Central Asia Journal No. 66

The Role of Foreign Actors in Afghanistan During 1978-1992

Dr. Razia Sultana*
& Mr. Azmatullah**

Introduction

The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan had attracted the Russians since the times of Peter the Great. The United States of America (USA) kept itself at distant and least concerned about the Russians’ intentions regarding Afghanistan. But this policy of isolation of United States’ (US) had undergone a dramatic change when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) made a direct military intervention in the second half of the twentieth century. The US government started intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and had revived its interest to counter Communist Russia there.
The Soviets’ motives behind the intervention were apparently unclear but the strategic direction of the move evoked long cherished designs of Soviet expansionist policy of getting access to the warm waters, the control of major portion of the world’s oil supplies, and also the protection of the Socialist Afghan faction.
 Before the Soviet invasion, the chaotic circumstances had already besieged Afghanistan and were the result of multiple factors, triggered by regional and global powers that had not only provoked the Soviet invasion but had also turned the conflict into a religious war (Jihad) that was initially a national uprising. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had intensified the cold war rivalry between USA and USSR and had also provided further opportunity to most of the foreign and regional actors for exploiting the situation to their advantage. It had greatly alarmed the world in general and the US and the Muslim world in particular, to resist the Soviet motives of spreading communism beyond its borders. Afghanistan as next door country of USSR provided it with an opportunity to spread Communist ideas. In this regard, when the Pashtun dominated Khalq (Masses) faction of the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) introduced social reforms under the influence of Moscow; an anti-government rebellion came as a serious response which than turned into a civil war that soon became a religious war under the command of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as USA supported the people of Afghanistan to resist the Soviet invasion of their homeland.
Whatever might have been the causes of the war and of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but in reality it had greatly affected the Afghans in general and Pashtuns in particular who by now were victimized from every sides. On one hand, the Soviet preferential policy towards the minorities have marginalized and deprived them of their due share in government institutions and on the other hand, the preferential policies of the other outside actors such as USA, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia towards one or the other ethnic and religious groups, not only had caused disunity among them but had also ravaged the country socially, politically and economically. The economic assistance of those outside actors had though given the Afghans some economic benefits but in the social and political fields, they had played a devastating role.
Those outside actors had used the Afghans, belonging to the various ethnic races and religious sects, for the sake of safeguarding their own selfish interests and in order to pursue those interests they shed the blood of the Afghans by using them in a way as mercenaries, in the tug of war of international players.
They did not rely on their own strength to clash with the Soviet Union. They found the formidable resistance of the bold Afghans that, in case of their support, could contain the advance, and they could, thus, take revenge for their previous defects and could hold on to their interests in the gulf and Indian Ocean.

The foreign actors were though collectively responsible for the devastation and destruction of Afghanistan, but this devastation and destruction became further hasty when the US strategists had selected it as the main field for combats against USSR during the cold war period. US for accomplishing its own designs, was bent on turning Afghanistan into a hell for the Soviets.

United States of America (USA)

The Afghans have made themselves familiar with the post-war world scenario, in which Germany had faced defeat and USA emerged as the new world leader. USSR though suffered had survived the war and remained as powerful as ever, Great Britain was no longer a hegemonic naval imperial power and was preparing to quit India.
Interestingly, Afghanistan despite its enormous importance had never been the area of much significance in the US global strategy of containing communism until the Soviet military invasion in December 1979 had taken place. But at the same time, US had neither ignored it nor had accepted it completely into the Soviet sphere of influence. After the Soviet invasion, US with the support of Pakistan had launched an operation (the longest in the CIA’s history), aimed at the Afghans’ resistance mobilization against the Soviets and the turning of that resistance into a holy war (jihad) for inspiring the Muslim republics of USSR to wage a collective struggle against the infidels. The USA had already warned the Soviet leadership against the Islamic threat in 1978 by pointing out to them that “Islamic movement is surging in the Central Asian States from Afghanistan”. However, with a little delay in 1979, US and its allies exploited the opportunity of Soviets’ military intervention in Afghanistan.
Before the Soviet invasion, USA did not provide much economic and military assistance to Afghanistan due to three reasons: one, Kabul showed no interest to join Western-sponsored military alliance; two, neither of the super power was willing to turn Afghanistan into a cold-war zone; and three, USA regarded Afghanistan as a “backward country, existing in ‘isolation’, which seemed to be under no threat of immediate Soviet expansion.” Even in 1970s, US policy being a “flying blind” was marked by no efforts of winning the Kabul government which compelled the later to make itself an ally of USSR for developing the country and for providing support against Pakistan with which it had territorial disputes. President Nixon and Ford had realized the importance of Afghanistan only when the pro-Soviet, Dauod Khan captured power in 1973. Dauod Khan preferred the Parcham (Flag) faction of PDPA in his government and projected the Pashtunistan issue. During those years, USA persuaded Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to give economic assistance to Afghanistan and to advise it for conciliatory policy towards its neighbours, especially Pakistan. That way, USA wanted to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan through the creation of an alternate political and economic system and to block the Soviet influence, in order to safeguard the Afghans’ freedom of action and improvement of its ties with Pakistan and Iran. Until the Soviet invasion, USA viewed Afghanistan through the prism of bilateral relations and considered it as outside the orbit of its vital interest.
The Soviet military invasion and intervention provoked the resistance that was comprised of various Afghan ethnic groups. Afghanistan became the core of East-West politico-military confrontation that reached the cold war to its heights. US condemned the Soviet invasion and responded it in two ways; one was to protect its strategic interest in the region, and the second was a series of punitive sanctions. President Jimmy Carter of USA described the Soviet action as “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.” He issued “the Carter Doctrine” according to which an assault on the Persian Gulf region by any country or a state was regarded as an assault on the vital US interests in the region which the later would repel by any necessary means including the military force. The doctrine also embodied that Pakistan would be supported to defend its independence and national security against the serious increased threat, it faced from the north.
After the invasion, USSR’s ‘Sovietisation’ policy provided ample opportunity to the hostile neighbours and some western powers which were hell bent against Soviet intervention and most of them at that time tried to settle centuries-old scores with Afghanistan which was made a battlefield after the induction of the Russian armed forces. “The destructive politico-military conflict not only inflicted large-scale human and material losses but also led to further fragmentation of Afghan tribal society.”
For containing expansionist communism and reducing the Soviet threat, USA (once again) made an alliance with Pakistan in order to protect the region against USSR’s ambitious policy. The US administration considered both Pakistan and the US as “natural allies”. and had thus jointly created the Mujahideen (Holy Warriors) force;
According to one estimate the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) and the CIA funded and recruited almost thousand fanatic mujahideen from 40 Muslim countries to fight on behalf of the US. Most of the recruits were not even aware that the Jihad was being sponsored by the US.

