THE AFGHANISTAN ARMED FORCES
(During the President ship of Babrak Karmal)

S. Fida Yunas*

Sitara-i-Shuja’at

General

Responsibility for various branches of the Afghan armed forces and auxiliary services was divided, as under, amongst four ministries:

• The Ministry of Defence

Controlled the Army, Air Force and the Border Forces. The Border Forces consisted largely of ex-military personnel up to the age of 55 and, at times, even beyond that limit also.

• The Ministry of Interior

Controlled the Police (Tsarandoy) and the regional militias (The Civil Defence Groups, Self Defence Groups etc.) The Ministry had its own armed units, equipped with even light tanks and APCs.

• The Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities

It controlled a fluctuating number of Border Militia Forces, in collaboration with the Ministry of Defence.

• The Ministry of State Security

Formerly KHAD – The Security Service. It controlled and deployed its own combat units. These were under the Party (PDPA) Command.

The Strength of the Armed Forces on Occasion of the 7 Saur 1357 AH (27 April 1978) Revolution

Two sources had determined the strength of the armed forces and their equipments as per the following tables.

Table – 1: Personnel

S. No.	Description	Number of the Force
		Gen. Nabi Azimi	Dyer/Soviet 1978
1	Army	145,000	100,000
2	Air Force		10,000
3	Police & Gendarmerie	-	30,000
4	Labour Corps	-	30,000
5	Reserves: Army Air Force	- -	150,000 12,000
6	Armed tribesmen	-	200,000
7	A/A Units	Three complete formations	3xBns = SA-2 Missiles; 2xBns = 37,85,100 mm guns 3xBns=Radar

Table 2: Equipment

S. No.	Description	Number/Quantity
		Nabi Azimi; P: 161	Dyer/Soviets 1978
1	Tanks T-54/55, T-62, T-34	650	700 (500xT-54, T-55, T-62 200xT-34)
2	Light Tanks and BMP MICV	78	40
3	Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC)	780	400 (BTR-40/50/60/152)
4	Artillery Guns	1920	900x76, 100, 122 mm 100xmortars 122mm 50x132mm multiple rocket launchers
5	Aircrafts (both fighters and transport)	150	30x Il-28 40xMiG-17 40xMiG-21 24xSU-7 22xTransport
6	Helicopters	25	30xM-8s

In November 1979, the Soviets suggested the re-organization of the army as under (Nabi Azimi; 163):

A	Officers	33,236
B	NCOs	14,682	Khurd Zabitan-e-Maktabi i.e. NCOs qualified from regular training schools
C	NCOs and Sarbazan (soldiers)	161,499	NCOs trained/qualified in the units and the soldiers
D	Total	209,417

The re-organization was approved by the Afghan government but could not be successfully implemented.
The Afghan army had, in fact, been demoralized and divided politically at the time of the Soviet invasion and had not been able to carry out the pacification task assigned to it. In late 1979, rivalries between pro- and anti-Amin factions were already tearing the army apart. Within six-month of the Soviet invasion, the Afghan army had disintegrated further through continuous mutinies and defections, culminating in an open break between Khalq and Parcham oriented units in July 1980. In mid-July 1980 there were rumours of a ‘coup’ plot by the Khalqi officers of the 4th and 15th Armoured Formations at Pul-e-Charkhi. Many of the Khalqis in these formations and others of the Central Army Corps remained bitterly hostile to the Soviets and their Parchami allies. Khalqi officers also led a revolt when Karmal tried to replace the Khalqi Commander of Ghazni formation in July 1980 with a Parchami. There was heavy fighting until the 4th of August, involving the Soviet troops with air support.
The Afghan army had lost during 1980 a large part of its strength. It was no longer capable of offensive operations above the battalion level. Within its units effectiveness had, as mentioned, been undermined by bitter factionalism among officers. The Khalqis obstructed Karmal’s attempts to enlarge the membership of Parchami and place its members in key positions.
The Soviets pacification scheme assumed that the army could be quickly revived after Karmal had been installed and Soviet troops had secured the cities. Afghan troops would then be free to suppress the resistance in the countryside. Indoctrination, partly through the training of a new group of young officers in the Soviet Union, was expected to produce a military force dedicated to the ‘revolution’ and the crushing of the guerrilla resistance. Soviet troops could then be withdrawn or kept at bases in reserve and out of contact with the Afghan people.
These expectations were rudely dashed.
Not only the disintegration of the Afghan army, but the outright hostility of those units that had retained their capacity to fight, had seriously upset the Soviet calculations. As a result their own troops had to take up the uninviting task of rural pacification.
Soviet military operations in Afghanistan were divided into seven sectors; with some logistical bases of great size constructed already in 1980, close to the main cities. Besides the garrisons of Soviet-Afghan troops in the cities, some fifty outposts, heavily protected by minefields, were spread out across a hostile countryside. In the northern provinces adjacent to Soviet Central Asia, military operations were also being conducted by the 30,000 troops based across the border, in addition to the 85,000 Soviet based in Afghanistan itself. The Soviet troops had to bear the brunt of fighting with the collapse of the Afghan army morale.
Factionalism continued to be a problem in the army. On 11 February 1981, there was an army officers and party workers conference in Kabul. The meeting was addressed by both the prominent Khalqi - Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mohammad Zeray - and Parchami - Nur Ahmad Nur. Both emphasised the importance of unity in the party and in the ranks of the armed forces. In April 1981, a similar meeting was held in the 8th Mechanised Infantry Division at Qargha.
But the tensions within the armed forces were more complex than simple Khalq-Parcham rivalry. There were other groups of officers, too, who had formed around particular men during early 1981. Such a development had taken place between the Minister of Defence, Brigadier Mohammad Rafie, and Major General Abdul Qadir, the former Defence Minister, the veteran of the April Revolution and the head of the Revolutionary Council Security Committee. This rivalry, too, was undermining the discipline and morale of the armed forces.
On 19 August 1981, Babrak Karmal addressed a conference of armed forces and party activists and outlined plans for stronger party control of the military. But party control of the forces remained tenuous.
The problem of manpower, or rather the lack of it, had remained a fundamental one for the army. A compulsory recruitment drive for about 170,000 conscripts for the year 1361 AH (1982-83 AD) by raising the upper age limits or lowering it, offer of generous salaries, education and ‘employment after completion of service period, free accommodation, food, medical facilities and family care had not evoked a respectable response. The eligible Afghans had disappeared overnight rather than register for service.
During 1983, the strength of the Afghan armed forces was estimated as about 70,000, almost triple the number in 1981 (25,000). In 1982, the figure was 30,000. But, in spite of the increase in number, its fighting capabilities were not up to the mark and desertion of the soldiers was continuing at a rate of about 1,000 per month. The following table-3 shows the number of deserters during the year 1362 AH (1983-84 AD).

