

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRATEGIC SHIFT IN PAKISTAN'S POST 9/11 AFGHAN POLICY

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Abstract

This paper explores the factors responsible for compelling Pakistan to support the 'Operation Enduring Freedom' led by the USA and its Allies in Afghanistan in 2001. The goals behind this operation were to dismantle the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization in Afghanistan. When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, were the only states who recognized their government in Afghanistan. Pakistan considers Taliban as a strategic asset for obtaining its objectives in Afghanistan. Regional and extra-regional powers such as, the India, US, Russia, Iran supported their client groups in support of their own national interest, in Afghanistan. However, keeping in view the US-India strategic partnership in the region, Pakistan changed its foreign policy, and supported the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This change of policy brought up economic and political, and security challenges for Pakistan. Terrorist activities, suicide killings, and bomb blasts hit the society. Since then, its security is in doldrums. The paper argues that serious internal and external security factors compelled Pakistan to change its policy towards Afghanistan in 2001.

Keywords: Operation Enduring Freedom, war on terror, foreign policy, security, national interest.

Introduction

Pakistan after 11th September, 2001 changed its policy of supporting Taliban Government in Afghanistan and joined US led Global War against Terror in Afghanistan. US military action in Afghanistan started in October

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2001; this operation pushed the militants and operatives of Al-Qaida from Afghanistan into Pakistan's Tribal Areas. Thus, turning it into a safe sanctuary for foreign militants, in addition provided base for Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban, these militants used the porous Pak-Afghan border to attack US and Western forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, US gave the status of a "major non-NATO ally" for Pakistan's important role in supporting US forces to get hold of Al-Qaida and its supporters. India subsequently took advantage of situation and became a major pawn in Afghanistan through investing and rebuilding projects and started growing its economic and political influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's post 9/11 Afghan policy is designed to protect Pakistan from any external threat and supported Afghanistan politically, financially and hosted millions of Afghan refugees. Despite these efforts, distrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan kept increasing, furthermore, excessive Indian presence in Afghanistan was a major strategic defeat for Pakistan. It gave rise to security threat perception of Pakistan in its neighborhood which it always wanted to counter.

USA launched War against Terrorism in Afghanistan with the approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 and support of her allies on October 07, 2001¹. Following the shift in the regional and international environment, Pakistan adapted to reverse its pro-Taliban policy in favor of US-led Global War on Terror².

Moreover, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 made Pakistan legally bound to support action against Taliban in Afghanistan; consequently, it influenced Pakistan's Afghan policy.

Pakistan's Policy makers were certain that assistance to US in GWOT against Al-Qaida and Taliban will pave way for having friendly Afghan government which would help Pakistan achieve its objective of countering India's hegemonic plans in Afghanistan³. Pakistani policy makers also believed that Pakistan is facing internal threat from extremism, economic, sectarian and external threats particularly from India⁴. Therefore; the decision makers of Pakistan decided to stand with US after 9/11 and justified

¹ HA, Rizvi. *Pakistan's Foreign policy: The Dynamics of Change*. (The Nation. September 26, 2001).

² Sohail, Mehmood. *The Strategic Dialogue between Reluctant Allies: The United States and Pakistan Today*. (Counter Currents. Org. 2002). <http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/the-strategic-dialogue-between-reluctant-allies-the-united-states-pakistan-today>

³ Qandeel, Siddique. *Pakistan's Future Policy towards Afghanistan a look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and the US*. (Danish Institute For International Studies Report. Copenhagen. 2011).

⁴ Aarish Ullah, Khan. *The Terrorist Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (Paper No. 11 September 2005 :16-19).

it as "National Interest"⁵. This paper looks into the factors which compelled Pakistan to ally with US in Global War against Terrorism and the National interests it wanted to achieve at that time.