USA had also started to run jointly with Pakistan the Afghan refugees camps, established inside Pakistan’s territory. Those camps proved breeding grounds to the Mujahideen, who were trained by the intelligence agencies of both the countries. The inspirational literature, taught to the Mujahideen was prepared by the US itself. The alphabets of the literature were jihad oriented, for example, “J is for Jihad, K is for Kalashnikov, and I is for Infidel. Mathematical problems had been something like: If you had fifty communist soldiers and you killed ten, how many would you still have?”
 USA supplied funds and weapons to the Mujahideen, nurtured in the camps of Pakistan. In fact, the US had not created the force, it was already there. The US though supported the resistance against USSR but it was not in favour of the fundamentalist resistance groups, based in Pakistan to overthrow the Kabul regime because it feared that they would follow “repressive policy against the nationalist, revolutionary, and patriotic forces throughout the country under the pretext of fighting communism.” In reality, USA adhered to Pakistan’s agenda which promoted particularly Pashtun groups. Pakistan remained firm as a “front-line” ally of the US against USSR. Behind that strategy, USA was following its own goals of turning the Afghan adventure into a costly and humiliating operation for the USSR; stopping Iran from exploiting the Afghan crisis; improvisation of its image that had shattered due to the Vietnam War; and to assert influence in the region that had declined after the fall of Shah of Iran in 1979. In pursuance of such goals, USA fostered strong bond with Islamabad and gave the later free hand to manage the war in whatever way it liked.
Subsequently, Carter’s administration boycotted the Olympics games of 1980, held in USSR which the later responded by boycotting the Olympics games of 1984, held in USA. The USA imposed grain embargo against the USSR, cut off high technology sales, freezing of arms control negotiations and making a request to the US Senate for postponing the consideration of the pending Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II. Besides those measures, USA at various fronts, tried to mobilize world Muslim opinion against USSR by calling it an aggression and preemption on the freedom and self-determination of Afghanistan.
 Due to the occurrence of such events, Mikhail Gorbachev as the new President of USSR, started radical changes in the foreign policy and had started proximity talks with USA at Geneva. The ‘Four Points Agenda’ was discussed in its sixth session held in December 1985, which were, non-intervention and non-interference in Afghan affairs, an international monitoring agreement and the return of the Afghan refugees and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Later on, Gorbachev made a unilateral decision in 1986, to withdraw some Soviet troops from Afghanistan and declared that all the Soviet troops would be withdrawn from that country after a satisfactory settlement.
The step taken for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan materialized in the Geneva talks of April 1988. Many had doubted the withdrawal at that time because USSR continued its support to Najibullah’s regime by strengthening his military power. USA on the other hand, despite knowing the Mujahidden’s disunity had started to support them more strongly. President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, who was hostile to the Kabul government, had favored a fundamentalist Islamic government for Afghanistan, preferably headed by Gulbadin Hekmatyar (A Kharotay Pashtun from Kunduz and the leader of Hizb-e-Islami Party of Afghanistan).
The Geneva talks came as a surprise to the whole world because it was not only a clear indication of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and of the improvement of the relations between USA and USSR but also the ending of the cold war rivalry that eventually led to the collapse of Soviet Russia.
United States of America’s CIA had provided more than $ 625 millions covert aid to the Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic parties for making Afghanistan as Vietnam for USSR. Along with this covert aid by the CIA, the US government also provided a total of $ 430 million worth of humanitarian assistance through the various international agencies, to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and continued military and financial support of the resistance forces in Afghanistan.
After the Soviet withdrawal, the regional powers such as Pakistan and Iran became more active in Afghanistan in order to fill the vacuum. Pakistan enjoyed front-line status during the presence of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan which had to face new realities. It was left alone because US interest in the region had declined. Pakistan had to reshape relations with the regional countries as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had minimized the US interest in Pakistan and the need for an intimate relationship with Islamabad.  
Though, US support of the Afghans against the Soviets had greatly helped them in resisting communism and the PDPA regimes but at the same time, it had adversely affected the Afghans. US prime intention was not to help the Afghans in getting independence from the Soviets but its design was to fulfill its own strategic objectives in the region. The Pashtuns, who were already at loggerhead with the PDPA regimes, had experienced latent ethnic differences within the Afghan resistance. On the other hand, Pakistan being a front-line state during the jihad had supported Hekmatyar’s group due to which other ethnic races feared Pashtuns’ renewed dominance. Pakistan as a next door neighbour had played a vital role in the promotion of Pashtun dominated religious groups, especially Hekmatyar’s group.

