Central Asia Journal No. 64

 

 

Khyber during the Frontier Uprising of 1897: Lessons to Learn from the British Policy in the Tribal Areas

 

Dr. Javed Iqbal*

 

 

Introduction

 Frontiers are like ‘razor’s edge’, a phrase very accurately and appropriately used by Lord Nathaniel Curzon in a lecture at Oxford. But the North West Frontier of the British Empire in India was perhaps more than a ‘razor’s edge’, hard to bring under control and yet harder to retain control over it.

In 1897, a serious uprising against the British on the North West Frontier, spreading to the entire tribal belt between the then British India and Afghanistan, shook the British hold in the area and caused a lot of concern to the British authorities. A number of factors were responsible for the uprising but important among them were the discontent among the tribesmen due to the actual demarcation of the Durand Line, the instigation of some formidable Mullahs like Hadda Mullah in the Mohmand area, Mastana Mullah in Swat and Mullah Said Akbar Aka Khel in Khyber, and the instigation by the Afghan authorities. The uprising was concentrated in the Mohmand and Malakand areas but Khyber Pass and the areas around it also felt the tremors of this first large scale revolt against the British.

 

In the Khyber, Afridis attacked the British positions and posts and after setting some of the British forts on fire, they also extended helping hand to the Orakzais in besieging the Samana posts. The control of the Khyber Pass was completely lost and it took quite a while for the British to restore their authority in the Khyber. The Afridis later on had to face a British punitive expedition in the Tirah Valley. However, the expedition had to be ended inconclusively due to the climatic conditions and the strain on the British transport resources due to campaigns in other parts of the tribal belt. However, eventually the British did succeed to extract a favorable agreement from the Afridi tribes resulting into a truce that restored British prestige to an extent.

 

Objectives of the Paper

 

The purpose of the paper is to give an insight into the causes and real nature of the uprising of 1897 and the British strategy to deal with the upheaval. It may prove useful for the policy makers and authorities in the tribal belt to deal effectively with similar situation at present. As a result of the global war on terror and Pakistan’s role as the frontline state in this war, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan have become a den of miscreants and lawless elements who either in the name of Jehad or imposition of Islamic laws are constantly challenging the writ of the Government. In these troubled areas, Pakistan Army has been called in and an operation has been launched in some tribal areas and a few settled areas adjacent to the tribal belt. To make these operations successful and to achieve the objectives in the minimum possible time with minimum possible damage to the lives and property of the common people, we have to learn from the experiences and military genius of the British rulers of Indian Subcontinent. We cannot, of course, follow the British techniques of dealing with such crisis exactly the way the British did. However, we can certainly learn many lessons from their strategy and effective use of force and insert some of their stratagem to our strategy for dealing with the tribesmen on the frontiers. The last part of this paper focuses on lessons that we can learn from the British administration and the successes and failures of their policy and techniques of military expeditions in the tribal belt. Traditionally, we have never been good at learning from our past but it’s never too late to make a beginning.

 

 

The Gathering Storm: Beginning of the Problem

 

From 1890 onward to the sudden uprising of 1897, apparently the Afridis had no grievances against the British. The British claimed that the uprising was mainly caused by the activities of ‘Mullahs of an extremely ignorant type’ who dominated the tribal belt, supported by many disciples who met at shrines and were susceptible to all intrigues and evils, inciting the tribesmen constantly against the British. But this is too simple an explanation for the causes of this uprising. In fact, the uprising of 1897 was caused by a combination of three important factors. The first factor was the rising sense of distrust and uneasiness among the tribesmen after the Durand Line Agreement and the actual demarcation process, which was considered by the tribesmen as ‘annexation of their country’ and a ‘menace to their independence’. The second factor was the religious fanaticism and the activities and propaganda of the Mullahs, which undoubtedly gave an impetus to the rising tide of resentment against the Durand Line Agreement and the demarcation of the boundaries. The third factor was the exaggerated expectations of moral and material support from the Amir of Afghanistan, which further emboldened the tribesmen to rise against the British. But the British authorities mainly held the Mullahs and their activities responsible for this large-scale uprising.