Table - 3

1	The first quarter of 1362	7,010
2	The 2nd quarter of 1362	10,453
3	The 3rd quarter of 1362	8,905
4	The 4th quarter of 1362	7,745
Total during the year		34,143

This figure is almost half of the strength of the army then and an increase of about 19,000 over the year 1981-82. (In 1361 AH, the number of deserters was 25,400). The figure increased every year. There were many reasons for desertions but the main one was the fighting. No one - officer or a sarbaz was willing to be killed. The war was oppressive and did not distinguish between a mujahid and a non-mujahid.
According to secret documents of the Soviets (Nabi Azimi; 291), the casualties of the mujahideen up to 25 Jadi 1365 (15 January 1986) have been mentioned as one million shaheed (martyrs) and one million wounded and incapacitated. Against these figures the casualties of the Soviets have been recorded as 12,000 and those of Afghan army and party members 38,000 (both totalling only 50,000). This means that against one Soviet and Afghan, there were 30 mujahideen martyred and 20 wounded or incapacitated. But, all these figures are exaggerated and distorted by the Soviet advisers and Afghan army commanders. In fact, both sides had received heavy casualties.
During 1983, as against the war establishment Table (WET), the on ground percentage strength of the army, by categories was as under (Nabi Azimi; 289):

Table - 4

1	Officers	95.6 %
2	NCOs (Regular and Training Centre qualified)	52 %
3	The manpower strength of the units/sarbazan (soldiers)	55.6%
4	The overall average strength of the Army	61 %

The above figures were not constant and fluctuated from time to time as dependent on many factors.
In the normal course of war, the fighting strength of the units/formations should be up to hundred per cent of its establishment or, at least, to 70 percent. Below this percentage (of 70 %) the operational capabilities are seriously affected adversely. However, many a times the strength of the Afghan Armed Forces had dropped down to as low as 40%.
To supplement the combat capabilities of the Afghan army many other fighting and security elements were raised from time to time (details at Annexure A). Changes were also effected in the compulsory Military Service Law and the pay scales of the soldiers, units junior officers and students (recruits/trainees) of the Armed Forces revised to attract the Afghans but with no positive results.
All the measures having proved ineffective, the government started using force to get hold of the eligible and even the ineligible ones in many cases.
The use of force had caused great resentments.
The young ones were maltreated everywhere and forcibly inducted into the military service. The ‘Press Gangs’ were formed by Army, Police, KHAD and the party. They would force their way everywhere - to search the young - in the outskirts of the cities, inside the cities, in bus services, shops, tea houses, restaurants, cinemas, houses, government offices, mosques, wedding halls, monasteries, assemblies convened for the dead etc. Proper planning used to be made and even spies employed for the purpose. Bribery had become rampart. The worst act of these teams (Press Gangs) was the arrests of boys of even 15 years of age showing their age as 18 and old ones of even 50 years introducing them as of 39 years to the recruiting centres.
Some of the following measures were adopted through rules and regulations to bring the army to its authorised establishment:

• The intake age for the compulsory military service was brought down from 22 to 20, then to 19 and ended up at 17 years. However, as mentioned above, many cases of children of 15 and 16 years of age were also rounded up by the Press Gangs and produced forcibly before the recruiting officers as of the age of 17 for conscription service.
• Gradually the age of reservists for call-up service was risen from 40 to 45 years.
• The period/duration of compulsory service was increased from 2 to 3 years. In many cases it had even become unlimited.
• Courses (refresher) for reservist officers were done away with.
• It was made compulsory that the graduates of schools/lycées, before joining the universities, would complete their military service.
• Students in the schools, who had reached 18 years of age, were required to do their compulsory military service. After the completion of their service, they were given graduation certificate and could join the university without undergoing the entry test.
• The Sarbazan who would voluntarily do military service (beyond the compulsory service requirements) were given a monthly salary of 5,000 Afghanis. They were also entitled to free coupons (for purchases) and could join the department/institution/establishment of their choice.
• General amnesty was declared for those who had deserted with or without weapons and returned to rejoin their units.
• The refugees (eligible for military service) who returned to their homeland were exempt for six months from joining the compulsory military service and were to be called for service after six months.

According to Dr. Hassan Kakar (PP: 169-170), for suppressing the resistance, the Soviets, for building a new Afghan Army, had undertaken the following actions:

• Distrusting the Khalqi-dominated army, the Soviets began to weaken the hold of Khalqis over it, first by wresting control of weapons stores from the Khalqi officers;
• By late March 1980, the Soviet advisers had made the weapons, including tanks, inoperable in all units that they controlled;
• The Soviets collected anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft rockets and other heavy weapons from the army. By January 1981, the army, in and around Kabul, had been disarmed;
• The 4 and 15 Armoured Formations were removed from their headquarters in Kabul (Pul-e-Charkhi cantonment) and sent to Muqur and Herat;
• By March 1980, about three thousand soldiers were left in the city of Kabul. The Soviets units were stationed in and around Kabul, patrolling it at night;
• The regime re-employed those former officers whom the Khalqi governments had dismissed;
• Short term courses were set up for training new officers, enrolling its own supporters, even if they lacked the proper qualifications. Known to the public as “instant officers” (Machine-made officers / Mansabdar-ha-e-ma’shin), they made the army inefficient;
• The problem was faced with the shortage of soldiers. It was difficult to recruit new soldiers to compensate for the desertions. As early as April 1980 the regime began taking the recruitment problem in earnest. Unsuccessful in its initial effort, the regime then called to military service university graduates who had either been exempt or whose recruitment had been postponed. The call-up was accompanied by concessions and bonuses.
• New enticements were devised, among them granting university entrance to high school graduates, who had passed only a nominal examination. Kabul University suffered academically as a result. (Such like incentives had been given during World War II also in the then India. Those students who were in the final (4th) year of their Bachelor Classes were given War Bachelor Degrees without passing the final examination, if they joined the army; author).
• Contained in the new policy of recruitment was the call-up of university professors and government employees under twenty years of age.

The programme of recruitment and conscription failed to work and the regime called reservists to duties. On 8 September 1981, the regime announced that those Afghans who had completed military service between 1968 and 1978 and who were under fifty years of age should present themselves to the centre of recruitments. The regime promised the reservists not only various bonuses but also 3,000 Afghanis per month, an amount of money far larger than that ever before paid to Afghan soldiers. Reaction to the call was swift. On the day after the announcement reservists started leaving cities and people in Kabul denounced the measures. The regime, noticing adverse reaction all over, modified the call by exempting university and school teachers as well as students. The drivers of state-owned trucks and government officials were also exempted from the recall. Most of the recalled reservists fled the country or moved to inaccessible areas.
By mid-October 1981, the regime had been able to recruit only five thousand men. In some cases, in particularly Herat, the recall reservists presented themselves for enlistment. But once they were issued with rifles they deserted with their weapons. This practice had, in fact, become common with the soldiers. (The approximate number of eligible reservists, during the ten year period of 1968 to 1978 ran into well over half a million men. Had they complied, the regime could not have provided supplies for such a number (Dr. Kakar; P: 174).
Karmal’s ‘new phase’ had pushed the army beyond the limits of tolerance. In the first year of its rule, the Karmal regime was not even in a position to demob soldiers who had already completed their compulsory one year service and were being kept in the army against their will. On 27 December 1980, about 600 drafted soldiers who had completed their obligatory service threw down their weapons in front of ‘Wilayat-e-Kabul’ (Kabul Governorate), the main police building, and formed themselves in to a procession which went round the streets of Kabul city demanding immediate discharge from military duties. The incident forced the government to demob all those who had completed their obligatory period of service. (Raja Anwar; P: 211).
It did not go un-noticed that no one belonging to the families of party cadres was made to join either the Sipahiyan-e-Inqilab (Soldiers of the Revolution) or the armed forces under the new regulations. The sons of senior party leaders were either in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe for higher education, if not chasing girls on the streets of Kabul. The sons of Karmal, Zeray and Panjsheri were exempted from the compulsory military service and sent to Moscow for studies, an example followed by less important party leaders. (Raja Anwar; P: 212).
On 6 September 1980, the ministry of defence announced a new penal law for the armed forces. Article 1 stated that the new law was needed to strengthen revolutionary legality, legal order and discipline in the DRA Armed Forces, the struggle against evading military service. Jail sentences were set out for a whole variety of misdemeanours; up to 4 years for ignoring call-up papers; 2-6 years for being absent without leave; up to 6 years for feigning illness to avoid service. Punishment of 15 years in prison or execution was provided for a long list of offences; desertion, insubordination, stealing state secrets, giving weapons to the ‘enemy’, ‘conspiracy against the revolution’, and engaging in propaganda against the call-up for military service. (Mark Urban; P: 70).
The mujahideen had, in some cases, succeeded in infiltrating the secrets of the regime. B. J. (Brigadier) Khalilullah, Director Reconnaissance, Ministry of Defence, and some other officers were suspected to be in touch with Commander Engr Ahmad Shah Masood of Panjsher. Having been found guilty Khalilullah along with Dagarman (Lt. Col) Mir Taj-ud-Din were executed. Many other officers were imprisoned for 15 to 20 years. One amongst them was Jagran (Major) Naeem from Wardak, who, during the Presidency days of Prof Rabbani and Engr Masood, was appointed on an important post in the ministry of defence. Yet another one was Dagarwal (Colonel) Sultan Shah, Deputy Director Intelligence in the Defence Ministry, who was imprisoned for fifteen years. (Nabi Azimi; P: 249).
Punishments were awarded for inefficiencies as well. During the month of Mizan 1364 AH (Sep/Oct 1985 AD), T. J. (Lt Gen) Farouq, who had replaced T. J. Pir Mohammad as the over all Commander of the Border Forces, was admonished for his inability to seal the border against the infiltration of the mujahideen. Likewise, Dagarwal Hazrat, Commander 9 Division, and Dagarwal Asef Shor, Commander 25 Division, (both Khalqis) were punished for their unsatisfactory work. (Nabi Azimi; P: 299).
Personal/professional rivalries and factionalism were, in fact, considered to be the main reasons for such punishments administered by Babrak Karmal, who was considered to be a revengeful person.
Most of the important command and sensitive posts, those days, were in the hands of the Parchamis; for example: (Nabi Azimi; P: 300).

