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## **Cover Image**

### **(Historical Museum of Sughd, Tajikistan)**

Founded in 1926, has two floors with watch towers, currently a collection of 30 thousand showpieces. A model of the world globe in honor of a famous scientist and philosopher Hoji Yusuf is set at the entrance door. A sculpture of Timur-Malik, a national hero stands in the lobby. The exhibition halls were decorated by an artist A. Mahmudov. Among the most popular exhibitions are the Somoni State (10 A.D.) exhibition and the Mehrob altar (11 A.D.)

*(Source: [http://traveltajikistan.tj/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Tajikistan\\_Guidebook.pdf](http://traveltajikistan.tj/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Tajikistan_Guidebook.pdf))*

Tel.: +92 (0)91 9216764

Fax: +92 (0)91 9216661

E-mail: [asc@uop.edu.pk](mailto:asc@uop.edu.pk)

Websites: <http://journals.uop.edu.pk/>

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# CONTEMPORARY GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF CENTRAL ASIA: THE US, RUSSIAN AND CHINESE PLANS OF INTEGRATION

*Shabir Ahmad Khan\* and Suleman Yousaf\*\**

## Abstract

*The idea of integration is central to the contemporary geostrategic environment of Central Asia. Each of the great powers that is Russia, China and America has been working on its plan of integration in order to give orientation to the region in own preferred direction, further her own influence and at the same time deny that to the others (rivals). Cooperation and competition is evident in the evolving contesting and competing interests of the major powers. The Central Asian Republics are playing these powers off one another to maximize their own interests and secure regime security. China vis-à-vis United States of America enjoys geographical advantage of close proximity to the region while relatively to the Russian Federation China enjoys huge economic and financial leverage. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a benchmark Project of One Belt One Road (OBOR) is closely related to this geostrategic environment of Central Asia as it would integrate the landlocked region to Arabian Sea and beyond efficiently and effectively.*

**Key words:** *Russia, China, Central Asia, USA, CPEC, Integration*

## Introduction

The breakup of former Soviet Union gave birth to a vacuum in Central Asia. The Central Asian Republics (CARs) became vulnerable to heavy pressures due to internal and external factors. At the same time major powers sought to penetrate and fill this vacuum and force the developments

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\* Presently serves as Professor & Director, Area Study Centre (Russia, China & Central Asia) University of Peshawar.

\*\* Ph.D. Research Scholar, National Defense University, Islamabad.

in a direction benefiting their own economic and strategic interests. Central Asian space has been contested for influence among major powers since the nineteenth century. The intensive rivalry mainly between the Russian Empire and Great Britain during the nineteenth century for establishing influence over Central Asia is popularly known as the Great Game. The term Great Game was coined by Arthur Connolly (1807-1848) for describing diplomatic and intelligence warfare between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain for dominating Central Asia; however it was fictionalized by British Novelist Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) in his famous novel 'Kim' (1901).<sup>1</sup> The renewed geo-strategic competition in Central Asia albeit with more and new players has been described as New Great Game by several analysts however it seems that the New York Times in 1996 used the term for first time.<sup>2</sup> The struggle is about winning spheres of influence for trans-continental trade-corridors, energy pipelines and military basis. The major players Russia, China and United States are forcing the developments to take shape in a direction benefiting their own interests. Each of the contesting state has its own grand strategy for regional integration and access to markets. Likewise the conflicting interests and competitive approaches are to deny access to rivals.

The Russians are old players of the game and enjoying geographical proximity along with historical leverage and influence. However in the post-Soviet era Russia has been facing economic challenges and therefore its influence in the region has somewhat diminished. The Russian plan is to integrate the region through Eurasian Union. Chinese enjoy the geographical proximity along with economic rise and is best positioned to integrate and give orientation to Central Asia. The Chinese plan is based on the One Belt One Road vision (OBOR). The American plan for the new region has been the New Silk Road initiative to integrate the region through Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC). So the convergence and conflict of interests have a price. Central to the competition in Central Asia, the major powers have their own declaratory and operational policies and therefore the post-Soviet Central Asian space is exposed to a strategic game that has consequences. America views China and Russia as strategic challenges. Russia views United States of America (USA) as a strategic rival and has opted for close collaboration with China to counter USA in the region. China seeks to balance India regionally and USA globally while USA has been expanding strategic partnership with India to balance China regionally and globally. New political and geo-economic alliances,

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<sup>1</sup> Shabir Ahmad Khan and Saima Kyani, "Pipeline Politics in Central Asia: Paradox of Competitive/Cooperative Relations between the United States, Russia and China", pp: 57-83 in *Central Asia* No. 73 (Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Winter 2013), 60.

<sup>2</sup> The Editor, "New Great Game in Asia" (New York Times, January 2, 1996), retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/02/opinion/the-new-great-game-in-asia.html>, (accessed April 4, 2017).

alignments and re-alignments are in gestation with aim of balancing and re-balancing major powers. The region's orientation will be mainly determined by the integration plans of USA, Russia and China.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a strategic maneuver to bypass the American occupied unstable, insecure Afghanistan in access to Central Asia. CPEC adds an economic dimension to the historically strategic and nuclear cooperation and relations between Pakistan and China. The inner crescent i.e. Eurasia and Heartland i.e. Central Asia are up for grabs through OBOR and CPEC. In the contemporary geostrategic environment of Central Asia, the idea of integration is central. Any power that integrates Central Asia efficiently with the global markets will be on victory stand. The cooperative/competitive Great Powers Structural Frameworks are American New Silk Road initiative announced in 2011, Russian Eurasian Union announced in 2012 and Chinese OBOR declared in 2013, each plan is being discussed in some detail in this paper. The work also looks into the responses of CARs as their policy actions. The hypothesis is that amongst the integration plans of the troika, Chinese OBOR in which CPEC plays the role of a backbone will be successful in structuralization of the region as elaborated in later part of this particular work. It is important to discuss the USA's and Russia's plans of integration prior to OBOR and CPEC to have a clear picture for the sake of comparison and drawing conclusions.

The theoretical framework for this particular piece of work is Mackinder's Heartland theory. Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947) in his Heartland theory presented Central Asia as the pivot area of history. In 1919 Mackinder summarized his theory as "who rules Easter Europe Commands the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the world islands (i.e. Eurasia) and who rules the world islands commands the world."<sup>3</sup> Nicholas J. Spykman modified this theory later on and stated that the Power which controls the Eurasian landmass controls the world.<sup>4</sup> The former National Security Advisor to US Government from 1977 to 1981 Zbigniew Brzezinski has also emphasized the significance of Eurasia, according to his theory control over Central Asia and Afghanistan is key to control over Eurasia.<sup>5</sup> It seems that USA made efforts to use Afghanistan as a springboard to enter Central Asia and ultimately establish its influence over Eurasian landmass. USA's declared agenda was against terrorism and promotion of democracy, human rights and economic reforms in Central Asia, however the operational policy seemed to minimize Russian influence and to pursue a

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<sup>3</sup> Mackinder, Halford J., "The Geographical Pivot of history (1904)", pp:298-321, in *The Geographical Journal* vol. 170, No. 4 (UK: Royal Geographical Society, December 2004), retrieved from [www.iwp.edu/docLib/20131016\\_MackinderTheGeographicalJournal.pdf](http://www.iwp.edu/docLib/20131016_MackinderTheGeographicalJournal.pdf) (accessed April 5, 2017).

<sup>4</sup> Shabir Ahmad Khan, "Dynamics of Trade Corridors and Energy Pipeline Politics", pp: 71-90 in *Pakistan's Strategic Environment; Post 2014*, ed. Mushir Anwar (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2014), 75.

<sup>5</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chess Board* (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 39.

policy of non-Russian, non-Chinese and non-Iranian routes for energy pipeline.<sup>6</sup>

China in its Go West policy, initially settled the border issues with CARs through Shanghai Five mechanism which later on became Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) and later on developed smooth energy and trade relations with Central Asia. The stability and development of Xinjiang is closely related to energy and trade relations with Central Asia. During the last decade China has replaced Russia as the major trading partner with the region. China however is careful about the security issues in the region which is a sensitive case for Russia. Importantly China is supporting local regimes in the region for the sake of security and stability.<sup>7</sup> Russia on the other hand, after a span of ten years i.e. the decade of 1990s, has been resurging in the region particularly after 2001, having a set of objectives including; using the region as a buffer to Islamic South, political stability, creation of single economic space and protection of ethnic Russians in the region.<sup>8</sup> Russia in comparison to USA and China is extensively linked to the region as an array of historical political, social and economic ties. Moscow still considers Central Asia as its backyard, and is in the quest for a privileged role in the region through traditional and historical linkages.

### **Central Asian Republics' Foreign Policy and Aspirations**

Central Asia Republics, though institutionally weak and size wise tiny except Kazakhstan and having low bargaining power vis-à-vis the troika i.e. Russia, China and USA, are nonetheless aware of Central Asia's wealth and significance. They are pursuing policies of balancing and playing the great powers off one another to maximize their own national interests as well as extract benefits for the ruling class. The local rules in Central Asia according to Alexander Cooley are the regime security and personal benefits of the ruling class.<sup>9</sup> In the geo-strategic Currents of Central Asia, there are several major powers particularly the troika vies for influence and consequently the authority and influence of a single power is diminished due to other balancing powers presence as available option. This 'multiple principals' problem/opportunity enables CARs to shirk their individual commitments to any patron, weakening the overall control of the objectively more powerful actors.<sup>10</sup> This has resulted in a somewhat strong position for CARs. However

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<sup>6</sup> Khan and Kyani, "Pipeline Politics in Central Asia: Paradox of Competitive/Cooperative Relations between the United States, Russia and China", 80.

<sup>7</sup> Alexander Cooley, *Great Games, Local Rules* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 75-95.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-29.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

the bargaining power of CARs vis-à-vis the great powers varies from state to state depending upon institutional structures and resource endowment.

Uzbekistan has tried to pursue an independent policy during the 1990s and forged closer ties with Washington. After the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijon episode in Uzbekistan, Tashkent accused the American Embassy for the uprising and social unrest in Andijon region and gave a deadline of 90 days for the evacuation of American base from Karshi-Khanabad under the umbrella of SCO in 2005.<sup>11</sup> Moscow and Beijing supported the Uzbek official stance on the crises while Washington demanded a probe for the event. Uzbekistan distanced itself from Washington and embraced the Russian security role and came back to the Russian block. Kazakhstan due to its long border with Russia and its demographic and economic linkages with Russia remained closed to Moscow however it has also developed relations with other major powers pursuing a ‘multi vector’ policy i.e. having relations in many directions. During the last decade, the economic revival and political stability has enabled Kazakhstan to pursue a more prudent policy having political and economic relations in all directions. Turkmenistan in reality pursued an independent foreign policy by declaring a policy of positive neutrality. The policy has earned some concrete awards in the shape of gas pipelines to China and in the form of internal stability for Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan has kept the population of around five million satisfied with different kind of subsidies, has avoid drastic economic changes and has no ambitions for regional leadership or influence in contrast to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan due to the lack of hydrocarbon resources and mountainous terrain not suitable for agrarian purposes embraced the directives of world financial institutions but experienced turmoil in the form of revolutions. Tajikistan the most impoverished of CARs earlier could not pursue any definable foreign policy due to civil war and still looks towards Russia for security and economic support.

CARs in the immediate post-Soviet period were looking towards the West for capital and technology in their transition towards a capitalistic economic system. During the 1990s Russia could not pay attention to the region due to her own economic and political transitional problems. Nor did Russia expect that the world will be so closely engaged in the region. China was engaged in making grounds for long-term relations with the region by resolving the borders issues. At the eve of the twenty first century, CARs had achieved economic stability by reverting the negative growths in their economies though the Central Asian local environment is full of suspicions owing to a number of factors such as border disputes, water issues, inter-ethnic issues and endemic corruption. Nevertheless the oil and particularly

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<sup>11</sup> Shabir Ahmad Khan, “Tashkent in November 2005”, pp: 167-176 in *Central Asia* No. 58 (Peshawar: Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Summer 2006) 171.



gas pipelines from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China are best examples of regional cooperation. CARs also need to simplify procedures for border crossing in terms of time, service and price/cost to make continental mode of transport competitive and attract more traffic. If CARs cannot address hazards in border crossing, even the development of trade corridors may not attract significant traffic growth.

Further the colour revolutions<sup>12</sup> added to the suspicions of ruling class in the CARs regarding the US aims and objectives of regime changes in the region. On the other hand CARs seem to be more comfortable with Russia and China who always supported the regime security and internal stability in the region. Russia and China have real stakes in regional stability and in keeping 'their backyard' politically stable and economically developed. The Central Asian economies are heavily dependent on commodity exports, and the export basket as well as economic structures need to be diversified. Turkmenistan exports mainly gas, Kazakhstan oil and Uzbekistan exports cotton and gold. The low commodity prices make the economies vulnerable to shocks due to the lack of diversification. If gas supply from Turkmenistan to China is disrupted for any reason, the total economic performance of Turkmenistan might collapse. Likewise Tajikistan is heavily dependent on remittances from Russia and foreign aid. Kyrgyzstan is also heavily dependent on aid and loan from Russia. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Tajikistan's porous border is yet another problem particularly for Russia. If Tajikistan becomes unstable like the 1990s the 7000 Russian troops present in Tajikistan would not stand idly. Uzbekistan would assist the north Tajikistan's people as it did during the 1990s while Iran would support the Islamists. Pakistan cannot remain aloof to that kind of situation as instability naturally spills over regionally. That is why the regional states are the real stakeholders in the regional security and peace. Therefore a regional approach is needed to address the regional security issues.

### **USA's Integration Plan: The New Silk Road Initiative**

The American New Silk Road Initiative was announced by Hilary Clinton the then US Secretary of State in 2011 in India by declaring revitalization of the ancient Silk Route.<sup>13</sup> The US initiative has been supported by Asian Development Bank (ADB) through CAREC program. The plan has been to provide assistance to Afghanistan and link it intra-regionally. The main objective of the initiative is to integrate Central and

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<sup>12</sup> The Western backed revolutions in former Soviet States like Rose in Georgia, Orange in Ukraine and Tulip in Kyrgyzstan.

<sup>13</sup> Vladimir Fedorenko, *The New Silk Road Initiative in Central Asia*, (Washington: Rethink Institution, August, 2013), retrieved from <http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Fedorenko-The-New-Silk-Road.pdf>, (accessed April 3, 2017)

South Asia via Afghanistan for the benefit of US backed government in Afghanistan. An important aim of the New Silk Road initiative has been stated as an exit strategy from Afghanistan and to fill the void of departing military.<sup>14</sup> The declaratory policy of USA has been to develop cross-border infrastructure for regional economic development and cooperation, promotion of international trade, providing space for civil society groups, human rights promotion and democracy development.<sup>15</sup> However such supports to civil society groups on the cost of state institutions and regime change policies disguised in democracy development programs enlarged the gap between CARs and USA. Geo-politically, in the post-Soviet CARs, two prime groups have been contesting for the natural wealth of the region i.e. USA and EU (European Union) versus Sino-Russian block in the form of pipeline politics. According to Zhao Huasheng Central Asia is the only place where all great powers converge and despite declared fervor for cooperation the contest and competition is high due to strategic distrust particularly between the two groups that is US-EU and Russia-China.<sup>16</sup>

Initially under the operational policy, USA tried to diversify the EU energy supply and to reduce EU dependence on Russian energy by linking Caspian and Central Asian energy resources with Europe bypassing Russian territory.<sup>17</sup> The US also did not support Iran and China for pipeline routes and Iran was particularly left outside of the New Silk Road initiative. The Central Asia South Asia electricity transmission project CASA 1000 and Trans-Afghan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline are projects under the New Silk Road initiative supported through the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. But the lack of trust between USA and Pakistan and instability in Afghanistan are still the major hurdles in their materialization as both the projects have to pass through Afghanistan. The US drawdown from Afghanistan and the lack of any serious policy for the region under the new US administration of President Donald Trump adds to American difficulties in pursuit of the New Silk Road initiative effectively. Furthermore USA is a far away team, has no direct geographic link to the region in contrast to Russia and China while USA's capabilities to project itself world over is constantly diminishing due 'imperial overstretch'.<sup>18</sup> US authority and capacity seems to be reduced to coerce or persuade other major

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<sup>14</sup> Erica Marat, *Following the New Silk Road*, The Diplomat, October 22, 2014, retrieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/following-the-new-silk-road/> (accessed April 19, 2017)

<sup>15</sup> Fedorenko, *The New Silk Road Initiative in Central Asia*

<sup>16</sup> Zhao Huasheng, "Central Asia in Chinese strategic Thinking" pp: 171-186 in., *The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform*, ed. Thomas Fingar, (USA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 181

<sup>17</sup> Khan and Kyani, "Pipeline Politics in Central Asia: Paradox of Competitive/Cooperative Relations between the United States, Russia and China", 77

<sup>18</sup> Imperial Overstretch is hypothesis which suggests that when a World Power projects itself everywhere in the world beyond its capacity or tries to extend itself to maintain hegemony, expand strategic means and maintain economic commitments beyond its ability and power.

and minor players and similarly the other players have been acquiring more scope for pursuing independent foreign policies.<sup>19</sup> The US initiative was also perceived with great skepticism in China and the broader region and Beijing doubts the US political and economic commitment to support the major projects.<sup>20</sup> It is evident from the fact that TAPI and CASA 1000 appear to be stalled projects. China also appears to see little to no benefit from coordinating its efforts in the region with those of US because Beijing perceives American political and strategic maneuvers in the region to contain China as it is demonstrated by the US-India collaboration. At the same time it is concerned about American efforts in the region to discourage its allies from joining Chinese led development bank.<sup>21</sup> Critics argue that the US unnecessarily ‘geopoliticizes’ its New Silk Road initiative by deliberately excluding important regional states like Russia, China and Iran.<sup>22</sup>

The US initiative seems to be less focused on capital-intensive projects while more attention has been given to address the regulatory and technical challenges faced by the region. For instance USA established a Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, Tajikistan and a Custom Training Staff College in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan as projects of the New Silk Road initiative.<sup>23</sup> Likewise the re-framing of Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade agreement (APTTA) and providing support to Cross Border Trade Agreement between Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are other examples under the US New Silk Road initiative. US State Department emphasizes to facilitate border crossing with reduced time and improved security by developing ‘software’ in the form of harmonized national custom policies and by bringing regional states into bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements.<sup>24</sup> The US integration plan has hardly materialized on the ground, apparently due to carrying a profound geostrategic face rather than geo-economic. According to a Eurasian expert Michal Romanovski, “the US New Silk Road initiative is a misfire because it is poorly financed and totally Afghanistan-oriented”.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Bobo Lo, *Axis of Convenience* (London: Chatam House, 2008), 24

<sup>20</sup> Thomas Zimmerman, *The New Silk Roads: China, the US and Future of Central Asia* (New York University: Centre on International Cooperation, October, 2015) retrieved from [http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/zimmerman\\_new\\_silk\\_road\\_final\\_2.pdf](http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/zimmerman_new_silk_road_final_2.pdf), (accessed April 17, 2017)

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Marat, *Following the New Silk Road*

<sup>23</sup> Fedorenko, *The New Silk Road Initiative in Central Asia*

<sup>24</sup> *U.S. Support for the New Silk Road*, US Department of State, retrieved from <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/newsilkroad/index.htm> (accessed April 23, 2017)

<sup>25</sup> Michal Romanowski, “Decoding Central Asia: What’s Next for the US Administration?”, *The Diplomat*, February 28, 2017, retrieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/decoding-central-asia-whats-next-for-the-us-administration/> (accessed April 19, 2017)

## **Russia's Eurasian Union**

Russia in the immediate post-Soviet period pursued a policy of band-wagoning vis-à-vis US led West under Yeltsin. The Atlanticts were advocating close economic and political relations with the West and were dominant over the Eurasianists in the realm of foreign policy formulating. Russia was facing severe transitional issues and economically was quite weak to shape and implement any effective policy towards the region. At the same time Russia did not expect that the World will be so closely engaged in Central Asia. Further after the Washington's refusal of Yeltsin's fantasies of equality, Moscow started framing a policy of balancing the USA. The thrust for shaping a multipolar world order made China the natural option for Moscow. Likewise the US led Western physical presence in Central Asia made the region Putin's first foreign visit's destination in 2001 and a focus of foreign policy since then. Russia considers Central Asia as its backyard, its traditional zone of influence and asserting herself in the region through a number of bilateral and multilateral approaches which include 'Union Treaty' with Uzbekistan signed in 2005,<sup>26</sup> the Eurasian Economic Union, the Custom Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the SCO. The Eurasian Economic Community group was founded in the year 2000 comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as a successor to Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization.<sup>27</sup> The Custom Union (Close Regionalism) was announced in 2010, CSTO in 2002, SCO in 2001 while the current Russian plan for regional integration is to create a common economic space in Eurasia including the CARs through the development of Eurasian Union announced in 2012. The Eurasian Economic Community was dissolved on January 1, 2015 and replaced by Eurasian Economic Union including Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>28</sup> Tajikistan has yet to join the Eurasian Economic Union.