Theoretical Framework

Pakistan and United States relations are always dubbed as marriage of convenience for the US since Pakistan has always been used by the former to realize its objective in South Asia either it is rolling back the Soviet influence in the region or attacking Afghanistan to eliminate militancy. The incident of 9/11 has not only created havoc in United States but Pakistan is still facing the offshoots of this tragic episode. It was this incident that revived the reluctant romance between the two traditional allies. Yet it was the geographical factor again that brought misfortune for Pakistan.

The incident of 9/11 altered the entire foreign policy of United States as elimination of militant and militancy became the prime concern of Bush doctrine. Bush in one of his statement said, 'now we have admitted the fact that our boundaries have become accessible and the worst attack can come from the state/group having WMDs'. In coherence with the realist paradigm of using power to secure national interest, US vice president announced Bush's doctrine to deal with terrorism iron handedly. He determined that US will lead the world in this war on the ground that US owes this position because of its economic and military might.

Bush's policy shift ought to be founded on observing the circumstantial evidence and the challenges he was confronting and was required to take policy decisions. Expecting the leader acts in a sensible way, one can predict the rationale behind the decision made. Referencing history, we can scrutinize the means taken by past statesmen. Realism expect "that statesmen think and act in the context of state's interest spells out as power, and the testimony of history unearth this assumption"⁶.

Human instinct never shows signs of change. In a generally cited quote of George Santayana, the individuals who can't recall the past are condemned to repeat it. Morgenthau states 'review and foresee,' by which he implies, examine "the footstep of a statesman – past, present, or future – has happened or will happen in world politics. Giving due consideration to this

⁵ Kuniharu Kakihara. *The Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift and its Effects on East Asia*. Institute for International Policy Studies, 292E (Japan. January 2003).

⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th ed. (New York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1985): 5.

statement, Bush while carefully analyzing the policy decisions made by the US leadership in the past, concluded that US by developing cordial relations with the major stakeholders will target the terrorists and will preserve the world peace. The basic idea behind this policy was to oversee the world through its matchless economic and military might⁷.

To implement his policy and to teach a lesson to the terrorists, the US once again relied on the territory of Pakistan to use it as a launching pad to attack Afghanistan. On the other side, Pakistan politically and economically was passing through transition owing to the October 1999 military coup. The US offer to Pakistan “either you are with us or with the enemies,” put Pakistan in catastrophic situation. However, US inflicted sanction on Pakistan and the persistent factor of India, converged Pakistan interest with that of the US and again Pakistan become ally of the US.

In global politics for survival, states pursue to wield power, have self-defense and secure their national interest. Additionally, there is no central authority that could regulate the conduct of states. Therefore, in this anarchical world wielding power and strengthening self-defense apparatus becomes indispensable for the states⁸. Keeping in mind its politico-economic vulnerabilities and significance of its geo-strategic importance for regional and extra-regional powers it is essential for a state like Pakistan to acquire power. To the realists it is the anarchical system that led to the struggle for power and formation of alliances among the states with converging interests⁹. The US-Pak alliance is the perfect description of this fact where the interests of both the states converged and they entered into alliance in 1950s, during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and now in war against terrorism.

Nonetheless, criticizing the global system, many states for self-preservation seek power and adopt contentious policies. Consequently, realist theorists build their arguments in the light of power and international anarchical system. "Realism," or the term interchangeably used by Henry Kissinger in his book *Diplomacy*, "Realpolitik – an approach dependent on computations

⁷ National Security Strategy of the United States, NSS 2002 available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. see also, George Bush remarks at (Houston, June 14, 2002) retrieved from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020614-8.html

⁸ Korab, Karpowicz . W, Julian. *Political Realism in International Relations*. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer Edition 2017), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-intl-relations>.

⁹ John, Mearsheimer. *Structural Realism, in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. 3rd ed, (Oxford University Press.2013).

of power and the national interest,"¹⁰ is tied in with achieving and keeping up national interests through the use of national power.