Pakistan

Pak-Afghan relations have been characterized by strains and stresses, and had never been cordial despite the geographical contiguity, considerable majority of the Pashtun race living in Pakistan, commonalities of religion and economic interests. Though Pakistan showed eagerness for friendly relations with Afghanistan but had failed mainly because of the Durand-Line and Pashtunistan issues, added by One-Unit Plan, in view of which the Afghan government claimed the North-West Frontier Province (N-WFP) as part of Afghanistan in 1955 and had attacked the Pakistan embassy. Internally, Dir incident had occurred that had evoked cross-border reactions.
The Durand Line agreement was signed in 1893 between the British Indian government and the Amir of Afghanistan. The British India was represented by Mr. (later on Sir) Mortimer Durand and the Afghan government was represented by Amir Abd-ur-Rehman Khan. By this treaty the British government wanted to protect its subjects in the North-West Frontier. This boundary agreement was drawn as a frontier for military convenience, much of which runs through the foothills, leading to Afghanistan’s Suleiman Mountains. It stretches from Chitral in N-WFP to Baluchistan and sneaks through the tribal belt with no regard to the concern of ethnic communities.
Another motive behind this agreement besides military objective was that the British traders wanted peaceful routes for British trade which was the basic source of income, and due to the expansion of the economic markets with the rampant colonization of the countries, the British thought that the demand for manufactured goods in the new colonies and economic markets was also increasing. The British in order to satisfy the demand of the traders had signed the Durand Line agreement as a guarantee of routes’ security. These routes included “the Khyber, the Kurram, and the routes from Ghazni, either by the Tochi valley to Bannu or by the Gomal to Dera Ismail Khan, and as a variant from Pashin down to the Lower Derajat and Dera Ghazi Khan.”
The demarcation of Durand Line had not only extracted a territory from Afghanistan but had also divided the Pashtun community. Not only the Pashtuns of Afghanistan were disappointed but their Amir, Abdur-ur-Rehman himself had expressed his displeasure over the agreement. He however, accepted the agreement because he was a realist and bowed to the superior power, while in his personal understanding, Pashtun areas were part and parcel of the Afghan Kingdom. In his autobiography, Abd-ur-Rehman had expressed his viewpoint that “the areas on the British side of the Durand Line were not permanently ceded to them, but in the same way he mentioned the areas to which he had renounced his claim.”
The text and the wording of the agreement demonstrates that it was drawn as a boundary agreement and the objective behind it was the demarcation and determination of the frontier between the Afghan Kingdom and the British Indian Empire. Though, the agreement caused displeasure of the Afghan Amir and of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line but it was accepted by them even in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919), as an Indo-Afghan frontier.
At the time of the British withdrawal and the announcement for the partition of India in June 1947, the Khudai Khedmatgars (God’s Servants) in N-WFP demanded the establishment of an independent Pashtunistan and boycotted the referendum which was to be held in the province for deciding the fate of the people to join Pakistan or India. With the surety of the partition, not only the Khudai Khedmatgars of N-WFP but also the Afghan government had expressed its concern about the future of the Pashtuns of N-WFP. It made a representation to Delhi and London on 3 July 1947 that the people of N-WFP and Baluchistan should be given the opportunity to determine whether to join Pakistan or Afghanistan or to become independent, rather than to make the choice between Pakistan and India. The British replied that it would consider the treaty of 1921, under which Durand Line was acknowledged as international border and in accordance with the international law; the successor government will be decided. Pashtuns, who had to exercise the sovereignty over the area came under the authority of the new government of Pakistan which made agreements with individual tribal chiefs who were promised to be given subsidies, they had received from the British. The reply of the British caused bitterness among the Afghans who had expressed that by opposing Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations on 20 October 1947 and thus, became the only country that voted against Pakistan.
The referendum that was held in N-WFP, according to the 3rd June Plan, without including the option of independence for the Pashtuns, was categorically condemned by the Khudai Khedmatgars and the Afghan government. However, the people voted in favour of Pakistan and thus N-WFP along with its tribal areas became as a part of Pakistan.
Afghanistan had out rightly rejected the referendum and had considered it as a “Fraud and Shame” on the part of the British viceroy. They argued that “the right of self-determination had to be given to Pashtuns living in Pakistan.” It had also passed a resolution in 1949, which repudiated all the past treaties, signed with the British Indian government. In 1955, the Afghan Loya Jirga (Grand Council) passed a resolution for the rejection of N-WFP and the tribal areas as parts of Pakistan.
Other issues, connected with the Durand Line and the Pashtunistan issues were the One-Unit Plan and Dir issue. The Afghan government had passed the One-Unit Bill in 1955, which was executed on October 1955, had greatly disturbed the Pakistani government. This bill was the resolution passed by the Loya Jirga which rejected Pakistan’s sovereignty over N-WFP and tribal areas. The Afghans then attacked Pakistan’s embassy. Internally, Dir crisis emerged as a result of protest by the inhabitants of Dir, under the influence of the Pashtunistan issue which in Pakistan became an important issue that had evoked cross border skirmishes. Dir dispute dominated the politics during that period. The elections that were held under the constitution of 1956 in Pakistan, the Nawab of Dir boycotted them and had sent no representative.
In 1973, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto banned the National Awami Party (NAP) in N-WFP and Baluchistan and later dismissed its government in both the provinces. The Afghans in general and Afghan government in particular became restless and launched a protest against Bhutto’s decision of banning and dismissing the NAP governments.
The relations between both the countries from 1976 to 1978, improved before the Saur (Red) Revolution in Afghanistan. But in 1978, the Khalqi regime of PDPA revived support for independent Pashtunistan. The leader of Parcham faction of PDPA, Babrak Karmal also supported the issue of Pashtunistan and Baluchs’ autonomy to create problems for Pakistan.
These issues caused strains in relations between both the countries. The Afghans claimed that “their blood brethrens were forcibly separated.” President Dauod once remarked that “the British did a wrong many years ago and we have been fighting to rectify it until that is done, the struggle will continue.” Pakistan on the other hand had denied all those claims and regarded Durand Line as a valid international boundary agreement and N-WFP and its people as part and parcel of Pakistan. Pakistan’s main contention was that “Afghanistan cannot challenge the validity of the Durand Line unilaterally.”
