Militarization of Ethnicity     

 

Militancy also played a prominent role in ascendency of ethnicity in Afghanistan. Militias on ethnic and sectarian basis established in Afghanistan in 1980s: the Uzbek militias of Rashid Dostam (Juwzjani), the Tajik militia of Ahmad Shah Masood (Shura-e Nazar), and Pashtun-Tajik militia of Ismail Khan (Hamza Division) were ethnic based, while that of Syed Mansur Naderi’s Ismailia militia (Wakhis), was sect-based. The co-ethnics followed their own militia group. The Juwzjani and the Ismailia militias were pro-government, while that of Ismail Khan and Ahmad Shah Masood, anti-government. The Juwzjani militia, an effective and equipped force, numbered 40,000 men by 1991. Its task has been to replace the Soviet troops protecting the gas fields and the supply routes from the Soviet border and southward through Mazar Sharif. Units of this militia were dispatched to Kandahar and Jalalabad to fight the Mujahideen in 1989 and 1990, respectively. The militia was also used against other ethnic groups in many parts of the country.

Naderi’s Ismailia militia was established to arm and defend his community when most of the Tajiks and Pashtuns in the north aligned themselves either with the Jamiat or with the Hizb-e Wahdat. Najibullah patronized Ismailis, Naderi was made a general, the governor of Baghlan province, and member of Revolutionary Council. This was a great social advance for a highly stigmatized group. Naderi’s forces, reaching 13,000 in 1989, acted as intermediary in distributing Soviet aid to Kabul. The obvious reason for patronizing Ismailis by the Afghan government, in the north, has been guarding Soviet supply line from the north to Kabul.

The anti-Soviet militias of Ismail Khan and Masood fought the communist government in Kabul. Ismail Khan, erected his power-base Herat, in 1988, a conventional type of military organization called Hamza Division, which sustained five regiments, each with six to nine battalions of about 200 men, made up of combat units of 25 men. He convened a Shura of commanders in Ghor from nine western provinces that led to improved military cooperation among resistance groups in the west of Afghanistan. Besides, in the north-east of the country, many Tajik and Uzbek Ulama and Commanders, nominally allied to the NIFA, switched their allegiance to the Jamiat and to its most effective commander, Ahmad Shah Masood, fighting the Soviet-Afghan forces from his autonomous Punjshir valley. His organization expanded into a regional cooperative of Jamiat commanders, called the Supervisory Council of the North (SCN). The unprecedented flourishing of militias based on ethnicity occurred in Afghanistan. These ethnic militias were fueled directly/indirectly by Afghan government of the time.

 

Efforts to Reconcile Ethnicization

 

After becoming president in April 1986, Najibullah announced on January 1, 1987, his program of national reconciliation, comprising three key elements; six month unilateral ceasefire, the formation of national unity, and the return of the over 5 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran. The ceasefire extended further for six months. Besides, peace jirgas were established at village, counties, districts, and provinces level, followed by convocation of a national peace ‘Jirga’. These jirgas asked for the cessation of war, and creation of an atmosphere of understanding among the people. Representatives of all ethnic groups, tribes, and nationalities took part in the Jirga. A Draft Constitution was published in July that year, with opposition invited to suggest changes. Najibullah appealed to the Peshawar based Seven Party Alliance, in October, to join a coalition government, declaring they would be allowed to open offices in Kabul, publish newspapers etc., if ended armed resistance. The New Constitution was formally adopted by Afghan Loya Jirga on December 1, 1987, establishing Islam as state religion, and converting Afghanistan in theory into a parliamentary democracy. Article 38 of the Constitution stipulated equal rights of the citizens of Afghanistan irrespective of ethnicity, race, tribal, and political affiliation. After election, as President, Najibullah delivered a presidential address at the Loya Jirga, forwarding his vision of Afghan multi ethnic/nation/culture state: called various ethnicities by name such as, the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen, Char-Aimaq, Baluchi, Nuristani, Kirghiz, Pashai, Arab, and Hindus, and resolved that he will “firmly and consistently consolidate friendship among all nationalities, tribes, and ethnic groups, decisively exterminate every manifestation of chauvinism and nationalist selfishness, tribal differences and distrust between one people and the other. We must preserve our multi-national garden from the hot winds of war and drought”. Najibullah or the PDPA’s government recognized ethnicity, while the Geneva Accords, the Mujahideen government and the Taliban regime did not. Besides, in the Bonn Accords, ethnicity was recognized with constitutional guarantees. The non-recognition of ethnicity by Afghan governments, paved the way for ethnic strife and warfare.

