SALIENCE OF QAWM, ETHNICITY, IN AFGHANISTAN: AN OVERVIEW

Sarfraz Khan* Irfan Ali Shah**

Abstract

      It has been assumed that qawm (a flexible term, referring to kin, clan, village, tribe, ethnic/vocational/confessional group, profession, and/or nation) used to be the primary identity in Afghanistan. However, after 1979, ethnicity and sect (confession) became the primary identities, as a consequence of war and funding by the West and neighboring/regional states. More than three decades of violence and instability in a multi-ethnic state, Afghanistan, not only destroyed political, social and economic infrastructure, but also inflamed ethnic, sectarian, and regional divisions. More than fifty ethnic groups reside Afghanistan including: four major groups; the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and the Hazara; constituting 90% of Afghan population. The Pashtun, ruled the country throughout its history, barring two brief spans (1929 and 1992-94) when Tajiks ruled Afghanistan. The promulgation of 1964 Constitution in Afghanistan stirred political struggle between various ethnic groups, the Pashtun and non-Pashtun, for power. The Soviet invasion, in 1979, stimulated and further politicised ethnicity. Conversely, the Mujahideen (1992-96) and the Taliban (1996-2001), ethnicised politics that led to severe infighting between major ethnic groups and resulted into ethnic violence, cleansing and/or conflict. Ethnicity became salient further during the post-Taliban governments due to power sharing arrangements. Examining the salience of qawm, in Afghanistan, the article argues that ethnicity was politicized following the Soviet intervention, however, Western and neighbouring states’ support to particular ethnic groups, during Mujahideen and Taliban periods, ethnicized politics. In turn that led to ethnic cleansing and conflict resulting into further salience of qawm, ethnicity, in Afghanistan.

Key Words: Qawm, Tribe, Ethnicity, Ethnic groups, Ethnic Cleansing, Sect, Constructivist, Soviet Invasion, Salience, Ascendency, Mujahideen, Taliban, Bonn Accord.

Introduction

      Afghanistan lacks official, scientific Population Census, though contested and disputed surveys and estimations are available. In1979, Afghan government (the Khalqis) tried to conduct the first ever official scientific Census but the task remained incomplete: only 56 percent of the population was enumerated due to mounting resistance in the countryside, and estimated the total Afghan population as 14.6 million. Organizations, such as, Wak Foundation, Asia Foundation, CIA World Fact Book and some broad casting companies have been conducting private surveys to determine ethnic composition in Afghanistan with varying results. Population figures by region, let alone by ethnic group, have been politically sensitive subject in Afghanistan; Census conductors have generally been forbidden to ask questions about group membership. The World Fact Book, in  2015, estimates size of ethnic groups in Afghanistan as; Pashtuns 42%, Tajiks 27%,  Hazara 09% , Uzbeks 09%, Aimaq 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baluch 2% and others 4%. The first four constitute around 90% of the total population of Afghanistan.

      Louis Dupree, an Afghanologist, estimated the population of Afghanistan, 13.82 million, in 1980, Goodson 22 million , in 2001 and Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 25.5 million (25,493500) , in 2009-2010.  The population of Afghanistan, in 2015, was around 26 million (26700277). Comparing ratio of residents and registered voters, in Iran and Turkey, and   applying it to Afghanistan may be another way to determine the estimated population of Afghanistan. In 2015, the population and registered voters in Iran have been 77.45 million and 50.48 million, in Turkey 76.6 million and 52.89 million, respectively. The average registered voters in both countries have been 67 % of the population.  In 2015, registered voters in Afghanistan had been 17.16 million , applying formula devised in case of Turkey and Iran, of 67 % on Afghanistan; total Afghan population may be estimated, 25.61 million, though there might be under registration of women votes in Afghanistan. Still, the estimated population of Afghanistan between 25-26 million seems more plausible. Though regarding total population, some guesstimates can be offered. However, qawm, ethnicity, is a fluid term, in Afghanistan, therefore, determining size of an ethnic group, in Afghanistan, becomes almost an impossible, gigantic task.