Afghanistan’s demand for the N-WFP and the tribal areas as part of Afghanistan or independent Pashtunistan was totally on ethno-nationalist grounds, rather than on religious grounds. They demonstrated their displeasure over the separation of their ‘blood brethrens’ rather on the separation of their religious brethrens. During Dauod Khan’s regime and later during Khalqi regimes of the PDPA, the issues of Durand Line and Pashtunistan gained prominence. For this reason, Pakistan never wanted a nationalist government in Afghanistan because it felt that the nationalists would destabilize the internal situation in Pakistan. During the rule of PDPA regimes, Pakistan deliberately provided support to the Pashtun-dominated Islamist parties on the grounds that the Pashtuns not only dominated the resistance but also formed the majority in Afghanistan. The opposition of those parties to the idea of Pashtun nationalism could help Pakistan in reduction of the significance of Pashtunistan issue. Pashtuns as a majority community in Afghanistan, Pakistan also knew the fact that keeping them out of the power corridors would result in the rise of a new aggressive Pashtun nationalism that would affect the Pashtuns of Pakistan also and thus would create internal instability in the country.
Pakistan as successor of the British, inherited the legacy of a ‘military state’, a colonial legacy that dominated its past and present. Pakistan’s deteriorated security situation and its strategic position after the partition obliged the rulers to make radical decisions of either continuing independent policy-thinking or to express its obsession with the Indian aggression and join the capitalist block, led by USA. Pakistan opted for the second option and thus faced heavy odds due to burden of the cold war rivalry between the two super powers, USA and USSR.
As a ‘security state’, Pakistan found itself locked in disputes ever since its independence with both of its neighbours (India and Afghanistan), on the eastern and western borders. India also faced the same dilemma because it had two hostile powers (Pakistan and China) on its border. China as a rival of India supported Pakistan and enabled it to face India’s aggression. Pakistan as a policy-rationale and in order to face India’s aggression had better thought to neutralize relations with Afghanistan.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the main burden of the refugees was borne by Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, the refugees were settled in camps of N-WFP, Baluchistan and Punjab. Their exact number were never known precisely but according to the 1990 survey, Pakistan had about 3.3 million registered Afghan refugees and about 10 to 20 % unregistered refugees. About 80% of those refugees were from the Pashtun ethnic background.
Pakistan by facing the refugees’ problem had condemned the Soviet invasion and had also played a vital role in mobilizing international public opinion against it on various fronts. Besides it, Pakistan began to train and equip the Mujahideen in camps which became sanctuaries of the Mujahideen activities. There were also two other reasons for the crucial role played by Pakistan against USSR: One was the internal domestic situation; and the other was the destabilization caused in the region by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Domestically in Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq was isolated after the execution of the former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in April 1979 and faced grave questions of legitimacy and demands for the fresh elections which he promised to be held within ninety days after toppling the civilian regime. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran bothered the US. Iran which before the Islamic revolution was US strategic partner had knocked out and in this situation, Pakistan was considered as a replacement by the US administration. The US-Pakistan convergence on Afghanistan issue had benefited Zia-ul-Haq in two ways: First, through US economic and military assistance had strengthened his support-base in the civil and military bureaucracy; and second, his strong support for Afghanistan had won him the support of the various religious groups, within the state. The economic growth in the country through the assistance from the various sources like World Bank and the countries of the western bloc enabled General Zia-ul-Haq to strengthen his position against the democratic forces in the country.
The Soviet invasion posed a serious security threat to Pakistan. USSR’s support to the PDPA regime, which was increasingly hostile to Pakistan, presented difficult security problems. Caught in such a situation, Pakistan could not remain dormant and had to reshape its Afghan policy.
The new Afghan policy shaped by Pakistan was to compel the Soviet forces to withdraw from Afghanistan and in order to achieve this objective; Pakistan played a far greater role during the Afghan war. It followed discriminatory but a very critical policy towards Mujahideen and among them had supported only its favorites. As an Islamic Republic predominantly Sunni and with a sizeable Pashtun population on the Afghan border, Pakistan favoured the main Sunni Mujahideen groups who represented the majority of the Afghan people. Among them, Pakistan promoted only one, Hizb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan, Hekmatyar group (HIA, H), most suitable for its own objectives. By promoting Hekmatyar, General Zia-ul-Haq had three objectives in mind to fulfill: firstly, to get rid of the Pashtunistan issue; secondly, to repatriate the three million Afghan refugees mainly ethnic Pashtuns; and thirdly, to prepare a strong Afghan politico-military force under the cover of countering the Soviet invasion in order to achieve the above goals in the medium-to-long term.
The choice of Hekmatyar sounded best to the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) for achieving their set goals. Hekmatyar, a Pashtun extremist and a radical Islamist had fled to Pakistan in the early 1970s, was a most prominent Mujahideen leader. The ISI channeled the bulk of internal and external (especially US and the Western bloc) assistance to Hekmatyar and his radical Mujahideen group- HIA. In this way, Pakistan reinforced ethnicity as a political identity. Pakistan’s special support to Hekmatyar was criticized on the ground that Pakistan and the certain officials of its intelligence agency, ISI had certain ideological affinities with the Hizb of Hekmatyar. The government of Pakistan and the ISI had repeatedly denied those accusations on the grounds that the aid was distributed among those Mujahideen parties who demonstrated military effectiveness.
The events took dramatic turn when in USSR, Gorbachev assumed power and under the mounting world pressure, Moscow gradually adopted a more flexible approach to the UN’s efforts of peace and security. Gorbachev, who was the only person to call Afghanistan ‘a bleeding wound’ felt concerned about Afghanistan. He decided the withdrawal of the Soviet forces and called for the formation of a government of “national reconciliation” as a pre-condition for withdrawal. Pakistan and USA supported the idea of interim government but demanded the withdrawal first.
The Geneva accord in 1988 appeared to be the important event in the history of the region. The accord was signed by the four parties to the conflict namely; USSR, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Under this accord, it was agreed that USSR would withdraw its forces and would not intervene in the politics of Afghanistan in future. USA also agreed not to provide assistance to the resistance forces. Pakistan and Afghanistan were banned from interference in each other’s territory.