• General Mohammad Anwar; Personnel Officer (Pezhandtoon); Adjutant General;
• General Siddiq Zaheen; Technical Assistance (Organization);
• Maj Gen Yasin Sadiqi1; Director General, Political Affairs;
• Gen Hissam-ud-Din Hissam; Director General, Military Security;
• Gen Asef Alam; President, Supreme Court;
• Gen Mohammad Hassan Sherzai; Director Signals;
• Dagarwal Mohammad Anwar; Director, Operations;
• T. J. Mohammad Afzal Lodin; Comd No 1 Corps;
• T. J. Nur-ul-Haq Olumi; Comd No 2 Corps;
• B. J. Mohammad Asef Dilawar; Comd No 3 Corps;
• Gen Juma Asak; Comd 17 Division;
• Gen Farouq; Comd 18 Division (Mazar-e-Sharif);
• Gen Barakzai; Comd 11 Div Ningrahar;
• Gen Mohib Ali; Comd 8 Div Qargha;

The Khalqis were assigned command of the following:

• D. W. Mohammad Asef Shor; Comd 25 Div;
• D. W. Hazrat; Comd 9 Div;
• D. W. Faqir Mohammad; Comd 7 Div
• D. W. Ila-ud-Din; Comd 4 Armd Formation;
• D.W. Abdul Wahab; Comd 20 Div (Nahrain)

The number of Parchami Political Directors in the various units and formations were also more than the Khalqis.
By the end of 1981, the Soviet and Kabul forces had demonstrated a new style of co-ordinated operations with main tactical features as under (Mark Urban; PP: 86, 87, and 91,121):

• The concentration of air assets and extensive aerial bombardment of targets;
• The landing of helicopter of forces both to stop the withdrawal of enemy forces and to engage them from unexpected directions;
• A drive by mechanized forces into areas of mujahideen support, after destroying crops and homes and often against the anvil of the helicopter landed party;
• Destroying orchards and forested area to deny cover to the mujahideen;
• Attempt to block mujahideen supply routes from Pakistan. Increasing use was made of air-dropped PFM-1 mines in large numbers, referred to in the West as “butterfly bombs” and among Soviet soldiery as “green parrots”, along the supply routes;
• Attempts to buy the services of tribal groups near the frontier, through cash and other incentives. This tribal recruiting drive had met with some success. In several places Tribal Revolution Defence Groups were formed. But, in due course the Tribals started selling, at cheap rates, the ammunitions and light weapons to the mujahideen, extending the excuse to the government that the same had been expended during an encounter with the mujahideen. The government knew the facts but would not annoy the tribal elders and replenish the losses.2
• Increased use was made of infra-red flares (designed to decoy the heat-seeking SA-7 missiles) by Soviet aircrafts over Afghanistan;
• Retard bombs (having a small parachute to slow them down) were introduced for low-level raids. (Previously many bombs had failed to arm when dropped at low altitudes, providing the mujahideen with large quantities of free explosives;
• Cluster bombs designated RBK-250 were introduced in 1980. Each RBK-250 carries 60 bomblets, each one of which is as effective as an 81 mm mortar round. The lethal area of one of these bombs is estimated at 200,000 square feet;
• There were also experiments in bombing from higher altitudes.

General Nabi Azimi maintains (P: 291):
“The Afghan army, over a period of time, had eventually improved its operational capabilities. Now a division would move out in an hour for undertaking active operation as against the earlier timings of 72 hours.”

More than 50 per cent of the officers had done training of various durations in the military academies of Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and other Socialist countries. Many party civilian cadres had also undergone officer training courses in the army, and ministries of interior and state security (Intelligence/KHAD). This had increased their fighting capabilities and would, along side the army, partake in operations against the ‘insurgents.’ Improvements had also been made in the Air Force and the Afghan pilots were nowhere inferior to the Soviets in air combats.
President Najeebullah had, for some time, been placing the total strength of the Afghan Armed Forces, including all types of defence forces as well, at half a million all ranks. In the second PDPA National Conference (October 18 - 20, 1987), he, however, gave the following figures of regular armed forces:

a. Army and Air Force	40,000
b. Tsarandoy (Police) – Operative Bns (Kandak-ha-e-Operateef)	40,000
c. The Frontier Force	30,000
d. The State Security (Combat Wing: Fa’aleen-e-KHAD)	27,000
Total	127,000

The President had also mentioned that, in addition to the above, there were 36,000 in the Regional Forces and 20,000 in the Militia Force. It was maintained that the number of the Defenders of Revolution had increased two times and the Civil Defence Groups and Self Defence Groups reached a figure of 42,000. The National Conference, at the end, had resolved that the Army should be raised to 200,000 and Tsarandoy to 115,000. The figures were never achieved.
However, commenting on the “battle worthiness” of the Armed Forces Najeeb remarked:
“But most of the issues related to military structure and strengthening the combat capability of our Armed Forces have not yet been solved. All our units and detachments at present are not capable enough to independently and successfully resist the enemy.”

He extended the following reasons for the low combat ability of a significant part of the military units and detachments:

• Low level of completion of the combat units and detachments, especially in the army, which has resulted in low level of proper usage of weapons and combat techniques by the soldiers and non-commissioned officers;
•  Lack of serious and precise mobilization of the combat units and detachments;
• Weak theoretical and political preparedness;
• Slow rate of activity of the political organs, party and youth organization in the armed forces for boosting the militancy of the army.