Between the years 1890 and 1898, there were three Mullahs of note having great influence among the Afridis. They included Mullah Said Akbar Aka Khel, The Malik Din Khel Mullah, and the Mullah of Kambar Khels. Said Akbar was young, termed as avaricious, and energetic by Warburton. The Malik Din Khel Mullah was an old, God fearing man, full of good advice to others, and highly loved and respected according to British reports. The Kambar Khel Mullah was of lesser note, but he also was not vicious. According to Robert Warburton, Said Akbar played a very important role in organizing the revolt among the Afridis. He was in contact with the Afghan Sipah Salar Ghulam Haider Khan Charkhi, who was well known for his anti-British character. He also had contacts with two other Mullahs, the Mullah of Hadda and the ‘Mad Fakir’ of Swat (Mullah Mastan). Said Akbar had regular communication with Ghulam Haider Khan Charkhi, Mullah of Hadda and the Mad Fakir during June and July and the greater part of August 1897.

Mullah said Akbar was also in contact with an Afridi Jirga at Kabul, comprised of some Adam Khel Afridis, led by Kazi Mira Khan. However, one of the letters from Kazi Mira Khan suggests that the Amir of Afghanistan was not interested in the tribesmen uprising against the British. He reported to Mullah Said Akbar that the Amir had advised them before the Uprising of 1897 not to fight with the British Government and that the Amir held the same view after the uprising. The Amir had rather asked the Afridis to record their grievances against the British and he promised that he himself would submit them to the British Government.

The uprising did not originate in the Khyber but when the news was received that the excitement was spreading to the Khyber, the Government of India showed great concern and did its best to avoid a war with the Afridis because they were armed to the teeth. Up to the end of the 19^th century, their weapons were the curved sword, a long straight knife and the jezail, a long barreled matchlock, better than the musket with which the army was armed until mid-nineteenth century, but not as good as the Snider, the Martini-Henry or Lee Metford rifles. By the end of the century, they had acquired a fair number of modern rifles by theft, capture or purchase from Afghan soldiers. Later on, the Afridis of the Khyber Pass got in touch with a band of arms smugglers and invested some of their tribal money into their organization to buy Martini-Henry rifles in the ports of Persian Gulf and move them secretly to Khyber via Persia and Afghanistan. The British Royal Navy intercepted and caught several consignments of arms of this nature.

The Afridis were also good at making their own guns in different parts of the tribal belt. They had started making exact replicas of Martini-Henry rifles at local workshops, mostly made of the scrap material auctioned at the military stores of British Indian Government, and then sending to other parts of tribal and settled areas. The matter was first revealed in April 1892 by Herald Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat District, in a letter to the District Superintendent of Police Peshawar. The Peshawar police had captured five Mohmands with one Martini-Henry Rifle and five Martini-Henry Carbines at Shabqadar. During investigation, they admitted that they had purchased these arms from one Hussain, a gunsmith of Kohat Pass, most probably at the notorious Darra Adam Khel gun market. These weapons were made entirely from material obtained from the scraped parts of guns auctioned at different arm stores in Pujab. Two Peshawari Hindus, Amir Chand and Bhagwan Das, purchased the material, which was disposed off by the Ferozpur Ordnance Store, and sold it to the gunsmiths in the Kohat Pass. Mostly the barrels of the disposed off English guns were utilized by the Kohat Pass gunsmiths in manufacturing their own local made guns.

In those days, Khyber Pass was held and controlled by the Khyber Rifles – an irregular military corps made up of young men provided by various Khyber clans at British expense – and in case of a need for reinforcement, the nearest troops were available at Peshawar. Captain Barton was then the Political Officer in the Khyber who was also in-charge of the Khyber Rifles. When he heard the news of trouble at Shabqadar, he moved to the biggest and the strongest post of the Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal. There he gathered about 350 Rifles, 50,000 rounds of ammunition and made sure that all the forts in the Khyber Pass had ample supply of reserved water.