The Geneva Accord obliged both Afghanistan and Pakistan, not to interfere or intervene directly or indirectly in each other’s affairs and territories. Afghanistan was asked to stop its irredentist claims on Pakistan’s territory while the later was instructed to stop the support of the Afghan Islamist guerrillas which it had repudiated  and continued interference in the affairs of Afghanistan because it (Pakistan) wanted the ‘rightist Muslim government in Afghanistan’ which sharply contradicted not only US and USSR strategic interests but also gave a clear impression that Pakistan regards Geneva Accord as a piece of paper rather than a reliable basis for mutual relations with Afghanistan.
However, as a consequence of the Geneva Accord, Gorbachev withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan in early 1989. In order to fill the vacuum, the various Afghan Mujahideen groups with international support and assistance had turned the war into an ethnic struggle with a special emphasis on Pashtun ethnic nationalism. In Pakistan, after the mysterious death of General Zia-ul-Haq in an air crash in August 1988, the interim government followed the same policy of the late Martial Law administrator, by retaining Zia’s foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqoob Ali Khan on the same portfolio. As a result of 1988 elections, Benazir Bhutto assumed power as the Prime Minister of Pakistan in December 1988. She kept intact the Afghanistan policy of General Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo. By the end of 1991, two new developments revived the importance of the Pashtuns’ cause in the Pakistani ruling circles under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. One was the decline of the Soviet support for the Najibullah’s government in Kabul, and the other was the emergence of the Soviet Central Asian Republics as independent states, opening to the outside world a new and resource-rich region. The first development occurred when the collapse of Najib’s government took place which brought no joy to Pakistan and the second development provided to Pakistan an opportunity to get economic benefits by getting access to the newly open markets and resources of Central Asia, for which Afghanistan was an obvious corridor.
Though the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had removed the major threat to Pakistan on its western border but the unfinished war remained a central issue on the Islamabad’s diplomatic agenda. The civil war among the Afghan Mujahideen had deteriorated the situation and new streams of Afghan refugees trickled into Pakistan. As long as Najibullah’s government remained in power, Pakistan bore the brunt of refugees. According to Afrasiyab Khattak, “Pakistan played a very negative role in Afghanistan because the war was actually in Pakistan and the chaos was in Afghanistan which the former had manipulated for the sake of its own selfish interests.”
The expectations of Islamabad that Hekmatyar would capture the power after the fall of Najibullah proved futile because Ahmed Shah Masoud, a Tajik and the rival of Hekmatyar, in alliance with the Uzbek warlord from the north, Abdul Rashid Dostum captured power at Kabul. Masoud after taking control of the capital invited the Pakistan-based ‘Sevenors’ for setting up Afghanistan’s first Islamic government.
At this juncture, the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had whole heartedly accepted the UN peace plan and gave assurance of support to the Interim Commission under Sibghatullah Mujaddedi. This decision of Nawaz government not only disheartened the more militant radical groups which it supported up till now but also created internal problems for the government itself. For example, Jamat-i-Islami protested and withdrew from the Pakistan’s ruling Islamic Democratic Alliance in May 1992.
Under such tumultuous circumstances, the Peshawar agreement of April 1992, with the full support of Islamabad, designated Sibghatullah Mujaddedi (a Pashtun) as President of interim government for the first two months and then the Tajik leader of Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan (JIA), Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani for six months. The radical Pashtun leader of HIA, Hekmatyar was offered the subordinate position of prime minister with the hope that he would join it. That way Pakistan under circumstances installed the Tajik domination through the Rabbani’s government with Masoud as its strong military man, which had spelled the defeat of Pakistan version of Pashtunistan policy in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar refused to honor the Peshawar Accord due to Tajik dominance in it.
Pakistan played a far greater role in the Afghan conflict as an immediate eastern neighbour of Afghanistan. It accommodated the Afghan refugees and mobilized international public opinion against the Soviet invasion. It trained and equipped the Mujahideen in its refugee camps in order to oust the PDPA regimes from power by violating the international law. Not only the Mujahideen fought against the PDPA regimes but they were also ready to fight against each other. In this struggle, the Pashtuns tremendously suffered, mainly due to Pakistan’s deep involvement in Afghanistan. This policy put the Pashtuns in the war on three fronts: one, the war against the government; second, the war with the non-Pashtun ethnic Afghan groups; and third, the undue importance to the radical and extremist group of Hekmatyar put them on fight among themselves.
Pakistan played the role of the main agitator during the civil war in Afghanistan, following the fall of Najibullah’s government in 1992. It was supported financially by Saudi Arabia and the USA. They provided funds to Pakistan, which spent it on the training of Mujahideen to fulfill its objectives. Among the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia provided funds to the Mujahideen,like USA through Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia supported Pakistani agenda and provided substantial financial assistance to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan, without paying attention to what Pakistan wanted to achieve out of the war. The Saudis who had no direct interest in the war were made conscious by the Pakistani establishment of their own objectives in the Afghan war. In this war, they (the Saudi Arabians) not only appeared as the defender of the Islamic ideology against the communists but exported their traditionalists Sunni Wahabi Islam to Afghanistan and also tried to block their main regional and Shiite rival Iran from gaining any sectarian or political benefits in Afghanistan. Working on this plan, they supported its close historical friendship with Pakistan. The Saudis allowed the ISI to provide most of their aid to the Mujahideen. Saudi Arabia supported the Pashtun Islamists mainly because it felt that the non-Pashtun resistance groups were more susceptible to the Iranian influence.
Also, Saudi Arabia played a vital role in the March 1990s coup, launched by General Shah Nawaz Tanai in Kabul against Najibullah. The Saudi intelligence agency along with Pakistan’s ISI paid up to $ 15,000 each to Mujahideen leaders to join the coup. But the coup failed and Tanai fled to Pakistan where he joined Hizb-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan, Khalis group (HIA, K).
Thus, Saudi Arabia shared with Pakistan, the support of the Pashtun Mujahideen groups. It had tried to neutralize the fact that Iran shared border and had also religious and linguistic links with Afghanistan. Iran supported mostly the non-Pashtun Shiite Tajiks and Hazaras ethnic groups in order to counter the Sunni Pashtun Islamists for the sake of its own interests.
Iran as a neighbour of Afghanistan had the interest to support its co-ethnic and co-religious groups and to counter the influence of the other regional powers in Afghanistan. Iran like Pakistan took active interest in the affairs of Afghanistan and had also tried to fill the vacuum there after the withdrawal of Soviet Union.