According to Russia, main building blocks of contemporary era which the Russians call "new international architecture" are regional integration associations<sup>29</sup> or 'macro-blocks. Russia's current foreign policy objective is 'Eurasianism' and the emergence of Eurasian Union is strategically important for Russia to successfully compete globally.<sup>30</sup> Russia considers itself as a Eurasian civilization and not a western or eastern, so this Project of Eurasian Union is not important economically but also closely related to

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<sup>26</sup> Khan, "Tashkent in November 2005", 173

<sup>27</sup> Cooley, *Great Games, Local Rules*, 59

<sup>28</sup> Evgeny Vinokurov, "Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results" *Russian Journal of Economics* Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2017, retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405473917300041> accessed May 2, 2017

<sup>29</sup> Igor Torbakov, "Managing Imperial Peripheries: Russia and China in Central Asia" in, *The New Great Game*, ed. Thomas Fingar (USA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 251

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 252

Russia's identity. At the same time Russia desires to use Eurasian Union as one of the poles in the contemporary world and to become an efficient link between Europe and Asia.<sup>31</sup> Eurasian Union Project is the reflection of Russia's prized geographical location and its bi-continental (Euro-Asian) dimension which is essential for Russia if it has to be reckoned as a major global power. Importantly strong influence in Central Asia will furnish Russia's political, strategic and economic objectives in rest of Asia.<sup>32</sup> Russia's evolving strategy in Central Asia has been three folded:

- i. The perception of great powerness as historical regional leader
- ii. To use the region as a buffer and security imperative that may stem from regional volatility and instability
- iii. And to check probable massive influx of labor migrants from Central Asia as a consequence of Eurasian Union<sup>33</sup>.

Besides, Russia desires to achieve a set of outcomes in the region i.e. a leading role with a compliant China following in its walk particularly in the security realm, absent or least interested West and no threat from Islamic fundamentalism. Russia also recognizes that there are limitations to Russian power to achieve this set of objectives vis-à-vis strength of China and its leverages in the region. Any frontal assault on China-Central Asia deals can be detrimental or counterproductive for Russo-Sino relations and Russia's relations with Central Asia. Central Asia can be a source of tension between Russia and China in long-term as Stephen Blank points out that "the signs that China is eclipsing Central Asia, Russia started its plan of Eurasian Union as a Custom Union to inhibit Chinese economic penetration and also that without these regional states who are member of Eurasian Union, Russia cannot effectively operate as a major Asian power".<sup>34</sup> Kazakhstan has become more important to Russia as it controls the southern border of Custom Union with other CARs and has become an indispensable unit of the Eurasian Union which has attracted over \$160 b in Foreign Direct Investment since 1993.<sup>35</sup> However Central Asia has also the potential to become focus of a lasting convergence of interest between Russia and China by integrating Eurasian Union and OBOR for a win win situation in all

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<sup>31</sup> Vladimir Putin, "Novi Integratsionnee Proektdlya Evrazii: Budushee Kotori Zozhdaetsia Cevodnia" ( New Integration Project for Eurasia: Future in Making Today), published in *Izvestia*, October 3, 2011, retrieved from <http://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/246>, The Russian Embassy in UK, 04/10/2011, (accessed April 19, 2017)

<sup>32</sup> Torbakov, "Managing Imperial Peripheries: Russia and China in Central Asia", 253

<sup>33</sup> Ibid

<sup>34</sup> Stephen Blank, "The Intellectual Orgin of the Eurasian Union" in *Putin's Grand Strategy: Eurasia and its Discontents*, ed., S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, (Washington: Central Asia-Caucasia Institute, 2014) retrieved from <https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/1409GrandStrategy.pdf>, (accessed April 3, 2017)

<sup>35</sup> Invest in Kazakhstan, 10 Reasons to Invest in Kazakhstan, (Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Canada, no date) retrieved from <http://kazembassy.ca/invest-in-kazakhstan/>, (accessed April 24, 2017)

directions. Sino-Russian partnership does carry a threat to the US led West but it is also worth mentioning here that this partnership also carries a measure of stability and predictability in form of a multipolar world order having balancing poles.

The geostrategic construct of sphere of influence in Central Asia is at the root of strategic competition between Russia and USA. Russia considers former Soviet space including Central Asia as her privileged sphere of influence while USA explicitly rejects this notion and also Russia's right to dominate the former Soviet space.<sup>36</sup> However this is not the case with Russia-China relations particularly in Central Asian context as mentioned above. It is evident from the pipeline politics in Central Asia that when Georgia helped the US led West in diversifying its energy supply by constructing more oil and gas pipelines bypassing Russian territory e.g. Baku-Tbilisi-Jehan (BTC) pipeline, it was attacked by Russia in 2008. Likewise the case of Crimea in Ukraine which is one of the main conduits of Russian energy to Western Europe, was dealt harshly by Russia. On the other hand China has already built a number of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia which are currently operational for the last many years but Russia did not respond in that manner. There can be three probable reasons for Russia's behavior towards Chinese engagement in Central Asia:

- i. Russia has no control or not in a position to stop and counter China-Central Asia collaboration because this relationship is mutually beneficial for China and Central Asia.
- ii. Russia has chosen to collaborate with China to counter USA in the region as Russia single handedly cannot do this.
- iii. Thirdly and most importantly the eastward movement of Central Asian energy diminishes the chance of Central Asian energy competition with Russia for European market.<sup>37</sup>

Further the unipolar world since the breakup of former Soviet Union has become more anarchic, instable and dangerous. In a unipolar world system a hegemon must protect and respect the sovereignty of other states and when it is not the case with in the global system then it gives birth to dissatisfaction with in the system and states try to increase their capabilities and challenges or try to replace the hegemon.<sup>38</sup> It seems the case with Sino-Russian cooperation particularly in Central Asia to counter US maneuvers in the region. Russia at the same time values Pakistan's geographical location and desires to assist Pakistan in its peaceful integration into the multipolar Eurasian framework being constructed by Russia-Chinese strategic

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<sup>36</sup> Lo, *Axis of Convenience*, 97

<sup>37</sup> Khan and Kyani, "Pipeline Politics in Central Asia: Paradox of Competitive/Cooperative Relations between the United States, Russia and China", 73

<sup>38</sup> Michael O. Slobodchiko, *Strategic Cooperation: Overcoming the Barriers of Global Anarchy* (UK: Lexington Books, 2013), 6



cooperation while multimodal CPEC provides the best opportunity to link Eurasia with South Asia.<sup>39</sup>

## China and Central Asia in Post-Soviet Era

China being a world leading energy consumer is attracted by the region's surplus energy resources available at the doorstep. The hydrocarbon resources available at doorstep make Central Asia a natural choice for China. The Russian factor remains important in China's policy towards Central Asia as Beijing first went to Moscow and then to Central Asia i.e. China first improved its relations with Russia by recognizing Russia's historical place in the region. In trade relations China has replaced Russia as a major trading partner with the region while several gas and oil pipelines have become operational. China has so far pursued a policy of non-intervention in the region and is being playing according to the local rules i.e. regime security and personal interests of the ruling class.<sup>40</sup> China, therefore, has pursued a pragmatic and economic oriented policy towards Central Asia since 1991 and has been following that in its New Silk Road Project i.e. OBOR having no ideological or hidden agenda attached to its investment plans. China is very cautious to Russia's sensitivities and maintains political neutrality even amongst the CARs. China refrains from investment in any disputed project for instance China announced to not invest in Rogun Dam Project until and unless Tajikistan and Uzbekistan resolve their dispute.<sup>41</sup> It seems that Central Asia is at core of OBOR as Central Asia provides overland connectivity to European market which is important in terms of trade.

On the other hand Central Asia as a landlocked region desperately needs investment in cross-border connectivity infrastructure development which China offers.<sup>42</sup> China's strategic partnership with Russia is important to develop its cooperation with Central Asia. Further Russia acts as a security provider to Central Asia while China acts as a banker to the region's development. Chinese investment in CARs has passed over \$30.5 billion during 2005 to 2014 while Chinese trade volume with the region reached \$50 billion in 2014.<sup>43</sup> This sort of relationship between Russia and China is highly valuable to the CARs and they appreciate it through their behaviors

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<sup>39</sup> Andrew Korybko, *Pakistan a Zipper to Eurasian Integration* (Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2015), retrieved from <https://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/> (accessed April 11, 2017)

<sup>40</sup> Cooley, *Great Games Local Rules*, 79

<sup>41</sup> Fedorenko, *The New Silk Road Initiative in Central Asia*

<sup>42</sup> LIM Tai Wei, "China's Pivot to Central and South Asia" pp: 269-281 in *China's One Belt One Road*, ed. LIM Tai Wei, Henry CHAN Hong Lee and others (London: Imperial College Press, 2016), 272

<sup>43</sup> Tao Wang and Rachel Yampolsky, "Will China and Russia's Partnership in Central Asia Last?" *The Diplomat*, September 21, 2015 <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/will-china-and-russias-partnership-in-central-asia-last/> (accessed April 11, 2017)

towards these giant neighbours. Further China does not intend or try to impede Central Asia and neither it opposes Russia's Eurasian Union rather seeks to complement it.<sup>44</sup>

### **China's One Belt One Road (OBOR)**

OBOR was announced by President of China in September 2013 with the aim of developing connectivity infrastructure to integrate the Asian, African and European continents on the basis of 'Open Regionalism'. More than 68 countries of globe have shown interest in the Project, having around 4.4 billion people i.e. 70 percent of global population generating 55 percent of global GNP and hold 75 percent of known energy resources.<sup>45</sup> Six corridors have been planned to develop under the OBOR; CPEC, China-Mongolia-Russia, New Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Bangladesh-India-Mayanmar and China-Indochina. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared three interconnected geo-economic and geopolitical objectives of OBOR; to develop the western interior and turn it into a frontier for opening up to the world, secondly, to enhance the status of Asia in world through the development of connectivity infrastructure and enhanced productivity, and thirdly, to form a community of destiny for China's relations with the region.<sup>46</sup> OBOR has two components i.e. Silk Road Economic Belt and 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road, known as Belt and Road as shown in Figure 1. The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road originates from eastern ports of China and via South China Sea-Strait of Malacca-Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf and onward up to Europe through the Suez Canal.

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<sup>44</sup> Haasheng, "Central Asia in Chinese Strategic Thinking", 184

<sup>45</sup> Manzoor Ahmad, *China's Role and Interests in Central Asia*, Dawn, October 6, 2016


<sup>46</sup> Lim Wen Xin, "China's Belt and Road Initiative: A Literature Review", pp: 113-131 in *China's One Belt One Road*, ed. LIM Tai Wei, Henry CHAN King Lee and others(London: Imperial College Press, 2016), 115

**Figure 1: One Belt One Road**



Source: <http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/chinas-one-belt-one-road-strategy/>

**Figure 2: Three Routes of Silk Road Economic Belt**



The Silk Road Economic Belt is overland connectivity from China via Kashgar through Central Asia to Europe in two corridors. The Northern Corridor starts from Beijing passes through northern Xinjiang-Kazakhstan-Russia up to Helsinki and Rotterdam. The Central Corridor passes through central Xinjiang-Tashkent-Tehran up to Paris. The Southern Corridor passes through southern Xinjiang i.e. Kashgar Special Economic Zone across Pakistan reaches to Gwadar and onward to Persian Gulf and Europe via Sea Lanes of Communication (figure 2). It is obvious that Northern and Central Corridors pass through a number of countries while the Southern Corridor i.e. China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC) involves only one country i.e. Pakistan where the trust level is much higher. The two components of OBOR fill the infrastructure gap in Asia and connect markets in Asian, African and European continents by overland as well as through Sea Lanes of Communication. The two financial institutions Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Fund (SRF) are established by China to support the OBOR financially free from reliance on Western backed Britton Woods's institutions.

Central Asia is crucial in Chinese economic Belt plans to provide overland connectivity to African and European markets and therefore the region is important for China not only due to its energy resources but also for China's increased engagement with these parts of the world. Some observers argue that OBOR is framed to increase and augment Beijing's influence in Central Asian region.<sup>47</sup> OBOR is also aimed at creating opportunities for China's companies in overseas markets and access to markets for over produced steel and construction material, electronic and other consumer goods.<sup>48</sup> According to *The Economist* "for Chinese manufactured goods, the journey to Europe by sea takes up to 60 days while trains from Chongqing in South-West China to Duesburg in Germany, 10800 km via Kazakhstan-Russia-Poland supposedly take 14 days."<sup>49</sup> In this regard the special economic zones in Xinjiang i.e. Khorgos at China-Kazakh border and Kashgar on Pak-China border have to play significant roles to materialize and consolidate the OBOR initiative.

## **OBOR and CPEC**

CPEC is a significant leg of Chinese OBOR initiative which starts from Guangzhou reaches southern Xinjiang i.e. Kashgar special economic zone and via Karakorum Highway (KKH) reaches Gwadar Sea Port in Baluchistan, Pakistan. CPEC has to play vital role in both the components of

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 113

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 115

<sup>49</sup> "The New Silk Road Hardly an Oasis", *The Economist*, November 18, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21632595-kazakhstan-turns-geography-advantage-china-builds-new-silk-road-hardly-oasis>, (accessed April 27, 2017)

OBOR i.e. in Belt via Kashgar and in Road via Gwadar. Currently 95 percent of the goods' movement between Asia and Europe take Maritime routes and leaves 2 to 3 percent of trade to continental routes.<sup>50</sup> In this context CPEC catches more attention as it has to play an important role in Maritime trade through Gwadar Sea Port. The following factors signify CPEC for OBOR and make it a priority for China:

- i. Through Kashgar CPEC is linked with Central Asia through the Silk Road Economic Belt while through Gwadar Sea Port, it is linked to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road
- ii. CPEC involves the shortest distance vis-à-vis other six corridors to be developed under OBOR initiative by a cutting a distance of 13000 km from eastern China to Persian Gulf from where China imports its 80 percent of energy to 2500 km.
- iii. CPEC saves time and reduce cost of transportation from 20 days to just 48 hours from Persian Gulf to China.<sup>51</sup>
- iv. CPEC will end the Malacca Dilemma for China which is under the strategic influence of USA
- v. The trust level between Pakistan and China is relatively much higher
- vi. And CPEC makes China a two Oceans power

According to an Indian source the Chinese strategic interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan revolves around OBOR of which CPEC is a subsidiary project in the context of South Asia.<sup>52</sup> China has been developing Silk Road high-speed railway linking the CARs with Xinjiang ultimately linking Gwadar with CARs via Kashgar. CPEC provides essential outlet to the landlocked regions of Central Asia and Western China towards Indian Ocean and beyond. Pak-China strategic cooperation centered at Gwadar has the potential to alter the entire regional geo-strategic configuration.


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<sup>50</sup> Sebastien Peyrouse and Gael Raballand, "Central Asia: the New Silk Road Initiative's questionable economic rationality", *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, volume 56, Issue 42015, retrieved from <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15387216.2015.1114424>(accessed April 21, 2017)

<sup>51</sup> Shabir Ahmad Khan, "Geo-Economic Imperatives of Gwadar Sea Port and Kashgar Economic Zone for Pakistan and China" pp: 87-100, in *IPRI Journal*, Vol. III, No. 2, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Summer 2013), 93

<sup>52</sup> Vikram Sood, *The New Great Game: An All Asian Game?*, (Observer Research Foundation, April 6, 2017) retrieved from <http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/new-great-game-all-asian/> (accessed April 27, 2017)

**Figure: 3. CPEC and 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road<sup>53</sup>**



CPEC will be instrumental in accelerating the emergence of new centres of power in Asia. Surrounded by huge resource full countries on one hand and resource deficit states on the other, CPEC can be the best supply chain for resource demanding markets. Each region's growth path is a function of many factors unique to it and the resource endowment factor cannot be overlooked in case of Central Asia. The resource rich countries of Central Asia can benefit from their edge in natural resource endowment by linking efficiently to markets through overland connectivity as well as through Sea Lanes of Communication. Undoubtedly the inter and intra-regional connectivity that CPEC offers to Central Asia could expedite their economic rise. Even Indians acknowledge the geographic significance of Pakistan. According to M.K. Bhadrakumar "Pakistan, due to its strategic location, is a

<sup>53</sup> Shabir Ahmad Khan, "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in a Multipolar World", pp: 13-25, in *Pak-Army 'Green Book'* 2015, (Rawalpindi: GHQ, September 2016), 19



pivotal state which impacts the regions of Central Asia and South Asia”.<sup>54</sup> CPEC would also end the Malacca Dilemma for China and in the form of Gwadar provides a platform to China from where it can protect its interest in Indian Ocean. USA on the other hand is courting India by trying to assign a leading role to India in Indian Ocean and Afghanistan to disorder Pak-China naval partnership centered at Gwadar. Pak-China partnership has the potential to scuttle Indo-US ambitions of dominating Indian Ocean in the increasingly becoming multipolar world. This multipolar world has become rife with incomplete wars with unfinished agendas resulting in global instability. Therefore major threat to CPEC and Pakistan can be a possible hostile act of Indo-US alliance to destabilize Pakistan though USA has diplomatically declared that it is not against CPEC.<sup>55</sup>

As Afghanistan remains instable, CPEC proves to be the strategic alternate to Pakistan and Central Asia for access to each other and beyond. The strategic and economic implications of the tri-partite agreement of India-Iran-Afghanistan will remain limited as neither of the state is a major player in the New Great Game for influence in Central Asia.<sup>56</sup> Indian plans to marginalize or sideline Pakistan in its access to Central Asia make India uncompetitive in Central Asian markets vis-à-vis China and other players like Turkey. CPEC provides the best opportunity to Central Asia for unlocking while the convergence of interests between Russia, Pakistan and China have shaped a new potential power troika that is bonded by geo-strategic and geo-economic benefits.<sup>57</sup>

The regions of Central and South Asia are least integrated in the world and the economic weakness of regional countries is born in large part to the lack of inter and intra-regional integration mainly due to the poor cross-border connectivity infrastructure. The regions face multiple and identical economic, political and security issues. .OBOR and CPEC offer a model of integration that is based on open regionalism in contrast to closed regionalism which adopts protectionist measures against non-member or non-regional states. Open regionalism is a sectoral/project based approach to regional integration where any regional or extra regional state can join a particular bi-lateral, tri-lateral or multilateral arrangement. The developing regional countries lack the capacity to develop cross-border infrastructure by their own. China having reserves well over \$3.3 trillion, is seriously developing cross-border connectivity infrastructure in the region.

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<sup>54</sup> M.K. Bhadrakumar “Pakistan, China, Iran and the remaking of regional security”, *Pakistan Defence*, April 18, 2015, retrieved from <https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/pakistan-china-iran-and-the-remaking-of-regional-security.371759/>(accessed April 19, 2017)

<sup>55</sup> Munir Akram, *The New Great Game*, Dawn, June 12, 2016

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

<sup>57</sup> Sabena Siddiqi, *Reconnecting Central Asia*, KATEHON, 21.02.2017, retrieved from <http://katehon.com/article/reconnecting-central-asia> (accessed April 27, 2017)

## **Conclusions**

Central Asia is undergoing significant geo-strategic and geo-economic changes as a consequence of the integration plans of the major powers i.e. Russia, China and USA. The operational policies of major powers carry divergent and competing interests which could be impeding factor in regional integration. Russia is more prepared to assert herself in her traditional sphere of influence after the Crimea, Chinese influence is growing while American attitude may change due to its partial retreat from the region. Russia is the major player in the hard security realm, having close defense ties particularly under the CSTO. In the post Crimea period, Russia is looking towards East and Asia particularly China for strategic and economic cooperation. Central Asia can be both a source of tension as well a source of lasting convergence of interests between Russia and China depending upon how Russia and China manage their relations vis-à-vis the region. The US New Silk Road initiative has hardly materialized on ground mainly due to the regional states' perceptions of US policies and partly due to its declining capacity to project itself more forcefully in post withdrawal period.

