control when disorder followed the meeting and some men threatened to push the Munshi out of the makeshift Sheranni post. The levies on duty were also intimidated. The head *Malik* Sadda Khan attributed the unrest to unequal distribution of allowances, and also to the British Indian government's disinterest in resolving the Madda Khels' conflicts with the Amir's subjects. The Political

¹⁷ Mr. Spencer, Extra Assistant Commissioner Thal to Deputy Commissioner Kohat, No. 72, dated 5th February 1896.

¹⁸ *Waziristan Border Administration Report for 1924-25*, Tribal Research Cell, Home & Tribal Affairs, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 14-15.

¹⁹ H. A. Anderson, Political Officer, Tochi Valley to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, No 100C, dated Miranshah 10th August 1896, "Report on the Madda Khel agitation in the Upper part of the Tochi Valley" File No. 46, Civil Secretariat, Punjab Government 1896, Serial No. 1547, Bundle No. 14, Central Record Office, KP.

Officer Tochi valley, H.A. Anderson, was quick to react to the reports of agitation in the Madda Khel country and he sent warning to the *Maliks*, holding them accountable for the peace and riots in the region. As a result, the leaders of the Madda Khels met the Political Officer and assured him of the law-and-order situation of levy post settings and their respective sections.²⁰

However, the *Maliks* unitedly emphasized that the Political Officer should give them the written document for the surety of their tribesmen on the certain points: First, the government would not take tax from them; second, they would not pay court fees; third, the government would stay away from their grazing grounds; fourth, the tribesmen would own their mines; fifth, the British would not interfere with the cases regarding women; sixth, the criminals would be incarcerated in Tochi.²¹ However, Sadda Khan the Head Malik also explained real motives behind the agitation to the Political Officer Tochi. He attributed the reasons first to the allowances that were given to Ahmadzai Wazir section, although they did not possess lands in Tochi, and second to the surveyor of the Amir, who had planted doubts in the tribesmen that the 1895 boundary line demarcated between the tribal areas of British India and Afghanistan would not continue, and that greater portion of Madda Khel lands would become part of Afghanistan.

The final motive, according to Sadda Khan, was related to the British Indian government's decision not to convert tribal territory into settled one, and that in certain way had ignited insurgence, so much so, that the tribesmen were willing to throw off even the yoke of their own *Maliks*. The Political Officer was not impressed with the explanation as he believed that it was the motive of the tribesmen and their *Maliks* alike to pressurize the government about the increase in allowances. The Political officer thought that the strong post at Datta Khel would be sufficient to intimidate the tribesmen. Before the advent of British in the Valley, the tribesmen were significantly controlled by their *Maliks*.²²

In 1908, the Afghan envoys tried to spread anarchy among Madda Khel Darwesh Khel Wazirs by propagating rumors that the British Indian Government would likely ensnare the tribe by constructing posts in Madda Khel independent region and continue using the Datta Khel cart road

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²²S. E. Pears, Political Agent Tochi to the Resident in Waziristan, No. 1855, dated 15th December 1908, "Grant of Maliki Allowances to Madda Khel Wazirs" File No. 3, Political Department, Chief Commissioner Office N.W.F.P 1909.

running up to the Durand Line with the customary land profits and the status of protected area.²³

The *Maliks* and elders of the Madda Khel Wazir tribe signed the agreement with the British Indian Government on 10th July, 1908 pledging to keep roads running through their region secure for travelers and traders, showed willingness to the government to build roads, set up posts, send troops anywhere in their territory, and renounced giving protection to any bandit from the government administered region in return for the *Maliki* allowances.²⁴ However, the Madda Khel *Maliks* also submitted a separate plea in the agreement regarding the payment of badragga commission on the Idak-Thal route to the *Maliks* or other people who provided safety to the travelers as escorts. In addition, there was another request for additional allowances if the government wanted to build more posts and roads on their lands in times of crisis.²⁵ One of the motives of the British Indian government behind giving allowances and grants to Madda Khel *Maliks* and constructing levy tribal posts in the territory was to use the *Maliks* as instruments in the protection of trade routes and high-risk areas. Additionally, the institution of *Maliks* acted as a tool to stop raids and crimes in the British Indian zone which was either under control or likely to be under British or Amir of Afghanistan's control across the border in future.²⁶