Qawm in Afghanistan

      T['”t]he term tribe may be used loosely for a localized group, having kinship as the dominant idiom of organization, whose members consider themselves distinct in terms of culture, customs, dialect and origin; tribes are usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader”. In Afghanistan, one of the outstanding social features of life is local tribal or ethnic divisions; peoples’ primary loyalty is, respectively, to their own kin, village, tribe, or ethnic group, generally glossed as qawm. Essentially the qawm is a community of interests, local and traditional, cemented by kinship, tribal or other ties, or it is a solidarity group encompassing family lineages, clans, tribes or sectarian, linguistic or ethnic group. The population of Afghanistan is divided into a myriad of groups at the local level; therefore, the term qawm is flexible, expandable and contextual. It, therefore, applies not only to these smallest units but by extension to the country’s major ethnic groups, and Afghan nation too.

      Tribalism is a desire to retain group identity and more important, sets of rights and obligations within the group , or it is a system of identity and solidarity based on kinship and locality  involving tribal institution, ideology, customs and common law. In Afghanistan, tribalism is a segmentary system organizing various levels of social groupings predominant only amongst Pashtun and some nomadic segments of non-Pashtun groups such as Turkmen, Uzbek, Baluch and the sedentary Nuristani. The Pashtun inhabit primarily east, south, and south-western parts of the country, though there exist colonies in parts of northern Afghanistan established during the last hundred years. For Nazif Shahrani, agnatic descent principles play a significant role in organizing socio-economic ties among the Tajik, Farsiban, Hazara, Uzbek, and Baluch and Turkmen sedentary; these groups are not tribally organized in the same way as the Pashtun. The existence of tribal ideology among the Pashai and Nuristani, and its role in the political processes is considerably different, even among the Pashtun, the role of tribe as a unit of military and political mobilization is often assumed than substantiated.

Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan

     “Ethnic groups”, for Fredrik Barth (1928-2016),   “are most commonly defined as social groups that meet four criterions: they are biologically replicating, share fundamental cultural values, constitute a field of communication and interaction, and are defined through self-definition and definition by others”. Barth sought to signify ethnic boundaries rather than the cultural content of ethnic collectivities by arguing that “the focus must shift to ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.” To Eller, an American anthropologist, “ethnicity is the process or phenomenon that underlies or gives rise to ethnic groups; it relates to the process of attachment, identity, cohesion, solidarity, and belonging. Ethnicity represents a “consciousness of difference” and a ‘mobilization around difference.”   Beginning in the United States, the notion of ethnicity did not emerge into widespread anthropological use until the 1960s. Thomas Hylland also confirms that ethnicity has been a main preoccupation since late 1960s in the field of social and cultural anthropology. The terms such as, ethnicity, ethnic, and ethnic group, have steadily grown from the late 1960s until the 1990s, and have widely been used since then, for two main reasons; firstly, owing to the changes in the world, secondly, changes in the dominant way of thinking in anthropology. Therefore, ethnicity is a flexible aspect of relationship between the social groups, having cultural identification and categorization (Us and Them).

Ethnicity has been found Constructivist in Afghanistan.  For  Nazif Shahrani,  an Afghan-American anthropologist, ethnicity is, “a means of adaptation for individuals and collectivities within the changing socio-ecological conditions of their environment, ethnicity is a dynamic phenomenon, subject to temporal redefinition and reorganization, with potential for defining structural integrity, distinctiveness and effectiveness for people so organized”. According to Thomas Barfield, ethnic groups in Afghanistan assert that ethnicity is primordial, however, in practice, it has been found flexible rather constructivist. Within a tribal group, a significant ancestor may be changed in an oral genealogy to reflect social distance. Groups in conflict cut back ties to make their lineages appear more distant and hence less worthy of cooperation. In order to justify cooperation, the Pashtuns incorporated a neighboring group by grafting their genealogy onto one’s own at a higher level.