Realism being a dominant school of thought in international relations accentuates inevitable clout of the existing forces and underscores that acting like rational being states should adjust and readjust it according to the evolving conditions. However, the most important question of these popular discourses is that why states seek power? In this regard the classical realist Morgenthau reveals to us that human instinct has not changed in centuries that have gone since the established thinkers of the antiquated times observed them and wrote about them. On this issue, Thucydides caught the quintessence of human instinct when he expressed, "to see distinctly the events that occurred before and which (human instinct being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much a similar way, be repeated in the future"¹¹. Hans J. Morgenthau emphasizing the Thucydides viewpoint that it is human instincts that orchestrate all the laws of politics.¹²

However, Neo-realists (also known as Structural Realists) part their ways from classical realists on the point that it is the structure of international system rather than human nature that forces the states to struggle for power and self-help. To structural realists' structure of international system and not the policies of the state, is the architect of power politics. To them behavior of the state is dependent on the structure of international system.¹³

However, the structural realists split up on the question that whether states struggle for power just for self-preservation and self-help or they pursue hegemony. As the relative power of some of the states are unbridled, thus leading to uncertainty and sense of insecurity of the weak states. This uncertain and insecure environment provides a reasonable claim to the weaker states to acquire power to coexist with the mighty states.

A further divide is found in structural realism (offensive and defensive). The defensive realists echoed the thoughts of Kenneth Waltz while the offensive realists echoed the thoughts of John Mearsheimer. To defensive realists it is the anarchical international system that forces states to increase their relative power which make it indispensable for the states to get involved in self-help apparatus. However, in their view point perusal of hegemony seems to be

¹⁰ Henry, Kissinger . *Diplomacy* . (New York : Touchstone .1994: 13)7.

¹¹ Thucydides. (translated by Warner). *History of the Peloponnesian War.*(R. London: Penguin. 1972:48).

¹² Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* 6th ed.(New York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1985): 4.

¹³ Joseph K. Clifton. *Disputed Theory and Security Policy: Responding to the Rise of China.* (Claremont McKenna College 2011).

disproportionate for any state. They hold that states should not struggle for power rather they should seek what in Kenneth Waltz view is “appropriate amount of power”¹⁴. Defensive realists contend that attempt from any state to pursue hegemony leads to balancing. Consequently, formation of military alliances against the hegemon becomes inevitable that further creates uncertainty and insecurity¹⁵. Nonetheless, the weak states are primarily concerned with balancing their standing in global politics rather than increasing their relative power¹⁶. However, in the presence of destructive military equipment the stronger states do not enter into direct military conflict rather they pursue their objectives through proxies.

To Loveman, the idea of proxy wars can be best understood by developing understanding principles of realism keeping in view the paradigm shifts in world system and knowing the hazardous of entering into direct military faceoff¹⁷. Analyzing the assumptions of realism Loveman holds a view that realism overlooks the corrosion of the idea of state’s power and parallel increase in interdependence; a changeover from global system to global society; and non-acceptance of war owing to risk involvement¹⁸. States are shun to use power not because they are supposed to act so but because of the modern military tools and weapons that assures shared destruction, states cannot go to maximize their security options by entering into state-to-state conflicts. The Cold War can be exemplified in support of this argument. The US and USSR ineptitude to get benefits of maximizing security arrangements that have chances of mutual destruction led to the growth of proxies in Middle East, Korea and Southeast Asia

After the tragic episode of 9/11, the president of US declaring the vulnerability of its boundaries against any possible terrorist attack signifies that US is engaged in balancing its position in Asia and again bringing Pakistan under its framework of security. On the other side, Pakistan to secure its boundaries joined US led war on terror to enhance her security mechanism. As the defensive realist, explaining the features of alliances where the primary concern of one state is to balance its position against the opponent while the object of the other state is to enhance its security through the formation of alliances¹⁹.

¹⁴ John H. Herz. *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*. World Politics 02 (02). 1950:157-180.

¹⁵ Kenneth, Waltz. *The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory*. In *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989).

¹⁶ Sutch, Peter and Elias, Juanita. *The Basic International Relations*. (Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007).

¹⁷ Chris, Loveman. *Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention*. (Conflict, Security & Development 2 (3).(2002):29-48.