Iran

Iran as a neighbour of Afghanistan shared not only border with it but also shares with it the Persian speaking Shi’a minorities. Iran as a Shiite country had its co-religionists living in Afghanistan. The Shiite religion is practiced by the Hazara of Hazarajat, some Orakzai Pashtun tribes and by some of the Tajiks. Most of Shi’as were/are living in Central Afghanistan. The Hazaras being the Shiite community owed to their geography and for the most part the Hazara groups felt no need to enter into alliances and remained localized. The Hazaras were practically abandoned by the Soviet Afghan forces in 1981 which helped the Hazaras to establish their self-rule over their own territory without the interference from the central government.
With the vacuum created by the disappearance of the Kabul authority, various groups and parties emerged in the Hazarajat. This change was caused by the Iranian influence, which had continued to increase throughout the period from 1950 to 1985. The religious mullahs (who leads prayers in the mosques) of the Shi’as were mostly educated in Iran and Iraq due to which the Shi’as proclaimed political allegiance to both of these countries, during the resistance movement. The various Shiite parties formed Shura-Inqilab-e-Ittefaq-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan (SIIIA), Nasr (Victory), Sipah-e-Pasdaran (Army of the Guardian of the Revolution) and Harkati-Islami-Afghanistan, Mohseni (HIA, M) had either disappeared due to internal corruption or have remained localized. But these Shiite parties received tremendous Iranian support during the whole period of the Soviet occupation. Tehran like Pakistan also wanted to establish unity among the Shiite parties, in order to gain regional autonomy for the Hazaras. For entering into alliance with the Sunni parties, Iran demanded greater representation for the Shi’as in the future government and local autonomy for the Hazarajat.
At the time of the Soviet invasion, Iran faced the burden of the Afghan refugees, numbering 100,000 to 300,000, though it provided camps to them but did not operate official relief programme. Unlike Pakistan, the refugees in Iran were not allowed to benefit from the local economy, to own property, to travel freely or to run businesses. Through these restrictions, Iran wanted to influence politically, the Afghan Mujahideen and the refugee communities. Soon, six new Afghan political parties emerged in Iran and each of which attempted to gain military and financial support from different Iranian government factions. The Shi’a groups did not get western assistance due to the antagonistic diplomatic relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the USA. These developments though increased the Iranian influence over the Shi’a Afghan Mujahideen but had also caused divisions and confrontations among them. On the whole; all these Iran-based Shiite organizations did not play a significant role during the war of resistance against the Soviets and the Communist PDPA regimes.
After the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, Iran entered into the tug-of- war with Pakistan. In the struggle for influence , for achieving its objectives, Iran had unified various Shiite groups in the alliance of eight parties, Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party) in 1989 who captured half of the capital’s territory when Kabul had fallen to the Mujahideen. This new alliance had boasted the morale of the Hazara ethnic group to such an extent that in the early days of the fall of Communist regime, they took control of the numerous buildings and localities in Kabul but due to lack of coordination could not consolidate their hold.
The Hazara-dominated Wahdat in alliance with the Tajik-dominated JIA (R) and the Uzbek-dominated Jumbash-e-Milli (Dostum) posed a direct challenge to the Pashtun-dominated outfits.
The Pashtuns during more than two hundred years had not harassed various non-Pashtun ethic groups and regarded them as Afghans but with the weakening of the Pashtuns during the PDPA regimes, the non-Pashtuns formed various alliances, not only against the government but also against the Pashtuns.
           