The anomalies of Eurasian Union and OBOR need to be addressed and can be addressed on a project/sectoral basis. As Eurasian Union seems to be a kind of closed regionalism having protectionist measures in form of uniform tariff(Custom Union)against the non-member states while OBOR and CPEC offer a kind of integration based on open regionalism. In that case Eurasian Union can have an institutional check on Chinese goods movement to Central Asian members of Eurasian Union. Likewise the Eurasian Union has been planned to govern by supra-national institutions such as Eurasian Economic Commission and Court of Eurasian Economic Union while OBOR and CPEC is based on the principles of open regionalism where governance of the sector/project is a joint responsibility of signatory group pertaining to a specific project/sector. Open regionalism in fact integrates markets with flexible relations to address the weaknesses of closed regionalism. Open regionalism is outward oriented and a country can become part or join different regional arrangement simultaneously and need not to surrender sovereignty. CPEC is crucial in making OBOR a combination of maritime and land routes. No specific amount has been marked for any other corridor under the OBOR in contrast to multi-modal CPEC where the Chinese declared investment has reached to \$60.5 billion for the short to midterm projects.

These new integration plans need to balance the multiple interests of major powers while regional states will stand victorious. CARs realize that hegemony of a single power unit over the region is detrimental to the interests of regional states and therefore they are pursuing policies of balancing and playing these powers off each other. CARs are fortunate that

they have not become prey to geography like Afghanistan. The two giant neighbours Russia and China have been integrating and unlocking it to keep their backyard stable and prosperous though for their own interests. Former Soviet CARs are being awarded for their location while Afghanistan is being punished for its geography.

The important question regarding regional integration is that whether it is geo-political or economic interests that dominate the process when national preferences of regional and extra-regional states are shaped. It means the regional states need to priorities the geo-economic interests for a win situation. One can also observe that geo-strategic interests of major powers are closely linked to their integrations plans and that can be a sort of impeding factor because of their divergent natures. Nevertheless the developed cross border infrastructure as a consequence of these integration plans in the region of Central Asia will increase CARs bargaining power and competitiveness in international markets. Whether this is OBOR or Eurasian Union or the US New Silk Road initiative, the single outcome must be the regional integration in any case and therefore shared growth and peace promotion would be guaranteed.

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## PRESENTING ISLAM IN THE CONFUCIAN CONTEXT: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF A CHINESE MUSLIM TRACT

*Ayesha Qurrat Ul Ain\**

### **Abstract**

*This piece of research is meant to investigate the interrelationship of Islam and Confucianism in the history of Chinese Muslims concentrating upon the textual analysis of a Chinese Muslim tract written during Ming dynasty. We suggest that the Muslims enacted the Islamic principle of 'picking up the appropriate and shunning the improper'; thus they adopted and inculcated the Confucian ethical teachings and social values compatible to Islamic tradition into their intellectual framework and stayed isolated from the rituals contrary to the Islamic practices. By adopting this strategy they intelligently propagated the word of Islam among the Confucian audience emphasizing the ethical aspect of their tradition thus enacting the Quranic principle of doing Dawah by calling towards a common word. The analysis of the Chinese Muslim tract known as Qingzhen Jiao Shu will reveal the patterns of Chinese Muslim thought and divulge the tactics the Chinese Muslim authors adopted while presenting Islam to a Confucian majority culture.*

**Keywords:** *Islam in China; Islam and Confucianism; Islamic and Confucian Ethics; Harmony; Reconciliation*

### **Introduction**

Islam had been introduced to China since 8th century A.D, to accept the historically authentic claims and it was followed by the emergence of Muslim communities in various regions of China particularly in Southern and Northern parts (Chang, 1987). Each Muslim community evolved in different circumstances and exhibited unique behaviors towards their host culture and society (Dillon, 2013; Gladney, 2003; Mi, 2004). When Islam

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\* Presently serves as Assistant Professor, Department of Comparative Religion, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.



stepped into the Chinese lands, there were three traditions constituting the religious framework of Chinese society i.e. Confucianism<sup>1</sup>, Daoism<sup>2</sup> and Buddhism. Confucianism and Daoism together smeared the panorama of Chinese religious life since ancient times as Confucianism provided the doctrinal grounds and intellectual foundations to the religious activities of imperial China and Daoism served as institutionalized religion by conducting ceremonies and performing rituals. These rituals were justified by Confucian ideology indeed. For example, the idea of emperor being the son of heaven was a Confucian endowment to Chinese cosmology whereas all the rituals performed at the temple of Heaven were conducted by Daoist priests. Similarly, filial piety was a primal Confucian virtue but all the death rites and ancestral worshipping rituals, complimentary to filial piety, were the expertise of Daoist priests.<sup>3</sup> So, although seemingly contradictory both of these were crucial to the Chinese common people and elite. Many historians state that during the Medieval period of Chinese history, the elite were Confucian in the day and Daoist at night. Smith very rightly postulated, "Traditionally, every Chinese was Confucian in ethics and public life, Taoist in private life and hygiene, and Buddhist at time of death, with a healthy dash of shamanistic folk religion thrown in along the way. (189)" It is significant to understand for a western reader that Chinese religious traditions are not exclusive at all rather they not only coexist but also complement each other. Interestingly there is no word in Chinese language both traditional and modern to convey the nuance of the term 'religion' at all so for them such a defined entity or system is non-existent at all. They employ the word "Jiao" i.e. teaching for legacy of an intellectual or a saint. And in this way they are and have been syncretic and eclectic in their daily lives choosing between the teachings of saints and sages on the basis of whatever they needed or liked. To be succinct, Daoism and Confucianism are opposite yet complementary to each other in Chinese society exactly the way Yin and Yang act in Chinese cosmology(Reid, 1917).

As far as Islam and Daoism are concerned, they have never been engaged in an intellectual barter in the history of China. Neither Islam had to interact much with Daoist philosophy under the historical strain in China unlike the way it had to do with Confucian ideology, the essential constituent of Chinese imperial mindset, nor did Daoism find any affinity for Islam. So, we find

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<sup>1</sup> Although Confucianism does not fall into the category of Western archetype of religion and the term itself is not native rather coined by Christian missionaries yet since the modern scholarship is habitually dependent upon its frequent usage, it is retained here as it is.

<sup>2</sup> Daoism is the Chinese tradition attributed to its legendary founder Lao Tzu from 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E. Daoism in China is understood in two distinct ways i.e. religious Daoism and philosophical Daoism. Here our allusion is towards religious Daoism.

<sup>3</sup> This statement does not mean that ancestral worship emerged as a result of Confucian notion of filial piety as these rites were part of Chinese folk religion even before Confucius, it is just meant to show the way Confucianism and Daoism supported each other and intermingled in the lives of Chinese folks.

nothing noteworthy in this context in the history of Muslims or in the writings of contemporary scholars who are engaged with the studies of Islam and Chinese religions today. Leslie (1998) clearly postulates that he finds it hard for Islam to accommodate with Daoism unlike Confucianism. Being a monotheistic religion, it was hard for Islam to reconcile with Daoism particularly when there was no social constraint upon the Muslims to do so. On the other hand, Confucianism with its foundations upon ethics and morality was logically akin to Islamic ethics therefore this research is devoted to explore the nature of interaction between Confucianism and Islam. In order to understand the kind and extent of contact between Confucianism and Islam, it is necessary to be aware of the integral role the former played in Chinese society. Unlike Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Confucianism was not a religion initiated at the hands of Confucius rather he only served to compile the 'way of ancient' for the Chinese generations to come. So, 'Confucianism' can be better understood as 'more a tradition generally rooted in Chinese culture and nurtured by Confucius and Confucians rather than a new religion created, or a new value system initiated, by Confucius himself alone.' (Yao, 2000) When one talks of Confucianism, one implicitly refers to the Chinese way of thinking, their cultural values and their social principles. This is the reason that Confucian ideology has been the essential tool as well as a standard for the integration and sinicization of the non-Chinese minorities in China (Weiliang, 1989). Chinese society based upon the concepts of filial piety and loyalty to the son of heaven was primarily Confucian and these ideas were further reinforced through the teaching of Confucian Classics in order to pass the imperial examination. Williams (1916) has rightly observed that, "Confucianism profoundly influences the life of every individual in China. As a child the Chinese is taught to bow reverently to the tablet of the sage when he enters and leaves the schoolroom. The sacred scriptures edited by Confucius are the text-books given him to study, and these he learns by heart. (273)" So, Confucianism since birth used to become the integral part of life in Chinese civilization. It has never been an institutionalized religion and its influence was not limited to a particular segment or sphere of Chinese world order rather it wrapped and colored all the walks of social life. And whosoever desired to sustain in Chinese social order, had to adapt to the Confucian thinking and values necessarily. This is what happened to Muslims as well upon their settlement in China; they could not escape the overwhelming influence of Confucianism and absorbed many of its characteristics and values thus unconsciously transforming their self from a foreign Muslim to Hui in China.

The relationship between Islam and Confucianism has been studied by various scholars belonging to different orientations. Leslie (1986) declared Islam and Confucianism to be reconciliatory and corresponding to each other. He seems to have the social and moral aspects of Islam in mind which emphasize the same moral values and ethical principles as Confucianism

does so both may happily coexist. Israeli (1977), on the contrary found both of these systems to be totally incompatible and contradictory as his primary concern was the social hierarchy and political system generated by the Confucian elite. This hierarchy and social order combining the elements from Chinese folk religion and Daoism spared no accommodation for a monotheistic and exclusive religion like Islam as far as Israeli could grasp. Zvi Ben-DorBenite (2005) reconciled the Chinese and Muslim cultures studying the unique instance of religious literature produced by Chinese Muslim authors and declaring that this authorship serves to locate Muslims 'at the overlapping center of a sort of Venn diagram one that shows two imagined spaces, "Islam" and "China", and their point of intersection'. Gladney (2003) concludes that the accommodation of Islam in Confucian society is a matter of great diversity and thus restrains one from a definite statement rendering the process as sinification or assimilation rather it is a continuous dialectic process taking different shapes in different communities of Chinese Muslims. Lipman (1997) proposes that Muslims as ethnic minority in China have challenged the transforming power of Chinese civilization and have stubbornly retained their essential cultural traits. His assumption tells half the truth as it is evident in their history that Muslims did retain their essential Islamic traits but they could not totally resist the transforming power of Chinese culture. Counterbalancing his point of view, Petersen (2006) very rightly holds that the interaction of Islam and Confucianism has been a historical interrelationship instead of a syncretism. He abrogates the stereotype that Muslim integration into Confucian society is a logical consequence of their abandoning of Islamic way of life. We hereby have adopted a novel approach of studying the Chinese Muslim literature instead of historiography as the Chinese Muslim authors themselves admit that such a literature has played a pivotal role in conservation of Islamic culture in Confucian China (Jianchu Xu, 2005). Ma Tianbo and Ma Jianfo (2006) postulated that the Muslims in China started recognizing the need of educational and cultural integration in China during late Yuan and this cultural consciousness resulted into the emergence of such pieces of writing which referred to the dual identity of Chinese Muslims. The analysis of Chinese Muslim tract known as *Qingzhen Jiao Shu* will reveal the patterns of Chinese Muslim thought and divulge the sources of inspiration the Chinese Muslim authors hailed from while writing in a Confucian majority culture.

### **Analysis of *Qing Zhen Jiao Shu* (the Muslim Tract)<sup>4</sup>**

This treatise has been chosen as a specimen of Chinese Muslim literature which is in circulation within the Chinese Muslim community. Not

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<sup>4</sup> The whole text can be seen from *Islam in China* (Broomhall, 1910)

the whole tract is being given here but some of the excerpts are quoted with the purpose to analyze the affinity developed by Chinese Muslim authors towards Confucian values and ethics and consequently how they managed to present Islam in a Confucian context. Before venturing into the textual analysis of the tract, it would be better to shed light on the significance of such tracts as they were written by eminent Hui scholars in various parts of China during the Ming age. The lexicon of the discourse indicates that the piece had been written during the late Ming dynasty slightly before the compilation of *Han Kitab* literature (Shiqian). Had such efforts not been made by the Muslim scholars in early Ming, *Han Kitab* literature would have not been produced (Zhuang, 2002). So, such pieces are extremely significant to understand the pursuit of integration of Muslims in the Chinese society. It is noteworthy that such representation of Islamic teachings in Confucian disguise is not limited to the piece under discussion only rather it was a widespread practice (Tong, 1983) (Zenglie, 2003).

The words *Tien fang* for Arabia and *Qing zhenjiao* for Islam are frequently used which appeared during the early Ming only. A major part of the passage is devoted to the *raison d'être* behind the name Qing Zhen Jiao with which Islam is identified in China and the author has illustrated the matter with respect to the key constituents of religious ontology i.e. God, man and the link between the two through revelation. The author has talked about the purity of God the creator, the man and the religion God has revealed to the human beings i.e. Islam. The interpretive categories and their order employed in the tract correspond to the thematic approach of the Chinese minds as well as Chan (1986) stated about the thematic composition of Confucian classics, “The Six Classics, with their varied contents, also exemplified an outlook on Heaven and man, on society, and on religion (357)”. Furthermore, The Chinese cosmological idea of taking nature as a holistic and coherent entity is very well integrated with Islamic concept of sacred and profane.

The worth of the ideas expounded and the rituals accentuated in the text gets illustrious if consigned a Chinese intellectual context. The author seemed to write this passage responding to many questions about Islam which probably arose during Ming when Muslims started integrating in the Chinese society at a larger scale and interacting with Han majority recurrently. Chinese society idealized and fantasized the way of ancestors and its imitation was the prime goal of their lives. So, here he way of ancestors has been taken exemplary and the dynasties of Yao and Shun are considered to be the golden period of humanity irrespective of any particular religion or nation which seems a deliberate attempt to tint Confucian ideals with universality. But one must not neglect that the authors were Muslims with a Chinese social background of many centuries so they might have unconsciously heightened Confucius legendary sages as common socially constructed ideals. Islam was considered to be a relatively new religion as

compared to Chinese traditions of Confucianism and Daoism as well as Buddhism in the Chinese society. Therefore, the author was confronted with the task of proving Islam to be an authentic religion and authenticity in Chinese patterns of thinking is derived only from the way of ancestors. This is why we see that the discourse begins with the creation of universe and the first human being. The tract posits, “The pure and true religion (Islam) dates from the creation, and the sages handed it down one to another, up to the present day (303)”. (Broomhall, 1910) Like all other Chinese Muslim writings, the Islamic archetype ‘prophet’ is replaced with its Chinese counterpart ‘sage’. The author elucidated that Islam traces its origin back to the creation of first prophet Adam (A.S) and claims that true religion began with the first man and with the passage of time when people grew, the opinions differed and the desires came over and resulted into the withering of true teachings. And then a lot of prophets were sent to each area and each nation to revive the true teachings at different intervals of human history. The basic creed did not differ but the laws and legislations varied in accordance with the need of time and finally the last prophet (P.B.U.H) came with the final version of Islam which is named *Qing Zhen jiao* in China. Chapter 7 of the Holy Quran narrates the stories of prophets in detail who recurrently came to warn the people every time when they deviated from the divine message throughout the history. “Those were the towns whose story We relate unto you. And there came indeed to them their Messengers with clear proofs.”(7:101)

According to the tract, The Exalted One God created the heavens and earth with primal essence and then He created the first man and sage Adam who descended to earth to live in the heavenly kingdom(Arabia) located at the center of heaven and earth’s four points. Here it is noteworthy that Chinese Muslims violated the Chinese principle of thinking which takes Chinese land as *Zhongguo* (middle kingdom). By taking Arabia as the center of the universe, both heaven and earth, they determined the place of their prime affiliation and ultimate association. Arabia being the land of Ka’aba (House of Allah) is the focal center of Muslim aspiration and affiliation all over the world and Chinese Muslims are no exception. After the inhabitation of first sage on earth, God sent a heavenly spirit with divine commandments. The commandments were received and promulgated by Adam very respectfully and dutifully. This revealed religion, as the tract asserts, had two core aspects i.e. ‘doctrine’ and ‘morality’. The doctrine dealt with the intellectual and cognitive part of divine message whereas the principles of morality served to regulate the practical and mandatory part of human life in the light of divine orders.

Here we see pure Islamic intellect at work, as Chinese traditions do not bear any formal creed or doctrinal formulations whereas Islam, like other revealed religions, lays its foundations on the faith and then constructs the building of actions and ethics on this foundation. Without faith, good deeds

bring no reward in Islam which is quite contrary to Confucian understanding where performing proper rituals and being morally upright<sup>5</sup> is the main goal. The notion of religion in Islam does not confine itself to morality at all when it comes to its application in daily lives rather it encompasses rituals, divine laws to govern family, civil, economical and penal issues and finally ethical instructions. But in this tract, the author tries to sum up all other aspects of religion in the concept of morality abiding by the Chinese patterns of thinking. The concept of morality is told to encompass all the obligations incumbent upon human beings from their creator God. So, it naturally encapsulates all the rites and laws Islam professes as obligatory upon its adherents. Since the Holy Quran commanded Muslims to present Islam to others beginning with the commonalities between their tradition and Islam we see Chinese Muslim authorship emphasizing the moral facet of Islam more than any other. Even the rituals like prayer and fasting etc are presented in terms of their moral gains at individual and social levels. So, here the author substituted the quintessential category for Islamic code of life i.e. *Shariah* with Confucian archetype of morality.

The tract explicitly states that in the ancient times, the great Doctrine was practiced in its true form and no corruption occurred as “genii and Buddhas and all kinds of heterodoxy were yet unheard of. Yet when man filled the Eastern earth (China), religion declined somewhat. But heresy had not yet arisen. Therefore in the times of Yao and Shun all its various names had not been heard, but from the Qin and Han dynasties onward, men all followed their own private (opinions) and those who set up heterodox views were forthwith many. Wherefore the three sects (Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism) spread over the nine divisions, and the hundred families, and all the philosophers came forth promiscuously so as to delude this people, and the statement concerning the (our) origin was rendered vague and could not be known. (304)” (Broomhall, 1910) And then the author goes on to say that although Chinese land had lost the clue of the pure religion yet it was present in the other parts of the world and finally was brought to China through the teachings of the last sage Muhammad (P.B.U.H). The author’s stance here is identical to the Quranic concept of Islam as the Holy Quran states, “He has legislated for you of the religion what He has instructed for Noah and what We inspired to you and what we instructed for Abraham, Moses, and Jesus: You shall establish the religion and be not divided therein.”(42:13)

This statement is full of implications. The Pure and True religion (Islam) is proclaimed to be the religion of the first man on the earth and not only has divine origins but also has been the way of the ancient. So, it is in fact pure Dao, the Way of Lord (Heaven) and then Way of sages. So, Islam thus becomes not only the part of the Chinese quest of Dao but also its ultimately

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<sup>5</sup> Li and Ren form two main categories in the theoretical system of Confucius. Li is the proper performance of rituals and Ren is humanity or self-cultivation of all the virtues.

perfect embodiment and not an essential part of Chinese ideal Way rather its highest apex. All other traditions of China are said to be relatively later, ensuing from the heresy of people of China and non-existent in the golden period of Yao and Shun. Thus all other traditions are none but based on human desires and deviation from the right path. And these deviated traditions prevailed in China to the extent that they obscured the True teachings. (This is again a very Islamic concept.) The True religion, revived by Muhammad's teachings, is 'very Pure and very True, and only holds what is correct, not vainly taking the name, while lacking the ability to prove its truth' (Broomhall, 1910). Here again, we see a Confucian thought implied which stresses on the rectification of names. The object bearing a name must be worthy of its name and if not, it must strive to be the appropriate reflection of its name. So the author intends to express that the Pure and True religion is worthy of its name in its characteristics. It is definitely an appeal to the minds of Confucian literati which upholds the principle of rectification of names (*zhengming*). Rectification of name means that the referent should abide by and prove itself worthy of all the attributes its name implies e.g. son should be obedient and filial and father must be benevolent as their names demand these qualities. The Analects (2003) explained the rectification as follows, "Let the lord be a true lord, the ministers true ministers, the fathers true fathers, and the sons true sons." (12.11)

Then the author proceeds to elaborate the purity and truth associated to the Lord. The portrait of Lord presented here is very much in line with the Islamic notion of Allah. The language used for the divine attributes is Quranic in content but simultaneously the author has denied the Chinese concepts of yin and Yang etc to distinguish between vague ideas of nature and the Islamic concept of God, the sole Creator. The Lord is without beginning, not confined to space, does not belong to any sex, transcendent and self-existent and omniscient. The attributes of 'emptiness' associated with Dao and 'nothingness' of Buddhist Nirvana are negated from the Pure Lord. The Lord is not like nature as He is eternal, immutable exalted and omnipotent. Nobody is like Him. He is the only responsible for life and death of all the men and spirits, good and bad. And this is the Truth of Lord. The idea of change is cast away from the True lord. It probably could be the negation of the theory of creation of a Confucius scholar from 17<sup>th</sup> century; Huang Zongxi who said that nature creates everything in the universe through change and transformation. The creative material force circulates everywhere and transforms into various things (Rainey, 2010). Daoism also shared the same belief of creation through changing forms but with the supremacy of Dao which is beyond any change or mutation (Reid, 1917).