¹⁸ Ibid:36

¹⁹ Weitsman, Patricia. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponent of Peace, Weapons of War*. (California: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Unlike defensive realists, offensive realists give gloomy picture of the international anarchy. They argue that anarchy in international system is Hobbesian in nature and powers of the states are unchecked. However, bipolar system and nuclear deterrence provides some sort of restraining power. Hence, many states for self-preservation try to enhance their relative power within the given mechanism of power configuration. Offensive realists believe that state functions in international system in accordance of their capacity and external surroundings. All these factors are given due consideration while formulating foreign policy and determining states' regional interest like Pakistan²⁰. In this anarchical system for survival and enhancing its security mechanism United States is trying to maintain power balance in Asia to deter threats emanating from the non-state actors.

3.3.1 UU Pressure

The modern global system works on the so called liberal code of cooperation and mutual respect of sovereignty thus discourages the direct conflict among states. Though, with the development of sophisticated and destructive military weapons the chances of military conflicts for most of the states have increased. Keeping in mind the dynamics of international politics many of the scholars argue that the assumption of realism in the absence of law executing agency many states go to maximize their power, find relevance. In order to achieve their objectives, the stronger states now regardless of entering into direct military conflict act through their proxies²¹. Following the same tradition, the US pressurized Pakistan and left her with no option but to act as her proxy to further its objectives.

The threatening and uncompromising attitude of US President George W. Bush government after 9/11 incident and his address to the Congress in which he stated that the only choice a state can opt is that "*Either they are with us, or with the terrorists*"²². This statement has reflected the message and choice US President wanted the world to consider. Later, United Nations Security Council's Resolution in which UN urged the world to stand by US or they will face the consequences. All such incidents ended in the launching of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on 7th October 2001, on Al-Qaida. These strikes by US in Afghanistan resulted in killing thousands of naive people in Afghanistan. People of Afghanistan fell victim to the land

²⁰ Randall, Schweller . *Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Under Balancing*. International Security 29, no. 02. (United States. Fall 2004).

²¹ Loveman, Chris. *Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention*. Conflict, Security & Development 2 (3) (2002)

²² *War on Terror: Perspectives*. Newsweek. (1 Oct. 2001).

and air strikes carried by US and its allies. US claimed that it will provide food to the innocent people of Afghanistan and that the intention of US to re-build and re-construct Afghanistan is clear but the US actions there raised questions over US's intention. Similarly, the only US intension which was visible and seemed clear was to target and hit the Al-Qaida organization in Afghanistan. Hence, US aggression and actions also left Pakistan with minimum choice of declining US offer and Pakistan decided to be ally of US in Global War against Terrorism.

3.3.2 Change Of Pakistan's Afghan Policy: Indian Factor

Soon after September 9/11 attacks on US, India offered unlimited and unrestricted cooperation to U.S. India by offering its military bases to US surprised the world however it never offered it to USSR during cold war though they considered as close allies at that time²³. India also shared Afghanistan's satellite images with US before NATO and US attacked Afghanistan. Moreover, on diplomatic level, Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee's visit to the U.S post 9/11 resulted in pleasing Indian government by using the term "natural ally" for them by the US senior official²⁴.

On 10th November, 2001 in United Nations General Assembly, US President Bush personally thanked Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee for their support and standing shoulder to shoulder in Global war against terrorism²⁵. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee showed their intention of defaming Pakistan by calling them the victim of terrorism and that they are determined to eradicate Al-Qaida from Afghanistan. India offered its land, air space and intelligence²⁶ to US and prepared a ground for defaming Pakistan on international level by declaring it a terrorist state. Hence, Pakistan was left with the only wise and practical way to counter the existing situation by accepting the US demand and provide all possible assistance in the Global war against terrorism. India would have benefitted a lot and could further implement their plans of defaming Pakistan in international community if, Pakistan refused to coordinate with US post 9/11.

²³ Tellis, J. Ashley .Eggers, Jeff. *U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Changing Strategies, Preserving Gains*. (Carnegie Endowment.org. May 22,2017) <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/22/u.s.-policy-in-afghanistan-changing-strategies-preserving-gains-pub-70027>.