The Geneva Accords, saying nothing about ethnicity, was signed on April 14, 1988 by the foreign ministers of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva, called for; the withdrawal of Soviet troops within nine months, non-interference in each other’s affairs by Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees. The United States and the Soviet Union pledged to guarantee the settlement in a separate document. The entire dimension of Geneva Accords was external: it did not address the internal Afghan situations; the Afghan resistance was not a party to the negotiations, which showed how ethnicity was not recognized in Afghanistan, and how it led to civil war in the 1990s.

 

The Mujahideen and Ethnicity (1992-1994)

 

During the fratricidal war in Mujahideen government, ethnicity became more prominent in Afghanistan. The qawm, a flexible term, diffused and took ethnic connotation. Though the PDPA’s government in Afghanistan had recognized ethnicity, the Mujahideen government did not. The non-recognition of ethnicity, and the quest for political power, led the country into political chaos. The major ethnic groups fought each other for gaining the prize of Buzkashi. The non-Pashtun ethnic groups, who tasted a degree of autonomy, and self-rule during the Communist period (1979-89) enabled by ethnic militia, had refused to accept traditional Pashtun domination, enabling relations troubled between the Pashtun and non-Pashtun.

The suspension of Soviet aid to Afghan government, in late 1991, had forced Najibullah to limit payments to the pro-government forces and militias. In the north, the swelling ranks of non-Pashtun militias such as of the Uzbek, Tajik, and Ismailia, demanded extra payment from  Najibullah’s government, in a time of financial crisis. Najibullah replaced the Tajik commander with the Pashtun, a flash point for which the warlords waited. This implied ethnic discrimination by Pashtun in politics. However, weeks before Najibullah’s stepping down in March 1992, an anti-Pashtun alliance had formed in Mazar Sharif. Two Tajik-dominated Mujahideen groups, Jamiat-e Islami and Shura-e Nazar, joined hands with the Communist Uzbek (Dostam) and Ismaili militia, the Shia’s Hizb-e Wahdat. Their political aims were ethnic-chauvinistic, overthrowing the communist government first, and then ending Pashtun domination. The establishment of anti-Pashtun alliance appeared as the second block of non-Pashtun ethnicities against the Pashtun in Afghanistan. Prior to it, the first block was appeared in 1960-70s when the novice political parties such as; Sitm-e Milli, Shula-e Javid, and Jamiat-e Islami had established unity of cooperative groups against the Pashtun. Subsequently, two further alliances of non-Pashtun groups established against the Pashtun-dominated regime of Taliban in 1996 and 1997. During these times, the shifting and drifting of alliances remained based on ethnicity.

Sect played its role too. After the fall of Najibullah, the Seven Sunni Parties based in Peshawar, were brought in a conference in Peshawar to form an interim government in Afghanistan. Hizb-e Wahdat, the Shia/Hazara Eight parties Alliance, were not invited to the conference owing to Shia Sect and Hazara ethnicity. The ministries, distributed exclusively amongst the Sunni parties. The avoidance of Hizb-e Wahdat in the interim government exposed ethnic and sectarian discrimination in Afghanistan. According to Amin Saikal, the Peshawar Agreement of 24 April, 1992, became inoperative due to the intransigence of Hikmatyar (Pashtun) who refused to sign it. Hikmatyar insisted that the position of Prime Minister reserved for his party, should not be subordinate to the President (Rabbani), and the position of Defense Minister (Masood), should be subordinate to Prime Minister (Hikmayar). He also objected Rashid Dostam’s (Uzbek) inclusion into the coalition government, who previously remained associated with the Communist government. Hikmatyar not allowing Rabbani’s government to succeed, launched a barrage of rockets against Kabul killing thousands civilians. The rejection of Rabbani’s rule in Afghanistan by Hikmatyar, had a particular motive behind it; Pashtun have not accepted rule of other ethnicity in Afghanistan. This substantiated further ethnic discrimination and polarization in Afghanistan.