Next is the purity and truth of man. The purity of mind (heart)<sup>6</sup> is to be free from the pollution of material and non-material delusions ranging from

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<sup>6</sup> Mind is taken to be the center of virtues and learning in Chinese philosophy whereas in Islamic intellectual thought, heart is the focal place of all virtues and vices. Here the author

‘depraved Buddhas’ to the lust for riches and honor. Confucius (2003) also urges to keep heart free and pure from bad intentions, “Merely set your heart sincerely upon Goodness and you will be free of bad intentions. (30)” He also said, “The gentleman cherishes virtue whereas the petty person cherishes physical possessions. (33)” If the mind remains pure and clean, the body, despite living in the dirty world, returns to Lord ‘without defilement’. The heart must remain the servant of Lord and follow His doctrine only as it is contrary to the purity of heart to possess ‘conflicting opinions’. Here is an inherent critique of the Chinese laity who practices all three traditions simultaneously not distinguishing between the true doctrine and the false one.

The truth of man is illustrated as follows, “Filial piety<sup>7</sup>, and brotherly submission, loyalty and faith, are matters which have their root in the Lord’s command, and should be respectfully practiced with attention. The principles of courtesy and rectitude,<sup>8</sup> modesty<sup>9</sup> and moderation, came forth from the Canon and Commentary<sup>10</sup>, and should be increasingly respected.” All the virtues, which are urged to be adopted so emphatically, are Confucian in form but they are embedded in The Holy Quran. Although the jargon is entirely Confucian, the referent virtues are equally important in Islam undoubtedly. Confucius (2003) declares, “One who is able to practice following of the five virtues wherever he may be is a man of goodness... namely respectfulness, magnanimity, faithfulness, diligence and kindness. (202)” He also said, “A young person should be filial when at home and respectful of his elders when in public. Conscientious and trustworthy, he should display a general care for the masses but feel a particular affection for those who are good. (3)”

Finally the author deals with the Truth and Purity of religion. Purity of religion is based on the principle of justice. The notions of self-established and self-subsistent nature are severely criticized and Lord is said to be the creator of the whole universe. And it is the Lord who gave doctrine to man and bestowed Him with the choice to accept the Truth or reject it. Since ‘delusion and enlightenment differ’, the people will be judged and distinguished by God after death on the basis of the choice they made in their lives. And thus they will get the ‘heights and depths’ in their life after death. This is the purity of religion. As far as Truth of religion is concerned,

prefers to use Chinese term ‘mind’ instead of heart.

<sup>7</sup> Filial piety, being the prime Confucian virtue is placed first in the order of good deeds.

<sup>8</sup> The book of changes emphasizes on rectitude as an essential quality of a gentleman. (Chan, 1986) p.280

<sup>9</sup> Confucius said, “The gentleman takes rightness as his substance, puts it into practice by means of ritual, gives it expression through modesty, and perfects it by being trustworthy.” Analects p. 181

<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to see that while mentioning the sacred literature of Muslims, the author did not suffice to talk about the text of Holy Quran rather included the commentary as well. It bears a strong resemblance to Confucian canon which comprises of the texts of the classics and some of the selected commentaries.



it comprises of the infallible transmission of the true teachings of God from the chain of sages down to the ordinary people. No personal opinions have polluted the True religion at all. In this passage, an allusion to the Islamic notion of retribution is made but no detail of eschatological events is given at all. It seems a bit surprising as the idea of heaven and hell is part and parcel of Muslim eschatology and these two are inevitably mentioned whenever the judgment in life after death is cited in Islamic literature elsewhere. Probably the author avoided an account of heaven and hell here because these notions are incomprehensible for a typical Chinese mind, being absent in their own philosophies although we observe the idea of heaven's wrath and heaven's punishment in the Analects. Confucius swore an oath which is quoted in Analects (2003), "If I have done anything wrong, May Heaven punish me! (62)" Chinese minds have always focused more upon this world than hereafter. When Zi Lu, a disciple of Confucius asked him about death, he responded, "Not yet Understanding life, how can you understand death?(115)" (Slingerland, 2003) So, the author found it unnecessary to embark on mentioning the details of the life hereafter and confined himself referring to the inevitable connection between the actions executed in this world with retribution in hereafter.

Having justified the name 'Pure and True religion', the author further moved to reveal the reason the prevalent name of Muslims in China i.e. Huihui. The logic is identical to the one given by the first Arab ambassador to the Tang Emperor, so it is futile to reproduce it here. Then he shifts his attention to the Holy Quran and tells his Chinese audience that the Holy Quran includes the answers to all the queries they are looking an answer for. Moreover, the Holy Quran enjoys the advantage of being true and explicit. The themes of the Holy Quran are mentioned to include the 'mysterious plan of creation' which in turn elaborates the mystery of human relations. Here one can observe an amalgam of Taoist and Confucian philosophies as cosmological issues are a favorite subject of Daoism whereas the prime concern of Confucianism is to rectify the Five Relationships in human life. But the order and link between the two as established in the passage is a definite influence of Islamic understanding which ties all the liabilities and duties of human beings to the creation of first man. Since Lord is the creator and sustainer, He only reserves the right to determine the rights and duties of his creatures in the universe. So, in establishing all the relationships and fulfilling their obligations all of the human beings are accountable before God in an ideal Islamic society. This is why the author stresses upon the recognition of Lord the creator as a primal duty of a disciple of Quran. Again one cannot help bewilder that the word 'believer', quite familiar in Muslim discourse and a frequent Quranic expression, is substituted with a Confucian term 'disciple'.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> A person who wishes to have a thorough knowledge of the principles in the world without first seeking for them [in the classics and histories] is one who wishes to go forward but

After the recognition of Lord there comes His worship. The rules of worship “unite seven days’ rites as the usages of one week. The purpose of worship is said to ‘seek the forgiveness of one’s bodily sins, to secretly implore the peace of the sovereign, to ponder one’s parents’ grace, and to be grateful for one’s teacher’s instruction’. To think of friends and friendliness so as to comprehend all men. No mention of typical Islamic rituals and their affiliated juristic details is found at all rather the famous Five relationships of Confucian social setup are established here as the purpose of worship. By the end of passage, the author again criticizes the two extreme approaches i.e. Confucian overindulgence in the matters of the material world<sup>12</sup> and body and on the other hand Buddhist/Daoist emphasis upon abstraction and non-action. Perhaps we can read between the lines here that the author is championing the Doctrine of Mean, an ancient Chinese virtue which necessitates the balanced approach in all the matters. It would be inevitable to see at the same time that Islam also lays stress upon the balanced path and avoiding the extremes. There are many verses and sayings of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) appreciating this quality. He states that his sole purpose behind writing this tract is to invite people to accept and understand the Truth which originated with the first human sage Adam and to get rid of all the heresies which corrupted the true message in the course of history. Hence one can proclaim that the author of the tract has very tactfully applied the Quranic principle of common word in the Chinese context and fulfilled the responsibilities of imparting *Dawah* to the Confucian audience intelligently.

## Conclusion

We can deduce following things from the above analysis,

- 1) Chinese Muslim authors, like their counterparts elsewhere in the Muslim world dealt with the basic Islamic theological themes of *tawhīd*, *nubuwwah* and *ma`ād* with the only difference that the order of ideas was manipulated to seek proximity to the mindset of their Confucian audience. All the questions related to epistemology, theology, ontology, metaphysics and cosmology are answered in the light of the aforementioned basic three Islamic principles.
- 2) The above discussion reflects that both Confucianism and Islam share an anthropo-cosmic vision of being i.e. they see the human beings and the cosmos as two parallel worlds yet reflecting the same Ultimate Reality or the Supreme Way. For Confucians, the Supreme Way is manifested in the way of Nature and personified in the Sages and for

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ends up standing right in front of a wall. This is why we say "a thorough study of principles must of necessity consist in book learning."(Chan, 1986) p.233

<sup>12</sup> Confucius responded to his disciple Ji Lu when he asked about the duties towards spirits, “When still unable to do your duty to men, how can you do your duty to the spirits?” Analects p.115.

Islam, the Ultimate Reality or Allah's existence is reflected in the worlds of 'anfus' and 'āfāq'. So, this shared vision of the reality and origin of universe helped the Muslims establish grounds for further intellectual discussion.

The writings of Muslim authors are self-explanatory evidence of philosophical coherence of Islam and Confucianism. Muslim authors concentrated, while looking for the common grounds between Confucianism and Islam, only on ethical and intellectual aspects of both the traditions evading the ritualistic and sacramental facets as the latter could highlight the divergence instead of harmony.

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## PAKISTAN'S POST 9/11 AFGHAN POLICY: IMPACT ON FATA

*Zarmina Baloch\**

### **Abstract**

*In the backdrop of War on Terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan abandoned its two decade long Afghan policy of supporting Taliban, Islamic Jihad, Islamic fundamentalists, and became an ally with US in conducting operations against Al-Qaida and Taliban network in Afghanistan. This change in Pakistan's Afghan policy had deep impacts on country's peace and security, particularly on Pakistan's bordering region with Afghanistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Consequently, Pakistan's military conducted several operations from 2002 onwards in FATA. During this period, several peace agreements were conducted between the military and militants in FATA. But such operations and the subsequent agreements failed to prevail peace in border region. Instead, spreading conflicts to other areas of Pakistan.*

*This paper attempts to examine Pakistan's Afghan policy since 2001, and analyze its impact on FATA's peace, security and social fabric. It also critically analyzes the strategies adopted by Pakistan's military in dealing with Pakistan based militant groups and foreign insurgents in FATA.*

*The issue of peace and conflict in FATA needs to be carefully addressed because this is a porous and fragile area that exists between Afghanistan and Pakistan. FATA's volatile geography makes it more violent and resistant to international aid, Counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, and development, which has direct impact over peace and development of Pakistan.*

*The methodology employed is qualitative and analytical. First half lays out the independent variable by describing US, Pakistani and militant action post 9/11. Second half lays out the dependent variables by describing socio-political and economic changes in FATA.*

*This study concludes with recommendations regarding prevailing peace in FATA. The finding of this study shall help in framing future Pakistan's Afghan policy.*

**Keywords:** FATA, Militants, Terrorism, Jihad, Al-Qaeda, 9/11, Afghanistan, Allies

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\* Ph.D. Research Scholar, Area Study Centre (Central Asia), University of Peshawar, Pakistan.

## **Introduction**

The incidence occurred on September 11, 2001 resulted in declaration of US Global War against Terrorism on Afghanistan. Pakistan being an immediate neighbour of Afghanistan also had to play its role in US War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. This War brought very strong repercussions for Pakistan especially its areas bordering Durand line. War on Terrorism not only affected the peace and stability of FATA but also the social fabric got upset. This instability and continued militancy generated many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from FATA, others migrated after the operations started by the Army of Pakistan against militants in FATA. It disturbed the normal life of those people and they had to compromise on their comfort and livelihood. Economic activities also got affected and people of FATA lost their means of production. Taliban became the power center of FATA and Political agent lost his hold over the administration. Pakistan's objective of using extremism to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan resulted in losing its writ in FATA and also proved to be unfavorable for its peace, security and stability.

## **Pakistan's Post 9/11 Afghan Policy**

Afghanistan based Al-Qaida global jihadists attacked US on September 11, 2001. Resultantly, Taliban regime collapsed after Afghanistan was attacked by US forces and its Allies. The demise of Taliban regime created fear in Pakistani policy makers of losing Afghanistan to the pro-Indian Northern Alliance. US being very decisive and prompt in its response post 9/11, declared Al-Qaida responsible for the incident. Promptly full scale war against Al-Qaida and their supporters was declared (Hadar: 2002). President Bush expressed US determinacy in eradicating terrorism (Robert: 2001, 25) and formulated policy for that purpose. Main objective of US was complete wiping out of Al-Qaida and their supporters. US attacked on Afghanistan in October 2001 after the refusal of Taliban's regime of handing over Osama Bin Ladin (mastermind behind September 9/11 incident) to US (Sher:2001). US started Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) on Afghanistan and was determined not to spare any state who is not willing to co operate with US (Bush: 2001).

Al-Qaida and Taliban faced lots of casualties and were pushed harshly, but, Osama Bin Ladin could escape successfully (Carrol: 2004). United Nations (UN) played an important role in justifying and legitimizing US and its allies on GWOT and was ready to play its role in peace building activities in Afghanistan (Chitkara, Girdhari: 2002, 53-57)

Due to the changed geostrategic environment and US pressure, Pakistan decided to join Global War on Terror (GWOT) in favour of international operation led by US, in Afghanistan. This decision was taken to adjust to the new global and regional politics (Abbas 2005, 13), the policy of strategic

depth of Pakistan continued. Pakistan selectively cooperated with US in Afghanistan and pursued the policy of its interest of taking control of Kabul through Taliban.

Situation in Afghanistan ten years down of GWOT remains precarious. A strategic control over Afghanistan through religious groups reflects Pakistan's strategic apprehensions in the region and remains the center of Pakistan's Afghan policy (Rubin 2013, 15). As a result of weak performance of Karzai's regime in Afghanistan and overabundance of blunders committed by US and its Allies, Pakistan wanted to protect its interests and objectives in Afghanistan and considered Pakistan's religious groups as best tool for this purpose. Some of these Taliban were sheltered along with their families and were provided safety in camps in Pakistan. Some joined Madrassas, got busy in arranging religious seminars in Pakistan (Rashid 2000, 223).

Moreover, huge assistance to American war was provided by Pakistan in the shape of providing air base facility, intelligence sharing, and installing troops at Pak-Afghan border in order to resist Taliban and Al-Qaida from penetrating in Pakistan. However, eighty thousand military troops were deployed along Pak-Afghan border region. The rationale behind this policy was the concern that forces should not be deployed in bordering region of Balochistan and Waziristan. Subsequently, the Al-Qaida operatives reach Waziristan easily (Rashid 2008, 148). Furthermore, in December 2001, an attack was conducted on Indian Parliament; Pakistani militant group Jesh-e-Muhammad (JeM) based in Pakistan was blamed. This incident resulted in building relations more volatile between Pakistan and India. These tensions compelled Pakistan deploying troops on its eastern border, hence, Al-Qaeda got compatible environment for entering inside Pakistan through its Western border. (Yousaf:28)

Britain and America needed to pay attention to the situation to cool down tension between Pakistan and India; they compelled General Musharaf for destroying the terrorists' safe heavens which he committed to do in his speech in January 2002. This pressure resulted in banning terrorist and extremist activities; however, these groups were not fatally banned or dismantled (Riedel 2011, 68-70). Even this strategy of restricted counteracts terror activities could not control the terror communications as Musharaf himself, in the following years, came under assault from the Al-Qaida connected extremists.

Accumulating economic assistance from US and backing of the military rule in Pakistan, policy makers in Pakistan thought to counter India by securing and increasing nuclear program and to thrive for installing Pakistan friendly government in Afghanistan (Rashid 2008, 148-219). Pakistan's policy makers also thought that non-cooperation can lead to US closeness with India and it will fatally blow Pakistan's security interest and to Kashmir issue. But trust deficit between US and Pakistan enhanced close relations between India and US.

President Musharraf while justifying Pakistan's post 9/11 Afghan policy stated in his interview to BBC that Pakistan's Afghan Policy is absolutely right and the changes incorporated in it is due to the change in circumstances. Moreover, Pakistan supported Taliban before 9/11 incident because they were in control of almost 90% of Afghan land. He also affirmed that this policy will lead to peace and progress of Pakistan and region. US Secretary of State, Collin Powell, after attending meeting of US National Security Council that all cooperation will be provided for arresting and punishing the culprits. Moreover, he showed satisfaction on Pakistan's cooperation with US in GWOT.

Similarly, Pakistan's decision of playing front line role in GWOT was also justified under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution no. 1373 and under Article no.51 of UN charter. As these UNSC could take military action against the state that refuses to cooperate US and its allies as GWOT is an important step to counter terrorism. Moreover, financing and providing shelter to terrorists and terrorist organizations were also strictly forbidden by UNSC.

Pakistan's military government had to abandon pro-Taliban Policy and ally with US and the world against terrorism as it was the key to national security and sovereignty.

### **Militant's Tactics and Military Operations in FATA**

Pakistan's military played role of frontline state in US led GWOT, post 9/11 in Afghanistan against Al-Qaida and Taliban, however, it could not effectively stop emergence of uprisings and rebellions at the Western border. Similarly, it also could not control entrance and escape of Taliban-led insurgents and Al-Qaida militants in South and north of Waziristan (Grare 2006, 6) porous character of Durand line is the major reason for that.

Owing to these weaknesses, these militants' organizations began reorganizing in FATA in 2004; however, intelligence agencies of Pakistan repeatedly ignored them and denied their presence in the region (Rashid 2012, 46-89). As Pakistan was having clash with India on its eastern border (Smith: 2002, 42) it could not pay required attention on what was happening on its western border. Hence, Al-Qaeda took advantage of this situation and began insurgency in Afghanistan with the logistic support of tribal armed militant organizations. Further to safeguard and justify their presence in FATA, foreign militants persuaded local tribes to form militant groups for waging Jihad against whoever stops them (Rana: 2009,3). Similarly, intelligence officers of Pakistan met some foreign Taliban's leaders, such as Tahir of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU, henceforth), heads of some local jihadi organizations like Jalauddin Haqqani (Rashid 2008, 269). The rationale behind meeting these heads and establishing ideological belt of Taliban at FATA was to gain favour from the Government of Kabul (Smith: 2008).



Pakistani Taliban, until 2004, focused more on recruiting forces (U.S. Department of State, *Diplomacy in Action, South Asia Overview: 2003*) for participating in war against US and its allies in Afghanistan as well as securing themselves from the security operations conducted by the state of Pakistan. They started earning strategic gains after they changed their tactics and started targeting security forces and officials. Similarly, other tactics like strategy of kidnapping government officials, demoralizing security forces by attacking them and later bargaining with the state for the release of their (militants) partners arrested by security forces. Around 1000 security personals had been kidnapped during 2007 and after bargaining Taliban were successful in releasing more than 500 militants. This tactic of kidnapping was the main reason which led to peace talks between State of Pakistan and Taliban. Trade and other economic activities in FATA got worsen which resulted in developing war economy. People started renting their houses and services to militants.

Pakistan for achieving its objective of strategic depth made distinction between Taliban as good and bad Taliban. But this strategy bought terrorism on Pakistan's soil and Pakistan could not save itself from the influence of Taliban-led militants (Paul: 2014, 62).