²⁴ Ninan, Koshy, N. *The Natural Ally and the Tachtical Ally*. Foreign Policy In Focus – (Institute for Policy Studies. November 1, 2001, November 1). https://ips-dc.org/the_natural_ally_and_the_tactical_ally/

²⁵ Vajpayee, Bush meet over terrorism war. Leaders discuss need to help rebuild Afghanistan. CNN.com.world, November 9, 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/11/09/india.vajpayee/index.html>

²⁶ Najish, A. Afroz. *Before and After 9/11: Indo-U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation*. (Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 9, Number 2. (2017): 128-139.

3.3.3 Fragile Pakistan's Economy

Pakistan's policy makers thought that agreeing to participate in GWOT can end economic problems faced by Pakistan. President General Musharraf announced publically that one of the most important aspects his government is dealing and managing is economy of Pakistan and its revival is his government's top priority. President Musharraf further stated that economy is the priority for the state as the viable economy can guarantee the security of Pakistan. To strengthen the deteriorating economic situation of Pakistan, concentration over reducing fiscal deficit, widening tax base, reviving industries and improving trade balance needs to be done²⁷.

Pakistan initially was successful in removing sanctions it faced and also overcome international isolation. Pakistan again became US close ally. Resultantly, nuclear test related economic sanctions (economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan in 1998 as its nuclear tests) were removed on 22nd September and 27th October in 2001²⁸. Pakistan was given US Dollar 600 million as Economic Support Fund (ESF) after removal of these sanctions as well as US Dollar 624.5 million as an assistance for developing purposes under ESF (Federal Ministry of Finance) (K.A.K, 2004 :14). Pakistan, faced serious security situation from terrorists' attack on its land after change in its 9/11 Afghan policy. Consequently, state of Pakistan decided to conduct operations against these terrorist elements in its tribal region. While conducting these operations Pakistan has spent and went through the economic loss far more than the money it got.

3.3.4 Counter Security Threat Perception

Pakistan longstanding Afghan Policy altered due to immense security threat perceptions both, internal and external. Decision makers of Pakistan termed it as a survival of nation. Similarly, President Musharraf stated in his address to nation on 19th September 2001 that top priority while designing policy for Pakistan is its defense. Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear assets are very precious for the survival of Pakistan. Pakistan's rationale behind joining GWOT was also the threat to the security and safety of nuclear assets of Pakistan from US. Though some of the nuclear expert criticized Pakistan's apprehensions and claimed them as undue. However, eminent nuclear experts refused to agree with this argument as they believed that this will create the perception

²⁷ Mary, A. Weaver. Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002):23

²⁸ Sav Explainer: U.S. Response To South Asia's 1998 Nuclear Tests. (Nuclear Issue. July 27, 2018). SAV editorial staff. <https://southasianvoices.org/sav-explainer-u-s-response-1998-nuclear-tests/>

of vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear possessions. Furthermore, they believed that it will further open the doors for US media to assault Pakistan's nuclear assets and would apprehend that terrorist organizations would take over these nuclear assets. President Musharraf used this statement to gain support from his public in his decision of joining US war on terror²⁹.

Pakistan was considering India and Israel nexus very seriously and considered it very alarming for its nuclear assets. As stated by the eminent officer Brig (Rtd) Feroz Hassan Khan of Strategic Plans Division (SPD), that in 1986 the Pakistani intelligence found out Indian plans to hit Pakistan's nuclear assets at Kahuta in following Israel's attack at Osirak on the Iraqi nuclear plant. Later after two years India planned an operation named Brass-tacks. Through this plan India again contemplated to strike at Pakistan's nuclear assets. Kashmir crisis between Pakistan and India again gained momentum and they came close to the verge of war. US at that time sent a mission lead by Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to ease the situation in the region³⁰.