Rabbani continued to consider his rule legitimate in Afghanistan, and the countries like Iran, Russia, and India recognized his government. For Carol Riphenburg, fundamentalist leaders like Hikmatyar, have played both pan-Islamic and ethnic cards, as needed, in Afghanistan. The effective practices, constituencies and strategies of Hizb-e Islami and Jamiat-e Islami, enhanced ethnic polarization and sheer political rivalries between their leaders, than with ideology.    

The ethnic activists, joined their own ethnic Mujahideen and militia groups, after the fall of Afghan Communists in 1992; some Khalqi (such as, Shahnawaz Tanai) ended up in Hizb-e Islami, Hikmatyar, the Parchami joined Jamiat-e Islami, Rabbani and Shura-e Nazar, Ahmad Shah Masood, while the Hazara and Uzbek defected to their own warlords in Hizb-e Wahdat and Jumbish Milli respectively. These groupings on ethnic lines set the scene for the most vicious ethnic conflict in Afghanistan. Hundreds of Hazara were massacred by forces of Tajik-dominated government in February 1993. This brought together Hizb-e Wahdat (Hazara) and Hizb-e Islami (Pashtun) against the ruling Tajiks. Dostam (Uzbek), Mujaddadi (Pashtun), Hikmatyar (Pashtun), and Khalili (Hazara) made an alliance against Tajik, known to be Shura-ye Ali-ye Hamahangi, which remained effective till mid-1996. Besides, Sayyaf’s Ittihad-e Islami (Pashtun) fought the Hizb-e Wahdat (Hazara), Tajik forces attacked Uzbek forces of Dostam, and Hizb-e Islami (Pashtun) rocketed the Kabul city to oust Tajik government from Kabul. Rabbani (Tajik) used power against Hizb-e Wahdat (Hazara) and Jumbesh-I Milli (Uzbek) in order to oust them from Kabul. The ethnic infightings between various major ethnic groups in Kabul were for the political power. The metaphor of Afghan Buzkashi, may be used, for the ethnic groups, pursuing ethnic warfare for political power, in Afghanistan, during 1992-94. Whitney Azoy, an American expert on Afghan culture and politics, has used the metaphor of Buzkashi for Afghan leaders; as the players in the game seize control of the goat by fair or foul, so did the political leaders to fight off their rivals.

 

Neighbouring States and Ethnicity in Afghanistan

 

Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, the neighbouring states,  Saudi Arabia and India as regional powers, Russia and USA, the super powers, of the times, had/have in-built incentives in meddling into the affairs of Afghanistan. Policies of these states are affected not only by developments in Afghanistan, but also by one another’s actions in Afghanistan or against each other. The Taliban’s takeover of Kabul increased competition between these states. The role of these states, in ascendency of ethnicity in Afghanistan cannot be overlooked; they fueled the ethnic groups in Afghanistan. During the war (1979-89) in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, important neighbouring states, deeply plunged into the affairs of Afghanistan. Both turned into headquarters of the political leaders of Afghan Mujahedeen groups, Sunni and Shia, respectively as well as the host to Afghan refugees.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan has aspired to gain a strategic depth against India, not only to subdue aspirations of its own Pashtun and Baluch ethnic populations but also sought to gain access to the Central Asian republics. Pakistan became active in Afghanistan in early 1980s, when it trained the Afghan Mujahideen, and supported militarily, financially, and logistically the Seven Sunni parties, based in Peshawar. The influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan reached 3.272 million in 1990. After disintegration of the USSR in 1991, Pakistan changed its Afghan policy from armed struggle to its market-oriented needs; focusing upon the economic market of Central Asia. For that purpose, a friendly and trustworthy government in Afghanistan became the most crucial task for Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan supported and invested enormously in Hizb-e Islami of Hikmatyar (Pashtun) in order to have a greater role for him in the newly established Afghan government.  Pakistan kept shifting its support from one Pashtun group to another in order to put pressure on Rabbani to honour the Peshawar Accord and to stop his transitional government from tilting towards India and other regional powers. The Rabbani government, unhappy from Pakistan, used the lever of Iran-Russia-India to contest Pakistan’s influence in Afghan politics.