Najeeb then added that these defects had created obstacles to the cause of strengthening the armed forces and did not give the opportunity to achieve the necessary superiority over the enemy.
But when Generals Tanai, Gulabzoi, Juma Asak, Ludin, Daud and Yaqubi assured Najeeb of their resolve to defend their country, Najeeb claimed:
“Some people impudently say that after the return of the ‘limited military contingent’ (of the Soviets) they would not be able to defend Afghanistan. Having such an army, political alliance, we declare to all the Afghan people and the world that we would succeed.”

Najeeb proved himself equal to his claim for quite some time.
On March 29, 1988, in his Press Conference (AAPSO Meeting, March 29-31, 1988) Najeebullah had placed the figure of the Afghan Armed Forces at 400,000 – too much inflated a number.
The pay scales of the soldiers were fixed in Decree No 146 dated 30.11.1363 (corresponding to February 18, 1983) of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (RC of DRA).
The Compulsory Military Service Law, cancelling all the earlier legal documents on the subject, was promulgated through Decree No 301 dated 4.12.1365 (corresponding to February 22, 1987) of the RC of DRA.
The mujahideen, too, had improved upon their tactics and fighting capabilities.
However, there were still many short comings in the higher echelon of command, mostly because of their accelerated promotions and having not gone through the normal chain of command process and, thus, the lack of experience for those positions. Because of such a short-sightedness one of the unfortunate ‘incidence was that at the Shin Dand airbase. As per decision of General Qadir ‘Aqa’, Commander Air Force and Air Defence, Dagarwal Dost Mohammad, Political Officer Air Force, T. J. Moslov (the Soviet adviser) and General Abdul Qadir, the Defence Minister, the organization of Shin Dand airport, commanded by an experienced regular officer of the Air Force, Dagarwal Rehmatullah ‘Pilot’ was cancelled. This paved the way for the mujahideen to infiltrate the airbase and plant mines inside it. The result was that 19 x aircrafts (6 x SU-7 and 13 x MiG-21) were completely destroyed. (In those days, it was believed that some pro-mujahideen Khalqi pilots at Shin Dand were also involved in this sabotage act. They had also reportedly dropped their bombs in the desert instead of on the target village, where presence of mujahideen was suspected. After a brief investigation some pilots were accused of the act and executed. Author).
The attitude of General Abdul Qadir, Defence Minister, had become unbearable. He once fell out with General Aslam Watanjar during their visit to 25 Division, Khost, and thrashed him bitterly. Watanjar had to remain confined to his house for a long time. Qadir would also, so often, misbehave with the doctors and staff nurses of the general and maternity hospitals. He would fall out with even the members of KHAD, headed by the strongman Dr Najeebullah, who was in the good books of the Soviets. The Soviets were finally got convinced that any further stay of Qadir inside the country was fraught with risks and unsavoury consequences. He was, thus, banished as Ambassador to Bulgaria. Qadir was replaced by General Nazar Mohammad ‘Pilot’ as Defence Minister. Nazar Mohammad who had done training in the Soviet Union was at that time Chief of Staff. Nazar Mohammad, a simpleton with a humble nature, had been generally referred to in the earlier days of his career as ‘Mullah Nazar’ by his colleagues. General Shah Nawaz, in turn, had taken over as Chief of Staff, the post having fallen vacant on appointment of the incumbent Nazar Mohammad as the Defence Minister. (Nabi Azimi; 300-302)
Mistrust between the two (Khalq and Parcham) had always been on the increase and the gulf never bridged. To maintain a balance and check it was ensured that in a unit/formation where the commander was a Khalqi, the political officer was to be Parchami and likewise a Parchami commander would be having a Khalqi political officer (Nabi Azimi: p: 303).
Nabi Azimi, referring to an article “30 years of PDPA” in Izestia by one Dagarwal Alexander Marzov, who had remained for four y ears as deputy intelligence officer in the Soviet Embassy in Kabul, says that (PP: 303-304):
“The Soviets were greatly afraid of the growing influence of Shola-e-Javaid (Pro-China) in Afghanistan. During the seventies Soviets had decided that under guidance of the KGB unity should be denied at all cost to the Khalq and Parcham factions – the reason for such a negative approach being that if one of the factions started leaning towards Shola-e-Javaid, the other, for sure, would try to strengthen itself by having a close friendship with Moscow… During the days of King Zahir Shah and President Mohammad Daud, members of the KGB and the Soviet diplomats had been maintaining close contacts with the leaderships of Khalq and Parhcam in great secrecy. Babrak was very close to Moscow. He, however, received two setbacks – one during the days of Nur Mohammad Taraki and the other during Dr Najeebullah.

Selig S. Harrison, in the article How the Soviet Union stumbled into Afghanistan, Chapter I of the book - Out of Afghanistan - says: “Interview, Moscow 4, 1993; Vladimir Kuzichkin, a KGB Major who defected in 1982, described KGB attitudes towards Karmal and Amin in an article in TIME (Coups and killings in Kabul; Nov 22, 1982, PP: 33-34); He said that Karmal had been a KGB agent “for many years” prior to his installation as President of the Communist regime in 1980. (Note; P: 400).

Security and Administrative Zones

In August 1980, the regime divided Afghanistan into nine (9) security and administrative zones/units, each comprising a number of provinces – the total provinces then being twenty nine (29). A member of the Central Committee of the party headed each zone; under him was a permanent commission composed of provincial governor and a Soviet adviser in command of the military unit stationed there. The job of the head of the zone was that of a social liaison officer. The new zones were like military units, as their main job was that of maintenance of security in their respective region of responsibility. Each zone had a KHAD chief as well, directly responsible to the President General of KHAD. The most important from political and operational points were the East, South-West and North-West zones. These were headed by directors and the other by deputy directors.
Details of the security and administrative zones are at Annexure B and B-1.

The Defence of Kabul City (Capital)

The Kabul City was protected by a strong armed force split up into three groups with the following responsibilities:

• A Force of 20/30,000 for holding strong strategic points around the City, in three security rings;
• A Force of 15/20,000 composed of armed police and Militia to deal with the small groups of mujahideen;
• A Force of 15/20,000 composed of WAD (Afghan Intelligence combat groups) and members of PDPA to deal with the ‘underground’ elements.

According to Kabul Times of March 31, 1988, the total strength of the armed forces for the defence of the Kabul City was 120,000 which figure was too much inflated.

Establishment of Military Posts

In 1980-81, private traffic between Kabul and other cities was only allowed to move once a day in the form of a convoy. But the convoys also came under attacks of the mujahideen, who would search the transport vehicles for party members and take them away when they recognized them. It was no longer safe for party members and pro-regime Afghans to travel between the cities. To escape unhurt they travelled in disguise. By the second week of May 1980, the Khalqis and Parchamis were no longer to be found in rural areas. They had either been killed or fled to cities.
Along with the efforts to build up the regular army, the regime, therefore, established military posts as well. These were first established around the provincial capitals, in areas of military significance in the countryside and on the main roads. Such posts were manned by mercenaries whom the regime recruited from the poor people. Each was paid 3,000 Afghanis, provided arms and ammunition and some additional bonuses.
The posts were defensive.
The mujahideen were unable to overcome the military posts, established around the provincial capitals and in the areas of military significance, by frontal assault. They had to infiltrate them to effect their surrender. A network of military posts throughout the country would have enabled the regime to pacify the land, but the government was, of course, unable to create such a system.
On the main roads not only the regime had positioned military check posts but the mujahideen, too, had established theirs and both within visibility distance of each other. Both the check posts were also engaged in ‘looting’. In many places they (the inmates of the two opposing posts) would, after dusk, sit together to pool the ‘loot’ and divide the same ‘honestly’ among themselves. The Afghan Torkham belt - Ghazi Abad Farms – region was then referred to as Dubai (because of the incomes).
But at times they would fall out also with each other on some count or other.
I (the author) had a bitter experience once. I was, once, returning to Kabul from Peshawar in the flag-car, along with Mr Niaz Ahmad Khan, our Pakistani Consul at Jalalabad. We had to stop in the middle of Ghazi Abad Farm, short of Jalalabad, as heavy exchange of fire was heard close by, between two opposing groups. A few other local civilian vehicles also stopped in rear of us.
As the firing subsided, I was requested by the civilians to lead, as, perhaps, due regard would be given to the Pakistani flag on the car.
We were stopped in the middle of the road by guns tottering fiercely looking young ones, demanding to come down. They did not give any importance to the Pakistani flag and our Diplomatic Passports and asked for Pakistani Identity Cards. As gook luck would have it, I had one on my person. They saw my photo on the card and started shooting in the air. They said that this was now a ‘welcome’ to the Ambassador of Pakistan.
Immediately on arrival in Kabul I issued instructions for every one to carry Pakistani Identity Cards in their pockets.
After sometime, however, the security worsened on the road between Jalalabad and Torkham and we were obliged to travel to Pakistan via New Delhi, India.