The efforts by Iran, to grab more shares in power for Shi’as with the Sunni parties had failed because fundamentalist parties refused to accept 25% representation for the Shiite groups in the Afghan consultative assembly that was set to elect the interim government had thus, prevented the Shiite groups from joining the Pakistan-backed interim government-in-exile in 1990.
Iran due to two reasons was reluctant to support the Pakistan-based Sunni parties. One was the traditional non-revolutionary Sunni Islamic orientation of the parties and the other was the ‘Realpolitik’ considerations. Iran was willing to negotiate with Najibullah’s government in case the Shiite parties were ignored by the Pakistan-based resistance groups because with the decline of the Soviet support, Najibullah paid heed to Iran’s concerns of granting autonomy to the Shiite parties in return for their support to Kabul.
Thus, Iran’s influence over the Shiite groups prevented them from entering into alliance with the Sunni Mujahideen resistance groups which had greatly weakened the resistance movement and had prolonged the Soviets presence in Afghanistan. Iran’s objective was to protect the co-religionist Shiites inside Afghanistan, it also aimed to weaken the dominance of the Sunni Pashtuns and for that purpose it supported the Hazaras and also, the Tajiks.
Iran, Pakistan, India and China, who took active part in Afghanistan as its neighbours had remained safe from the Central Asian Republics (CARs), including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghistan and Kazakhstan, because these republics were themselves under the influence of communist Russia and could not find the time to interfere actively in Afghanistan.

CARs

The independence of the CARs; Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghistan and Kazakhstan with the collapse of Communist Russia added a new factor to the regional power rivalry in Afghanistan. The CARs being mostly Muslims were compelled during Communist Party rule to change their Islamic outlook for the Communist ideology. After the disintegration of the Communist Russia, the CARs found themselves in trouble and were unable to order their matters.
The CARs had some sort of common attributes that it shared with Afghanistan such as borders, ethnic, cultural and religious affinities. In the religious context, though the CARs had shown their willingness to the revival of cultural Islam by allowing the reopening of mosques and madrassahs (Seminaries) but later on under the Russian pressure they had to adopt a hard stance against the expansion of the influence of Islam on political level. The Russian pressure was the result of its bitter memories of the role of Mujahideen in its defeat in Afghanistan.
Not only Russia but the leaders of the CARs, who rose to power after the disintegration of Soviet Union, were also reluctant to accept the Islamic movements and their leaders and even non-communist elements at any cost. In the course of time, their adherence to the authoritarian communist power structures generated growing opposition on the issues of democratic liberties and greater religious freedom. For example, in May 1992, the growing power of the Islamist forces and their alliance with the secular democratic parties was visible as a brief success they gained by removing the ruling establishment of Tajikistan. The communist leaders of CARs blamed Afghanistan for such Islamic influences which the later had denied.
Except the little support of the Uzbekistan to the Uzbeks of Afghanistan, CARs played almost no role in the Afghanistan due to their unstable economic and tottering political situation. Once the barriers vanished, erected by the former USSR, CARs were more concerned about their economic dilemma.
The CARs that remained neutral were though a blessing for the Afghans but their vacuum was filled by another main regional power who claimed hegemony in the region was India. In order to prove itself as a bulwark state, India equally tried to exploit the Afghan situation under the garb of a neutral status. It had overtly tried to influence the Afghan government in its own favor and to counter Pakistan.

India

Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan was centered on three main objectives during the war in Afghanistan: firstly, territorial disputes with Pakistan; secondly, non-aligned status and opposed to military pacts; and thirdly, friendship with the Soviet Union. Among those objectives, the first featured most prominent. At the time of the withdrawal of the British from the sub-continent and the emergence of the two new states of Pakistan and India, when Afghanistan demanded that the people of the N-WFP should be given the choice of becoming independent or rejoining Afghanistan, Jawaharlal Nehru, the congress leader and the Foreign Minister of the interim government of the undivided British India said that;
If the selective claims of history gave Afghanistan the right to demand parts of NWFP and Baluchistan, then the sub-continent’s erstwhile rule over Kabul also bestowed upon India a valid legal right to lay a claim over the Afghan territory up to the Hindukash beyond the Durand Line.
                                                                       