 

The Rising

 

In August, 1897, the British Government had got the news that the Afridis and the Orakzais had planned a simultaneous rising in Khyber and Kurram – Afridis were to rise and take possession of the British posts in Khyber Pass while the Orakzais would rise and massacre the Sikhs and other troops garrisoning the British outposts in Samana and other parts of the Kurram Valley. Accordingly, the first to rise were the Afridis, playing the role assigned to them in the pre-planned plot towards the end of August 1897. On August 21, the Afridi clans of Aka Khel, Malik Din Khel and Zakha Khel had started their march from Tirah to the Khyber Pass in order to take possession of the forts up to Bara and Jamrud. The British forces sent in large numbers from all parts of India to deter the Afridis and Orakzais from attacking the British posts had no effect on the Afridis. On August 23, the Afridis attacked the Khyber Pass in great force, their line extending a mile and a half, and occupied the whole length of the Pass, from Ali Masjid to Landi Khana, on the same day.

Fort Maude was captured and burnt by the Afridis. The British sent forces from Jamrud under Brigadier General Westmacott to render assistance to the beleaguered garrison at the Fort but they were repulsed two or three miles away from the Fort while the Fort was set on fire by the Afridis. The garrison there, however, took advantage of the advance of the British troops and made an orderly retreat to Jamrud. On the same day, Ali Masjid had been burnt, while the Landi Kotal Fort had been besieged by the gathering Afridis.

From Ali Masjid, the tribesmen marched to Landi Kotal on the morning of 24^th August. Their number increased en route and their passage was nowhere blocked by any British force since the garrison at Katta Kushta and Gurgura had already abandoned their posts and taken to the hills. In the meanwhile, Captain Barton, Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, had been ordered by Mr. Udney, The Commissioner of Peshawar, on August 18 to forsake his men and retire to Jamrud , leaving Subadar Mursil Khan in charge of the garrison at the Landi Kotal Fort. The attack on the fortified serai at Landi Kotal began at 8.00 A.M and during the whole of that day and the night that followed, the defense was resolutely maintained by Subadar Mursil Khan and his brave men of the Khyber Rifles. Captain Barton was not allowed to return to Landi Kotal despite of his willingness and desire to be with his men. Barton had actually asked for reinforcement but instead he was called to Peshawar. Captain Barton was one of the finest frontier officers the British had ever had and the orders from Udney to abandon his post and his men was hard to accept for him. His men (Khyber Rifles) were to fight for the British without his presence among them and he considered it a shame for himself and for the entire British nation. He believed it would blacken the face of the British before all the tribesmen who supported him against their own kith and kin. Despite his absence, the Khyber Rifles fought for the British against their own brethren because ‘they had eaten the White Queen’s salt’.

Subadar Mursil Khan, who was commanding the Khyber Rifles in absence of Captain Barton, had two sons in the attackers and one with him in the Khyber Rifles. The garrison at Landi Kotal consisted of five native officers and 369 men. Of these, 120 belonged to the miscellaneous clans; Shilmanis, Mohmands, Peshawaris and the Kohat Pass Afridis; and of the remaining 249, seventy were Lowargi Shinwaris, 50 were Mullagoris, and the rest were from Zakha Khel and Malik Din Khel Afridis. Mursil Khan and his men held on till 25^th of August when finally Mursil Khan was killed at 11.00 A.M. and the gate was opened from inside by treacherous hands. The Mullagori and Shinwari sepoys fought their way out and escaped, instead of switching over loyalties or surrendering before the tribesmen. A native officer of the Mullagori Company brought his men back to Jamrud without the loss or theft of a single rifle. But before their retreat, they had killed about a hundred of the attackers, while ten of the Khyber Rifles men were killed and two native officers were wounded.