The Regime’s Failed Attempts to Seal Pak-Afghan Border

Both the Soviets and the Afghan Communists regimes had ever been trying to control/seal off Pak-Afghan border to the movements of the mujahideen and adopted many measures. As mentioned in the preceding pages the Soviets had laid mines in provinces bordering Pakistan which had not proved effective. During the CPSU Politburo meeting of 1 November 1988 it was conceded that due to geographic and other conditions sealing of such a long border was not possible.
During September 1982, the regime considered erecting an “Afghan Berlin-Wall’ along the 2,100 KM Pak-Afghan border (Tehran Times; September 27, 1982 – Annexure C), but obviously the project was found impracticable.
Earlier in mid-1980s, Border Brigades – ten in number (Quwa-e-Sarhadi) were raised under the control of the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribes to control movements across the borders, but later on they were reverted to the Ministry of Defence. In 1988 the total strength of the Force was claimed at 11,000.
The force was newly raised and not that much experienced to seal the various routes and valleys along the border. At many places they even allowed passage of the co-tribal mujahideen. General Nabi Azimi maintains that, as planned by General Akhtar, Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of Pakistan, every month about 5000 tons of weapons (arms and ammunition) would enter Afghanistan. Turan Janral Farooq, who had replaced Turan Janral Pir Mohammad as the Commander of the Border Forces, had been reprimanded by President Babrak Karmal for his inefficiency and inability to control the border.
In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the DRA – RC dated 8.4.1361 (corresponding to 29 June 1982); the Border Militia Force was raised by the Ministry of Defence in co-operation with the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribes. In 1986, the total strength of the Force was claimed as 3,500. According to Article 2 of the Regulations, the function and one of the duties of the Militia was given as under:
“All-sided co-operation with the units, detachments and elements of the Border Forces of the DRA Ministry of Defence in closing effectively the country’s eastern, southern and western borders against the penetration of counter-revolutionary elements, saboteurs, spies and other enemies and traitors to the country and revolution.”

The reliability of the Force was directly connected with the reliability of the respective tribe and its elders.
Article 4 of Decree of the Presidium of the RC of DRA dated 18.4.1363 (corresponding to 8 July 1984) promulgated as “Law for Regions under Special Administration in the Territory of the DRA”, states;
“Entry into the region under special administration and exit from there is to be carried out through the traffic control points and the prescribed routes of the military posts.”

The tribals on either side of the border ignored such restrictions and the law remained on paper only.
The Council of Ministers on 25.9.1365 (16 December 1986) issued regulations on ordinary crossing and re-crossing of borders of DRA by the nomads and inhabitants of border localities. Article 3 of the Regulation state:
“Grant of permission to the border crossing nomads and inhabitants of the border localities to cross and re-cross the borders is controlled by the Border Forces of the Ministry of Defence of the DRA in accordance with the general administration as under:

• Through the permanent controlling points of the Border Forces, jointly with the customs (authorities) and/or independently if the customs is not there;
• Through the temporary controlling posts of the Border Forces of the Ministry of Defence of the DRA, which have been set up by the Ministry of Defence of the DRA in border localities on the basis of the provisions of these regulations.

This law had also met the same fate as the “Law for Regions”. The aim of both the laws was to screen the movements of people for undesirable elements.
A list of the districts, sub-districts and cities where permanent and temporary controlling posts were to be established is at Annexure D.
The Regimes had also, directly and indirectly, attempted to involve the tribals for security of the Pak-Afghan Border. Article 6.9, Second Chapter, of Decree No 32 of 7.2.1360 (27 April 1981) says;
“Extending all sided assistance and help to the Pushtun and Baluch nationalities and tribes, who are acting seriously against the enemies of Afghan revolution at ‘Borders of the DRA.’

Article 7.D.4 suggests; “Holding of Jirgahs for defence of the borders of the DRA, consolidation of oneness, unity, fraternity and equality amongst the nationalities and tribes.” (Author – S. Fida Yunas’ book on Afghanistan – PDPA etc: 1982-1998; Volume One; PP: 147-161).
On September 14-15, 1985, the First High Jirgah for the Frontier Tribes was held in Kabul, in which Babrak Karmal asked the participants for ‘safeguarding the frontiers of “our united homeland Afghanistan”. It had no effect on the tribes.

Reaction of the Locals towards the Mujahideen

The mujahideen were supported by the locals who provided them with shelter, food and clothes. Landlords paid them Islamic tethe, while merchants paid them taxes. (This was told to me – the author – and during 1981 by a known dry fruit shopkeeper in Kabul. He, at the same time, pointed out two persons also, who, according to him, collected the tax for the mujahideen. Many persons during day time were ‘innocent’ shopkeepers/vendors and at night ‘mujahideen’) Another source of income for the mujahideen was a percentage from the pay of government employees, including party members, who were on government pay roll but who had property in the area under the control of the mujahideen. (Kakar; 127-128).
The locals showed grave concern also, many a times, with the behaviour of the mujahideen. They objected to the summary execution by the mujahideen of the party members and their associates and resented their burning of houses, confiscation of properties, loot, extraction of money by force and even molesting of women. On one occasion, the mujahideen, after killing the male members in a village of Paktya, rounded up forty women of different ages and terming the ‘poor’ to be ‘war booty’, as being the families of Khalqis, sold them here and there against nominal money. Saddest of all was also the case of the immigration and custom officials of Afghan Torkham after their offices were over-run by the mujahideen. They were taken possession of by Maulvi Khalis group, mercilessly slaughtered, their dead bodies stuffed in gunny bags and thrown astride the road between Afghan Torkham and Dakka check post, according to them, ‘a lesson’ to other pro-regime elements. This was told to me – the author – in Peshawar by Louis Dupree, the known Afghanlogist, who had seen the littered body bags with swarms of flies over them, and had those photographed also. He was reluctant to part with a set of the photographs. Such like other gruesome instances have also been narrated in heart-rending manner by Pakistan former Ambassador to Kabul, Mr Amir Usman, in his book of incidences in Pushto Da Dewe Lande Tortam (Darkness below the lamp).
Like some members of the Mojaddedi families who had, somehow, miraculously escaped the massacre in Qala-e-Jawad (on the out skirt of Kabul city, beyond the village Afshar) during the initial days of Taraki’s Presidency, by the Khalqis and hoped that their elders - Ibrahim Jan Mojaddedi and Ismail Jan Mojaddedi - were, perhaps, still alive, having been taken to Siberia by the Russians, some relations of the Afghan Torkham officials also entertained such hopes.
During the year 2004, I (the author) was one day concentrating on a book on Afghanistan, when my eldest daughter Dr. Meher Angez, a known gynaecologist and in charge of her Medicare Hospital, Canal Road, Danishabad, Peshawar, burst into my room, and with tears in her eyes thrusted in my hands a bundle of some cuttings of newspaper along with a hand written paper, and pleaded if I could do something about it. The cuttings were about “the Torkham incident” and the paper contained one name “Sayyed Meer Hamza” (second name Bacha), M.A., Economics from Kabul University, officer in Customs – missing date November 4, 1988 (Annexure E).
The ‘bundle’ had been given to my daughter by a female medical nurse, employed in her hospital, the sister of the ‘missing Sayyed Meer Hamza”, with the request to find out the whereabouts of her brother in Pakistan. The family was still hopeful that one day their ‘loved’ one would all of a sudden and unexpectedly knock at the door of their house.
I told my daughter the fate of the Afghan Torkham officials and asked her to inform the ‘sister’ (without, of course, the fate of the officials, in general) that no such person could be traced.
Contents of one of the newspaper cuttings are at Annexure F.
Dr. Kakar says (P; 128):
“Those mujahideen who bore grudges against others resorted to badal (revenge – the ugly facet of Afghan society). The biggest source of disillusionment for the common Afghan was the multiplicity of the resistance of organizations and their lack of unity. This dissension was caused partly by disunity among their leaders and partly by the jealousy of the local commanders, who wished to extend the areas they controlled with little or no regard for Jihad.