If history of Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear capability is analyzed it shows that US have never favoured it. It was always a contention between US and Pakistan's relations³¹. This gave a very solid ground to Pakistan's policy makers to be considerate regarding security and safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets. Meanwhile, western press was pointing towards Al-Qaida's plan to obtain Weapon of Mass Destruction through Pakistan³². Furthermore, US forces post 9/11 have produced some evidences supporting their claim of Al-Qaida's attainment of nuclear capability from Pakistan through people related to Pakistan's Nuclear Program³³. This situation was extremely critical for Pakistan. US as a consequence to this sensitive situation offered nuclear safety assistance to Pakistan. As a result, two kinds of thoughts arose in Pakistan. One thought was that, the assistance of international community to Pakistan in enhancing security to its nuclear program would help strengthening its security and safety apparatus and also to the non-proliferation system. Furthermore, post 9/11 both US and Pakistan has

²⁹ Shabana, Fayyaz. *Regional Extremism and Militancy in South Asia*. Paper presented at international seminar organized by Pakistan Institute of Regional Studies in collaboration with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in (Islamabad, (Oct, 2008)).

³⁰ H.F. Khan. *The United States, Pakistan and the War on Terrorism: Enduring Allies or Uncertain Partners? Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures*. (Institute of Regional Studies, edit., Islamabad, 2006).

³¹ Ibid:357-382

³² Julian, Borger. *Al-Qaida Videos Show Poison Gas Tests*. (The Guardian. 20 August 2002).

³³ Simpson, J and Littlewood, J. *A Framework for Assessing UK Responses to CBRN Terrorism*. British International Studies Association 28th Annual Conference. (UK: The University of Birmingham. 17 December 2003:3).

cooperated immensely in the field of nuclear security and safety and US assistance in the shape of training and equipment³⁴. Moreover, US perceive that Pakistan had also traded nuclear technology in exchange of missile technology to North Korea³⁵.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's name was exposed by US as a dishonest person who has the potential of assisting in providing nuclear capability to Al-Qaida³⁶. Later, President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf pardoned Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. General Musharraf for justifying his decision stated that, Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs will never be rolled back. The underworld must be checked by the world community and Pakistan should not be targeted for having links with it as underworld is stronger in other Asian countries, Europe and many other countries, which actually rely on underworld for their developmental projects. Dr. A. Q. Khan a hero of the country is pardoned due to the mistakes committed by him³⁷. General Musharraf claimed that any act committed by Dr. Abdul Qadeer, was his personal act and state of Pakistan has nothing to do with it, but credibility of Pakistan's nuclear assets became questionable in front of international community. This situation was analyzed by an analyst Shireen Mizari,

For the future, the countries like Pakistan will be dragged into the Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD issue. For Pakistan, the issue is critical because this pretext could be a means of trying to target Pakistan's nuclear programme that sits uneasily with the US. And since WMD remains one of the rationalizations for the US pre-emptive doctrine, the present framing of the WMD issue impacts and aggravates Pakistan's security concerns³⁸.

On the other hand, nuclear command and its control worked as a part and parcel of National Military Command Structure whose task was to guide on conventional military operations. Later, National Command Authority (NCA) was established under Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in 2000 as a secretariat of SPD. Apart from dealing with the developmental and operational issues related to nuclear competence, SPD looked into exports

³⁴ Z, Khan. *Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan's Export Control Experience, Current and Future Challenges and Options Safeguards against Illicit Transfers: Pakistan's Institutional Response*. (International Conference Report, London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute.2006).

³⁵ Greg, Bruno . Jayshree, Bajoria.*U.S-Pakistan Military Cooperation*.(Council on Foreign Relations. June 26, 2008). <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-pakistan-military-cooperation>

³⁶ *The News, The Nation, Dawn*, (19 January , 2004).

³⁷ President Musharraf (quoted in) *Pakistan Times*(, 6 February 6, 2004).

³⁸ Shireen, Mizari. *Current Situation & Trends of Terrorism in South Asia*. Strategic Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 2,(Summer 2004).

over and above clearance certification from ministry of Commerce. Similarly, tough and rigid code of conduct is guaranteed to defend against any possible threat from external and internal non-state radical elements³⁹. Moreover, Pakistan has always been trying to meet requirements under international Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, that are, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNHCR) 15400 which was issued on 28th April 2004⁴⁰.