Discussing ethnic composition of Afghanistan, Erwin Orywal and collaborators list 55 ethnic groups, for Orywal, these groups and identities, as local categories, are relative, varied and dynamic. His ethnic groups include: Arab (Arabic speakers), Arab (Persian speakers), Aimaq, Baluch, Baluch (Jat Baluch), Brahui, Eshkashimi, Farsiwan, Firuzkuhi, Gavarbati, Gharbat, Gujar, Hazara, Hazara-Sunni, Hindu, Jalali, Jamshedi, Jat, Jogi, Kirghiz, Kutana, Maliki, Mawri, Mishmast, Moghol, Mountain-Tajik, Munjani, Nuristani, Ormuri, Parachi, Pashai, Pashtun, Pikraj, Qarliq, Qazak, Qipchak, Qizilbash, Rushani, Sanglichi, Shadibaz, Sheghrani, SheykhMuhammadi, Sikh, Taheri, Tajik, Tatar, Taymani, Taymuri, Tirahi, Turkmen, Uzbek, Wakhi, Wangawala, Yahudi, and Zuri. It is evident that he has taken into account kin, clan, village, tribe, ethnic/vocational/confessional group, profession and nationality.

H. B. Bellow has mentioned six ethnic groups in his Races of Afghanistan, viz. the Afghans (Pashtun), Tajik, Hazara, Aimaq, Uzbek and Kafir. Louis Dupree cited 21 such groups, including: Pashtun, Tajik, Farsiwan, Qizilbash, Hazara, Aimaq, Moghol, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Pamiri, Baluch, Brahui, Nuristani, Kohistani, Gujar, Jat Guji (called Gujar in North),  Arab, Hindu, Sikh and Jew. Abdul Ghani mentioned 11ethnic groups and divided them into Afghans (Pashtun) and non-Afghans (Tajik, Turk, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Hindki, Arab, Qizilbash, Hindu and Jew. Thomas Barfield has described 17 groups including: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Aimaq, Nuristani, Pashai, Qizilbash, Baluch, Arab, Pamiris, Jugis, Jats, Kirghiz, Hindu, Sikh. The Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004 has recognised 14 ethnic groups including: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Aimaq, Arab, Kirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujar, and Brahui. The four major groups constitute 90% of the Afghan population, are considered to be prominent players in the social and political milieu of Afghanistan. It is evident from the above discussion that Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state.

All major ethnic groups of Afghanistan except the Hazara, have overlapping international borders into neighbouring countries. In the south-east, Pashtun overlap with Pashtun in Pakistan; specifically with Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan . The Baluch residing in the south and southeast of Afghanistan (Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar), overlap with Baluchistan (Pakistan) and Iran (Siestan) in the southeast. In the north, Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen have their own co-ethnics residing in independent states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Hazara, though Mongols, have Shia- confessional ties with Iran. In the west, Herat, mainly Pashtun and Tajik dominated, have cultural ties with Iran. In the north-east, Wakhi overlap into Pakistan (Wakhan, Kalash) and Chinese Uighur (Sinkiang), while Brahui overlap into the south-east with Baluchistan, Pakistan. The neighbouring countries have in-built mechanism and incentives to meddle into the internal affairs of Afghanistan (see details below). Situation has been further complicated by meddling of regional (Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, China) and extra-regional (West, NATO) states by fueling or undermining ethnicity.

Forced Displacement and Ethnic Cleansing       

Amir Abdur Rehman, (r. 1880-1901) colonized the north of Afghanistan by forcibly displacing the Pashtun population to settle in areas dominated by the non-Pashtun ethnic groups. For the Amir, these forced resettlements carried political and economic objectives; securing and defending the northern frontiers against possible Russian incursions, and promoting nation’s prosperity by ploughing unused but fertile land to procure crops and generate revenues for the state. Establishment of a settled trustworthy Pashtun population to defend the border regions carried an ethnic dimension since the Amir has been an ethnic Pashtun. The colonization occurred in two directions:  First the Ghilzais ( related to Hotaki, Tokhi), mostly farmers, were deported in large numbers to settle and farm. Secondly, several thousand families of Durrani tribe (Ishaqzai, Nurzai, Achakzai) from Kandahar and the southwest (Farah, Herat) were resettled in the northwest (Badghiz, Maimana, Sar-i Pul, Murghab) to guard the frontier. They were granted land rights at favoured spots and encouraged to settle and cultivate.   In 1907, 11000 Durrani families of which 1100 Alizai were settled in Maimana, of 9900 Ishaqzai, 2000, settled in Badghiz, 900, in Maimana and 7000, in Sar-I Pul. Of another 9200 Ghilzai families, 3400 settled in Maimana and Andkhoy regions and 5800, in the vicinity of Sar-iPul and Shiberghan.