The Afghan Regular Armed Forces in General

The Afghan Regular Armed Forces, in general, were composed mostly of Pushtoons, belonging to the Khalq faction of the PDPA and flooded with officers. According to one estimate there was a total of 40,000 officers in the Afghan Army, Air Force, WAD (Afghan Intelligence) and the Frontier Force. The mujahideen often referred to these officers as ‘machine-made officers’ (Sahib mansubin-e-mashini). Due to the comparative shortage of the other ranks the ‘machine-made officers’, at times, were required to perform even guard duties as well. The regular officers, the graduates from the Military and Air Force Academies were mentioned as ‘Sahib mansubin-e-Maktabi’.
During the presence of the Soviet Army in the country the Afghan officers lacked initiative as the operations were mostly planned and conducted by the Soviet officers and advisors. The tactics level, then, of the Afghan very senior officers had thus been reduced to that of a company commander of the Pakistan or Indian Army – as once mentioned by the Indian Military Attaché, Colonel Samay Ram in a diplomatic function in Afghanistan during 1981. For major operational plans the Soviets also did not take into confidence even the Afghan senior officers as they never placed full trust in them. They feared leakage of their plan to the mujahideen. On their part the Afghan officers also did not like the ‘bossing’ attitude of the Soviets and would ‘co-operate’ at times, with the mujahideen on ‘tribal’, ethnic and nationality basis.
The situation had, however, taken a different turn after the withdrawal of the Soviet Forces from Afghanistan. It was now the Afghan honour at stake. The Afghan honour was successfully displayed by the Afghan government forces during the ‘Jalalabad operation.’ Now they were in no way ‘inferior’ to the mujahideen.

The Afghan Air Force

In March 1988, the total strength of the Afghan Air Force was estimated at 16,000, all ranks, including the civilian employees as well. The force was then stated to be short of Helicopter Pilots but up to strength in transport and fighter pilots. The civilian pilots who returned to the country after completing training in the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries were mostly inducted in the Air Force. The Force, in general, was quite efficient and effective.

References

The following relevant Laws and Decrees are given in the Author’s (S. Fida Yunas) book – Afghanistan: Organization of the PDPA… 1982-1998; Vol Two; Peshawar; 1998.

• The Recruitment Plan; July 26, 1982; PP: 617-623;
• Decree No 146 dated 18.2.1985 – regarding pay scales etc.; PP: 624-628;
• Military Service Law NO 301 dated 22.2.19878; PP: 629-656;
• Decree dated 29.6.1982; regarding Border Militia; PP: 673-687;
• Decree dated 23.8.1982; regarding Civil Defence; PP: 688-708;
• Decree dated 8.7.1984; regarding Special Regions; PP: 711-725;
• Endorsement No 186 dated 16.12.1986; regarding Nomads etc.; PP: 726-737.
• For Convocation of the First High Jirgah for the Frontier Tribes, Sept 14-15, 1985, reference may be made to Author’s book on ‘Jirgahs and Loya Jirgahs: 977-1991 AD; PP: 446-572.

Annexure A

THE CIVIL ARMED FORCES

 The Watan Nursery

This was, in fact, the ‘brain washing’ centre, established during the presidency days of Babrak Karmal where children, who had no guardians, whose parents had been killed in the war or those infants who were collected together by the troops after destruction of their homes and villages, were brought in “to make new people of them” as boasted by the Communists. The orphans, including also the illegitimate ones, whose number was continuously on the increase, would stand in front of the photograph of Babrak and sing:
We are the children of Afghanistan;
And we are the lion-hearts of the battle ground;
We are the lovers of Revolution.
These children were also sent to the Soviet Union and her satellites for brain washing.
These ‘kidnapped’ children were trained for guerrilla warfare, police service or serving as secret agents and saboteurs. Their role to a great extent was effective.
Mehbooba, wife of Karmal, was in charge of this setup.

The Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan (DYOA)

It was established in 1975 and in January 1988 its total strength was claimed as 211,000 including 23 % of girl members. On February 26, 1988, in a message of the DYOA Central Committee to the Youth of the Country, it was stated that after the return of the Soviet troops a responsibility devolved on them to defend their country. It was also announced that the DYOA had, till then, raised two battalions, one each in the provinces of Kabul and Takhar. The PDPA banked heavily on the DYOA and took them to be the real defenders of the party and the revolution. The ‘Youths’ though enjoyed all the facilities of the party yet they never took their ‘role’ seriously.

The Afghan Women Council

It was founded in 1965 as the first Social Organization of Afghan Women, under the leadership of the PDPA (Dr. Anahita Ratibzad). However, after the appointment of Mrs Masooma Asmati Wardak as its chairperson, the organization was seceded from the PDPA. But still it claimed that from within a total strength of about 110,000 (in 1988) about 27,500 women had joined the Revolution Defence Groups. The force had mostly remained on paper only.

The Pioneers (Scouts; Pesh Ahangan or Makh Kashan)

The organization was of the teenagers between the ages of 10 and 15 years. They were not required to take part in active operations but training was imparted to them in the use of small arms for eventual absorption in the PDPA.

The Border Forces/Brigades (Quwa-e-Sarhadi)

In the mid-1980s these forces were under the control of the Ministry of Nationalities and tribes (also earlier called Ministry of Frontier and Tribes) but later on reverted to the Ministry of Defence. In 1988, the total strength of the Force was claimed at 11,000 as formed into 10 Border Brigades.
The government placed reliance on this force and it had, in fact, proved somewhat effective as well.

Border Militia Force (Neero-ha-e-Militia-e-Sarhadi)

The Border Militia Force was raised through a Decree of the Presidium of the DRA-RC dated 8.4.1361 (corresponding to 29 June 1982) by the Ministry of Defence in co-operation with the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribes, and availing of the active support of elders and ‘white-beard ones’ of the various nationalities and tribes. In 1986 the total strength of the Force was claimed as 35,000. Units were established in Ningrahar, Kunars, Herat, Paktya, Nimroz and Kandahar; though the effective ones were of:

• Shinwar area led by Nabi Jan Shinwari;
• Mohmand area led by Firdaus Khan Mohmand;
• Paktya area led by Abdur Rehman Ahmadzai of Said Karam;
• Kandahar area led by Haji Asmatullah Muslim Achakzai.