Iran became active in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion, and a home for around 2.94 million (the 1990 figures) Afghan refugees and a support base for the Afghan Mujahideen, particularly the Shia groups. It provided the Shia-Hazara groups with limited military and financial aid. While the penetration of western and Middle Eastern aid, did not follow into the Shia Mujahideen due to the hostile relations between Iran and the USA, and Saudi Arabia. Though Iran became active in Afghan affairs in late 1980sin the affairs of Shia-Hazara Mujahideen, the Iranian government agencies such as, The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Etelaat, Bunyad, and Wazarat-e Keshwar (Ministry of Interior), had become active in attempting to push their agenda in Afghanistan. After Soviet withdrawal, Iran united the Hazara factions into Hizb-e Wahdat, and tried to normalize relations with Najibullah. The reason behind policy shift was Iran’s desire to protest the US and Saudi’s influence in the upcoming Mujahideen government. Iran supported the Rabbani (Tajik) government, and its support intensified after Taliban captured Herat in 1995.

Iran cultivated relations with the non-Pashtun parties such as Jamiat (Tajik), the Wahdat (Hazara), Jumbish (Uzbeks) and Ismail Khan (Tajik) to counter the Peshawar-based Pashtun parties. It established five training camps near Mashad for 5000 fighters led by Ismail Khan. The non-Pashtun government in Afghanistan represented a major diplomatic triumph for Iran. Iran provided substantial material support to the Kabul coalition to counter Pakistani and Saudi support for Hikmatyar (Pashtun). After the coalition fragmented in 1993-94, Iran began supporting Shiite-Wahdat to counter Saudi financial support to the Rabbani-Masood regime. Iran poured arms, cash, fuel, and logistical support to the Northern Alliance; the Iranian air craft flew military supporters of the Northern Alliance based in Iran to Mazar Sharif. It even cooperated with Russia to provide joint support for the anti-Taliban forces, discouraging international recognition of the Taliban government, to gain diplomatic support for the Northern Alliance. Thus Iran has been supporting the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan.          

The two important states in the north, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, entertained two apprehensions about Afghanistan; first the creation of Islamic state in Afghanistan may destabilize their societies, inciting similar elements across their border, second, they echoed the concerns of their ethnic cousins in Afghanistan against Pashtun domination. Since the ousting of Tajik government in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan increased their political and material support to the forces of Northern Alliance; Tajikistan offered sanctuaries to the anti-Taliban forces, allowed their aircraft from Afghanistan to its own airfields and operations from there. Turkmenistan has ethnic ties with Turkmens in Afghanistan, however, on one hand it has pursued neutral policy towards its neighbours, and on the other, it wanted its oil and gas to be exported.

Russia aspired to secure its borders from extremism and terrorism. It did not support religious elements in Afghanistan, rather discouraged them. Taliban takeover threatened Russia. In cooperation with Iran, Russia provided arms to the Northern Alliance. Saudi Arabia had a greater influence on developments in Afghanistan in the 1980s; however, this influence dwindled later. They have supported Taliban with limited financial assistance. Besides, the Indian policy in Afghanistan is Pakistan-centered. India wants to limit Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan; therefore, it supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Thus various ethnic groups in Afghanistan have been fueled/supported by various neighbouring/regional/extra-regional states in 1980s and 1990s.