The first large- scale ethnic cleansing occurred in Afghanistan during 1891-93. The Hazara were forcibly conquered by the Pashtun-dominated government, consequently, fled and scattered in three different directions: Czarist Russia, Iran, and British Baluchistan (Quetta).   After a century, Afghanistan faced ethnic cleansing during the 1990s. Control over the capital Kabul betweenthe four major ethnic groupsduring 1992-1996, became the principal military and political objective of the warring ethnic factions. The Hazara evicted Pashtuns from 3^rd and 4^th districts of Kabul, the Uzbek militia too looted homes in the predominantly Pashtun districts of Kabul. More than 500,000 people of the major ethnicities fled Kabul to the neighbouring countries, leaving 19000 wounded, and 25000 killed.

During the Taliban period (1996-2001), ethnic cleansing campaigns began in the north (Mazar Sharif, Hazarajat, Badghiz, Charikar) of Afghanistan. In 1996, in Badghiz, a population of 50,000 comprising both Pashtun and Uzbek ethnicities was displaced in the wake of war between the Taliban and Uzbek forces. The Taliban began an organized offensive in January 1997 against militias led by Masood (Tajik) and Dostam (Uzbek), captured Charikar, displacing some 50,000 people from Charikar to Kabul. On sectarian basis, ethnic cleansing occurred in Mazar Sharif, in 1997, and in the Hazarajat between 1998 and 2001. The New York Times, in 1997, reported that some 100,000 refugees in the north fled Afghanistan to the northern border entering Tajikistan. In 2002, some 20,000 refugees, mainly Pashtun, fled the north as a result of harassment by their non-Pashtun neighbours. Suffice to say that deportation, displacement and ethnic cleansing of major ethnic groups have occurred in Afghanistan.

Ascendency of Ethnicity in Afghanistan        

In Afghanistan, in the early 1960s, four clandestine left-wing ‘study circles’ of committed intellectuals and activists emerged: one led by Noor Muhammad Taraki (a Ghilzai Pashtun); second led by Babrak Karmal (a Ghilzai Pashtun) and Mir Akbar Khyber included Tajik and Hazara members; third led by Karmal and Taher Badakhshi (Tajik) mostly comprised students from Badakhshan; fourth led by Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri (Tajik) included Tajik and Uzbek recruits. It is evident, these small groups, divided along tribal and ethnic lines, remained inconsequential minority on the political scene of Afghanistan.

The Constitution of Afghanistan, 1964 provided the freedom of press, and formation of political parties, however, the special legislation, required by the Constitution to legitimize the founding of political parties, was never passed. Two multi-ethnic political parties, Marxist, Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and Islamist, Jamiat-e-Islami (JI) appeared. Khalq (People) was organ of the former, PDPA that split in 1967 into two factions; the Khalq and the Parcham, due to more personal than ideological differences, reflecting different social origins and approaches to revolution. The rural Pashtun numbered the Khalq, while the educated urban Pashtun and the Persian speakers joined the Parcham. The latter began publishing an organ Parcham.  Jamiat-e Islami too split into two factions in 1976-77: Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) and Hizb-e Islami Afghanistan (HIA). Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of Jamiat-e Islami, a Tajik, and Gulbadin Hikmatyar, leader of Hizb-e Islami , was a Pashtun. The split occurred due to personal, not ideological reasons, too. Hikmatyar was radical advocated revolutionary changes in the government, while Rabbani was moderate and preferred evolutionary path. It is remarkable that in both cases, beneath the surface, lay ethnic connotations, as the major causes of the divisions.