The Force did not have a regular military training. The basic responsibility of the force was the protection of the main roads. The reliability of the Force was directly connected with the reliability of the respective tribe and its elders. However, the fat salaries, a Kalashnikov and staying on in ones own area had an appeal for the tribesmen, rendered jobless from smuggling business and working on their lands due to the mujahideen activities.
The Civil Defence Groups (Difa-e-Mulki)

The Civil Defence Scheme (CD) was introduced in the country through a Decree of the Presidium of the DRA-RC in August 1982 to save soldiers from routine duties, like guard duties at various places and installations etc. The force was not capable of rendering direct assistance to the Armed Forces in battles against the mujahideen.
According to Kabul New Times of March 30, 1988, over 11,500 workers and employees had been organized in 47 civil detachments of the various economic institutions in 11 (eleven) provinces of the country.

Revolution Defence Groups or Soldiers of Revolution or Revolutionary Guards (Giroh-ha-e-Mudafe’een-e-Enqilab or Pasdaran-e-Enqilab or Sepahyan-e-Enqilab)

In September 1980, Babrak Karmal had announced the formation of Sepahyan-e-Enqilab, an armed outfit drawn from party volunteer cadres. But it was properly organized in December 1982 from within the ranks of the PDPA with the following objectives:

• Implementation of the party and government programmes;
• Active participation in socio-economic transformation;
• Expansion and strengthening of the achievements of the Saur Revolution;
• Elimination of armed counter-revolutionary elements;
• Co-operation in expansion and strengthening of peoples’ power in localities.

The organization came under the Ministry of Interior and received properly military training. Enrolment was voluntary. The officer cadre was from Police. The total strength of the organization during 1988 was mentioned as 1700.

The Self Defence Groups/Resistance Groups (Giroh-ha-e-Difa-e-Khudi)

These groups, members of which were made proficient in handling of light weapons, were organized in various productive and industrial units and agricultural farms, both in private and public sectors. Their main task was the protection of their respective units. It was claimed in December 1987 that there were 2751 groups with a total strength of 27,200 and formed in 482 units/organizations.
These groups had indirectly proved useful in the sense that the police elements employed in these units had been relieved to fight the mujahideen.
The Hazara community of Kabul City had also organized self-defence groups in their areas of Qala-e-Shada, Dogh Abad, Karta-e-Sakhi, Wazirabad, Chandawal and Karta-e-Mamoorin with a total strength of about 10,000 persons. The Hazara had the blessings of Prime Minister Sultan Ali Kishtmand, a Hazara.

National Volunteer Brigades (Ghund-ha-e-Qaumi Dao-talab)

This was yet another form of defensive mechanism in which even the armed opposition groups, joining the state were mobilized. The tasks of this force were:

• To take active part in combat activities together with the army units in ‘crushing’ the counter-revolutionary elements (mujahideen);
• To ensure state security;
• To stop infiltration of counter-revolutionary ‘bands’ into their regions;
• To ensure security of military and goods transport, power stations, power transmission lines, head of dams, irrigation establishments, tunnels, transport highways, economic institutions, state departments, schools, hospitals, historic and cultural monuments, mosques, sacred places and various projects;
• Contribution in recruitment;
• Conducting explanatory and publicity work in localities about the tasks of revolution, socio-economic and cultural policy of the party and state.

The following strength was claimed of this force on June 18, 1986:
a.     Regiments (Bdes)                         13;
b.     Battalions                                      17;
c.     Companies                                    6;
d.     Total strength                               18,000

According to Kabul New Times of March 6, 1988, 15,000 former armed men had joined defence in regimental units and that over 40 Tribal Units had been formed.
According to Kabul News of March 28, 1988, General Shah Nawaz, the Chief of General Staff, during an interview had claimed that 42,000 persons were organized in the regional forces; including those from the former opposition groups.
The surrendered groups were permitted to keep the same arms as brought along by them from the mujahideen side. Ammunition was provided by the government. These personnel were, however, not fully trusted by the Afghan Government as, according to it, some might have been planted ones.

The Guard Brigades (Ghund-e-Mohafiz)

These were established to work in collaboration with police, army and WAD (Afghan Intelligence) for protection of roads and convoys and vital installations, like Herat Cement Project, Band-e-Sardeh, Ningrahar Canal, Shibarghan Gas Pipeline, Kunduz Irrigation Project, Balkh Silos, Balkh Irrigation Project, Ainak Copper Mines and some other economic enterprises. They were not involved in direct fighting.

Watan-parast (The Patriots)

These were the individuals who were drawn from the Afridi of Khyber Agency, Pakistan, and paid Afghanis 5,000 per person. They were required to deny passage of the mujahideen into Afghanistan through their territory. The effort was not successful.

The National Guard (Guard-e-Milli)

Formerly known as the Special Guard; the designation of this force was changed in February 1990 to Guard-e-Milli because of its expanded strength, role and deployment in various other parts of the country for operational purposes. The guard was initially raised as a personal force of President Najeebullah for his own safety and protection.

Establishment of Army Brigades on Ethnic Base

In their overall programme of Nationalities and creation of autonomous regions the Government decided to establish some army brigades on ethnic basis to be commanded by an officer of the same ethnic group and located in the area of the same nationality. Some of such formations were the following:

• The Jauzjan Division No 53 of Uzbeks and Turkoman of General Abdul Rashid Dostam;
• The Samangan Division No 54 of Syed Jaffer Nadri (Ismaili);
• The Pashai Bade at Laghman;
• The Hazara Tribal Regts established in Kabul City, Doshi, Peshto districts and Sar-e-Pul province;
• The Hazara Tribal Bns set up in Parwan and Wardak provinces

The aim of forming such like ethnic army formations was to give due share to the minority nationalities of the country so as to win them over to the Government side as they had not been reasonably accommodated in the Afghan Armed Forces during the past regimes.

 Annexure B

SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ZONES
1981

S. No.	Zones	Provinces	In Charge
1	-	Kabul City	Zahoor Razmjoo
2	Central Zone	Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Bamyan, Wardak and Logar	Mir Sahib Karwal
3	East Zone	Ningrahar, Laghman and Kunarha	Ghulam Sarwar Yurish
4	South-East Zone	Paktya, Paktika, Ghazni and Khost Loe Uluswali	Shazar Lewal
5	South-West Zone	Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand and Uruzgan	Abdul Haq Ulumi
6	West Zone	Farah and Nimroz	Khudai Noor Bawar
7	North Zone	Balkh, Samangan, Jauzjan and Fariab	Syed Ikram Paigeer
8	North-West Zone	Herat, Badghis and Ghor	Mohammad Hassan Baraq Shafie
9	North-East Zone	Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan and Baghlan	Syed Tahir Shah Pakargar

Source:  S. Fida Yunas; Afghanistan: Organization of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan/Watan Party… 1982-1998; Volume One; Peshawar P: 166
Notes:     (1) Including Kabul City, treated independently, there were in fact nine (9) Security and Administrative areas/zones. Dr. Kakar has mentioned eight, perhaps, Kabul was not taken into account (P; 192).
(2) The total provinces then were 29 and not 28 as stated by Dr. Kakar (P: 192).