The *Maliks* controlled their clans by taking their followers with them. They somewhat organized raiding missions and if not involved personally; they encouraged their tribesmen to carry out on their behalf. Before the advent of British in the Tochi Valley, the *Maliks* controlled their tribesman by playing upon their destructive and voracious instincts. However, the Wazir *Maliks* after signing agreement with the British Indian government and having accepted their grants found themselves trapped in a difficult situation. Their main supporters turned their back on them out of resentment and others became opponents because of ban placed on plunders and raids. The ensuing result was that the *Maliks* had to look for backdoor and sneaking ways to maintain their position at any cost. Majority of them

²³ S.E. Pears, Political Agent Tochi to the Resident in Waziristan, No 1601 dated 31st October 1908 "*Grant of Maliki allowances to Madda Khel Wazirs*" File No. 3, Political Department, Chief Commissioner Office N.W.F.P 1909.

²⁴ A.H Grant, Secretary to the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner North-West Frontier Province to the Resident in Waziristan No 1385-P dated Peshawar, 18th November 1908 "*Translation of a petition dated 10th July 1908, presented by Madda Khels.*

²⁵ H. S, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Punjab of Government, No. 334, dated Sheikh Budin, 25th June 1896 "*Raids Committed by certain sections of Darwesh Khels on the Amir's Subjects beyond the Durand boundary*" File No. 73, Foreign Frontier Department, Civil Secretariat Punjab Government, 1895, Serial No. 255, Bundle No. 28, DALKP.

²⁶ Ibid.

chose the easy option of allowing their tribesmen to pillage and later covering up their actions; while some others tried to check the bad ways, and fulfilled their pledge with the government. But they found the situation very difficult and continuously asked the government for help.²⁷

The Wazir tribesmen were democratic in nature, and so were not controlled by their *Maliks* in real or serious way. The *Maliks* could not exercise their influence and punish the outlaws in true sense. Therefore, in many criminal cases, the headsman had to suffer by volunteering to pay the outlaw's fine, on virtue of being responsible for the whole section's conduct. By granting allowances and support, the British Indian government attempted to augment the *Maliks'* power, but it did not achieve the desired effect. Mr. Fanshoac, Chief Secretary to Punjab government, elaborated the agency of *Maliks* by comparing it to "a natural growth that has immensely deep roots", and if the tribe did not yield such leader, then the government could do nothing by a way of "top dressing."²⁸

O.K. Carao, Resident in Waziristan, regarded the British Indian government's policy of subsidies and allowances to the *Maliks* as an intricate system of bribery and intimidation growing out of Sikh-Afghan model. The justification given was that the government wanted to attain ready service of *Maliks* as the leaders of their respective clans; second, it provided for a difficulty created by a check on raids and the need for survival. However, the objectives were never attained, and the payment of subsidies did not stop the tribes from antagonism and attacks against the government. The *Maliks* manipulated the allowances in two ways: the *Malik* or a group of *Maliks* understood that the best way of getting increase in allowances was to create trouble, and that tactic worked a lot as Mahsuds, the most problematic tribe in Waziristan were paid the highest allowance. The other was that the *Malik* would engage in some kind of service or assist the government and then ask for increased allowance with a tacit warning that refusal would be followed by either trouble or cessation of service. Most of the times the receivers of the allowances would play their secret part in the agitation, with two-fold benefit of getting increase in allowances from the government and popularity amongst their tribesmen.²⁹

²⁷H.S Anderson, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division Punjab Government No 334 dated Sheikh Budin, 25th June 1896 "*Raids Committed by certain sections of Darwesh Khels on the Amir's Subjects beyond the Durand boundary*" File No. 73, Foreign Frontier Department, Civil Secretariat Punjab Government 1895 Serial No. 255, Bundle No. 28, DALKP.