First significant non-Pashtun political party, Sazman-e Azad-e Bakhshi-e Zehmat Kashan-e Afghanistan (SAZA), a splinter of the PDPA, was renamed Sitm-i-Milli (The Oppressed Nation), in 1968. It was organized and led by Taher Badakhshi (Tajik), a former member of the Central Committee of the PDPA and the brother-in-law of Sultani Ali Keshtmand (Keshtmand’s sister married to Badakhshi), the Prime Minister during Babrak Karmal and Najibullah regimes. Sitmi-i-Milli, had been Maoist Communist Party, supported the Chinese Communist line. During the division of the PDPA, many considered Tahir Badakhshi an opponent of Pashtuns. Badakhshi’s anti-Pashtun party had rooted particularly in Qataghan and Badakhshan vilayats. The party propounded that Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Hazara oppressed nations and were deprived of national and civic rights by the dominant Pashtun. These views were also expressed by Abdul Majid Kalkani, nephew of Bacha Saqao, in Parwan. Stressing ethnic oppression, Sitm-i-Milli openly pointed towards ascendency of ethnicity in Afghanistan. In 1989, the SAZA had provincial committees at Faizabad, Mazar Sharif, Shiberghan, Maimana, Herat, and Pul-e Khumri.  The agreement of alliance between the PDPA and SAZA in October 1987 confirmed its name, and announced three Tajik members of SAZA (Sitm-i-Milli) as ministers: Mehboobullah Kashani was appointed Deputy Prime Minister; Muhammad Ishaq ‘Kawa’ Minister of Mines and Industries and Muhammad Bashir Baghlani, Minister of Justice.

Shula-e Javid, another Maoist Political Party, founded by Mehmudi Brothers, out of PDPA, in 1966, condemned the ‘social imperialism’ of the Soviet Union and their native allies. It had a populist strategy and enlisted support amongst university students, professionals, and Shia Muslims, particularly the Shia Hazara. The party had a following in industrial workers in Kabul, mostly the Shiite Hazara, looked down upon by the rest of the population, a kind of underclass, a lumpen proletariat. The Mehmudis organized them on ethnic and religious basis, and led most of the workers’ strikes in late sixties and early seventies of the previous century. The popularity of this party grew rapidly but was declared illegal by the government in 1969, since it criticized King Zahir Shah.  Ahmad Shah Masood (Tajik) is believed to be the member of Shula-e Javid. The Centre of activities of this party had been Herat and Nimroz. Abdullah Rastakhez and Usman Landai acted as mobilisers and organizers of the communist forces, believing the combat would march from urban to rural areas.  The party collaborated with Sitm-i- Milli and other Mujahideen groups against PDPA factions. More influencing groups even gained membership of Jamiat-e Islami led by Rabbani. Members of Shula-e Javid were considered reliable and remained loyal to Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood. Splinter groups of Sitm-i- Milli and Shula-e Javid, merged into the PDPA in late 1980s. It has to be kept in mind that apart from Maoism and enmity towards pro Soviet PDPA, significant gluing factor between them has been their affiliation to other than Pashtun ethnicity. Following the Promulgation of Constitution, 1964, the 216 members of Wolasi Jirga (Lower House of Parliament), included the representative; anti-royalist, supporter of King, Pashtun nationalists of both right and left of political spectrum, entrepreneurs-industrialists, political liberals, a small leftist group, and conservative Muslim leaders. The first open criticism of non-Pashtun ethnicities was heard during the proceedings of the 12^th Term of Afghanistan Parliament. It is evident that non-Pashtun ethnic groups in 1960s carried grievances against dominant Pashtun and separated from the Pashtun political parties in the early stages of political development in Afghanistan.

The Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA united in 1977 only to carry the so-called Saur Revolution out, in 1978, in Afghanistan, though, for Juma Khan Sufi, it has been a revolution of the Pashtuns from the beginning till the end. The Soviets might have had no role in preparing the Saur Revolution. It seemed an indigenous reaction of the Afghan people to the exploitation and deprivations by the ruling elites. As J. Blaut ably elaborates in The National Question, arguing, all national struggles are class struggles, not Eurocentric diffusions. Moreover, rivalry between the leaders of Khalq and the Parcham factions re-emerged soon after the establishment of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), in 1978.

