CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS AND RAILWAYS IN THE KHYBER PASS DURING THE BRITISH PERIOD:

A POSITIVE SIDE-EFFECT OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE

Javed Iqbal*

The British first came into contact with the Khyber Pass tribes during the first Anglo-Afghan War. Later on, when Peshawar became a British possession in 1849 as a part of the annexed Sikh State of Lahore, they tried to deal amicably with the tribes in and around the Khyber Pass and the tribes also responded positively to a great extent.
Unlike the rest of the invaders of India and Central Asia, who used the Khyber Pass as a convenient passage and a short cut, at times paying meager tolls to appease the local tribes, the British had a long-term strategy and agenda to work among the tribesmen. Realizing the geo-strategic importance of the Pass, they annexed it directly to their rule and to facilitate their administration in the Pass, they made roads, railways and lines of communication. They also built cantonments, forts, towers and pickets for the permanent stationing of their multiple forces to guard the Pass.
The British greatly emphasized on the improvement of the communication lines and roads through the Khyber Pass because in any effective system of administration, the means of communication and transportation plays a pivotal role. The British knew its importance and decided to improve them in order to have a greater hold on the tribal territories under their administration.

Construction activities before the actual British Rule

The First occasion when the British undertook construction work in the Khyber Pass was during the First Anglo-Afghan War. After experiencing the difficulties on return march from Kabul during the first Anglo-Afghan War, Colonel Frederick Mackeson, the British Political Agent at Peshawar during the Sikh period, realized that the way through the pass was extremely difficult and unsuitable for guns and wheeled traffic. He then started the construction of an excellent road from Ali Masjid to Fort Jamrud through the hills (roughly the same as in use today). It was the second time in history that the road through the pass was constructed and improved. Before that, it was the Great Mughal Akbar who had constructed the Khyber road for the first time in history. In the British period, it was again reconstructed and widened in 1879-80 during the second Anglo Afghan War.1
The construction activities intensified during the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon. A metalled road was constructed through the Kohat Pass to improve communications between Peshawar and Kohat.2 This was followed by tremendous improvement of roads and construction of railway in the Khyber Pass.

The Construction of the Mullagori Road

Curzon undertook the project of constructing an alternative military road in the Khyber, linking Landi Kotal with Peshawar – a distance of 42 miles, bypassing the Afridi territory in the Khyber Pass – passing through the territories of the Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris who were friendlier to the Government than the Afridis. Such a road had been recommended earlier by Warburton in 1887 and Roos Keppel in 1900-1901. The idea appealed to Curzon: The Mullagori road would provide an alternative to the Khyber Pass route and would enable the Government to reinforce its position at Landi Kotal and, if necessary, to move troops against the Afridis. Thus, as Curzon explained to Hamilton Grant: “Instead of all our eggs in one basket, as they now are with the present Khyber route, and the Afridis being practically able to dictate terms to us in the event of a Frontier campaign, we shall have them completely in our hands, by our ability to leave the Khyber Pass severely alone and shall have permanent guarantee for their good behavior.”3 Similar views were expressed by Robert Warburton, the Political Officer Khyber Agency, when he was asked about the advantages of this road by Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy of India, during his visit to the Khyber Pass in November 1887, “if by any misfortune or disaster the Afridis attempted to close the Khyber Pass, the route from Landi Kotal through the Shilman and Mullagori country to Peshawar would always remain open and could never be closed, as these two tribes were far too weak to make any attempt of the sort. And even if the Khyber Pass did remain open, it would always in case of war westwards give us two routes from Peshawar to the Landi Kotal plateau, and vice-versa.”4
The road was completed in the beginning of 1905 at the cost of 4,04,000 rupees and without any tribal opposition to the project. For their good behavior during the construction, the Mullagoris, Shinwaris and the Shilmanis were rewarded with an increase in their allowances.5