 

The Taliban and Ethnicity (1996-2001)

 

The Taliban rose to the political scene in Afghanistan as a military force in the summer of 1994. They captured Kabul in September 1996, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, the only states in the world, recognized the Taliban government. Iran, India, Russia, Turkey and four of the five Central Asia republics such as, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan backed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance with arms and cash to try and halt the Taliban’s advance. Particularly Iran and the CARs shared a deep suspicion of Afghan-Pashtun fundamentalism due to support of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Apparently, the central tenet of the Taliban creed was to free Afghanistan from the control of Mujahideen parties, to establish an Islamic state based on Sharia law, however, the endorsement of the system of jirga by the Taliban, implied the embodiment of Pashtun culture and ethnicity. In other words, the Taliban movement embodied resurgence of Pashtun under a religious and charismatic leadership, and despite a religious movement, driven by Islamic fundamentalism; the ethnic Pashtun undertone of the Taliban movement cannot be dismissed. Ethnicity and sect played an active part during the Taliban regime. Some Afghan, and foreign observers described the Taliban as Pashtun nationalists, willing to revive a centralized Pashtun-dominated state in Afghanistan. For non-Pashtun, Taliban characterized as a symbol of Islamic conservatism and Pashtun chauvinism, aimed at recapturing political power and reasserting its dominance. Taliban suffered too, like the Islamists, from ethnic bias, polarization, however, they discarded any ethnic claim, pretended to represent the Afghan Muslim millat (nation). The non-Pashtun criticized the Taliban’s social decrees, such as;

“in the areas under the Taliban government, every kind of wickedness and immorality, cruelty, murder, robbery, songs, and music, TV, VCR, satellite dish, immodesty (be purdagi), travelling (women) without a mehram (immediate blood related person), shaving of or trimming the beard, pictures and photographs, have all been totally banned^”.

 

Ethnic politics and violence pursued in the Taliban regime. The Taliban did not share alliances with the non-Pashtun factions in power sharing arrangements; they mis-treated the Shiite in Kabul, in the Hazarajat, and in Mazar Sharif. In Mazar Sharif, in May 1997, the Hazara and Uzbek forces collectively massacred some 600 Taliban in the north; hundreds of Taliban were shot dead, buried in mass graves by Masood’s forces. The Taliban, in revenge, in 1998, treated the Hazara in Mazar Sharif most viciously; the Hazara men, women, children were massacred; even goats and donkeys were killed. The Taliban were ordered to kill for two hours, but they killed for two days. Taliban’s mullah, proclaiming from mosques, put three choices to Shia-Hazara: convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Iran, or face death. Taliban’s policies accentuated the process of polarization of Afghanistan, already nascent along ethnic-linguistic lines.

Taliban replaced all senior Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek bureaucrats with inexperienced Pashtun. Governor, mayors, and police chiefs in Kabul, Herat and Mazar Sharif were appointed as Pashtun, who only spoke Pashto, not Dari, the lingua franca of the country. After a month of capturing Kabul by Taliban in October 1996, the non-Pashtun, such as Masood (Tajik), Dostam (Uzbek), Karim Khalili (Hazara) had formed a Supreme Council for the Defense of the Motherland, declaring Mazar Sharif as capital. Within a month, Masood recaptured key positions along  Salang Highway (Jabul Seraj, Bagram, and Chrikar), bringing fight within 20 kilometers of Kabul, forcing 50000 people to seek safety in Kabul. While tens of thousands of Kabulis, mostly Tajik and Hazara, fled for Mazar Sharif or Pakistan to escape Taliban’s arrests and reprisals, leading to large scale ethnic cleansing. After defeating Taliban in Mazar Sharif, again the leaders of three major non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as, Masood (Tajik), Khalili (Hazara), and Maalik (Uzbek), formed a new alliance on June 13, 1997 called the United National and Islamic Front for the Salvation of the Homeland. Rabbani was reelected as President, with Masood as Defense Minister, declaring Mazar Sharif (North of Afghanistan)as capital. Iran declared to support anti-Taliban Alliance and appealed to Russia, India and the Central Asia states to help them too. Taliban blamed Iran and Russia for support of the opposition. Afghanistan remained divided between the Taliban (Pashtun) and the Northern Alliance (Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara) during the Taliban period. Severe ethnic and sectarian violence and conflicts occurred. The non-Pashtun alliances (1996, 1997) in the north were necessarily against the Pashtun- dominated Taliban.