Prior to Najibullah’s government, the thrust of Soviet’s state building strategy was to transform Afghan society through Sovietization (export of Soviet institutions, political models, and ideology), however, when Najibullah became President, the Soviet realized to change its policy to increase the regime’s social base. Najibullah announced policy of National Reconciliation in 1987, to reduce military confrontation and negotiate a political compromise.

The Soviets used ethnicity to enlist support for its intervention offering concessions to smaller ethnic groups and tribes in return for their support or neutrality in the war. Rights to smaller nations, ethnic and racial groups including language and cultural rights were essential part of Soviet ideology too. Additionally, they encouraged formation of rural militias to protect their areas from the opposing Mujahideen fighters. They used  Juwzjani militia led by Rashid Dostam (Uzbek) comprising Uzbeks in non-Uzbek areas that brutally attacked other ethnic groups where needed. The strategy of using ethnic groups against each other, did not succeed in defeating the Mujahedin, however, it did encourage growth of ethnic-based, regional armed factions, further straining relations amongst ethnic groups.

 The PDPA government treated minority ethnicities judiciously, since the 1987 Constitution rejected all discriminations and classification on the basis of tribe, language and religion, thus, stipulates:

“All citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan, man and woman, regardless of nationality, race, language, tribe, religion, political ideology, education, occupation, ancestry, wealth, social status or place of residence, are viewed as equals, and entitled to equal legal rights according to the law.”

During the PDPA’s government, the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural character of Afghanistan was officially recognized that opened new avenues for cultural expression in the form of daily newspapers in vernacular, ethnic languages, the formation of folk songs, dance troupes, wider publicity of ethnic poets and their works. The official recognition of the multi-ethnic character of the country was unprecedented in Afghanistan.

One of the most widely publicized aspects of the Soviet nationality policy has been the emphasis on cultural autonomy; this ‘autonomy’ consisted chiefly in the use of the national language in schools, government administration, and courts, and in the flood of books, magazines, pamphlets, and newspapers which began to flow from the printing houses. The PDPA’s government promoted the nationality policy similar to the one in the Soviet Union, for example, Radio Afghanistan began airing programs in Uzbeki and some other minority languages. Likewise, the Afghanistan’s minorities’ languages such as Uzbeki, Turkmen, Baluchi, and Nuristani were elevated to the status of national languages.

Besides, during the PDPA’s government of Parcham, the situation of Hazara changed significantly for the better; Sultan Ali Keshtmand (Hazara) was appointed the Prime Minister, another Hazara, a Deputy Minister of Afghanistan. Hazara got minor government posts, and engaged in lucrative transport business and the government in Kabul armed them against the Mujahideen. Before 1987, the Pashtun alone were allowed to form a national jirga, but the Hazara became able to form the first ever Jirga-ye-Sarasari-e- Milliyat-e- Hazara (the Central Council of the Hazara People) too in Afghanistan.

Impact of War (1979-89) on Ethnicity

In the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, massive influx of arms and cash penetrated Afghanistan fueling and mobilizing ethnic polarization and sectarianism. The United States, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia matched a dollar for a dollar and bullet for a bullet to counter any development sponsored by the USSR. In order to keep it covert, the American CIA through Pak ISI, initially, delivered weaponry, AK47, Klashinkov rifles, heavy machine guns (Dashaka), pistols (Makarov) manufactured in Warsaw Pact countries, to the Afghan Mujahideen. Later upon rising stakes, stinger missiles were also provided to the Mujahidden. By 1981-85 annual US military aid to the Mujahideen, channeled through ISI, allegedly grew from $30 million to $280 million, making it the biggest single CIA covert operation anywhere in the world. Further $470 million were pledged in 1986, which increased to $630 in 1987, $600 million in 1989, and $280 million in 1990. Besides, the Saudi Arabia funneled more than half a billion dollars to CIA accounts in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands; this was in addition to its direct contributions in cash and arms to its favorite Mujahedin parties. Kuwait and UAE also funded this war. The Soviets stationed around 85000 troops inside Afghanistan, comprising 60000 motorized force, 25000 made up of artillery, engineering, signals, borders and security units, and air force personnel. Thus, pumping of arms and cash in Afghanistan by the foreign states, sanctioned the rival feuding ethnic parties, to intensify further factional and fratricidal fighting.