The Improvement and Reconstruction of the North Khyber Road

The successful completion of the Mullagori Road encouraged Curzon to improve the existing means of communication between Peshawar and Landi Khana through the Khyber Pass. At that time, the main road through the pass, known as the North Khyber Road, was unmetalled. In addition to that road, there was a track running close and parallel to the North Khyber Road, known as the South Khyber Road, used only by the kafilas. The government wanted to widen and metal the North Khyber Road, the main road through the Pass, and also improve the South Khyber Road. The two operations together were referred to as ‘doubling’ or ‘duplicating’ the Khyber Pass Road. Major Dundee, W. J. D., with his experience of the construction of the Mullagori Road, was put in charge of the new project and the same method of construction was followed. In order to avoid any kind of trouble from Afridi clans influenced and incited by anti British mullahs, contracts were given to friendly Shinwaris and Kuki Khel and Malik Din Khel Afridis for construction work within their respective limits in the Khyber Pass. By mid 1907, the North Khyber Road had been metalled to a width of 12 feet and South Khyber Road though remained unmetalled had been considerably improved. Six years later, in 1913, the road through the Khyber Pass was further improved.6
To facilitate trade between British India and Afghanistan, mostly carried out by the tribesmen, transport was mechanized and instead of pack animals, lumbering trucks were plied between the two countries. It ensured the quick movement of trade articles and a fair means of income from it to the tribesmen.7
Amir Habibullah Khan, the Afghan ruler, protested against the construction of the North Khyber Road when it approached Landi Khana, contending that as the Indo-Afghan boundary near Landi Khana was still not demarcated, the British should desist from their construction activities on the road through the Khyber Pass. The British Indian authorities simply ignored his protests.8

The Khyber Railway

Although the Mullagori Road and the North Khyber Road through the Khyber Pass were both important source of communication and transportation but the most durable and beneficial monument left behind by the British is the Khyber Railway, which is a masterpiece of engineering.
The very first proposal to build a railway to Afghanistan came from Sir Guilford Molesworth after the First Anglo-Afghan War, who examined the possibility of running a meter gauged line through the Khyber but the idea could not be transformed into reality because at that time even the bridge at Attock on Indus River was yet to be erected.9
But the idea of a railway line through the Khyber finally materialized through the efforts of Colonel Gorden Hearn, who planned the project, and Mr. Victor Bailey, a British engineer, who implemented it under his supervision.10 However, the construction of this railway line has a long history behind it.
For the construction of a railway line between Peshawar and the Afghan border, two alternative routes were under consideration; the Khyber Pass route and the Kabul River Valley route. A number of objections were raised to the construction of the railway line through the Khyber Pass route. It was said that the high and rocky terrain of the Khyber Pass involved great engineering difficulties and consequently it would be more expensive. Moreover, it could only be a narrow gauge line, not serving the purpose of moving large bodies of troops in times of emergency. It would not only be expensive to build and difficult to maintain, but it would also arouse the Afridi opposition and the government would be constantly involved in ensuring the safety of the line. Curzon was, therefore, averse to “placing too valuable a hostage” in the hands of the Afridis. The feasibility report of the second alternate route through the Kabul River Valley was more encouraging and Captain J. R. Macdonald, who surveyed the route in 1890-91, reported that a broad-gauged line could be constructed from Peshawar to Dakka along the southern bank of River Kabul. The route presented no great engineering problems and the neighboring tribes were also more friendly. Under the circumstances, the Kabul River Valley route commended itself to Curzon and his Colleagues.11
In the meanwhile, a twelve mile broad-gauge railway line from Peshawar to Jamrud, which Curzon thought was of ‘positive military value’ both for suppression of tribal uprisings and an advance into Afghanistan, was sanctioned by Hamilton Grant in August 1899. The estimated cost of construction for this section only was to be five to six lakhs. The construction of the track was completed and it was opened for traffic in January 1901.12 The project of constructing a railway line beyond Jamrud, however, remained in suspension until 1919 due to non-agreement on the route.13
In 1919, the Third Anglo-Afghan War once again impressed the Government of India with the urgency of constructing a railway in the Khyber. Consequently, the Government deputed Colonel (later Sir) Gordon R. Hearn to examine and report on the best route for the construction of a railway to the frontier. He carried out a ‘masterly survey’ showing ‘that a broad-gauge line could be laid up and over and down the other side of the Khyber Pass.14 The project was sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India on July 7, 1920 and the decision was communicated to the Afghan authorities on July 14. The Governor General made a public announcement of the intention to begin work in his opening speech in the Legislative Council on August 20 as the project was no longer a secret and the Government wanted the Afridis to know about it. The Secretary to the Government of India in Foreign and Political Department instructed to begin the work in the first week of October 1920, expressing the hope that although there would be temporary unrest among the Afridis but this opposition will die down when they will realize that the construction of the railway will be of great advantage to them in providing them with much needed employment opportunities.15
Although the Afridis had already agreed to the construction of a railway through the Khyber Pass in 1898 in their agreement with the Government after the Tirah expedition, but F. M. Humphrys, the Political Agent Khyber was of the view that the Agreement of 1898 had been outdated by later events and that a fresh agreement should be concluded with the Afridis in particular reference to the construction of the railway. He suggested retaining and consolidating the friendship of the Afridis by taking them into confidence and offering compensations in return for their goodwill and assistance.16
Humphrys had already sent a secret report to the Chief Commissioner on August 12, 1920 in which he had stated that the Afridis did not consider the railway through the Khyber as a military necessity as peace had been made with Afghanistan but a scheme ‘designed to curtail his freedom, impoverish his country and undermine his political importance, and finally to set the seal on the permanent occupation of his cherished highway’. He was of the view that the Afridis will feel that they had been tricked and will take every opportunity of showing his resentment. He suggested that work of a committal nature should not be undertaken on the Khyber Railway until the Amir of Afghanistan had signified his official acquiescence and an announcement had been made to a representative Afridi jirga. This announcement, he suggested, should not be made and work should not be definitely started unless the Government of India is prepared to carry it through to completion, by force if necessary.17
In another secret letter to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Humphrys suggested the following incentives to be granted to the Afridis to secure their approval for the railway project and their goodwill:

1. Increasing tribal allowance by 84,040 rupees per annum.
2. The grant of an additional 12,000 rupees per annum on account of extra lungis to elders who perform conspicuous service in furthering the construction of the Railway.
3. Giving preference to Afridis in matter of contracts.18

He warned that the building of a Railway line through the Khyber without the goodwill of the Afridis would be a long and costly business. He also favored the employment of local labor because imported coolies could be harassed and stampeded by resolute night attacks and they would consequently demand high wages. In his view, ‘the expenditure of something less than a lakh of rupees a year to secure the cooperation of the tribe in a work which they believe to be directly opposed to their interests would be an excellent investment.’ He also proposed a 16,000 rupees increase in the Shinwari allowance as five miles section of the railway track between Landi Kotal and Landi Khana was to be laid through the Shinwari country.19
The Government of India, however, did not approve of Humphrys suggestions for increase in the allowances because the Afridis will consider it a sign of weakness and it might increase Afridi turbulence and opposition.20 Humphrys still persisted in his views and defended his proposal for the increase of allowances. He did not agree with the Government of India in assuming that the Afridis will take it as a sign of weakness. He thought that the Afridis will consider it a just recognition of their proprietary rights in the Khyber Pass and of the increased responsibility which could be laid upon them. He warned the Chief Commissioner that there were only two alternatives regarding the construction of the railway line; obtaining the goodwill of the Afridis through incentives, or the use of force. He himself opposed the use of force and favored the incentives.21
The intention of the Government to construct a railway through the Khyber was announced to a fully representative jirga of 5000 Afridis by the Political Agent Khyber on December 24, 1920. The Afridi elders unanimously opposed it for the same reasons as had already been communicated by Political Agent Khyber to the higher authorities; the fear that their liberties will be curtailed, their country rendered more vulnerable, and their political importance diminished. Their opposition to the project was further strengthened by the intrigues of the Afghan agents who distributed about 8,000 rupees among the Afridis for propaganda against the railway project. Humphrys, however, informed the Chief Commissioner that he had been trying to split the tribes and obtain adherents to the idea of the railway project. The Shinwaris were easily befriended and later on Humphrys also succeeded in creating jealousies between the four clans of the Afridis, which lived at a distance from the Khyber Pass, and the three other sections, which owned villages in the Pass itself. The former, viz. Kamber Khel, Sipah, Kamarai, and Aka Khel were given the impression that the other three sections will be won over by the promises of a monopoly of contracts and they, therefore, themselves decided to apply for the contracts. Humphrys later own tried to persuade the Malik Din Khel and eventually the Zakkha Khel to follow suit and secure their share in the contracts.22 In this way, Humphrys succeeded in winning over the tribes to the idea of a railway through the Khyber. However, opposition to the construction of the railway line did not subside altogether. There were still people who tried to prevent the construction work by use of force. Bullets were exchanged with the British forces guarding the construction workers. The Afridis who were opposed to the construction of the railway considered their kinsmen working on the project as “traitors”, the work itself as “unholy” and the wages they earned as “infidels’ unclean money”.23
As stated earlier, the project had been sanctioned in September 1920 and the work had commenced in November the same year. The laying down of a railway line through the Khyber Pass was a difficult task as the Pass was full of narrow gorges, heights and depressions. The fear of tribal resistance was also lurking on the mind of the constructors and the British authorities. The 27 mile long section of the railway line from Jamrud to Landi Kotal offered a lot of difficulties due to the greater heights that had to be negotiated. Jamrud is situated at about 1,500 feet above the sea level, whereas Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid are about 3,500 feet high. Moreover, due to the importance of the Khyber Pass and the route, narrow gauge was not desirable here so a