While all this deadly game was being contested at Landi Kotal, a large British force was present at the mouth of the Khyber Pass at Jamrud but was not permitted by the British authorities to lend a helping hand to the men of Khyber rifles fighting for the British against their own people. When the garrison finally succeeded in reaching Jamrud with their dead and wounded, the angry, disdainful and helpless troops stationed there cheered and applauded them wildly. But some of the Khyber Rifles men, resentful as they were, spat in anger as they passed the British troops. “It was a day of shame and humiliation for every Briton”, writes Macmunn, “and loud were the curses called down on Lord Elgin and his two penny Council, and on Udney, the unready, as the troops dubbed the Chief civil authority.”

The Pass fell completely into the hands of the Afridis after the fall of Ali Masjid on 23^rd and Landi Kotal on 24^th and the British then feared an attack on Jamrud. They were preparing themselves to face it. The Afridis, however, after burning the posts in the Khyber Pass found the Peshawar Valley too strong to be lightly attacked. Instead, they decided to assist the Orakzais in Tirah and to proceed to the Kurram to capture the Samana Fort. Kohat was also under a strong threat of attack by the Afridis and Orakzais. There they were effectively checked by the British and by 1898, peace was restored. The tribesmen lost 12 of their men at Ali Masjid, 34 at Fort Maude, and 200 at Landi Kotal in the Khyber Pass during the entire duration of the Uprising of 1897.

In the uprising, both the Afridis and the Orakzais were led by Mullah Said Akbar Akhundzada of the Aka khel tribe. Warburton narrates in his book that at one point during the attack on Landi Kotal, Said Akbar came close to the wall of the fort. At that time, a young Zakha Khel in the Khyber Rifles turned to the son of Zakha Khel Chief, Malik Khwas Khan and said, “Here is Said Akbar; let me shoot him and end this business for good and ever.” But Malik Khwas Khan’s son abused him and struck the soldier, calling out, “Would you destroy the light of Islam?” This incident suggests that Mullah Said Akbar was highly respected by the Afridis and even the men in the Khyber Rifles had respect for him. While Warburton writes that he commanded little respect among the Afridis and due to his avarice and greed for money and power, the Afridis called him a ‘Loe Shaitan’ (A big devil) behind his back. Irrespective of the dispute about his position among the Afridis, it’s a fact that he succeeded in securing a joint rising of the Afridis and Orakzais against the British.

 

Restoring British Authority in the Khyber Pass

 

On December 18, 1897, the British forces recovered the Khyber Pass as far as Fort Maude; on the 23^rd, Ali Masjid was reoccupied, and on the 26^th they marched to Landi Kotal. On their way, they found villages deserted, barracks destroyed and damage done to Government property. The Shinwaris of Landi Kotal, who had assisted in the early attacks on the Khyber posts, had by then submitted and paid up their fines. To prove their repentance, they assisted in picketing the hills and keeping off the Zakha Khel raiders. They even restored some of the property taken away by their men when the serai at Landi Kotal was attacked and plundered.

In the attacks on the Khyber posts, the Afridi tribesmen had sustained some 250 casualties and immediately after the fall of Landi Kotal, they had dispersed to their homes, promising to re-assemble on September 15. The most worrying aspect of the capture of Landi Kotal serai by the tribesmen was that fifty thousand rounds of ammunition had fallen into their hands and it could be used against the British in any future encounter.

 

Assessment of British Performance in the Khyber Pass during the Uprising

 

After receiving news of Afridis attack on the British posts in the Khyber on the 23^rd of August, the British had taken some precautionary measures. Ali Masjid and Fort Maude were reinforced by 100 tribesmen each; the Zakha Khel and Shinwari maliks were reminded of their obligations but at the same time, the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles was recalled from Landi Kotal to Peshawar as the Commissioner of Peshawar thought his presence there might hamper the actions of the Indian Government. This might have been very demoralizing for the Khyber Rifles men but the Commissioner’s concern was also justified.