India not only considers itself as a regional great power but also wants hegemony in the region. It considers South Asia, as its sphere of dominance and South East Asia, Middle East, Central Asia and East Africa as its spheres of influence. Unfortunately, Pakistan is located in South Asia which not only claims equal status with India but is also engaged in a struggle with the later. India for putting Pakistan in trouble after its creation had supported Afghanistan’s claims across the Durand Line and provided help to the later for projecting the Pashtunistan issue. India itself created the Kashmir dispute for the newly independent Pakistan. The Indo-Afghan disputes with Pakistan provided a new basis of friendship to both India and Afghanistan. They were added by the Soviet Union that had developed its own peculiar grievances over Pakistan’s joining the western military pacts. Thus, Pakistan became common enemy of the three that provided solid basis for their friendship.
India supported King Zahir Khan’s monarchy for his claims on Pakistan’s territory. Sirdar Dauod Khan was the engineer of the Afghanistan’s policy vis-à-vis Pakistan and the Indo-Afghanistan friendship. During his premiership, Dauod Khan was anti-Pakistan and Pro-India and a staunch supporter of the Pashtunistan issue. His foreign policy was in accordance with the wishes of both India and the Soviet Union and was viewed entirely to the liking of both these countries. At the time of his coup against the King, India and USSR acted as ‘security guards’ in support of Sirdar Dauod. India moved its troops along its borders with Pakistan and USSR to the Amu Darya by giving an impression to China, the former Shah of Iran and Pakistan to desist from exploiting the initial unsettled situation in Afghanistan.  
After assuming power as President, Dauod Khan wanted to balance relations with both, USSR and the West led by USA. To achieve this purpose he prevented the military and the leftists from gaining influences in his government. He in order to balance the Soviet influence concluded economic assistance agreements with the pro-western countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran and also sent Afghan military officers for training to Egypt and India instead of USSR for which he had to pay heavy price. He was assassinated in the communist Khalqi coup of April 1978.
In pursuance of pro-Western policy, Dauod Khan reached an understanding on the Pashtunistan issue with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This agreement remained unknown to India at that time. Before the arrival of the Soviet forces; India hoped the return of stability in Afghanistan and the end of outside powers’ interference. The Janata party regime under Morarji Desai never accepted Soviet explanation for its invasion of Afghanistan. Maintaing non-aligned stance, it was revealed later on that the Indian Prime Minister advised the President of USSR, Brezhnev to urge the Communist Afghans to seek support among the masses instead of blaming Pakistani interference for its troubles.
At the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, India though projected a non-aligned status and was against the involvement of external powers in the security affairs of the region had remained silent and had officially never uttered a word against the injustices of the Soviet forces inflicted upon the Afghans.
India’s Afghan policy during this period of time was of a contradictory nature. On one hand it was claiming itself a non-aligned country and on the other hand it had totally aligned itself with the Kabul regime for extracting maximum military and economic benefits from USSR. The Indian leadership not only ignored the Soviet intervention but had also justified it arrogantly without regarding the national sovereignty and non-aligned status of Afghanistan.
The pro-Soviet policy on the part of India was consistent with its general policy vis-à-vis global alignments, for three reasons: firstly, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not a direct threat to the Indian security; secondly, India did not want Pakistan’s friendly Mujahideen to topple the PDPA regime and was in favour of secular, neutral and friendly Afghanistan; and thirdly, Pakistan had become weaker in the regional power equation as it played role in the Soviet-supported conflict and become amenable to New Delhi’s leadership in the region.
India in support of Soviet Union was also of the opinion that Pakistan’s support to the resistance was directed to the destabilization of Afghanistan and that the Soviet intervention was reactive rather than strategically offensive which in reality meant to undermine US justification of military assistance to Pakistan. But in the due course of time India lost the ground as a major power in the region and Pakistan emerged a far more influential regional actor with considerable international support.
India was supportive of the PDPA regime. When it realized that the Soviets seriously wanted to end the Afghan war, it attempted to become part of the regional settlement but this move of India was frustrated by Pakistan and its allies which made India to increase its support to Najibullah’s regime. Through this tactic, India hoped that the Mujahideen would be exhausted by the war and in the end they would accept Najibullah’s rule. This Indian prediction met a failure because Najibullah’s regime caved in under pressure both from Afghan resistance and from the internal dissentions of his own regime.
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, India became more worried about the Mujahideen who were thorns in its eyes because they had thrown out Indian friendly regime and had called off the Pashtunistan rhetoric.
When leaders of the Mujahideen gathered at Islamabad for mediation, India detested it, because it wanted the kind of relationship with Afghanistan as it had with Nepal and Bhutan. Thus, by condemning the cause of the national self-determination of the Afghans, India alienated the popular forces of Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided greater opportunity to all the foreign actors, of exploiting the situation for their own selfish interests. The USA, who initially remained unconcerned about the situation in Afghanistan, got deeply involved after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to stop USSR, from further expansion. During the presence of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the rule of the PDPA regimes, new alliances were forged between the various regional and international players which caused devastation to the Afghan policy and state. The Pashtuns were victimized not only by the government of the Parcham faction but also by those outside parties who were anti-Soviet and anti-PDPA. The Afghans were locked into a civil war and according to Mrs. Zahira Khattak;
USSR’s preferential policy towards the ethnic minorities, to wrestle powers from the Pashtuns, and USA and Pakistan’s preferential policy towards the later scared the non-Pashtuns about the renewed Pashtun dominance that brought the resistance forces to a war, not only against government but also to a civil war among themselves, for gaining power and dominance.
           
In short, the foreign actors’ role was destructive. The Afghans, including all the ethnic races of the country who were collectively fighting a Jihad against the Soviet forces, were made conscious about their ethnic affiliations and were compelled for a power struggle among themselves, as every regional and international actor supported its own favorite. The various warlords of Afghanistan were hired by one or the other country, added by their own respective interests to fight the war on their behalf. As the Soviet Union had withdrawn its forces from Afghanistan, followed by the subsequent collapse of the USSR, the foreign actors could play a constructive role but unfortunately, they in the pursuance of their own objectives had created problems in the way of rebuilding the political system in Afghanistan. They, by accomplishing their own respective designs and as players of the zero-sum-game did not allow the Afghans to flourish their own system of government.
Another devastating aspect of such role in Afghanistan by the foreign actors was that it has turned the region in to a constant conflict zone among the various regional and international powers. The foreign actors were concerned only with their own selfish interests and had no intention of settling the Afghan problem. They played their role to weaken the Pashtun dominance instead of increasing and strengthening it. The Pashtuns in this whole process were marginalized in Afghanistan and the ethnic minorities got an upper hand over the Pashtuns in the power structure of the country that caused a serious problem for all the ethnic races as the Pashtuns would not allow such minorities to dominate or rule their country peacefully. Hence, rise of the Taliban was a radical outcome of Pashtun alienation in the 90s era. The future might hold similar reactions in case rightful lessons are not taken from the past.