broad gauge line of 5’ 6” was to be laid, making the task more difficult. Besides numerous bridges, 34 tunnels had to be dug in this tract of 27 miles. The total length of all the tunnels is 3 miles and among them the Kafir Tangi tunnel is the longest. At one point, the railway line passes through so narrow a gorge that it could not take even a gradual turn. The railway line there is shaped like the English letter “W” with turns going forth and back and forth again. That is why two engines are always employed to haul the train. Sometimes one engine becomes inactive and sometimes the other and at times both have to haul the train. Two engines are needed also in view of the sharp ascent at certain points and there is the danger of the train slipping back down and at such places the rear engine serves only as a prop and support from behind.24
The project was completed and the railway track from Jamrud to Landi Kotal was inaugurated on November 21, 1925. The track was further extended to Landi Khana (from Landi Kotal), two miles short of Afghan border, on April 3, 192625 but it remains closed since 1932 on the insistence of the Afghan Government.26 A total number of 150 guests were invited to attend the opening ceremony in which the Viceroy was to inaugurate the Khyber Railway.27 The ceremony was planned to take place on October 31, 1925 but the Viceroys visit was postponed by two days and it was announced that he would open the Khyber Railway on November 2.28 Later on, it was announced that the Viceroy’s visit to NWFP has been cancelled owing to the severe illness of the Countess of Reading but the date of the opening ceremony for the Khyber Railway remained unchanged. The ceremony was performed by Sir Charles Alexander Innas, the Honorable Member for Railways (Viceroy Executive Council) in the absence of His Excellency the Viceroy.29
The cost of its construction is not given uniformly in the different sources. According to one source, the cost per mile was 700 to 800 thousand rupees. Another source has put the total cost at two million Pound Sterling,30 which seems too little keeping in view the nature of the railway track and difficulties in its construction. Yet another source put the cost of the construction at eight million rupees per mile, which brings the total cost to 216 million. This, however, matches none of the other two sources and seems too high.31
Whatever the cost of this marvelous project, the British gained much political experience during the construction of the Khyber Railway and they put it to good use later on. For example, they realized that the construction of this railway was not possible without the cooperation of the Afridis and the Shinwaris and, therefore, all contracts for construction were assigned to the Khyberi tribes. It not only helped the British in securing the tribal support for the project but it also provided the tribesmen with jobs, leading to their economic well being and prosperity due to which they remained peaceful for a long time afterwards. The lesson that the British learnt was that the solution to tribal problems lies not in the use of force but in economic incentives and prosperity32 and the British have always been good learners.
The British were good learners but we, as heir to a part of the British Empire, did not learn from them the art of dealing with the unruly tribes and the importance of constructing roads and railroads in the mountainous tribal areas both for the welfare and benefit of the tribes and for the military and strategic needs. We haven’t constructed any new roads or railroads in the tribal belt since 1947 except the widening and reconstruction of some of the existing roads that we inherited from our British colonial masters. If they could do it in the 19th and early 20th century, why can’t we do it in the 21Century? Development and progress in the tribal belt is conditional upon the development of the means of transportation and communication. Economic and social development is inconceivable without an adequate infrastructure in which roads and railroads are of basic importance. Today, the problems that we are facing in some of the tribal areas are primarily due to the absence of roads and railroads for the swift and timely deployment of our troops. We should give a serious thought to the fact that in Khyber Agency, the only problem areas are those where there are no roads and railroads; Tirah Valley that remained inaccessible even after 60 years of independence. The Khyber Pass and its adjoining areas are easy to administer and control in times of any problem because of the roads and railroads for which we should be thankful to our colonial masters.