For Conrad Schetter, ethnicity remained a dominant argument in the war in Afghanistan, therefore the peace process initiated, after the fall of the Taliban regime, at the Bonn peace conference in 2001, was based on an ethnic representative government.

 

Post 9/11 Afghan Ethnicities 

 

After the event of 9/11, the United States began to seek out allies in the region to destroy al-Qaeda, and crushing the Taliban. The Bush administration, choosing the Northern Alliance against bin Laden and the Taliban attacked Afghanistan. Within a brief time span of two months, the Taliban regime was toppled. They fled Kabul and the major cities, the vacuum created, were filled by the forces of the Northern Alliance. After capturing Kabul, the Northern Alliance, dominated by Tajik, reincarnated the pre-Taliban bureaucracy dominated by Shura-e Nazar Tajik. The monopolization of power precluded the emergence of an ethnically balanced post-Taliban government. The dominance of military considerations within the U.S.-led coalition affected political developments, after the demise of the Taliban. The negotiations, on the structure of the new government, between the four major ethnic groups, at the UN sponsored conference in Bonn, were strongly influenced by the military situation on the ground. At Bonn, the hallmark of developments in Afghanistan was to restore ethnic balance to the government through a political process.

Representatives of the key Afghan political, ethnic, and military factions, signed Bonn accord in December 2001, sponsored by UN, to establish a framework for the political reconstruction of Afghanistan. These were anti-Taliban delegates, or simply the Northern Alliance, occupying most of the space in the deliberations. Ethnicity became the dominant theme in the Bonn conference due to the violent episodes of ethnic cleansing and ethnocide, in the 1990s: ethnic violence in Kabul during 1992-94; in the Shomali plains to its north during 1996-2001; in the Hazarajat during 1998-2001; and in Mazar Sharif during 1997-1998. Patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, and region often superseded relationships based on ideology or religion/sect. These patterns have been evident in every Afghan election since the fall of the Taliban regime. The prominent members of Northern Alliance in the Bonn Accords, most notably, the Punjsheri Tajik occupied key positions in the interim government in 2001: Younis Qanuni was selected as Interior Minister, General Fahim as Defense Minister, while Dr. Abdullah Abdullah as Foreign Minister. However, Hamid Karzai (Pashtun), though politically weak, was selected as the President of Afghanistan. The Cabinet included 11 Pashtun, 8 Tajiks, 5 Hazaras, and 3 Uzbeks, the remaining 3 were drawn from other minority ethnic groups. This political change was unprecedented. The Pashtun political power was weakened again by the Tajik in Afghanistan. The Tajik have been the only ethnic group in Afghanistan who have defied Pashtun thrice (1929, 1992-94, 2001) in politics of the country. Pashtuns were unhappy with this ethnic imbalance in the government, hence, Hamid Karzai, later included 5 more Pashtun ministers.        

The political power of non-Pashtun increased, while that of the Pashtun decreased after the fall of Taliban. Ethnicity emerged as a salient force due to ethnic violence perpetuated by the major ethnic groups in the 1990s. The post-Taliban government needed broad-based ethnically balanced parliament, to save the country from descending into ethnic war and chaos again. Thus, the Constitution of 2004 of Afghanistan recognized ethnicity as a dominant theme in the politics of Afghanistan. The rights of ethnic groups were recognized:  articles 16, 35, and 135 of the Constitution (2004), guaranteed peace amongst the ethnic groups, safeguarding their relations. Recognizing the status of non-Pashtun ethnic languages, article 16 stipulates, thus, 

“From amongst Pashto, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani, Pamiri and other current languages in the country, Pashto and Dari shall be the official languages of the state. In areas where the majority of the people speak in any one of Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pashai, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamiri languages, any of the aforementioned language, in addition to Pashto and Dari, shall be the third official language, the usage of which shall be regulated bylaw. The state shall design and apply effective programs to foster and develop all languages of Afghanistan. Usage of all current languages in the country shall be free in press publications and mass media. Academic and national administrative terminology and usage in the country shall be preserved.”