Colin Powel, the then U.S. Secretary of State, paid a prompt visit to Islamabad in 2004 and notified Musharraf's administration that US would attack South Waziristan in case of Pakistan's failure to attack Al-Qaeda militants, situated at South Waziristan. Following US threat, Musharraf's administration, launched military operations in FATA. For instance, FC unit in Kaloosha, situated at South Waziristan, launched counter militant attack in 2004. Subsequently, a peace deal was signed between eminent tribesmen of Shakai and Musharraf administration, which led to extend and legitimize mullah-military nexus (Shehzad 2011). That deal included: to marginalize traditional Jirga system and get into it to political set up of state, tribal council of elders and local religious clergy and replace them with Taliban to bring them into forefront as representatives of FATA, it was also agreed upon that militants would not attack on any state property and personnel and that militants would also refrain from any action in Afghanistan (Sattar, 2014).

Conversely, the peace deal was proved of assistance to the armed militants and, thus, their terror compelled tribesmen and their elders not to refused to provide support to Taliban. These tribal militants either killed numerous tribal leaders and innocent villagers or made them run away from their home. On the other hand, the military leadership of Pakistan had faced hurdles in countering tribal militancy and, thus, it led to additionally strengthen militants (Rashid 2000, 238-239). As a result, these militants launched their self-styled system of *Sharia* (Rashid 2008, 275). Moreover, they also started FM radio station as propaganda tool and media organ, such as *Al-Saha*, collected funds and recruit men from each and every subsection

of the tribe to expand their activities, established *Sharia* courts, banned sources of the government, forced tribal people girls to marry their daughters with to militants and destroyed numerous schools (Rashid 200,239-240).

Some militant groups residing in agencies of Mohmand and Orakzai in FATA, Tank, Banu were making their finances by involving in criminal actions, such as, kidnapping for ransom, killings, taxes on trade and transportation etc (Rana 2009,9). These Non-State actors were aiming at destabilizing Pakistan. In FATA and Swat, they have not only murdered 400 Maliks but also civilians, religious leaders and personals of security forces were killed by them (Parveen, Khalil, & Shah, 2014). The State of Pakistan wanted to control and calm the situation by initially conducting peaceful dialogues. Subsequently, a peace deal was signed between eminent tribesmen of Shakai and Musharraf administration, which could not control the activities of Taliban in FATA (Rana & Gunaratna 2008, 71). Hence, calming down the hostilities of Pakistani Taliban, State of Pakistan decided to conduct massive operations to deal with the situation. Operation Sher-Dil in Bajaur on September 9, 2008. In April 26, 2009, operation named Operation Rah-e-Rast, in Swat valley. Safe havens' of militants in Orakzai Agency were dismantled by the air strikes in Bara, the Operation *Sirat-e-Mustakin* (the path of the righteous) was conducted, as a lot of killings of minorities were done by the militants. On 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 2011 Operation Koh-e-Sufaid was launched in Kurrum Agency (Parveen, Khalil, & Shah, 2014, 239-252), and then Operation Zarb-e-Azab was started in June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2014, in North Waziristan. Operation Zarb e Azab though reduced the number and influence of Taliban in North Waziristan. These militants found safe shelter in Kunar (Afghanistan) mostly and went there. But victory against militancy cannot be claimed by the security forces as various military outfits are still presently working, such as, Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Lashkar-i-Khorasan, Jamat-ud-Dawa, Lashkar-i-Jhagvi etc (Mehmood & Azeem 2007).

The retaliation of militants towards the operation Zarb-e-Azab was extremely heartless. They killed 135 students of an army run school based in Peshawar. Whole nation was grieved and international community mourned with Pakistan (Nahyan 2016, 51-52). This tragic day in December 2014 was declared as "*a national tragedy day unleashed by savages*", by the Prime Minister of Pakistan (Dawn, 2014). Military courts were established as a response to militarism and within one year 2,763 militants were killed and around 90000 submitted (Shahid, 2015).

Major concern faced by the State of Pakistan was the efficient settlement of internally displaced people (IDPS) after military operations conducted in FATA. These offensive military operations ended in creating major security and humanitarian problems. Consequently, 298,600 families displace from FATA according to the FATA Disaster Management Authority. Managing these IDP'S and then returning them safely back home

was a challenge for civil and military administration of the state. But International agencies and State both could not fulfill this task (Shinwari 2010, 40). FATA, Research Center in 2013 stated researching on the major problems IDPs were facing and found out that most of the problems were related to children and women, like, health, hygiene, loss of identity, food problems and lack of shelter.

US for targeting foreign and local militants in FATA started using Drone. Obama administration emphasized more on drone attacks with introduction of signature strikes, than Bush's administration. Obama, in 2013, implemented the rules for relying more on intelligence information in these drone attacks to avoid civilian casualties but lots of civilian lost their lives as it was declared by US that "*proposed targets are imminent to threats to US*" (Entous 2015). Though, many militants were killed in drone attacks but Al-Qaida kept on recruiting new militants from FATA. From 2005 till April 2013, according to South Asian Terrorism Portal around 270 drone attacks were reported which resulted in killing 2496 people.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in the wake of drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan, US would use drone strategy for attacking militant hiding in FATA.

Pakistan supported USA in catching several militants of Al-Qaida and numerous were also arrested from the major cities of Pakistan with the support of CIA (Hussain, 122-140). Militants, who were involved in attack on Parliament of India, escaped and found safe refuge at Azad Kashmir or FATA (Haque, 11). Militants kept finding refuge in tribal belt of Pakistan, For instance, Al-Jazeera TV exposed that leader of Al-Qaida, along with his vicegerent Ayman Alzawhiri, was seen roaming around the mountainous South Waziristan in 2003 (Rashid 2008, 270).

## **Pakistan's Participation in War on Terror: Socio-Political Impact on FATA**

Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR)<sup>2</sup> deals with Law in FATA. It gives Political, Administrative and some sweeping judicial powers to Political Agent (P.A) appointed by the government in center of any agency. FCR gives inclusive power to the P.A of arresting any or all members of the tribe

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<sup>1</sup> South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), Drone attack in Pakistan: 2005-2015.

<sup>2</sup> Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) comprises a special set of laws of Pakistan which are applicable to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of northwestern Pakistan. The law states that three basic rights are not applicable to the residents of FATA – *appeal i-e*, the right to request a change to a conviction in any court., *wakeel* the right to legal representation i-e, and *daleel* i-e, the right to present reasoned evidence, respectively. The FCR has its origins in the Murderous Outrages Regulation (FOR) which was enacted by the British Empire to prosecute crimes in British India. The Murderous Outrages Act 1877 was specifically devised to counter the opposition of the Pashtuns to British rule, and their main objective was to protect the interests of the British Empire. The laws are currently applied by the Government of Pakistan to FATA residents.

whose member has committed crime. Moreover, actions taken by P.A could not be challenged in any High Court, Supreme Court or any Court of Law (Sabri:1999,202) P.A possessed an absolute authority in political and administrative sphere. The main instrument through which P.A controls his Political Agency and administration are Maliks<sup>3</sup> of the Tribe. For attainment of loyalty and favour of these Maliks, they are paid and privileged by P.A. these privileges includes hospitals, jirga Halls, Schools, jobs in Khasadar force. Such government institutions granted to them were either used as guest house/ rooms or they used to sell them further.(Focus on FATA: 2005, 4) Hence, Maliks serve as a bridge between P.A's administration and tribes. They not only played role of the mouth piece of P.A, conveyed their messages and decisions to their people but also did spying for the P.A. Consequently, conducting such significant tasks for the political administration in agencies makes these Maliks influential and plays a very important role in local jirgas<sup>4</sup>(Khan, 78).

Under FCR, in tribal system any debatable issues raised between political administrations of the relative agency with tribesmen of that agency, are resolved by jirga system. These influential Maliks in actual practice just used to read out the verdict in jirgas and these verdicts were handed to Maliks by P.A.

Post 9/11, Pakistan decided to side along US and its allies in War against militants of Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan. These militants after facing aggression in Afghanistan started moving across the border through porous border they share with Pakistan. FATA, located on Durand line became best option for Taliban to convert it in their camp for further planning (Washington Post: 2007, 3).

Tension mounted on Indo-Pak border around 2002 and Pakistan stopped deploying its army on western border, it also gave a good chance to Taliban for establishing allies with local tribes in FATA. (Rashid: 2010, 148) Taliban wanted support and favour of locals in FATA; they started punishing/hanging criminals and dacoits. They threw the image of implementing true Islam. Taliban in FATA banned internet, television and setup their own Courts and administration. A recruitment office was setup in Wana (South Waziristan) (Zahid Hussain: 2010, 97).

Since long FATA was deprived of their rights and privileges by the government that is the reason they found relieve in Taliban's Amir Court (Zahid Hussain: 2010, 97).

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<sup>3</sup> Malik is the leader of the Tribe in FATA. Yet doesn't possess absolute powers. Several factors for the attainment of the title of Malik are: experience, charismatic personality, inter-personal communication skills, wealth, family back ground and influence and approval of government .

<sup>4</sup> A formal meeting called by the tribal elders for the settlement of disputes, with the power to impose penalty on both the disputed parties.

Political Administration of P.A in FATA was replaced by Court of Taliban's Amir. Amir's Court had Shura which was comprised of Ulema who used to interpret Islamic Law in accordance with local traditions and customs (The Frontier Post: 2006). These courts soon gained confidence of tribal people by providing speedy justice to them. Taliban's position strengthened in FATA. Subsequently, Taliban to further strengthen their positions had to get rid of Maliks and Political Agents. Courts of Amir commenced jihad by claiming all Maliks and political Agents corrupt. They were then killed or kidnapped for ransom by Taliban (Shah Sikandar, 2005). Consequently, Amir became the chief of maintaining Law and Order in FATA. Eventually, the power struggle was won by the Mulla from Maliks, resulting in ending the power system exercised by Maliks and Political Agents setup by British government (Shah Sikandar, 2005).

### **Impact on Society**

FATA, due to lack of urbanization, illiteracy, absence of modern institutions and detachment from national mainstream remained more traditional and rigid in their practices. Pakhtunwali<sup>5</sup> is very religiously practiced in FATA. Post 9/11 changes in the region also brought changes in Pakhtunwali and some new and abrupt trends were also inculcated in the tribal societies of FATA (Economist: 2007). People in tribal belt were inclined towards the sharia state installed in Afghanistan during Taliban era. Later, post 9/11 the presence of these Taliban in Tribal belt and their imposition of Islam according to their own interpretation repelled people and their ideological inclination towards Taliban rule reduced.<sup>6</sup>

### **Extremism**

FATA was comprised of Pathans who were comparatively more peaceful than Pathans residing in settled areas. Moreover, the crime rate in FATA was lesser than the developed areas. Regardless, of the fact that during Soviet war in Afghanistan, US flooded FATA with dollars and jihadi

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<sup>5</sup> Pathan community as a whole and FATA in particular is hosts to hundreds of customs and traditions. They take pride in their code of life. This code of life is known as Pakhtunwali. Pakhtunwali consists of some common habits and practices like , Melmastia (Hospitality), Nanawati (application of mercy/ status of forgiveness), Badal (revenge) the only way to avoid Badal is Nanawati, Naang (courage, generosity, grace), Ghairat (courage to protect one's own rights or tribe's prestige), Marrana (bravery), Jirga (formal meeting called by Tribal elders for the settlement of disputes with the power to impose penalty on both the disputing parties), Athanr (special tribal dance), Badi (animosity), Badraga (if anyone happens to move through the tribal territory, his protection is the responsibility of that tribe through which he moves), Cheegha (constituting a team of tribe).

<sup>6</sup> Personal interview from Danishver Afridi, Associate Professor in University of Peshawar, belongs to Gaum (tribal area) and research scholar.

groups were indulged into jihad, they remained peaceful but religious extremism kept rising (Ahmad: 1983).

These jihadi groups fought for US objectives in Afghanistan, later after Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan; these groups became active for attainment of Strategic Depth a long term determinant of Pakistan Afghan policy, in Afghanistan. But, post 9/11 Pakistan joining GWOT of US against Al-Qaida, this strategy of Strategic Depth was initially kept aside (Hilali: 2005, 249). Pakistan, Post 9/11 decided not only to fight for US but also agreed on sharing intelligence, providing logistic support for trekking and handing over Al-Qaida members and Taliban to them. This situation was alarming for Al-Qaida and Taliban and they started crossing long and porous Pak-Afghan border, making tribal belt of Pakistan as their new base. These jihadis were comprised of not only native Taliban but also foreign jihadis (Christine.Nicholas:2006, 2).

US pressure, asking and expecting “Do more “from Pakistan Army became intense and resulted in operation in FATA(discussed in above).These operations and drone attacks by US in FATA resulted in killing innocents there. Consequently, anti-US feelings and hatred for Pakistan’s Army started flourishing. In the meanwhile, Jihadi propaganda by militants through Radio in FATA commenced, which resulted in converting the minds of illiterate and innocent people to believe and strive for Badal (Spain: 1963, 64) against Pakistan Army. They challenged the Government’s writ and attacks over security forces and kidnapping of government servants started taking place. Hence, extremism and violence became so intense that the area which was previously peaceful turned into war zone.

## **Impact over Social Practices**

### **Enmity**

Tribal men being illiterate used to be involved in inter tribal fueds and enmity. They used to be in fueds with their cousins (Tarboors). With the rising of Taliban’s influence in tribal area, those tribes who were weak in front of their Tarboor found chance of increasing their strength by joining Taliban. On contrary, it also complimented Taliban’s rise and strength in FATA. These weak tribals got strength form Taliban and could easily take revenge from their Tarboor either by killing or kidnapping them. Destabilizing the economic strength and position of Tribes according to their wishes became easy for them (Frontier Post: 2007).

FATA is a mountainous area. Several tribes lives on mountains and at times enmity arises on the claim of ownership of the mountain. This enmity is based on Tribal’s intra-fueds “Wesh” means division on inheritance (Spain: 1972, 89). Such ownership claims are decided by jirgas if not, they

remained disputed. Amir of Taliban post 9/11 resolved or intensified these claims on the basis of their own interest.

### **Status of Women**

Under tribal practices women play no role in decision making, economic fields' etc. Tribal society has always been a male dominating society. In plain parts of FATA women observed strict "Purdah" means veil (IPRI: 2008, 31). In contrary, those parts of FATA which are mountainous, women used to go to "Gudaar" a place consisting of natural water reservoirs to fetch water. They also used to go out for the purpose of collecting woods for liting fire for cooking. Hence, there were hardly some restrictions over the movement of women in these mountainous areas. Though, women there kept conducting their duties in accordance to the wishes of male members of their family. Though, they used to move freely but no one could dare to intrude in the honour of women due to strict tribal practices and tribal codes which cannot even hesitate in granting death penalty if someone spoils the chastity of women.

Some practices regarding women used to be observed like if anyone in a family kill someone from another family, and then the jirga decide the punishment Qisa, Deyat or Swara for the family of the culprit. That particular punishment will be granted by the family of the deceased. Swara, is when the assassins family gives the hand of woman from their family to the family of deceased (Hussain: 1990, 30). This practice compels women to bear the punishment of the crime which she has never committed. FATA women in some parts of Tribal areas were also sold like a commodity. The amount paid for a woman is dependent upon how active she is in different household tasks, her beauty also compliments in her value. This practice is known as "Sar", means head money or bride's money. If a woman is a divorce she could still be sold but her price reduces. Polygamy is a normal practice in tribal society.

After Pakistan's participation in crushing militants with US in Afghanistan and then movement of Taliban in FATA and establishment of Amir's court, practices related to women altered abruptly. Amir of Taliban imposed strictness on purdah and movement of women. Previously, the head money for a woman ranged between PKR 1-2 lakhs, but Amir fixed this money at PKR 80,000 .He also claimed that this head money should be considered as a dowry which should be paid to her guardian instead of her. Engagements of infants by their families were declared null and void by Taliban Amir and he claimed that such practices were against the Islamic rights granted to people. Under Taliban's influence a choice to the divorced women is given of either leading her life at her Father's or Brother's place or she wants to re-marry. If she opts for re marrying then she should be married in her previous in-laws.

Swara was also banned by Taliban. Women could only commit legal marriages and could not be used as a commodity under Taliban's administration. As a punishment for crime only options given to the deceased family was Diyat, Qisas and forgiveness. Women though were kept within four walls of their house but were also granted some basic rights which they were deprived off earlier.

### **Arms Carrying Custom**

FATA have never changed and developed in political, constitutional and legal sphere, reason being ruled under FCR, Since it was installed in 1901. Moreover, state does not take responsibility of protection of fundamental rights of tribes and of its people. Consequently, people of FATA protect their rights themselves. This leads to carrying of arms and weapons with them when they move around. Hence, possession and carrying of arms has become a common practice there (Shinwari: 2008, 45). The arms tribals used to carry ranged from the simplest dagger to the most modern arm, i-e, kalashnikov popularly known as AK-47. Carrying these arms was also considered as a symbol of status. But, using these arms was not very common as the code of conduct of FATA brings strict repercussions then.

Arms sophistication in FATA started post Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (ibid, 46). factories of arms and weapons were installed in most of the agencies. Miran Shah, headquarter of North Waziristan Agency and Derra Adam Khel are quite famous for the production of arms and its dealing.

Post 9/11, conventional arms like dagger and rifle were replaced by high quality explosives and suicide jackets. It was then used by the militants for target killing, public slaughtering and suicidal attacks.

### **Education**

Government of Pakistan never took educational system in FATA seriously. That is the reason that the improvement in educational system in FATA was very slow. There were thousands of primary, middle and high schools in FATA. But, instead of using them for educational purposes they were either given by P.A as a bribe to Maliks of the particular agency or sell to them in order to gain their favour and cooperation. These Maliks used to become owner of the building famously known as Malik-i-Makan there. (Rahmanullah:2007) the literacy rate in FATA was 17%, out of that female literacy rate was just 3% .(ibid)

Teaching staff in FATA was more obedient to Maliks because they had power to transfer them according to their will. These schools were used as Hujras (place for guests). Many schools in FATA were ghosts' schools. Though these schools used to get their funds for repairing, furniture and other educational purposes. Ghost schools kept withdrawing their salaries. Since,



female education system was not very popular and supportive there, girls schools were not functioning. Secondly, female teachers appointed there were mostly not local, and living in FATA was not very easy and accessible for them.<sup>7</sup>

Post 9/11, Taliban after taking refuge in FATA from the aggression of US and its allies in Afghanistan targeted schools mostly. They specially focused more on girl's schools. Taliban declared female education unislamic (Hussain Zahid: 2010, 97). Taliban blew many girls school.

Government servants appointed there in FATA, were warned by Taliban for performing their duties. Ultimately, all educational activities and institutions were closed down by Taliban(FATA: 2006).

Taliban's basic focus was on religious based education focusing more on jihadi curriculum and literature. To fulfill their objective they established chains of Madrassas where religious teaching based on jihadi curriculum was taught. Moreover, training centers for jihad were established throughout FATA (Maleki:2009).

### **Economic Life**

FATA has mountainous terrain. It has small pieces of land between mountain, crops like wheat, Maze, Rice, Sugarcane and fruits like orange, apple, peach and dates were produced there. Some dry fruits like nuts and chalgosas. The climate of FATA is suitable for agriculture but the terrain is not. Those small pieces of land between the mountains were cultivated by farmers. They used to earn their bread and butter from farming. Other common means of earning livelihood apart from farming was small business, daily wagging as a worker or shop keeper (FATA:2006).

Post GWOT, 2001, FATA faced in secured scenario for life and property distracted economic activities of residents there. Taliban for raising funds for the purpose of jihadi activities started imposing tax on the tribals, who were indulged in any kind of business or work.

The economy of FATA turned into war economy people joining Taliban for any rank or activity/task were paid by Taliban. Those tribals who lend their houses to the members of Al-Qaida organization were paid heavy rents. Those tribals who were helping Taliban either local or foreigner were becoming rich (Frontier Post: 2007). Hence, those Tribals helping in providing safe sanctuary to Taliban or any other task for them became rich and powerful, and they used their power for killing any one.

Post 9/11 smuggling routes for exploitation of Trade Transit agreement of Afghanistan<sup>8</sup> were illegally either re-exported or sold in Pakistan.