²⁸ Fanshawe, H.C, Officiating. Chief Secretary to Government Punjab Government, confidential No 89C, dated 24th March 1894 "*Indo Afghan boundary Waziristan*" File No. 1, Foreign Frontier Department, Civil Secretariat Punjab Government, 1894, Tribal Affairs, Central Record Office N.W.F.P, Serial No. 1102, Bundle No. 11, DALKP.

²⁹*Policy in Waziristan* Note by O.K. Caroe, Resident in Waziristan, Secret File No. 4/89 F.R, 29 January 1942, DALKP.

The tribal mind did not grasp the fact that the allowances were granted to get services from them. As far as the idea of filling the economic gap was considered, Olaf Caroe, argued that it could have been done by giving jobs to the young men, but *Maliki* had unfortunately no access to the pockets of young tribesmen. There was another limitation in the payment of allowances, that is, they were granted according to the principle of gain and loss, and not in keeping with the service performed with the effect that those allowances augmented the ancient tribal framework and gave no reward for service. As a result, there was seldom any reduction in allowances due to bad conduct. O.K. Caroe was of the opinion that the *Maliki* paid in the tribal areas should be revised to ascertain if whole or part of it could be used as an incentive for personal service or used to establish charitable institutions for the tribes.³⁰

The rationale behind the British system of giving allowances to the tribe in return of promise of good behavior, according to Khalid Aziz, seems to create an aura of order and responsibility, thereby gradually implanting the seeds of “British Indian” way of life on tribal fabric. In the greater context of modernity and its civilizing mission, it was a subsidy to maintain the “peace of the King” by the whole tribe, who were tacitly made a party to the framework of imperial state of British India.³¹ It was an exercise in strategic management by the British.

Conclusion

The British’s primary interest in Wazir tribe and their leadership was triggered by their overt motive to not only indirectly hold those remote and disadvantaged people, but the latent desire to control the strategically vital territory of the British Empire. For this purpose, the British government contrived a distinct frontier strategy that consisted of winning the trust of local leaders by giving them titles, honours, more civil influence, subsidies and allowances. The giving of allowances provided the Wazir tribesmen an incentive not to perpetrate or abet crimes and enable the tribal elders and *Maliks* to use the allowances as a means to exercise control and dominance over other members of the Wazir tribe.

From the perspective of the British government as well as the tribe the importance of subsidies and allowances was political rather than economic. For the British government they represented the most effective and amicable step for prevailing on the Wazir tribe and incorporating them

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Khalid Aziz, ‘The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) and Administration of Tribal Areas of Pakistan’ in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri *ed. Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Response* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005).

into British management of the North-West Frontier. In the course of time, the payment of allowances and subsidies were not able to retain much of their importance as a useful tool of tribal control because having once been given allowances could not be withdrawn without antagonizing the most influential members of the tribes. The process of the distribution of allowances was another source of dissension within the Wazir tribe because a number of tribal elder and *Maliks* distributed the allowances to their family members and followers. Sometimes they withheld large share of the allowances for themselves besides getting their own Maliki allowance.

This embezzlement of the allowances by the tribal *Maliks* undermined the tribal system by weakening the authority and status of the *Maliks* as recognized tribal chiefs. Moreover, this rising disproportionality of disbursement was in disagreement with Wazir egalitarian tribal system and led to creation of horizontal division within the tribal structure. Eventually, the *Maliks* were not able to retain much of their importance and influence among the common tribesmen, and hence, also, their capability to enforce the policy of the British government. This was an indicator of inserting corruption, as opposed to settled districts in another form.

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