 

In cultivating democratic culture among the various ethnic groups, article 35 of the Constitution 2004, provides for the formation of political parties;

“To attain moral and material goals, the citizens of Afghanistan shall have the right to form associations in accordance with provisions of the law. The people of Afghanistan shall have the right, in accordance with provisions of the law, to form political parties, provided that:

1. Their manifesto and charter shall not contravene the Holy religion of Islam and principles and values enshrined in this constitution;

2. Their organizations and financial resources shall be transparent;

3. They shall not have military or quasi-military aims and organizations; and

4. They shall not be affiliated with foreign political parties or other sources. Formation and operation of a party on the basis of tribalism, parochialism, language, as well as religious sectarianism shall not be permitted.

 

A party or association formed according to provisions of the law shall not be dissolved without legal causes and the order of an authoritative court.”

Article 135 provides for assigning of translator in mother tongue in court’s cases to the various ethnic groups when they need it,        

“If a party in lawsuit does not know the language, the right to know the materials and documents of the case as well as conversation in the court, shall be provided in the party’s mother tongue through a translator appointed by the court.”

Thus, the Constitution (2004) of Afghanistan recognized ethnicity constitutionally and officially and proclaims equity.

 

Conclusion

 

Due to changes in the state and society in Afghanistan; the Constitution of 1964, the Soviet invasion, the ensuing war, and the foreign states’ involvement, ethnicity, not only emerged, but became more salient in that specific socio-political Afghan milieu. The stirrings of politicization of ethnicity, initiated by Khalq and Parcham factions of PDPA in 1960s; aggravated further on ethnic and sectarian lines by the Afghan Resistance alliances, buttressed by foreign powers, Pakistan and Iran, in 1980s.   The politicization and militarization of politicized ethnicities, during the 1980s, and the sudden flight of the Soviet Union and the United States from Afghanistan, in 1989, left the risen major ethnicities: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek; to fight each other. This, not only, led to the most vicious ethnic war ever seen in Afghan history in 1990s, but led to ethnicisation of politics too. The fueling of ethnicity and sect by neighbouring-regional states, such as Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, India and Saudi Arabia further aggravated ethnic issues. The Mujahiddeen and Taliban were ostensibly religious regimes, professing not to recognize ethnicity, directed, ferocious fratricidal infightings, ethnic, cleansing and killings. The ethnic politics subdued, in the name of religion, qawm and sect, nevertheless an inherent ethnic undertone existed. Various ethnic based alliances, mainly non-Pashtun, to gain political power, in the 1990s emerged: such as, Shura-ye Ali-ye Hamahangi (1993), Northern Alliance (1996), and United National and Islamic Front for the Salvation of the Homeland (1997). These ethnic groups tried to weaken rivals to strengthen their own political power.However, the Communist regime under Najibullah (1987) and the Karzai government (2004), both made ethnicity constitutionally documented. The Constitution (1987) rejected all classifications on the basis of language, tribe, religion, race, and political ideology, and entitled every citizen to equal legal rights according to the law. The minorities’ languages such as Uzbeki, Turkmen, Baluchi, and Nuristani were elevated to the status of national languages (Dari, Pashto), and the character of Afghanistan as the multi-ethnic state was recognized, these moves were unprecedented. Najibullah began even reconciliation efforts to bring ethnic groups at peace, and recognizing their role for national development. In the wake of two decades of ethnic warfare, the Constitution of Afghanistan (2004), recognized ethnicity, and the rights of various ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The present Constitution (2004) of Afghanistan, recognizes 14 ethnic groups such as; Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Aimaq, Arab, Kirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujar, and Brahui. Though ethnicity has become salient, recognized, officially and constitutionally, but still unresolved. Presently, the major ethnic groups are struggling hard to attain political power and influence in the state and society. Although, a National Unity Government of President Ashraf Ghani (Pashtun) and Chief Executive, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah* along with leaders of other ethnicities as vice Presidents, etc., have been formed, however, contest based on ethnic politics continues, if not mounting.

 

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Newspapers/Constitutions

 

The New York Times. [May  4, 1997]

Kabul New Times. [January 22, 1987]

Kabul New Times. [December 10, 1987]

Kabul New Times. [December 1, 1987]

Kabul New Times. [December 3, 1987]