On the 23^rd of August, when the attack began in the Khyber, the distribution of the Khyber Rifles was as under:

Name of Place	Deployment of Khyber Rifles Men
Jamrud	217
Bagiar (Shadi Bagiar or Bagiarai)	13
Jehangira	7
Fort Maude	42+hundred tribesmen
Ali Masjid	80+hundred tribesmen (of whom only 40 were present on the 23rd)
Katta Kushta	7
Gurgura	10
Landi Kotal	374
Fort Tytler	20

Despite of the fact that the British got definite information on August 17, news reaching from Khyber to Peshawar that an Afridi force of about 10,000 men had left Bagh in Tirah on the 16^th with the intention to attack the Khyber posts on 18^th, both the General Officer Commanding and the Commissioner of Peshawar decided not to garrison the Khyber forts by regular troops for the reason that it would raise unnecessary suspicions and concerns among the tribesmen still holding to their treaty obligations. This decision and the resultant abandonment of the Khyber and the failure to assist the Khyber Rifles holding their posts were later widely criticized and greatly condemned by the British themselves. Colonel Sir T. Holdich remarked, “But alas! Whilst the Afridi fought for us, we failed to fight for ourselves; 9,500 troops about the Peshawar frontier looked on, whilst 500 Afridis maintained British honor in the Khyber.”

In a lecture given at Simla in 1898 on “The Campaign in Tirah”, a prominent British civilian officer in the Punjab said, “The 23^rd of August was a day of pain and humiliation for every Englishman in India. We had 12,000 troops at the mouth of the Pass (Khyber) or within easy reach of Ali Masjid, marking time as it were, or held in leash, and we allowed these forts to fall one after the other.”

 

The Tirah Valley Expedition

 

Although outside the scope of this study but very much related to it as an offshoot of the uprising of 1897, the Tirah Valley Expedition comes as the next important episode after the uprising itself.

Tirah Valley in 1897 was, as it still is, the common home and ultimate refuge of all the Khyber tribes. It was also used as a base for the Afridi raids into the settled territories of the plains to terrorize the plain dwellers and to plunder their property. To teach the Afridis a lesson, Tirah was attacked by the British in 1897. During the expedition, a number of houses were demolished, including the extravagant house of Mullah Said Akbar, which had been constructed lavishly in three years time. Herds of cattle and pack animals and other household property were confiscated in the Aka Khel area in Tirah proper. Offering little or no opposition, the tribesmen simply vacated their homes and disappeared in the thick forest of alpine trees on the hills around their homes. However, it does not mean that there was absolutely no resistance from the tribesmen.

A British officer Colonel Grace Younghusband recalls the Tirah expedition in these words:

“The Afridis may be driven all day like mountain sheep but when the night begins to fall and their tired pursuers commence of necessity to draw back to lower levels for food and rest, this redoubtable foe rises in all his strength, with swords and guns and huge boulders hurls himself like a demon on his retiring enemy.”

 

The fact that the Afridis were one of the best guerrilla fighters in the world was also recognized by Sir William Lockhart in a memorandum for guidance of troops campaigning in Tirah issued from his Camp in Maidan area on November 18, 1897. He warned his men that the British force was ‘opposed to perhaps the best skirmishers and best natural rifle shots in the world’ and that the country they inhabited was the most difficult on the face of the globe.

But with tact and diplomacy, the British were able to impress the tribes. By the end of February 1898, nearly all Afridi clans had either submitted or were approaching the British authorities for submission and settlement. The Khyber Pass had been re-opened but the Zakha Khels, the most dangerous and notorious of all the Afridis, were still resilient and unwilling to give in. In March, preparations were made for a spring campaign against them. The British troops under General Sir William Lockhart returned to Jamrud after the Tirah Expedition. Fresh transport (mules and horses) was distributed among the troops and one of the British army brigades was sent towards the Bara Valley. The movement of the British troops had an immediate effect upon the Zakha Khels. Almost all the clans had submitted by April 3^rd and had given hostages for fines still not paid. At the Peace Durbar of Afridi Chiefs in 1898, the Afridis, notably the irreconcilable Zakha Khels, demonstrated their submission by taking the horses out of General Sir William Lockhart’s carriage and drawing it themselves.