Prior to1979, qawm, remained the primary identity in Afghanistan, however, following Soviet invasion and ensuing war of attrition, ethnicity became the primary identity, flourishing in the 1990s. During the war in Afghanistan (1979-89), sect also appeared as prominent identity when the Sunni and Shia party alliances appeared with dominant political pressures. This shift in identity was unprecedented in Afghanistan. The internal strife among various factions, organized along tribal, ethnic, religious, and ideological lines, demonstrated one of the most destructive dimensions of war in Afghanistan. Oliver Roy argues that the ethnic awareness in Afghanistan is not as pristine as often claimed; it is a consequence, of war, of strategic alignments, with foreign countries. The war made the various ethnic and social forces of Afghanistan more conscious of their separate identities. Shah M. Tarzi has argued that the politics of Afghan resistance, shaped by traditional ethno-linguistic and tribal cleavages internal to Afghan society, was added and abated further by differences in the ethnic composition of the resistance leadership.

Sunni Resistance

Sect and ethnic based alliances were established, in Pakistan and Iran, during the war in Afghanistan (1979-89). Seven Sunni parties Alliance emerged in Peshawar, Pakistan, while eight Shia party Alliance established in Iran, to counter the former alliance, from gaining political leverage in Afghanistan. Though sect and ethnicity are two different social facts, Hazara was a sect as well as ethnicity in Afghanistan. Pashtun and Tajik have sects too but ethnic ties are more important for them. Pakistan and Iran fueled sect and ethnicity in order to put a favourable client regime in Afghanistan. Besides, it is the salience of ethnicity over sect in the Hazara: ethnicity played active role in their unity, and emergence to political power.

The Seven Sunni parties’ Alliance, based in Peshawar, emerged in early 1980s. Earlier the tribal insurrections in south-eastern provinces of Afghanistan in summer 1979, with the Kabul government counter-attacks and repressions, and the Soviet invasion, brought influx of refugees into Pakistan, initially 400,000 in 1980.  The Pakistani authorities asked the exiled Afghan leaders in Peshawar to manage the situation. These exiled Afghan leaders had set up headquarter in Peshawar after failed uprising against Daud, in 1974. The refugees in Pakistan needed to be recommended by one of the parties in order to be eligible for food ration; that enabled these small unrepresentative parties become mass organizations. Pakistan encouraged, armed and directed the spread of insurrections in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s ISI ensured that every commander in the field belongs to one of the Seven Party Alliance that included:

• The Jamiat-e-Islami, headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik from Badakhshan.
• Hizbi-Islami Afghanistan (Hikmatyar), headed by Gulbadin Hikmatyar, an ethnic Pashtun from Kunduz.
• Hizbi-Islami Afghanistan (Khalis), headed by Molana Younis Khalis, an ethnic Pashtun from Paktya.
• Ittehad-e-Islami Baraye Azadi-e Afghanistan, headed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an ethnic Pashtun from Paghman.
• Harkat-e-Inqilab-i-Islami headed by Molana Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, an ethnic Pashtun from Logar.
• Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan), headed by Pir Syed Ahmad Gillani, an ethnic Pashtun from Nangarhar.
•  Jubbah-e-Nijat-e Milli Afghanistan (Afghan National Liberation Front), headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, an ethnic Pashtun from Kabul.