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<sup>7</sup> Personal interview with Khaddim Hussain,(2017, May 15) , managing Director at Bacha Khan Trust, Academic writer and was present during Shakai peace agreement between state and terrorist in tribal belt.

<sup>8</sup> Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, under which goods may be imported duty.

### Total Schools Destroyed

Agency/Region	Boys	Girls	Total
Bajaur	68	27	95
Mohmand	66	22	88
Khyber	31	27	58
Kurram	45	16	61
Orakzai	23	11	34
North Waziristan	23	9	32
South Waziristan	29	6	35
FR Peshawar	11	4	15
FR Kohat	17	15	32
FR Tank	2	2	4
FR Lakki	2	2	4
Total	317	141	458

**Source:** FATA Research Centre

**Note:** The schools destroyed include primary, middle, high and secondary schools and a college.

### Conclusion

Pakistan's post 9/11 Afghan Policy could not fulfill main objectives of Pakistan in Afghanistan such as: non-Pashtuns were empowered post Bonn Agreement 2001 in Kabul, Indian influence in Afghanistan increased in reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan, even Karzai sent his army for training to India. All these actions from India were supported and encouraged by US. Pakistan always aimed at reaching to energy rich Central Asian market but could not attain this objective too as constant militancy and destabilization was a hurdle.

Pakistan's tribal belt bordering Afghanistan is rigid, conservative, politically disorganized, way too behind in development from rest of the state led it to radicalization soon. Resultantly, militancy from across the border defused and started strengthening its roots. Post 9/11, this tribal belt known as FATA not only became hub for Pashtun Taliban but also non-Pashtun Talibans.

Pakistan policy makers thinking that policy of dividing Taliban as good and bad in Afghanistan will be in their favour but this policy option bought all the actors in Afghanistan against Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan started facing isolation in the world; one more objective of Pakistan in joining GWOT remained unsuccessful. Moreover, Pakistan was also targeted and blamed for double game.

Pakistan remained unsuccessful in attaining its interest in Afghanistan by taking lead in GWOT and could not transform its status into strategic

partner of the leading powers in Afghanistan. Pakistan not only faced loss in form of men (security personals, civilians, students) but also economically. Moreover political instability, clash in military and civilian setup, dis harmony in different religious factions, extremism, radicalization in society.

Since US along with its allies decided to drawdown in Afghanistan by 2014 and leaving necessary forces in Afghanistan, gave rise to concern from regional players like China, Iran and Russia, in Afghanistan as they were concerned of Taliban again gaining power and taking over Kabul. This convergence in objective led all these players came on one table with US.

Pakistani policy makers showed shortsightedness in differentiating between good and bad Taliban and developing feeling of apprehension among regional and international players in Afghanistan. Consequently, US after drawdown of its forces from Afghanistan seemed interested in shifting of supply and trade route from Afghanistan to Northern Distribution Network (NDN) in order to reduce dependence on Pakistan. This strategic shifting is not only an attempt to push Pakistan more into international isolation but also Islamabad losing an important card for Afghanistan and US.

Pakistan became victim of its own Afghan policy. Lost its internal peace and security, internationally started getting isolation and bringing its enemy on eastern border closer to US major player in Afghanistan. Pakistan should reconsider its Afghan policy. Pakistani policy makers should start considering about the objective of economic depth as it will enhance Afghanistan's dependence more on Pakistan. Secondly, stable and peaceful Afghanistan should be the aim instead of Plaintiff regime in Afghanistan.

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## REPATRIATION VS SETTLEMENT: THE FUTURE OF POST-1989 KASHMIRI REFUGEES IN AZAD KASHMIR

*Dr. Faizur Rehman\* and Anna Aziz\*\**

### **Abstract**

*Due to the diverse reasons, people have been migrating from one place to another since centuries. Kashmir conflict is one of the world's unsettled conflicts, which has negative implications on regional security and stability, with no termination in sight for the tumult. Since the beginning of uprising in 1988, the Jammu & Kashmir region has been the spot of dreadful violence, death and displacement. Due to the unrest, thousands of refugees have crossed over to Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K, shortly AK) and encountered a number of tangible and intangible challenges; however, the AK Government has given certain incentives to these refugees. On the other hand, the Government of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K, also known as Indian Occupied Kashmir) has introduced Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy in November 2010 to facilitate the return of these refugees, yet, due to certain reasons, the policy has remained unsuccessful in achieving its goal. Though refugees have been entering into the social fabrics of the local communities through intermarriages and socio-economic ventures since 1989, yet the Government is still indecisive about their future settlement. This study is focused on the issues and challenges to the refugees, Government response and the possible solution regarding their future settlement.*

**Key Words:** *Repatriation, Settlement, Baradary, IDPs, Ceasefire Line, Line of Control, Identity, Indo-Pak, Gojri, Pahari/Hindu, UNHCR, Azadi, Refugee-like, Forced Migrants, Rugs, Namdas, Kurtas, Paper Machie and Pherans*

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\* Assistant Professor, Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Muzaffarabad.

\*\* Research Associate, Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Muzaffarabad.

## **Introduction**

Forced migration is an intricate practice opted by numerous people for many centuries. There are certain reasons for migration which have displaced millions of people across the world and as a result of migration people face various types of challenges in the new regions of settlement, which take decades in settling down, particularly in the conflict zones. Jammu & Kashmir region has been one of these conflict zones that forced millions of people to leave their homeland for their safety and security since decolonization and partition of British-India in 1947. Since then, there have been certain spells of migration in both directions as a sizeable Muslim-population migrated from Jammu & Kashmir to Azad Kashmir (Under Pakistani Control), especially after the India-Pakistan War (Indo-Pak War) of 1947, followed by 1965, 1971 and finally after the 1988 uprising in the J&K. Similarly, the Non-Muslims, predominantly Hindu-community settled in the liberated part of AK migrated to J&K.

According to some analysts, the position of 1989 refugees is relatively different as compared to the earlier Kashmiri refugees which made their position more critical as they have been directly or indirectly involved in the uprising since 1988 while the earlier refugees were the war-refugees. After the migration, these refugees had to face certain snags; however, the official sources claim that Government tried to address their anxieties at its level best. These Refugees can be divided into two categories: (A)-Migration from Kashmiri speaking belt mainly from the urban areas such as Srinagar, Baramulla, Pulwama, Badgam, Kupwara, Islamabad (Anantnag) and Shopian. Majority of these individuals had crossed the LoC for arms training and later they involved themselves in militancy in J&K.

(B)- Migration from Gojri, Pahari/Hindu speaking belt (mostly families) chiefly from the areas adjoining to the Line of Control (LoC). Later, these refugees from urban areas married local girls in AK and since the introduction of Rehabilitation Policy of J&K Government 2010, around five-hundred militants along with their families have returned to J&K. Some sources claim that owing to cultural and linguistic barriers, these families could not modify themselves into the Kashmiri-culture. Therefore, some people are of the opinion that the remaining refugees should be settled in AK without any prejudice to their original status.

## **Methodology**

Qualitative approach is utilised in this study. The data is collected through one to one in-depth elite interviews. Apart from audio and video recording, hand written notes are taken from participants. The sample is comprised of 20 interviews from leading figures amongst Kashmiri refugees, mid-rankers refugees living in the camps, opinion makers and officials of



Rehabilitation Department, Government of AK Muzaffarabad. An attempt is made to get access through email or telephone in taking the opinion of certain researchers from J&K on board who are working in the same area of study. Some data including documents (in soft & hard copies), prepared by Government departments, and NGOs working with refugees is also used.

## **A Brief History of Human Migration**

Migration has been a complex practice that opted by numerous people within the geographical confines of the respective States and sometimes across the borders. Conflicts and wars were amongst the leading causes of mammoth migration athwart the world. The first gigantic migration in the modern era took place after the World War II in which around 40 million refugees displaced across the Europe which was one of the largest migrations in European history.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the partition of British India on religious lines in 1947 led to the migration of approximately 14.5 million people in both directions followed by the millions of refugees till today.<sup>2</sup> Since then, the process of migration is on its way in different regions of the world in different shapes, however, with the termination of cold war, the pattern of global migration or internally displacement has been shifting from international level to intra-State conflicts which caused intensifying numbers of displaced people within their own States.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, there has been a difference in interpretation amongst the political analysts and jurists as far as the difference between refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) are concerned. The word refugee is often used for the people who leave their homeland and migrate from one place to another place as a result of natural or man-made disasters. Natural disasters include volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis and floods and man-made disasters like conflicts, wars and violence etc. According to the Lexicon Universal Encyclopaedia, “refugees are the persons who have fled their country or been expelled from it and who cannot or will not return because they fear persecution.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mona Chalabi, “What happened to history’s refugees?,” *The guardian*, July 25, 2013, accessed May 28, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/interactive/2013/jul/25/what-happened-history-refugees#World War II>

<sup>2</sup> Adrienne Millbank, *The problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention* (Information and Research Services, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2000), accessed May 28, 2016, [http://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Parliamentary\\_Departments/Parliamentary\\_Library/pubs/rp/rp0001/01RP05#refugee](http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0001/01RP05#refugee)

<sup>3</sup> Conflicts in Iraq, Kashmir and Syria are its prime examples.

<sup>4</sup> S. J. Foderaro, A. C. Kimmens, and S. Moll, “Lexicon universal encyclopedia,” *New York: Lexicon Publications, Inc* 5 (1983): 125.

## Recognition of Refugees and Internally Displaced People

Even until World War II (WWII), there was no fixed definition of refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs). It was 1948, when under Article 14 of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A, accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was the landmark in history of human rights in acknowledging the right of refugees in the other States.<sup>5</sup> Later, in 1951, United Nations Refugee Convention established guidelines regarding the Status of refugees, which was the significant valid document in defining the status of refugees, their rights and the licit liabilities of countries.<sup>6</sup> According to the Article 1A (2) of the 1951 of the Geneva Convention on Refugees, “a refugee is a person who is outside his/her country of nationality on the sound reasons for anxiety of being victimized because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group or political belief, and is incapable to attain protection from home State or the person who do not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitation.”<sup>7</sup> In Europe, “a person is entitled for subsidiary protection status means a third country national or Stateless who would face a real risk of suffering serious harm<sup>8</sup> if he/she returns to the country of origin.”<sup>9</sup>

The definition of IDPs is relatively different from that of refugee because the term IDPs is used for those people who move from one place to another as a result of war, disaster, political or racial discrimination but do not cross an international boundary and unlike refugees they do not need to go through any practice to determine their legal status while refugees are those people who cross international borders in order to escape themselves from the human rights abuses and conflicts.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” (1948), accessed May 29, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>

<sup>6</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The 1951 Refugee Convention,” *UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency*, accessed May 12, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html>

<sup>7</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, UNHCR, 1967, accessed May 12, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> Serious harm is defined as the risk of death penalty or execution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin.

<sup>9</sup> Council Directive, “83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted,” *OJ L 304*, no. 30 (2004): 09, accessed May 29, 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4157e75e4.html>

<sup>10</sup> A. Bets, and Gil Loescher, *Refugees in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

## Forced Migration of Kashmiris

As a result of decolonization and partition of British India into India and Pakistan on communal lines, one of the world's largest displacements of population in both directions took place in the mid of 20<sup>th</sup> century wherein around 8.5 million people migrated from India to Pakistan and about 6 million from Pakistan to India, however, some estimates indicated that the figure of displaced persons may have been as high as 25 to 30 million.<sup>11</sup> Since then, both the countries have entrenched into the conflicts and wars.<sup>12</sup> Due to wars, conflicts and fear of persecution, massive migration of Kashmiri refugees/IDPs from J&K to AK took place in diverse spells. During the Indo-Pak war of 1947-48, approximately one and a half million refugees migrated from J&K to AK and settled in the various cities in AK and Pakistan.<sup>13</sup>

The Indo-Pak war of 1965 caused the second round of migration from J&K to AK. According to the Department of Rehabilitation and Relief Muzaffarabad, approximately ten thousand families (around forty thousand people) migrated, which were settled in different areas of Punjab (Pakistan).<sup>14</sup> The third stage of migration took place during the war of 1971, when around ten thousand people crossed the Ceasefire Line and entered into AK.<sup>15</sup> These migrants were settled in different camps in Azad Kashmir. The fourth phase of migration was witnessed after the mass movement against the Indian occupation in the J&K in 1989.

According to the report of Department of Rehabilitation and Relief Muzaffarabad, Government of AK, the number of registered refugee-families who crossed over since 1989 is 6853, out of which, 3735 families are living in refugees' camps while the rest of the families residing in hired accommodations in and around cities.<sup>16</sup> According to record of Azad Kashmir Rehabilitation Department, there are 20 refugee camps in different districts of AK including: Poonch, Bagh, Muzaffarabad, Mirpur and Kotli; however, an overwhelming of them temporarily settled in Muzaffarabad district.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ragini Trakroo Zutshi, Jayshree Satpute, and Masood Tahir, *Refugees and the Law* (New Delhi: Socio Legal Information Cent, 2011), 58.

<sup>12</sup> Donald Johnson, "India-Pakistan Relations: A 50-Year History," *Asia Society*, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://asiasociety.org/countries/conflicts/india-pakistan-relations-50-year-history>

<sup>13</sup> P. Banerjee, Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhuri and Samir Kumar Das, *Internal Displacement in South Asia* (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2005).

<sup>14</sup> Khalid Rahman, "Kashmiri Refugees: Facts, Issues and the Future Ahead," *Policy Perspectives* (2006): 43-67.

<sup>15</sup> Robinson, *Body of Victim Body of Warrior*, 56.

<sup>16</sup> Data (1989-2016) collected from the office of the Azad government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir Commissionerate Rehabilitation, Muzaffarabad.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

## Pattern of Migration

The Kashmiri forced refugees can be divided into two main categories:

1. Refugees from 1947 to 1988
2. Post-1989 refugees

The refugees, who crossed over from J&K to AK till 1988, were the war-effectees of 1947, 1965 and 1971. The security and safety of these refugees was their main preference while the sizeable refugees of 1989 have been involved in militancy since 1988.<sup>18</sup>

The refugees of 1989 can be further divided into two groups:

- (A) Migration from Gojri, Pahari/Hindu speaking belt chiefly from LoC adjoining rural areas.
- (B) Migration from Kashmiri speaking belt mainly from the urban areas such as Srinagar, Baramulla, Pulwama, Badgam, Kupwara, Islamabad (Anantnag) and Shopian.

According to Raja Izhar Khan, Community Leader & Spokesperson for Nisar Camp Chehla, Muzaffarabad, “The refugees who left their home from the J&K side of LoC catchment areas mainly due to harassment of Indian security forces in suspicion connections with militants as their facilitators in crossing LoC.”<sup>19</sup> Since 1989, these refugees have been crossing LoC in diverse intervals along with their families to reach AK and settled in the different camps in AK. The paramount objective of the migration was the security and safety of their families while the refugees from Kashmiri speaking belt were mostly from the cities, they were individual youngsters who settled in the cities and mostly living in hired houses. Their main purpose of migration was to get arms training and then return to J&K to fight against the Indian occupier forces.<sup>20</sup>

## Status of Kashmiris Forced Migrants

In several cases, it becomes grim to segregate between refugees and IDPs as in case of Kashmiri-refugees who moved from J&K (Indian Occupied Kashmir)<sup>21</sup> to AK (under Pakistani Controlled part of Kashmir)<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> David Devadas, *In search of a future: the story of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Penguin, Viking, 2007), 165. (On July 31, 1988, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) had started an arms struggle in Jammu & Kashmir against the Indian occupation with two-bomb blasts at the Central Telegraph Office Srinagar and Srinagar Club).

<sup>19</sup> Raja Izhar Khan, Personal Interview with main author, Chehla Camps, Muzaffarabad, April 9, 2016.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Terms IOK is used because under 370, India has declared Jammu & Kashmir as its constitutional part.

<sup>22</sup> Terms PAK is used because Pakistan did not declare AK as its constitutional part.

by crossing the Ceasefire Line or Line of Control (LoC).<sup>23</sup> Some people are of the opinion that these people are the refugees because they have migrated from the other side of LoC (J&K) which is now under the Indian sovereignty to AK which is under Pakistani sovereignty and even the AK Government has also issued them the refugee cards.<sup>24</sup>

On the other hand, some law experts consider that the people who migrated from J&K to AK are actually IDPs as they have displaced from the same part of the land and they did not cross the international border while the final decision of the future of the State is still pending.<sup>25</sup> A renowned researcher from University of Washington (U.S.) argued that “the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir was not included in the territorial partition of British colonial India, its subjects were not considered partition-refugees, therefore; they were not counted as people who would have to be rehabilitated into the political life of the new States.”<sup>26</sup> Under the terms and conditions of the Ceasefire,<sup>27</sup> the geographical division of Jammu and Kashmir was theoretically temporary till the final settlement through the plebiscite which was endorsed by the part III the UN resolution of August 13, 1948.<sup>28</sup>

According to the UN report of 1951 on post-war refugees concluded that Partition refugees were not considered refugees by the international community because they have not lost their nationality; therefore, the 1951 Refugee Convention should not apply to Kashmiris.<sup>29</sup> “Kashmiri-refugees settlement was legally temporary and provided for future return to specific properties from which refugees were originally displaced. Each part of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir has made constitutional provisions to preserve the hereditary State Subject Status of displaced people.”<sup>30</sup> The Government of AK had enforced “Azad Jammu & Kashmir Evacuee Property Act” in 1950 which protects the evacuees’ properties in AK.<sup>31</sup> The Cross LoC Travel has further enhanced their status as IDPs because both sides of Kashmir, people cross LoC from the designated points on travel

<sup>23</sup> Ceasefire Line was converted into Line of Control after the Simla Agreement of 1972.

<sup>24</sup> Justice (R) Manzoor Hussain Gillani, Personal Interview with main author, Muzaffarabad, April 29, 2016.

<sup>25</sup> Syed Mudassar Hussain Gardezi, Personal Interview with main author, University of AJ&K, Muzaffarabad, April 27, 2016.

<sup>26</sup> C. D. Robinson, *Too Much Nationality: Kashmiri Refugees, The South Asian Refugee Regime, and a Refugee State, 1947–1974* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 353.

<sup>27</sup> A cease-fire line was recognized under the provision of Part I of the resolution of 13<sup>th</sup> August 1948 as a counterpart of the deferment of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1949.

<sup>28</sup> Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13<sup>th</sup> August 1948. (Document No.1100, Para. 75, dated the 9<sup>th</sup> November, 1948).

<sup>29</sup> Robinson, *Too Much Nationality*, 346.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> A. A. Malik, *Law: Rehabilitation and Property Evacuee Azad Kashmir* (Islamabad: Kashmir Law Publishers, 1996).

permit rather than using passport as a travel document since 2005. Moreover, the identity cards are being issued to these IDPs as the citizens of AK.

### Where Do They Stand?

Despite the UN and other definitions and explanations, AK Government<sup>32</sup> has declared that refugees from J&K who have taken refuge in AK or in Pakistan and could not return to their homes in J&K, would be considered as refugees.<sup>33</sup> However, the interesting point is that despite the notification, the Kashmiri refugees could not get the full refugee status under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) because the 1951 Refugee Convention should not apply to Kashmiri and Indian partition-refugees, either they saw them as being political refugees.<sup>34</sup>

The exclusion of partition-refugees from the definition of refugees because they had not lost their national identities and the protection of their States, however, Indian and Pakistani representatives had protested on it in Refugee Convention.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, Pakistan has neither applied for their refugee status in UNHCR nor asked for aid to UNHCR for these refugees.<sup>36</sup> These refugees are lacking the most of the fundamental rights including the political rights those adopted by UN on July 28, 1951 in line with Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948 which confirms the principle that “human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.”<sup>37</sup> Mohammed Akram, a refugees, told that “We are not getting our basic fundamental rights as refugees.”<sup>38</sup>

Under the UN definition, Kashmiri refugees do not fall in the refugee category, however, analysts argue that this act from AK Government to give them the refugees status, is equivalent to accept the status of LoC as an international border as Justice (R) Syed Manzoor Hussain Gilani, a distinguished jurist, articulates that “indirectly Pakistan has already accepted the status of LoC as a “De-facto border” verified through Simla Agreement

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<sup>32</sup> Under the Rules of Business for Azad Kashmir Government 1952, no draft legislation shall be put before the Council without obtaining the advice of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.