The Afridis paid 50 thousand rupees and 800 rifles as reparation. This amount was far less than the British losses because all the weapons and ammunitions at Landi Kotal, Shahgai, and other forts in the Khyber Pass had fallen into the hands of the Afridis during the uprising, which obviously amounted to lacs of rupees. In December 1899, the British regular forces were withdrawn from Khyber and the Pass was placed under the control of the Khyber Rifles. By November 1898, the situation returned to normalcy and the normal arrangements for the administration of Khyber previously in force were practically re-established.

The British forces did not permanently occupy Tirah because what they wanted had been achieved and permanent occupation was not desirable. Their longer stay in the area could lead to guerrilla warfare of the most difficult and organized nature against them. But the British had certainly succeeded in lifting the purdah (veil) of Tirah, which had so far guarded it against the invaders’ gaze.

The expedition, however, proved a great financial burden to the British. Several million pounds had been spent and a large number of casualties sustained. Some of the British officers had even started questioning the purpose and worth of the expedition and many of them believed that it was not worth what it cost to them.

 

The Lessons

 

The results of the Tirah Campaign can be disputed and there are those who opine that the campaign failed to achieve any ‘permanent results’ but the psychological effects of this expedition cannot be ignored. The British at least broke the myth of Tirah’s inaccessibility by ‘lifting the curtain’ that had veiled Tirah for centuries. The total casualties during the campaign amounted to 287 killed, 853 wounded and 10 missing. The cost was huge, but it was hoped that the Afridis would realize that no part of their country was inaccessible to British troops. It was noticed as a favorable sign that the enlistment of the Pathans, especially of the Afridis, in the British forces had accelerated after the end of the hostilities. Although acts of individual raids and outrages did not cease but there were no large scale efforts to challenge British authority in the Khyber and for some years no need was felt of sending military expeditions against any of the Afridi tribes.

Though the Khyber Pass was reopened for caravan traffic on March 7, 1898 but the rising of 1897 once again highlighted the importance of the Khyber Pass as the main line of communication and trade route. The British realized that they had to give due consideration to the maintenance of the Khyber Pass for safe communication and trade in any future revision and reorganization of the frontier policy.

After the conclusion of the Tirah Valley expedition, the reconstruction of the forts was started at once. The forts were not in as bad shape as was feared by the British. The interior of the forts had been badly damaged but the walls were intact and the water tanks about a mile and half below Landi Kotal were in good shape. Before peace was fully restored, small skirmishes frequently took place in which three British soldiers were killed and fourteen wounded. The troops in the Khyber Pass at Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid and Jamrud had to be reinforced. At the beginning of the year 1898, three British brigades had been sent to hold the Khyber Pass from Jamrud to Landi Kotal and two more were stationed along the northeastern boundary of the Afridi territory. Later on, under Curzon’s Scheme of Frontier defense, the jezailchis were renamed as the Khyber Rifles and its strength was increased to two battalions of 600 men each, placed under British officers and supported by a Mobile Column at Peshawar. This was a part of the British effort to beef up security in the Khyber Pass.

After an year of arduous and costly fighting, the uprising apparently subsided but the British outposts and isolated forts were still in constant danger. From then onward, the activities of Mullahs were kept under vigilance and the maintenance of the Khyber Pass for safe communication and trade was given due consideration in the reconstruction of the Frontier Policy. The communication lines through the Khyber Pass were improved. The need for the construction of roads and a railway line was felt for the unhindered, swift and convenient movement of the troops to the troubled spots.