Except Jamiat-e Islami, mainly comprising Tajik elements, the remainder of six major resistance parties, were Pashtun dominated. The rivalry between Rabbani and Hikmatyar was initially strategic, later turned to ethnic; Rabbani stressed flexibility in actions against Daud Khan after crackdown in 1974-75, while Himatyar stressed armed struggle, a shortcut to establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan. Later, in the wake of split between JIA (Rabbani) and HIA (Hikmatyar), in 1976-7, political differences had wheeled more around ethnic factor.  Most non-Pashtun joined Rabbani, and educated but religious Pashtun rallied around Hikmatyar that further strengthened the ethnic dimension in Afghan politics in early 1980s. Moreover, ethnic and sectarian rivalry existed even between the Mujahideen Commanders in Afghanistan;

“Different commanders from the same area would join different Parties, thus widening existing gaps between them. A commander considered himself king in his area, felt entitled to the support of the villages and to local taxes. He wanted the loot from attacking any nearby government post, and he wanted the heavy weapons to do it with, as they increased his chances of success and prestige, which in turn facilitated his recruiting a larger force. Such men often reacted violently to other commanders entering, passing through or ‘poaching’ on their territory. No party had a monopoly of power within specific areas or provinces in Afghanistan.”

Shia Resistance

For, Syed Askar Mousavi, the Shia resistance movement, led by Hazara against the Soviet and the Kabul regime had two distinct phases: In phase-one (1978-83), barring the Centre of Bamiyan province, the entire Hazarajat were liberated and brought under organized control of Shura-ye Ittifaq , an organization led by Syed Ali Behishti; Phase-two later in1983-89 was marred by intense internal fighting in Hazarajat, since the Hazara groups backed by Iran emerged resulting into killing and migration of thousands of Hazara.

Some 50 Shia/Hazara minor/major groups backed by Iran were formed: such as the Sazman-e-Nasr, Sazman-e-Mujahideen-e Mostaz’affin. Eight Shia/non Pashtun groups, including Hazara, united in a coalition, in 1987, as a result of pressure from Iran, as they camped in Iran. The coalition, named, Shura-ye-I’telaf-e Islami-ye Afghanistan, professed that it is opposed to the destructive infighting between the different groups inside Hazarajat. The coalition included; Sazman-e Nasr, Pasdaran-e Jihad-e Islami, Nahzat-e Islami, Jabha-ye Mottahid-e Ingelab-e Islami, Harakat-e Islami, Hizb-e Da’war-e Islami, Hizbullah and Sazman-e Niroo-ye Islami. Later, in 1989, the Hazara/Shia political and religious leaders in Hazarajat, officially formed Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami (an alliance of eight Shia/Hazara political parties), in Bamiyan, this time under the control of Hazara of Afghanistan. Hizb-e Wahdat stressed Hazara ethnic identity more than Islamic solidarity and its relations with Iran deteriorated after 1996. The Alliance gave voice to the rights and demands of the Hazara. The term Hazaristan also appeared in some publications of the party. Later, former Hazara nationalists also joined the party, who never supported the idea of an Islamic state. The ethnic polarization remained the main predicament of the Islamist parties.

Revolution, invasion, ensuing war and intervention of foreign material resources in terms of weapons and currency transformed hitherto traditional immobile Hazara society in 1980s. New terms such as Hizb (party), rahbari-e siyasi (political leadership), sazman (organization), goroh (group), tabaqah (class), milliyat (nationality), markaziyat (centralism), jang-e mosallahanah (armed struggle) entered into Hazara lexicon gradually but steadily replacing traditional tribal terms and structure. The Hizb-e Wahdat: opened avenues for the development of Hazara in Afghanistan; participated in international gatherings, on Afghanistan; Conference of  Islamic Foreign Ministers, in Istanbul; Four partite Conference in Islamabad and Tehran; the Sixth Conference of the OIC in Senegal; the UN Annual Meetings and held official talks with the UN General Secretary in New York. It also took part in discussions alongside the seven group Mujahideen alliance backed in Peshawar. The increased political awareness, strength and role of Hazara, began to cause ethnic tensions with Pashtun and other ethnicities.

The anti-Soviet insurgents divided along sectarian lines: the Shiite political parties, supported by Hazara, relied on Iran for financial and political support; while the Sunni parties were supported, politically, militarily, financially by United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The ISI distributed foreign aid exclusively to these Sunni Islamic parties. Instead of unity, differences and disunity, based on ethnic/sect/clan lines, had been the chief characteristics of the Afghan resistance against Soviet/Afghan forces. Effective links between the Shiite and Sunni groups lacked, rather, contest and hostility, could be witnessed.

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