<sup>33</sup> Board of Revenue, “The Land Laws of Azad Jammu & Kashmir,” *Board of Revenue AJ&K, Muzaffarabad*, fifth edition 1996, 852.

<sup>34</sup> Robinson, *Too Much Nationality*, 346.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Under the Karachi Agreement of 28<sup>th</sup> April 1949, regarding Kashmir, Pakistan Government is responsible for all activities such as procurement of food, civil supplies running of refugee camps and medical aid.

<sup>37</sup> Adopted on 28<sup>th</sup> July 1951 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened, under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14<sup>th</sup> December 1950, with effect from April 22, 1954, in accordance with article 43 of UN charter.

<sup>38</sup> Mohammed Akram, Personal Interview with main author, Mirpur, January 12, 2015.

of 1972 and Lahore Agreement of 1998 respectively.”<sup>39</sup> So, where do they stand? The simple answer is that they are the internally displaced people who practically are living in “refugee-like” situation in tents or in rented property in AK and even in some cases few refugees have constructed their own houses in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Anyhow, the term “refugee” will be used from hereafter for these internally displaced people because this is their legal status under the AK law.<sup>40</sup>

### **Problems of Refugees and the Government Response**

Refugees from LoC catchment areas had a poor background while majority of them were living below the poverty line.<sup>41</sup> They were the dwellers of underdeveloped bordering areas and had very limited access to the basic opportunities of life like health, education, and employment. After the migration, shelter, food, health, education and identity were their main trepidations. Despite the limited sources, the AK Government has made efforts to provide them these basic facilities and tried to address other refugees’ problems.<sup>42</sup> While the refugees of second category, married local girls in AK (a significant number) and have developed their families. They were expecting the freedom of Kashmir from Indian occupation, however, the movement got steady decline after the 9/11 incidence when under international pressure, Pakistan had to impose a ban on some of Kashmiri militant organizations.<sup>43</sup> Now some of them believe that the promised destination of Azadi (freedom) is like a day dream.<sup>44</sup>

After their migration and partial settlement in camps, they had to face certain challenges including rehabilitation, education, employment, identity and housing. Government has been taking their issues on its priority list and established a Department of Rehabilitation, headed by Commissioner which acts as a bridge between Government and refugees and is responsible for keeping record of refugees and providing them the financial assistance. Government provides a monthly budget of 30 million rupees to the Rehabilitation Department for the subsistence allowances and other refugee matters.<sup>45</sup> The AK Government has allocated 1500 rupees (equivalent to nearly US\$ 15) per month subsistence allowance for each member of

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<sup>39</sup> Gilani, Personal Interview.

<sup>40</sup> Revenue, “The Land Laws of Azad Jammu & Kashmir.”

<sup>41</sup> Mahmood Bin Muhammad, *The Anatomy of Terrorism* (New Delhi: A.P.H Publication, 2004).

<sup>42</sup> Khawaja Abdul Qayyum, Commissioner Rehabilitation, Personal Interview with main author, Muzaffarabad, April 21, 2016.

<sup>43</sup> BBC News, “Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba,” *BBC News*, May 3, 2010, accessed May 30, 2016, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/3181925.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3181925.stm)

<sup>44</sup> Manzoor Ahmed, Personal Interview with main author, Kotli, December 4, 2015.

<sup>45</sup> Rehman, “Kashmiri Refugees.”

refugees whereas head of the family gets 90 rupees on top of allocated allowance.<sup>46</sup>

However, refugees are not satisfied with existing ratio of stipend as “it is quite unfair because for an average family of six people, the normal monthly budget is roughly RS. 18,000-20,000, hence, we are breathing considerable below the poverty level.”<sup>47</sup> In these circumstances, it becomes almost impossible to bargain the basic essentials of lives. Raja Shehzad Khan narrates, “When my father died, I was crying not for the death of my father but for the reason how will I bury him?”<sup>48</sup> AK Government has promised many times to increase the rate of stipend but nothing happened on ground. Mohammad Shafi, a refugee, states that “This is one of the reasons that some Kashmir families have returned to J&K in last few years and more were ready to return because many families were under the severe pressure of heavy loans.”<sup>49</sup> The AK Government Commissioner Rehabilitation is of the opinion that this is fair amount for refugees as “we [Government] pay stipend to each member of the refugees family even then a vast majority of these refugees have been involved in private sector jobs while we [Government] do not pay any stipend to our [Government] unemployed local people.”<sup>50</sup>

Secondly, the refugees are demanding for allotment of land and construction of houses as promised by Government because the rehabilitations efforts from 1989-2016 in statistical terms met with dulled results in rehabilitation process because of faltering efforts from Governmental sector or international community at holding to its promise of construction.<sup>51</sup> Government has acquired 300 canals land for IDPs while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are funding the project for the construction of housing colony at Thotta near Langurpura on Jehlum Valley road nearly 20 kms from Muzaffarabad. At its first phase, around 240 houses (4-Marla house) will be constructed, however, due to the political grounds, this process is very slow as Raja Izhar is of the view that “politicians want to keep us in their own constituencies for voting purpose and here we have to adopt the tribal (baradary system) lines and we are now being identified as Rajas, Gujjars, Awans, Chaudharies, Khawajas and so on which is new trend for us.”<sup>52</sup> Secondly, at the time of the planning of the housing colony, “we had a small family while it took many years in completing the housing

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<sup>46</sup> Rehabilitation Commissionerate, accessed December 2014, [http://bord.ajk.gov.pk/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=91](http://bord.ajk.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=91)

<sup>47</sup> Raja Izhar Khan, Personal Interview.

<sup>48</sup> Raja Shehzad Khan, Personal Interview with authors, Muzaffarabad, December 10, 2014.

<sup>49</sup> Mohammad Shafi, Personal interview with main author, Muzaffarabad, April 9, 2016.

<sup>50</sup> Khawaja Abdul Qayyum, Personal Interview.

<sup>51</sup> Raja Izhar Khan, Personal Interview.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.



colony and now our families are bigger; hence, the 4-Marla house is insufficient for us.”<sup>53</sup>

In education sector, the AK Government has provided all the available facilities to the children of refugees. The children studying in class 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> classes get 100 rupees while the students of 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> classes obtain 150 rupees and from Inter (12<sup>th</sup> class) to Master level get 300 rupees while university education is free for them. Government has allocated 6% quota for refugees and under this quota, 6% admission seats are reserved for their children in medical colleges, universities and other professional institutions which is huge incentive from the Government end. Muhammad Afzal Dar, Refugee from Nisar Camp, narrates that “We did not have this educational facility in J&K because we belonged to the far flung areas from Srinagar, the capital city of J&K and the J&K Government did not care for us.”<sup>54</sup> Today, the adult literacy rate of refugees in various camps is around 74% which is higher than literacy rate of India (65), Pakistan (56) and AK (64).<sup>55</sup> There are approximately 10-12 doctors and engineers in each refugee-camp in Muzaffarabad.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, 6% employment quota for refugees is also reserved in all the departments, it means that after completing the education, their new generation will be able to get jobs or develop their own businesses for their better future and will be accepted in the local community. Likewise, there is a free access for the refugees to the health facilities.

Identity has been a problem for these refugees since 1989 because National identity is a political perception and a basic dimension of national realization where the inhabitants of the State feel a sense of belonging and recognition. Living in the refugee-camps, these refugees have considerably changed over the decades. Now they have entered into the new phase of their loss of identity. At first, the AK Government issued them ‘Refugee Card’ for their identification which was a matter of great concern amongst them because they had lost their national identity within the geographical limits of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir. Raja Arif Khan states that “in the absence of identity card, the travelling is very difficult for us. We do not possess any documentation for our own identity.”<sup>57</sup> Now the Government has started issuing the ‘National Identity Cards’ to refugees as citizens of AK with the special reference to their place of birth in J&K.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Muhammad Afzal Dar, Refugee from Nisar Camp, Personal Interview with main author, University of AJ&K, Muzaffarabad, April 7, 2016.

<sup>55</sup> A. M. Dar, “Refugees camps of Kashmiri migrants,” (Unpublished M. Phil diss., Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Muzaffarabad, 2016), 41.

<sup>56</sup> Ghulam Hassan Butt, Personal Interview with main author, University of AJ&K, Muzaffarabad, April 7, 2016.

<sup>57</sup> Raja Arif Khan, Personal Interview with authors, Muzaffarabad, December 12, 2014.

<sup>58</sup> Nusrat Izhar, Personal Interview with main author, Chehla Camp, Muzaffarabad, April 9, 2016.

This is not the issue only with the refugees from J&K in AK but also the almost same situation with the refugees who crossed over the Ceasefire Line from AK to J&K in 1947.<sup>59</sup> These refugees living in Kathua, Samba and Jammu districts of J&K State (known as West Pakistan Refugees), are deprived of their basic fundamental rights.<sup>60</sup> They have been demanding citizenship rights, a right to vote for J&K Assembly, right to contest State-Assembly elections for last seven decades. Recently, the J&K Government has decided to issue them the identity certificates so as to help them get jobs in paramilitary forces and other central government establishments as citizens of India which is considered a first step towards getting them permanent resident status and property rights in the State.<sup>61</sup>

### Role of NGOs

On top of the Government efforts, certain Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) are also working with refugees in training and developing their skills in various fields. The positive aspect of NGOs training and skill developing programs is that most of them are focusing their training courses to unlock the potential of women who are around 50% of total population, which will further enhance the 'Government Self-reliance Program for Refugees.' Amongst these NGOs, International Central Asia, in collaboration with Department of Small Industries, has started six-month embroidery training course for women and after the completion of course, each woman is given a loan of RS 0.2 million (two hundred thousand rupees) for opening her own small business.<sup>62</sup> Al-Ansar Welfare Trust is working for uplifting the education standard of refugees children while K-Creations has directed viable support projects on Kashmiri shawl, suiting, knitting products, bed covers, cushions, bags, rugs/namdas (A unique piece of wool-made carpets), Kurtas, Paper-machie and Kashmiri Pherans (traditional winter outfit for both males and females in Kashmir).<sup>63</sup> These entire efforts by the Government and NGOs are indeed resilient efforts that

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<sup>59</sup> Suba Chandran, "The Forgotten People of Jammu and Kashmir: 'Refugees' from PoK," *Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies*, #2182 (2007), accessed May 14, 2016, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-forgotten-people-of-jammu-and-kashmir-refugees-from-pok-2182.html>

<sup>60</sup> <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/west-pakistan-refugees-in-j-k-empty-handed-even-70-years-after-independence/story-Vf3eeYCbvskrykOyi7bFLL.html>

<sup>61</sup> In 1947, 5,764 families migrated to J&K, have now grown to 19,960 families with a population of around 80,000 to 85,000. Of these only 20 families are Muslims. Details available at: <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/west-pakistan-refugee-vs-rohingya-muslim-refugee-turns-into-kashmir-vs-jammu-identity-certificates-spark-protests-and-violence-4446449/>

<sup>62</sup> Dar, "Refugees camps of Kashmiri migrants," 56.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

can potentially be coupled as a growth locomotive for the economic reintegration of refugees.

### **Travel Across the LoC**

The Kashmiri refugees are the product of Indo-Pak endless conflict over Kashmir which caused divided families across the LoC. After the long waiting of around 58 years, both India and Pakistan issued certain standard operating procedures in 2005 regarding the reunion of the divided families across the LoC. However, it was kept limited only to those refugees who had migrated prior to the uprising of 1988, hence, a sizeable number of Kashmiris have been excluded from this facility. Abdul Majid Dar states that “We are very much interested to visit our relatives and area of origin which is natural as we were born and grown up there and anxiously waiting for any good decision regarding softening the LoC and upgrading the agreement for the divided families of 1989 refugees.”<sup>64</sup> On the other side, Khawaja Abdul Qayyum is of the view that “the refugees residing in camps are interested in returning to J&K but it seems almost impossible at this stage because civil and criminal cases have been registered against many of these refugees.”<sup>65</sup>

### **Repatriation VS Rehabilitation Policy**

At the moment, Government has no policy in place regarding the future settlement of these refugees.<sup>66</sup> However, there is a debate between the analysts whether they should be allowed to return to J&K or should be settled in AK. Some analysts believe that option should be given to refugees under the Government of J&K policy announced on November 23, 2010, which enabled the return of ex-militants who belonged to J&K and had crossed over to AK or Pakistan between January 1, 1989 and December 31, 2009 for arms training purposes but have given up mutinous actions and were disposed to return to the State.<sup>67</sup> “The returnee shall not be entitled to any of the special benefits or Privileges available in the existing surrender/rehabilitation Policy.”<sup>68</sup>

Currently, the Rehabilitation Policy of J&K Government seems to be complex and problematic because the former militants were permitted to enter only through the designated crossings points like Wagah, Salamabad, Chakan-da-bagh or through the Indira Gandhi International Airport, New

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<sup>64</sup> Abdul Majid Dar, Personal Interview with main author, University of AJ&K, Muzaffarabad, April 9, 2016.

<sup>65</sup> Khawaja Abdul Qayyum, Personal Interview.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Government of J&K Home Department, “Policy and Procedure for return of Ex-Militants to Jammu and Kashmir State,” *Order No. Home 1376 (ISA)*, 23/11/2010, accessed April 20, 2016, <http://jkhome.nic.in/Rehabilitation%20policy.pdf>

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

Delhi.<sup>69</sup> Under this policy, around 500 families have returned to J&K through Nepal border.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, they could not take any advantage of the said policy and face strict security restrictions.<sup>71</sup> The miserable part is that “our families in J&K are constantly being interrogated by intelligence agencies while if we go back; we will be viewed with suspicion as Pakistani agents.”<sup>72</sup>

India wants refugee to return through the designated points, however, there is an opinion that Indian policy makers can take statements from these returnees regarding the Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir’s uprising or Kashmiris’ betray from on-going movement and release it through the electronic and print media to the international community that Kashmiris have surrendered their movement. On the other hand, Pakistan will not allow them to travel through the LoC because the policymakers think that the return of refugees will last negative impact on on-going Kashmir movement.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, foreign delegates visit these refugee camps which provide an opportunity for Pakistan in moving a campaign against India for committing human rights violations in J&K. In all this regional politics, the people of Kashmir suffer at worse.<sup>74</sup> Equally, under the Rehabilitation Policy, going back to J&K would mean surrendering to India and accepting its rule, which would give an edge to the Indian Government.

Secondly, due to the bitter failure on the economic front, J&K Government have been unable in creating job opportunities for returnees where according to the report of Economic Survey for the financial year 2011-12, the number of unemployed youth is 6.01 lakhs (5.3 percent unemployment) in September 2011 as compared to 1.11 lakhs in 2007.<sup>75</sup> This situation is quite alarming for refugees in AK who are thinking to choose the return-option. Another serious issue with Kashmiri speaking youngsters (90 % militants) who married local girls in AK and returned to J&K with their families under 2010 Rehabilitation Policy is that their families could not modify themselves in the new environment as people of Valley of Kashmir are culturally and linguistically distinct from the people of AK.

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Abdul Majid Dar, op. cit.

<sup>71</sup> [http://www.bbc.com/urdu/regional/2016/06/160625\\_pakistani\\_woman\\_in\\_kashmir\\_sr](http://www.bbc.com/urdu/regional/2016/06/160625_pakistani_woman_in_kashmir_sr)

<sup>72</sup> Human Right Watch, “With Friends Like These: Human Rights Violations in Azad Kashmir,” *Human Rights Watch*, Volume 18, no. 12 (C) (2006):63, accessed April 30, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/pakistan0906/pakistan0906web.pdf>

<sup>73</sup> Dar, Personal Interview.

<sup>74</sup> Raja Majeed, Personal interview with main author, Chehla Camp, Muzaffarabad, April 10, 2016.

<sup>75</sup> Sumit Hakhoo, “JK has 6 lakh jobless youth,” *Greater Kashmir*, March 3, 2012, accessed March 12, 2016, <http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/news/jk-has-6-lakh-jobless-youth/114847.html>

These returnees live in Kashmiri (Koshur) speaking areas where Kashmiri language is new for their wives and children while Kashmiris live in joint family system as compared to the small-family system in AK which is unaffordable for these families.<sup>76</sup> Thirdly, at the time of their arrival in AK in 1989 or early 1990s, they were single but after 20 years on, each of them has developed his family from 4-6 people (including children). Due to the financial crisis, they have no mechanism in place to settle themselves there. Additionally, the local people considered these people as traitors who caused trouble for them.<sup>77</sup> It is reported that one of the families have been returned back to AK and even in few cases, some of the refugees have left their families behind in AK and returned to J&K which caused economic, social and psychological problem for these families and particularly, the children are being vulnerable.<sup>78</sup> Despite certain concerns, most of refugee-families are exultant to settle in AK because they got the better opportunities to develop their families here as compared to J&K. Raja Arif Khan is of the view that “We want to settle here because we have been socially integrated into local communities, however, would like to visit our own area of origin where we born and grew up but equally love to return AK because socially and economically we are now the part of this system.”<sup>79</sup>

Particularly, in the education sector, their new generation performed well in the professional and technical education. During the visit, Raja Izhar, told that there are around 55 doctors and 48 engineers in the 310 families who moved from Karen sector on the other side of LoC in 1990, which is marvellous and makes a big difference when we compare these conditions with the area of our origin.<sup>80</sup> We are anxious to return but will come back as our new generation has been engaged in inter-marriages system with local families and our new generation is part of this society. Will they return to J&K and adjust in that society or will that society accept their new generation? This is big question mark, but Abdul Majeed Dar is of the opinion that “once you settle down yourself in the new society and it is quite unfair to move your children in an entirely new culture because it will last negative impact on their education and capacity.”<sup>81</sup> The Government of Azad Kashmir is allotting the lands and properties to these refugees as numerous refugees’ families have obtained land in Thotta (Muzaffarabad).<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Khan, Personal Interview.

<sup>77</sup> Dar, Personal Interview.

<sup>78</sup> Yasir Sameer, Personal Interview with main author, Jaffna Sri Lanka, March 15, 2016.

<sup>79</sup> Khan, Personal Interview.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Dar, Personal Interview.

<sup>82</sup> Tariq Naqash, “Protesting Kashmiri Refugees Demands Fulfilled,” *Dawn*, June 11, 2013.

## **Way Forward**

The human history of migration indicates that refugees do not re-migrate to the areas of their origin. The settlement of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in Madina after migration from Makkah is one of the key examples. Even after the conquest of Makkah, he (Prophet Muhammad, PBUH) returned to Madina. Likewise, since the departure of Soviet Forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan has been struggling hard in deporting the Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan. So, the best way forward is to settle the Kashmiri refugees in the different areas of AK with the “Right of Return” by supporting them economically, culturally, socially and politically in becoming the part of local community.

## **Conclusion**

The uprising that started in 1988 has displaced a sizeable population of Kashmiris. Many of them are living as refugees in different parts of AK and Pakistan. Despite the Government incentives, these refugees are still facing certain hitches and living under unsociable environment while the Government is still faltering about their future settlement. There is also a difference between the Government policy and practice as Government has declared them refugees without refugee-rights under UNHCR. However, they are living in refugee-like situation within the geographical confines of former State of Jammu & Kashmir. In 2005, both India and Pakistan have agreed on certain policy and procedures for the divided families to visit each other across the LoC, however, the refugees of 1989 were left out of this facility.

On the other hand, in order to facilitate these refugees, the Government of J&K introduced Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy in November 2010; however, due to several barriers, the policy could not achieve its targets. Particularly, due to the economic instability and security grounds, the J&K Government is inept to provide the economic openings for these returnees. Militants who opted J&K Government Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy, and returned to J&K with their families have been facing unemployment and strict security restrictions while their families could not adjust themselves into the Kashmiri-culture. The refugees from LoC contiguous areas who migrated to AK are constantly entering into the social structure of the local societies through inter-marriages and socio-economic values. Therefore, the remaining refugees should be settled in AK without any prejudice to their original status.