Annexure B-1 Separate File

Annexure C

KABUL SAYS TO CONSIDER AFGHAN BERLIN WALL ALONG PAK BORDER

Stockholm, Sweden (AP)
The Soviet-backed Marxist regime in Afghanistan is optimistic that a political solution will be obtained with Pakistan on the pullback of Soviet troops, but considers erecting an Afghan ‘Berlin Wall’ along the Pakistani border, according to newspaper reports here.
Swedish national daily Svenska Dagbladet’s Kabul Correspondent Anna Maria Lantz wrote yesterday that the Afghan Babrak Karmal regime was prepared to accept the Pakistani demand that the Soviet troops withdraw from Afghan territory according to a worked-out time schedule.

Lantz Quoted Reliable Sources in Kabul

Last week a member of the Kabul regime in an interview with the independent Conservative newspaper’s correspondent was quoted as saying that Afghanistan considers erecting a “Berlin Wall” along the 2,100 km (1,300 miles) Pakistani border and that several delegations were sent to East Germany to study their special security systems.”
Anahita Ratibzad, Politburo member and one of President Babrak Karmal’s closest aides, was quoted as saying that a detailed plan had been worked out to systematically seal off the Pakistani border with barbed wire, mines and armed check points, thereby shutting out “counter-revolutionary rebels” based in Pakistan.
The information from Ratibzad, sole woman in the Kabul regime and the first female physician in Afghanistan, was confirmed by Communist Party Secretary Mahmood Baryalay, Babrak Karmal’s brother, Svenska Dagbladet wrote.
Ratibzad said the rebels had 80 training camps in the inaccessible mountainous Afghan-Pakistani border area.
She was quoted as saying that most of the Soviet troops would be pulled out within three to five years’ time.
According to Western estimates there are between 80,000 and 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.

Annexure D

LIST OF THE DISTRICTS, SUB-DISTRICTS AND CITIES WHERE PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY CONTROLLING POSTS WERE TO BE ESTABLISHED

1.   Kunars Province:

• Permanent controlling post at Barikot to control the motorable road from Nooristani, Gujar and Meshwani tribes;
• Temporary border controlling post at village Deraki, sub-district Dangam, to control the function of footpaths/tracks of Dangam Pass and traffic of Mamund, Salarzai, Meshwani and Gujar tribes;
• Temporary border controlling post in the regions of Marawara sub-district to control the footpath/track of Ghashi Kandao and traffic of Mamund, Safi and Nooristani tribes;
• Temporary border controlling post in the regions of Khas Kunar district to control the traffic of Safi, Mohmand and Shinwari tribes.

2.   Ningrahar Province:

• Permanent border controlling post at Kuro Thana in the regions of Goshta district to control the motorable road for Safi, Shinwari, Mohmand tribes and nomads.
• Permanent border controlling posts and traffic points at Daka and Torkham to control the Jalalabad-Torkham Transit highway for Shinwari, Afridi, Mohmand and Khugyani tribes and all citizens of the DRA;
• Temporary border controlling post at Guroko for Shinwari, Afridi and Khugyani tribes and nomads.

• Paktya Province:
• Permanent border controlling post at Paiwar in the regions of Ali Khel, Jaji district for Jaji tribes, nomads and all citizens of DRA;
• Permanent border controlling post at Patan for Mangal, Jaji, Chamkani, Muqbil and Kharoti tribes.

Khost Division (Paktya Province):

• Permanent border controlling post at Gurgurai Thana to control the motorable road of Gurgurai Thana, related to the Jaji Maidan district and traffic of tribes of Jaji Maidan, Bak and Nomads.
• Permanent border controlling post at Haroon Khel for traffic of Lakan tribes and nomads and use of Tore Obe, Qadam Thana and Baki routes.
• Permanent border controlling posts at Shai Kandao and Ghulam Khan for traffic of Tani, Gurbaz, Khostis, Ismail Khel, Mandozai and Zadran tribes and use of motorable roads of Shai Kandao and Ghulam Khan.

• Paktya Province:
• Permanent border controlling post at Sarobi sub-district to Control the Angoor Ada route and traffic of Kharoti, Suleman Khel, Pirkoti and Wazir tribes and nomads;
• Permanent border controlling post at Gomal for Kharoti, Suleman Khel tribes and nomads;
• Temporary border controlling post at Wuze Khwa for Suleman Khel tribes and nomads on motorable roads and in the regions of Tarwai and Qamar-ud-Din Karez.

Zabul Province:

• Temporary controlling posts at Pirane, Qala Akhtergul and Qala Zarif for Tokho, Barakzai and Kakar nationalities in Pirani area.
• Temporary controlling posts of Border Forces at Barakzai Karez, Peshagane Vekh, Khwara and Sher Gas for Barakzai nationalities and all citizens in the area of Barakzai.

• Kandahar Province
• Permanent border controlling post at Bambol Thana for traffic of nomads, Achakzais and Noorzais.
• Permanent border controlling post in the region of Shorabak district for traffic of nomads and Barech tribes.

Nimroz Province

• Temporary border controlling post at Khwabgah for Baluch nationalities and all other nationalities of Khwabgah region;
• Temporary border controlling post at Munshi for Baluch nationalities and all citizens of Munshi region;
• Temporary border controlling post at Rais \Juma Khan for Baluch nationalities and all citizens of Rais Juma Khan Region.

• Farah Province
• Temporary border controlling post at Faizabad (Lash Javin) for all inhabitants of frontier of Faizabad region.
• Temporary borer controlling posts at Kotala Gurgur and Qalai Kah for inhabitants of frontier of Qalai Kah region.

Herat Province

• Permanent controlling post of Herat Border Forces at Islam Qala for inhabitants of frontier and all citizens on transit highway in Islam Qala region.

Annexure E

BIO-DATA

1	Full Name	Sayyed Meer Hamza (second name Bacha)
2	Father’s Name	Sayyed Raza Bacha
3	Grand-father’s name	Sayyed Janan
4	Date of birth	1959
5	Place of birth	Dist of Tehsil Shinwar; Ghani Khel village Kateli
6	Qualifications	M.A. Economics from Kabul University
7	Marital status	Married
8	Missing date	November 4, 1988
9	Missing place	Torkham
10	Occupation	Officer in Customs
11	Relatives	Sayyed Hamidullah (Brother)

Annexure F

(Newspaper’s title [The Frontier Post, Peshawar] and date not recorded)

HELPLINE
Afghan families seek CE’s help

We the family members of former Afghan Army officers and soldiers would like to bring into the kind notice of the Chief Executive of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, that some of our relations who defected to Pakistan via Pak-Afghan Torkham border in 1988-89 have been missing ever since their crossing over to Pakistan.
Our nears and dears had chosen to join Mujahideen ranks and files as siding with invading Red Army was tantamount in their religious faith. They crossed over to Pakistan along with arms, ammunition and a tank on November 5, 1988. Some other who followed them and were among old relatives had also deserted the Afghan Army in 1989 and handed over to Afghan Mujahideen occupying the border areas along Durand Line near Pakistani Torkham territory.
Later they were taken into custody by the Pakistan authorities. Since their arrival in Pakistan, they have been missing. We have no information as despite our hectic efforts we miserably failed to get even a single clue about their whereabouts.
Among the missing Afghan army personnel some of them are the fathers, some are brothers and some of them are the relatives of us. We the missing families form various relations ties. We would like to make an appeal to the Chief Executive of Pakistan in the name of Allah Almighty and humanity to please do some thing for locating our missing family members.
The record of Afghan personnel presently under detention in various jails can be checked for this purpose so that our relation should not suffer for a sin that they did not commit.
Probono publico
c/o The Frontier Post, Peshawar.