The Tirah Valley expedition was well-planned and accurately executed with full force and the objective to create an awe into the hearts of the Afridis. A half hearted effort like the operations that the Pakistani authorities are conducting in FATA and other troubled areas along the Pak-Afghan border, might have produced an altogether adverse effect. Negotiations with the tribes were held at the terms of the British and violations of the terms of the treaty were timely and severely punished.

Temporarily subduing the Afridis was not the real objective of the British. They wanted to eliminate the source of trouble and one such source was the preaching of the Mullahs. To weaken the Mullahs, the British patronized and strengthened the local maliks and chieftains of the tribes.

The most important aspect of the British handling of the uprising and the Tirah Valley expedition was its follow-up in the shape of improvement and development in the fields of logistic facilities and lines of communication. The expedition was not left incomplete. The improvement of communication lines and the constant vigilance and watch over the activities of the potential miscreants ensured the durability of peace and firm British control.

Another lesson that we have to learn from the Tirah expedition in particular is the fact that military operations should be brief and target specific. Randomly targeting constructions and people might not help in eliminating the real target and it might also increase the sympathizers of the adversaries. The British had precise targets in mind and they did not unnecessarily prolong their stay in Tirah after achieving their objectives.

One other factor that the authorities at present must keep in mind is that the hill-abode of the tribesmen is their greatest strength and biggest weakness at the same time. It is hard to gain access to their territory but it is easy to impose an effective blockade against them, compelling them to come to terms and agree to a settlement through negotiations.

In short, the success of British policy in the Khyber hills was because of their tact and diplomacy supplemented by effective use of force when necessary. This is what our present authorities and tribal administration should learn from history, if at all they are willing to learn.

 

Bibliography

 

Afridi, A., [2003]: Qayyum. The Hill Tribes Along the Eastern Side of Durand Line. Peshawar: Self-published by the Author.

Baha, Lal, [1978]: NWFP Administration under British Rule 1901-1919. Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research.

Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India Vol. II: North West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers. Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1979.

Khan, M. Fahim, [1984]: “The Frontier Rising of 1897”, in Central Asia, Journal of Area Study Center for Russia, China and Central Asia, University of Peshawar, No. 15, Winter, 169-179.

Khan, Dr. Azmat Hayat, [2000]: The Durand Line: Its Geostrategic Importance. Ed. M. Y. Effendi. Peshawar: Area Study Center, University of Peshawar & Hanns Seidal Foundation.

Khan, Teepu Mahabat, [2001]: The Land of Khyber. Ed. Prof. Dr. Qabil Khan. Peshawar: Uzbek Publishers.

Macmunn, Lt. Gen. Sir George, [1978]: The Romance of the Indian Frontiers. Quetta: Nisa Traders.

Mills, H. Woosnam, [1996]: The Pathan Revolts in North West Frontier. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications.

Nevill, Captain H. L., [1984]: Campaigns on the North-West Frontier. Delhi: Neeraj Publishing House.

Sabir, Mohammad Shafi, [1966]: Story of Khyber. Peshawar: University Book Agency.

Trench, Charles Chenevix, [1986]: The Frontier Scouts. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd.

Wylly, H. C., [1998]: The Borderland: The Country of the Pathans. Karachi: Indus Publications.

Warburton, Colonel Sir Robert, [1975]: Eighteen Years in the Khyber: 1879-1898. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

 

Archival Material

 

Letter from Kazi Mira Khan, and other Adam Khels composing the Afridi Jirga at Kabul, to Mullah Said Akbar dated October 25^th, 1897 reproduced as   appendix in Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India Vol. II: North     West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers. Quetta: Nisa      Traders, 1979.

“Memorandum by Sir William Lockhart for guidance of troops campaigning in Tirah”, reproduced as appendix in Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India Vol. II:North West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers.

“Report on the manufacture of Arms in the Kohat Pass” by H. Arden Close, Assistant District Superintendent of Police, Peshawar, dated September 9, 1894, File No., 16 C/ II, S. No. 22, Bundle No. 4, Office of the Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.