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# TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS REGARDING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAR ON TERROR AND THE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF TRAUMATIZED STUDENTS IN VILLAGE SAFI, MOHMAND AGENCY

*Parveen Khan\**

## **Abstract**

*It was a descriptive study that explored the relationship of War on Terror and the Academic Achievements of War on Terror Stricken Students' in Village Safi, Mohmand Agency. The study was descriptive in nature. The population of the study constituted of all male and female students of Secondary Schools in village Safi. There were total 115 Schools in village Safi, Mohmand Agency in which 09 were secondary schools (07 were boys' and 02 were girls'). The target population was all 9th Class students and teachers in Safi, Mohmand Agency. Purposive Sampling technique was used. Only those students were included in the study who appeared in board examination in the year (2016) and were victim of War on Terror. The sampling included 100 students (both male and female) from all the secondary schools 70 from male (10 students per schools) and 30 from female schools (15 students per schools) and 80 teachers were randomly selected from the same schools. Pearson correlation was used for data analysis. Results showed that there was strong negative correlation between the academic achievements of class 9th students and War on Terror. The analysis also indicated that students' who were victim of war of terror did not like to face and meet strangers and it had a high positive impact on their academic achievements at secondary level in village Safi, Mohmand Agency. Some recommendations were also given in study which included that in spite of all efforts made by the government, the present strategy is not workable, so existing strategy may be revised. The government, parents, psychologists, psychiatrists and educationists may be aware about the relationship of War on Terror and its impact on students' academic achievement. Guidance and counseling services should be introduced in schools, psychosocial trainings*

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\* Assistant Professor, Institute of Education & Research, University of Peshawar.

may be arranged for teachers and awareness programs for self management may be recommended. To improve the situation in schools in village Safi, Mohmand Agency, further research on this topic may be conducted.

**Keywords:** *Teachers' perceptions, students' academic achievement, War on Terror, secondary schools.*

## Introduction

There may be a developing frame of evidence that war on terror and political violent have come about in dozens of states within the past decade and feature appreciably intensified in among the worst affected international locations in latest years. The attacks are achieved in opposition to college students; teachers; lecturers; and education personnel, such as assist workforce, which include caretakers and education officers; and useful resource employees. They incorporate killing, injuring, abduction, kidnapping, compelled recruitment as infantrymen or for labor, compelled disappearance, illegal detention, torture, sexual violence, damage or destruction of educational institutions and services, including transport; amenities for protection functions; and violent assaults on the academic firms, along with attacks on convoys carrying examination papers. Additionally they encompass the prevention of restore, rehabilitation or reconstruction of attacked schools by way of the use or hazard or drive.<sup>1</sup>

The risk to education from assaults should be visible inside the context of the wider problem of the effect of war in general at the degradation of schooling or prevention of tutorial development.<sup>2</sup>

Terrorism effects the law and order situation, destroy infrastructure, promote political instability, and wreck the social fabric of the society. Once we go searching the field from a historic attitude, we see that struggle affected worldwide areas, whether or not in Africa, Asia, Europe or every other situation have suffered alike.<sup>3</sup> Terrorism actually deals with harassment, destruction, suicide assault and killing of innocent human beings with none reason.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> O'Malley, B. *The Longer-Term Impact of Attacks on Education on Education Systems, Development and Fragility and the Implications for Policy Responses* (2010). A Background Paper for the EFA Global Monitoring Report (2011)

<sup>2</sup> Barth, Tong Li, Don Mccarthy, Triphon Phumiwasana, And Glenn Yago., *Economic Impacts of Global Terrorism: From Munich to Bali*. Retrieved from [Http://www.milkeninstitute.org/Pdf/Econ\\_Impact\\_Terrorism.Pdf](http://www.milkeninstitute.org/Pdf/Econ_Impact_Terrorism.Pdf) (Accessed 3 June, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> Javaid, U. "War on Terror: Pakistan's Apprehensions," In *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 5 No.3 :(2011). 125- 131.

<sup>4</sup> Chachar, A., Mangi, A. Abbasi, Z. & Zubair. "Impact of Terrorism on the Psychology of Working Women in Pakistan: A Case Study of Sindh," In *International Journal of Science and Research*, 2, (2013).462-465.

## Review Literature

Pakistan has been combating the war on terror considering the fact that September 2001 up to now; the battle has affected the lives of more than 35,000 residents and 500 security employees, except destruction of infrastructure.<sup>5</sup>

Terrorist assaults which include suicide bombing which has deteriorated legislation and order state of affairs and the abroad customers are reluctant to invest in Pakistan. The military operations against the terrorists displaced countless numbers and countless numbers of folks from Swat district of KP and FATA.<sup>6</sup> Terrorist also shattered Pakistan picture in the world community. Terrorism has threatened the peace, balance and thoroughly-being of Pakistani society.<sup>7</sup>

The instantaneous impact of assaults includes the loss of life, harm to, or abduction of college students, instructors and personnel; and harm to homes and centers – most generally because of the burning, bombing or shelling of homes or delivery centers, or wear and tear or war damage caused by army use. The impact generally extends far past the authentic goal, as fear of further assaults causes complete schools to shut briefly or teachers and students quickly to stay at home.<sup>8</sup>

Militants attacked and destroyed a number of boys and girls schools in FATA and KP as a strategy to imbue the youth of the area with militant values. Militants attacked and destroyed a number of boys and girls schools in FATA and KP as a strategy to imbue the youth of the area with militant values.<sup>9</sup>

In step with KP education branch, militants destroyed a total of 758 faculties in numerous parts of the province which includes 640 schools in Malakand division.<sup>10</sup> Militants destroyed local lifestyle, banned paying attention to tune and leisure sports.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, "Economic Survey of Pakistan, [2010-2011]". Retrieved from [http://Www.Finance.Gov.Pk/Survey\\_1011.Html](http://Www.Finance.Gov.Pk/Survey_1011.Html) [Accessed April 10, 2013].

<sup>6</sup> Ibid

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Xinhua, "Thai Southern Schools Ordered To Be Closed", (June 19, 2007). The Longer-Term Impact of Attacks on Education on Education Systems, Development and Fragility and the Implications for Policy Responses. A Background Paper for the EFA Global Monitoring Report (2011).

<sup>9</sup> Allvoices. Com, "Impact of Terrorism on Female Education in North West of Pakistan," Retrieved from <http://Www.Allvoices.Com/Contributed-News/9276276-Impact-of-Terrorism-on-Female-Education-in-North-West-of-Pakistan> (Accessed 15 June, 2013).

<sup>10</sup> The Express Tribune, "Over 3,000 Schools Destroyed In Militancy, Disasters: Retrieved from [officialhttp://Tribune.Com.Pk/Story/393911/Over-3000-Schools-Destroyed-In-Militancy-Disasters-Official](http://Tribune.Com.Pk/Story/393911/Over-3000-Schools-Destroyed-In-Militancy-Disasters-Official) (Accessed 14 June, 2013).

<sup>11</sup> Bari, F. "Gendered Perceptions and Impact of Terrorism / Talibanization in Pakistan" Website: [Http://Www.Pk.Boell.Org/Downloads/Farzana\\_Barifinal\\_Report.Pdf](Http://Www.Pk.Boell.Org/Downloads/Farzana_Barifinal_Report.Pdf) (Accessed 14 June, 2013).

Due to military operations in diverse elements of the KP and FATA, millions of people were displaced that's considered as the biggest displacement in the history of Pakistan. The displaced people left their houses for protection and safety and went to the urban regions of the country.<sup>12</sup> In Khyber agency, among 84,000 and one hundred,000 humans were uprooted even as the variety of folks who fled Mohmand and Bajaur Agency is estimated at 7, 50,000.<sup>13</sup>

Because of improved militancy and next army operations, the neighborhood residents, mainly ladies and kids, of the affected areas suffered from physical and psychological abuse and traumas. The concern of dying and emotions of helplessness in addition traumatized their lives.<sup>14</sup>

Pakistan has been facing the war on terror since September 2001. So far, the war has delivered large destruction to Pakistan from all walks of life. For the duration of this period, depth of the conflict expanded and it spread into the settled areas of Pakistan. Federally Administered Tribal regions (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) suffered the maximum.<sup>15</sup>

Anxiety, despair and strain negatively affected the instructional fulfillment of 10 class students which include demanding events tremendously multiplied anxiety and melancholy due to which they showed poor instructional overall performance.<sup>16</sup>

Depressed college students have been not able to perform nicely in instructional existence due to the fact that they had no courage in what they have been doing? They were feeling that they couldn't carry out well and for this reason they had been depression and disillusioned. They perceived matters negatively and considered themselves as screw ups. This situation may want to without a doubt contributed too many severe issues for them academically e.g. Low academic grades.<sup>17</sup>

USA drone attacks had robust negative effect on the instructional achievement of 10th elegance students in North Waziristan Agency. They have been laid low with psycho trauma because of US. Drone strikes together with stress, worry, cognitive disorders, anxiety, despair, headache, intellectual problems and nightmares and so on. Primary locating become that there was negative relationship between U.S.A Drone assaults psycho

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<sup>12</sup> Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, "Pakistan Security Report –(2010). Retrieved from <http://San-Pips.Com/Download.Php?F=74.Pdf> (Accessed June 10, 2013).

<sup>13</sup> Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, "Pakistan Security Report (2012). Retrieved from <http://San-Pips.Com/Download.Php?F=74.Pdf> Accessed June 10, 2013).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Khan, T.[2013].The Social, Political And Economic Effects of The War on Terror: Pakistan 2009 To 2011. *ISSRA Papers 2013*

<sup>16</sup> Williamson, D. E., Birmaher, B., Ryan, N. D., & Dahl, R. E. Stressful Life Events in Anxious and Depressed Children. *Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychopharmacology*, 15(4), 2005, 571-580.

<sup>17</sup> Surtees, P. G., Wainwright, N. W. J., & Pharoah, P. D. P. Psychosocial Factors and Sex Differences in High Academic Attainment at Cambridge University. *Oxford Review of Education*, 28, 2002, 21-38.

trauma consequences and the academic fulfillment of class 10th students in North Waziristan.<sup>18</sup>

In London, 40% students had mental issues, tension and poor awareness. They showed terrible instructional grades due to high misery.<sup>19</sup> Exceptionally- nerve-racking college students were appreciably much more likely to attain lower educational achievement.<sup>20</sup>

When students perceived their schooling as a challenge, stress may want to convey them a experience of competence and an increase capacity to learn. However, while schooling became perceived as a chance, strain could elicit feelings of hopelessness and a darkish feel of loss, therefore leading to decrease academic success.<sup>21</sup>

Students with intellectual issues felt disabilities inside the simple activities of each day which includes health care, dressing, cooking and buying.<sup>22</sup> Headache immediately affected the mental responsibilities of 10th college students.<sup>23</sup>

Aggressive students were academically poor and they were mostly in D grades.<sup>24,25</sup> Aggression negatively affected the behavior of 10th Class students due to which their academic performance was also badly influenced.<sup>26,27</sup>

Psychiatric and psychological studies show that children and adolescents who experience terror events directly or indirectly have a higher

<sup>18</sup> Mati Ullah, Rahmatullah, Irfanullah & Ayaz. Impact of Drone Attacks Psychotrauma on Students' Academic Achievement at Secondary Level In North Waziristan Agency. *Gomal University Journal Of Research*, Volume 31 Issue 2, 2015.

<sup>19</sup> Andrews, B., & Wilding, J. M. The Relation of Depression and Anxiety to Life-Stress and Achievement in Students. *British Journal of Psychology*, 95 (4), 2004, 509-522.

<sup>20</sup> Seligman, L. D., & Wuyek, L. A. Correlates of Separation Anxiety Symptoms among First-Semester College Students: An Exploratory Study. *The Journal of Psychology*, 141 (2), 2007, 135-146.

<sup>21</sup> Misra, R., & Mc. Kean, M. College Students' Academic Stress and its Relation to Their Anxiety, Time Management, and Leisure Satisfaction. *American Journal of Health Studies*, 16 (1), 2000, 41-52.

<sup>22</sup> Olds., David, L., Sadler, L., & Kitzman, H. Programs for Parents of Infants and Toddlers: Recent Evidence from Randomized Trials. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 48 (34), 2007, 355-91.

<sup>23</sup> Waldie., Kweren, E., Markus, H., Barry, J., Milne., & Richie, P. Migraine and Cognitive Function: A Life-Course Study; *Neurology*, 59(6), 2002, 904-908.

<sup>24</sup> Dahlquist, G. & Ka, Swedish Childhood Diabetes Study Group. School Performance in Children with Type 1 Diabetes, A Population-Based Register Study. *Diabetologia*, 50(5), 2007, 957-964.

<sup>25</sup> Eisenberg, M.E., Neumark-Sztainer, D., & Perry, C.L. Peer Harassment, School Connectedness and Academic Achievement. *Journal of School Health*, 8 (73), 2003, 311-316.

<sup>26</sup> Nansel, T.R., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R.S., Ruan, W.J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. Bullying Behaviors among U.S Youth: Prevalence and Association with Psychosocial Adjustment. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 285(16), 2001, 2094-2100.

<sup>27</sup> Patchin, J.W., & Hinduja, S. Bullies Move beyond the Schoolyard: A Preliminary Look at Cyber Bullying. *Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice*, 4(2), 2006, 123-147.

risk of developing symptoms of anxiety and stress which are occasionally accompanied by depression, aggressive behavior, social and emotional problems, and impaired cognitive development.<sup>28</sup>

Instructors may be an aid to offer classroom-primarily based socio emotional restoration efforts. They occupy this reputation due to the fact they play a principal function in the lives of kids, they may be considered as honest by students and parents, and lots of are amenable to being educated for a greater therapeutic role. The locating shows that teachers may be used to lessen the long-term suffering of students.<sup>29</sup>

### **Objectives of the Study**

Following are the objectives of the study:

1. To explore the relationship of war on terror on academic achievements of war on terror stricken students of village Safi, Mohmand Agency.
2. To determine the psychological impact of war on terror on secondary school students'.
3. To make recommendations how to control the existing situation and help the effected students in Mohmand Agency.

### **Significance of the Study**

The topic is significant because it would help us to know about the mental health, psychological factors and negative impact of terrorism on students' academic achievements who remain the victims of War on Terror. It will also provide guide lines for the future researchers.

### **Research Methodology**

The study was descriptive in nature. The population of the study constituted all male and female secondary schools in village Safi, Mohmand Agency. There were total 115 Schools in village Safi, Mohmand Agency in which 07 were boys and 02 were girls' secondary schools. The target population was all 9th Class students and teachers in Safi, Mohmand Agency. Purposive Sampling technique was used. Only those students were included in the study who appeared in board examination in the year (2016) and were victim of War on Terror. The sampling included 100 students (both male and female) from all the secondary schools (70 from male (10 students per schools) and 30 from female schools (15 students per schools) and 80

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid

<sup>29</sup> Wolmer, L., Laor, N., & Yazgan, Y. School reactivation programs after disaster: Could teachers serve as clinical mediators? *Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America*, 12, 2003,363 – 381. Retrieved from doi: 10.1016/S1056-4993(02)00104-9. *Psychology in the Schools* DOI: 10.1002/pits

teachers were randomly selected from the same schools. The perceptions' of the teachers' with regard to various statements were collected through face-to-face questionnaire.

## Results and Discussion

Pearson Correlation was used for knowing the relationship between War on Terror and students' academic Achievement. Results and discussion showed that there was strong negative correlation between the academic achievements of 9th students and War on Terror as shown in the tables below:

Table-1: Correlation between Academic Achievements of Class 9th Students and anxiety, insecurity and nightmares.

S.No	Psychological Problems	N	Mean	S.D	r	Sig
1	anxiety	100	1.4700	.50161	1	.842
2	insecurity	100	1.6800	.61759	.197	.738
3	nightmares	100	1.7900	.64031	.185	.007

N=100 \*P<0.05\*\*P<0.01

Table-1 indicates strong negative relationship of an anxiety, insecurity and nightmares with academic achievements of Class 9 students as the r value was 1, .197, .185 and respectively and the Sig: level was .842, .738 & .007.

Table-2: Correlation between Academic Achievements of Class 9th Students and attitudes towards teachers, class room activities, interaction with friends and reluctant to discuss WoT issues.

S.No	Behavioural Change	N	Mean	S.D	r	Sig
4	attitudes towards teachers	100	1.6400	.74563	-.083	.649
5	Class room activities	100	1.6100	.69479	010	.080
6	interaction with class fellows	100	1.6200	.58223	- 0.005	.809
7	reluctant to discuss WoT issues	100	1.4400	.59152	011	.944

N=100 \*P<0.05\*\*P<0.01

Table-2 shows strong negative relationship of attitudes towards teachers, class room activities, interaction with class room fellows and reluctant to discuss WoT issues with academic achievements of Class 9 students as the r value was -.083, 010, -.005, 011 and respectively the Sig: level was .649, .080, .809 & .944.



Table-3: Correlation between Academic Achievements of Class 9th Students and of reduced interest in studies and not participating in class room discussion.

S.No	Lack of Interest	N	Mean	S.D	r	Sig
8	reduced interest in studies	100	1.7800	.73278	-.101	.116
9	not participating in classroom discussions	100	1.7300	.64909	.924	.279

N=100 \*P<0.05\*\*P<0.01

Table-3 explains strong negative relationship of reduced interest in studies and not participating in class room discussion with academic achievements of Class 9 students as the r value was -.101,924, and respectively and the Sig: level was .116,& .279

Table-4: Correlation between Academic Achievements of Class 9th Students and headache, upset stomach and fear of facing people.

S.No	Emotional Instability	N	Mean	S.D	r	Sig
10	headache	100	1.6600	.66999	-.061	.017
11	upset stomach	100	1.3400	.62312	.227	.835
12	fear of facing people	100	1.8600	.92135	-.075	.010

N=100 \*P<0.05\*\*P<0.01

Table- 4 demonstrates strong positive relationship of facing people with academic achievements of Class 9 students as the r value was-.061,227,-.075 and respectively and the Sig: level was .484,&.138.

Table-5: Correlation between Academic Achievements of Class 9th Students and low academic achievements and not appeared in exam.

S.No	Academic Achievement	N	Mean	S.D	r	Sig
13	low academic achievements	100	1.4600	.61002	-.020	.484
14	not appeared in exam	100	1.1600	.48659	.061	.138

N=100 \*P<0.05\*\*P<0.01

Table-5 indicates strong negative relationship of low academic achievements and not appeared in exam with academic achievements of Class 9 students as the r value was -.020,061 and respectively and the Sig: level was .484 &.138.

Table-6: Correlation between Academic Achievements of Class 9th Students and disturbed due to heavy security measures.

S.No	Security Measures	N	Mean	S.D	r	Sig
15	disturbed due to heavy security measures	100	1.7400	.64542	.320	.772

N=100

\*P<0.05\*\*P<0.01

Table-6 discusses strong negative relationship of due to heavy security measures with academic achievements of Class 9 students as the r value was .320 and respectively and the Sig: level was .772.

## Conclusions

Based on analysis and interpretation of data, it was concluded that the correlation tables clearly showed strong negative relationship of anxiety, insecurity, nightmares, negative attitudes towards teachers and class room activities, did not like to interact with friends, reluctant to discuss WoT issues, reduced interest in studies, not participating in class room discussions, headache, upset stomach and disturbed due to heavy security measures. The analysis also indicated that affected students scared to meet strangers and it had a high positive impact on students' academic achievements at secondary level in village Safi, Mohmand Agency.

## Recommendations

Pakistan has suffered a great deal because of the continued war on terror and still paying for it. Government needs to develop a practical and workable strategy to handle the existing situation. Instead of making efforts by concerned authorities, the situation is getting worst day by day. Government may just take into account the destroyed infrastructure, together with schools, roads, and bridges in FATA and KP. The government should also organize certain scientific, psychological and psychiatric wards for the medication of students. As the relation between war on terror and pupils' academic success used to be strongly negative so the government may be taken serious steps and movements with the intention to beef up pupils' educational achievement. The government, psychologists, parents, psychiatrists and educationists could also be aware concerning the influence of war on Terror and its effect on students' academic fulfillment steorage and counseling services will have to be introduced in faculties, psychosocial trainings may also be arranged for academics and realization programs for self administration is also encouraged. To give a boost to the drawback in colleges in village Safi, Mohmand agency, additional research on this subject may be conducted.

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