3.5 Blame Game

Post 9/11 the fatal insurgency in Afghanistan resulted in rising suspicion of Kabul government towards Pakistan. The most insecure and unsafe areas in Afghanistan were those areas which were bordering Baluchistan, KP and FATA of Pakistan. These areas of Afghanistan were claimed as extreme risk areas⁴¹. These areas of Pakistan have the highest illiteracy and poverty rate. The increased insurgency in Afghanistan resulted in blaming Pakistan by Afghanistan for not playing its role efficiently against terrorism.

Afghan Government kept blaming Pakistan for supporting Taliban and then these Taliban launch attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan refused all the blames and charges; instead Pakistan blamed Afghanistan for spreading unrest and insecurity in Pakistan⁴².

Hamid Karzai kept condemning Pakistan for not doing enough against Taliban residing in its tribal belt. He also threatened Pakistan of tracking down Taliban into tribal belt of Pakistan and stated that the dilemma for Afghanistan is not Taliban its Pakistan, since Pakistan is supporting and harboring them⁴³. Similarly, Karzai on 13th December 2006 again delivered a statement blaming Pakistan for supporting Taliban and further stated that terrorist activities carried by these Taliban in Afghanistan are for scaring and pressuring Afghanistan⁴⁴.

³⁹ Naeem, Salik. *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press. 2009).

⁴⁰ Z, Khan. *Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan's Export Control Experience, Current and Future Challenges and Options Safeguards against IllicitTransfers: Pakistan's Institutional Response*.(International Conference Report, London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute.2006:2).

⁴¹ Johnson, H. Thomson and M. Chris Mason. No Sign until *the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*. Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 32. no. 4. Spring 2008.

⁴² Seth G.Jones. *The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad*. (International Security, 32(4). Spring 2008).

⁴³ Tang, A. Pakistan Accused of Supporting Taliban. 2006website:
<http://www.afghannewscenter.com/news/2006/dec>

⁴⁴ Imtiaz, Gul *.The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan Relations under the Taliban*. (Pakistan: Vanguard, 2002).

Military Ruler of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf while rejecting all the accusations by Afghanistan said on 2nd February 2007, in a news conference that all these Taliban are nurtured in Afghanistan. Moreover, he also claimed that Pakistan's agencies and intelligence has no involvement in any type of insurgencies and terrorism in neighboring states⁴⁵. Afghanistan kept accusing Pakistan and resultantly bitter relations developed between both the neighboring states, further giving rise to the environment of mistrust between them.

Hamid Karzai during an inauguration ceremony in Jalalabad, of Bacha Khan Complex expressed the way towards better relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan is only through reforms introduced by Pakistan in its Afghan Policy and stopping support of Taliban⁴⁶. Afghanistan targeted Pakistan that Pakistan has banned the jihadi outfits but still no major achievement has been made and these Taliban are residing peacefully in Tribal belt of Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand blamed Afghanistan for letting its soil being used by India.

President Musharraf blamed Afghanistan by stating that Indian objectives there in Afghanistan are only to offend Pakistan which is very clear and evident. He also raised the point of opening of Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad is only for creating problems for Pakistan⁴⁷.

Afghanistan kept accusing Pakistan for maintaining same strategy of backing insurgencies as it had during 1990's. Though Pakistan kept denying these accusations Afghan government firmly believed that Pakistan since Soviet war until now is supporting and backing such groups who creates insurgencies and unrest in Afghanistan⁴⁸. These Afghan suspicions became stronger after the revival of Taliban in Afghanistan. A UN report on the security of Afghanistan in September 2006 revealed that revival of Taliban especially in Southern Afghanistan is due to the weak, corrupt and incompetent Afghan institutions. Report also claimed that Afghan government, its army and police failed in securing Afghan land, guard its people, providing necessary services to them and counter insurgencies on their land despite the fact that billions of Dollars have been spent on them⁴⁹.