Bibliography

Archival Material in Chronological Order

1.     Secret Report sent to Chief Commissioner NWFP by F. H. Humphrrys, Political Agent Khyber, dated August 12, 1920, File No. 19 D/ VI, S. No. 215, Bundle No. 32, Office of the Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.
2.     Secretary to the Government of India in Foreign and Political Department to Hamilton Grant, Chief Commissioner, NWFP, No. 618 F, dated September 7, 1920, Political Agent Khyber Office Endsment No. 3215-P. S. N./ 322, September 11, 1920, F. No. 19 D/ VI, S. No. 215, B. No. 32, Office of Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar.
3.     A Secret letter from F. H. Humphrys, Political Agent Khyber, to Hamilton Grant, Chief Commissioner, NWFP, dated September 19, 1920, F. No. 19 D/ VI, S. No. 215, B. No. 32, Office of Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.
4.     Secret Note from F. H. Humphrys, Political Agent Khyber to Mr. P. J. G. Pipon, the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner NWFP, No. 3242, dated November 2, 1920, File No. 19 D/ VI, S. No. 215, Bundle No. 32, Office of the Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.
5.     The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, to the Chief Commissioner, NWFP, No. 55 F/ D, dated November 11, 1920, F. No. 19 D/ VI, S. No. 215, B. No. 32, Office of Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.
6.     Political Agent Khyber to Chief Commissioner, NWFP, No. 3455, dated November 23, 1920, F. No. 19 D/ VI, S. No. 215, B. No. 32, Office of Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.
7.     Secret letter from F. H. Humphrys, Political Agent Khyber, to H. A. F. Metcalfe, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner NWFP, dated January 10, 1921, File No. 19 D/ VI, S. No. 215, Bundle No. 32, Office of the Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.
8.     Minutes of the meeting held in the Foreign Office on July 14, 1925 to discuss arrangements for the opening of the Khyber Railway, File No. 24 D/ VI, S. No. 242, Bundle No. 36, Office of the Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.
9.     Chief Commissioner, NWFP, to Political Agent Khyber, No. 2441, dated September 1, 1925, and No. Nil, dated September 19, 1925, F. No. 24 D/ VI, S. No. 242, B. No. 36, Office of Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.
10.   Telegram received by Political Agent Khyber, on October 10, 1925, F. No. 24 D/ VI, S. No. 242, B. No. 36, Office of Political Agent Khyber, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, NWFP, Peshawar.

Books
11.   Baha, Lal. NWFP Administration under British Rule 1901-1919. Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978.
12.   Hart, David M. Guardians of the Khaibar Pass: The Sociological Organization and History of the Afridis of Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985.
13.   Khan, Teepu Mahabat. The Land of Khyber. Ed. Prof. Dr. Qabil Khan. Peshawar: Uzbek Publishers, 2001.
14.   Quddus, Syed Abdul. The Pathans. Lahore: Ferozsons Pvt. Ltd., 1987.
15.   Sabir, Mohammad Shafi. Story of Khyber. Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1966.
16.   Shah, Sirdar Iqbal Ali. Afghanistan of the Afgthans. Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1998.
17.   Warburton, Colonel Sir Robert. Eighteen Years in the Khyber: 1879-1898. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975.
18.   Wylly, H. C. The Borderland: The Country of the Pathans. Karachi: Indus Publications, 1998.
19.   Yousufi, Late Allah Bakhsh. The Frontier Tragedy. Karachi: Mohammad Ali Education Society, 1986.

Electronic Sources
20.   Zeb Travels. “Khyber Steam Safari: Revival of the Khyber Railways”, (Online), June 6, 2003, http://www.zebtravels.com/zeb/html/khyber/html