⁴⁵ F, Talib. Taliban Up Rises to Put Pakistan in Pressure. (PIPS, 2008). website: <http://san-pips.com/index.asp>.

⁴⁶ *The News*. (April 16, 2007).

⁴⁷ Ahmed, Rashid. *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. (Penguin Publishing Group: New York.2008).

⁴⁸ Mir Sherbaz Khetran, *Indian Interference in Balochistan: Analysing the Evidence and Implications for Pakistan*. (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies.2017).

⁴⁹ UN Report,2006:3. <https://www.un.org/zh/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDGReport2006.pdf>

Furthermore, the report stated that militants operating in Afghanistan were trained in Afghanistan. These Afghan militants were not motivated by ideology, its only their low social status, poverty and being deprived of basic needs that compelled them to involve themselves in such activities. Afghan government failed in satisfying needs of its people and remained incompetent which compelled its citizens to find other means of earning. A survey conducted by an Asian Foundation in Afghanistan in 2004 and then in 2006 also disclosed that the people of Afghanistan are dissatisfied by its people⁵⁰.

Moreover, a state where Government writ is weak is very easily manipulated by various sections. Afghan's weak administration could not have managed violence smugglers and drug dealers etc. kept taking advantage of situation and served their interests well in Afghanistan. Interests of different sections converged, insurgents protected smugglers, drug convoys, traffickers and in return were benefited financially by them. All these sections of society could easily fulfill their interest as the government was incompetent to stop and get hold of them. In 2006 Hilmand province of Afghanistan proved to be the worst example of violence⁵¹.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai established his Republican party named *Hizb-e-Jamhuri Khwahan* after Burhanudin Rabbani formed a new version of Northern Alliance⁵² named United National Front (UNF). Rationale behind formation of Republican Party was that Karzai felt threatened from UNF and wanted to oppose it. Such political insecurity became a much bigger issue than revival of Taliban, Al-Qaida and insurgency. Furthermore, in such weak political scenario regional and neighboring states also play their role in serving their interests. Likewise, role played by Iran, India, Pakistan, Russia and China to serve their interest in Afghanistan could not be ruled out. India wanted to grow its influence in Afghanistan to upset Pakistan easily. Pakistan was concerned about Indian involvement and consulates in Afghanistan. Russia and central Asian states had their own concerns and interests. Therefore, blaming Pakistan only is not the solution to the problems Afghanistan faced post 9/11. It has to tighten its administration and then tackle with all the elements causing disturbance in Afghanistan.

⁵⁰ Seth, G. Jones. *The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad*. (International Security, 32(4). Spring 2008).

⁵¹ International Crisis Group. (*Asia Report*, no. 68. Dec., 2003): 45

⁵² Kenneth. Katzman. *Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance*. (Congressional Research Service 7-5700 . RS21922. November 30, 2012). www.crs.gov

Conclusion

Pakistan's shift in Post 9/11 Afghan policy is a tactical move as to resolve uncertain economic condition, international isolation, nuclear and other security problems which it faced in pre 9/11 era. This changed Afghan policy considered factors which were very similar to the previous Afghan policy where Pakistan was particularly concerned about security and strategic issues like, Kashmir issue, US pressure, nuclear security and Indian influence over Afghanistan. Countering security and strategic issues emanating from its Afghan policy required Pakistan to use its military, political and an institutional instrument. The geography of Pakistan has created such a scenario for Pakistan that its Afghan policy does not only depend on Pakistan and Afghanistan's relations but regional, international powers and their interests also design them. As the defensive realists truly argue that the anarchic states struggle for power for their survival and in this competition the weaker states are left with no option but to balance their position in global politics rather to increase their relative power. In the similar fashion Pakistan to counter the threats emanating from its eastern border and US threats, joined hands with the US. Therefore, it is pertinent to mention that this new Afghan policy put Pakistan into a much grave situation as domestic and external security dynamics got disturbed.

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