

THE EFFECT OF MALAKISM ON ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN BAJAUR, TRIBAL DISTRICT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

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Abstract:

Malakism is a known phenomenon in Pakhtun society in general and the tribal districts in particular. The Malaks, in tribal districts are exercising a dominant status in social, political and economic spheres. In elections, Malaks are too instrumental in moulding electoral preferences of the voters in favour of their electoral candidates. The threat of dislodge from the house, the creation of problematic situation for the subordinates, the provision of jobs and development are some of the effective tools that are applied by the Malaks for obtaining the electoral support of the voters. The present study tends to explore that how Malaks happen to be the major determinant of electoral behaviour in tribal districts in general and Bajaur in particular. Data analysis have been made via descriptive statistics including frequencies, percentage, valid percentage and Cumulative Percent and inferential statistics comprising of regression, coefficient of regression and ANOVA.

Keywords: Malakism, Malak, tribal district, Bajaur, Electoral Behaviour.

Bajaur Tribal District: A Brief Description

Geographically, the Bajaur has its strategic location. It joins border with district Dir on the North-East, Malakand division on the South-East, Afghanistan on the North West and the Mohmand on the South-West. The district headquarter is located at Khar. The Bajaur has area of 1273 square

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kilometers. The area lies between latitudes 34° 36' to 34° 56' North and longitudes 71° 15' to 71° 35' East¹. (See Figure 1)



Source:

http://www.rlcipfata.gov.pk/images/agencies_map/bajaur_agency_map/bajaur_agency_map.jpg

Bajaur is a mountainous area. Nawagai and Barang are its two large valleys which are surrounded by mountains with an average altitude of about 3000 meters. The altitude of the plain area is about 2500-2900 feet above the sea level. The mountainous region constitutes about forty percent of the total area². It has a long border of about 120 kilometers on the North-West with Afghanistan. The four important passes between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Bajaur are Loegram pass (Salarzai), Kaga Pass (Mamond), Ghakhi Pass (Mamond) and Nawa Pass (Chamarkand)³.

According to the population census of 2017, the total population of Bajaur is 1093684 in which 557160 are male, 536520 females while 04 are

¹ Mian Sayed Badshah, "Geology of Bajaur and Northern Part of Mohmand," *Geological Bulletin*, Vol.11 (1979): pp.163-164; *Socio-Economic Profile of Bajaur* (Islamabad: Prepared by USAID, 1992), 1

² *Socio-Economic Profile of Bajaur*, 2

³ *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Selected from Government Record*, Vol.I (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1982), pp.502-503

transgender.⁴ Bajaur is inhabited by two main tribes, namely the Tarkalani and the Utman Khel. The Tarkalanis lives in the areas of Salarzo, Mamund, Charmang, Nawagai and part of Khar. The Tarkalani Tribe is divided into four sections, Salarzai, Mamund, Ismailzai and Essazai⁵. Uthman khel tribe is divided into eight branches, Ismail Zai, Mandal, Ali Zai, Matakai, Pegho Zai, Gurai and Seen Zai⁶.

The Deputy Commissioner (Former Political Agent) is the head of all administrative departments working in Bajaur. Khar and Nawagai are its two sub-divisions which are administered by Assistant Commissioner. The offices of the Assistant Commissioner are located at Khar, which have been further sub-divided into eight tehsils. The Nawagai Sub-division has been further divided into five tehsils, namely, Nawagai, Loi-Mamund, Ware Mamund, Barang and chamarkand. The Khar sub division has been further sub-divided into three tehsils, namely, Khar, Uthman Khel and Salarzai. Each tehsil has a Tehsildar, who supervises the whole area.⁷

The Deputy Commissioner has a force in the form of Khasadars or Levies. These Khasadars are recruited from each tribe. The F.C (Frontier Corps) force also helps the local Administration. The role of the Deputy Commissioner (Former PA) has been described as "Half-Ambassador or half-Governor"⁸.

The Pakhtuns

The Pakhtuns are the ethnic group residing as a large racial faction in Afghanistan, merged area (formerly called FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.⁹ The social structure of the Pakhtuns is based on segmentary lineage system which is based on hierarchical set up. The lowest hierarchy is the group at local level proceeding to various upward levels making whole ethnic group at the highest level.¹⁰ The Pakhtuns are further divided into various tribes. Some of the Pakhtuns tribes in Pakistan are Kakaṛ, Sheraani, Ustarana, Maḥsud, Darwesh Khel, Waziri, Biṭani, Turi,

⁴ *FATA Development Statistics* (Peshawar: FATA Secretariat, 2012), 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 116

⁶ Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Yusufzai Pathan* (Karachi: Sharif Art Press, 1960), 353

⁷ Sher Mohammad. Khan Mohmand, *FATA: A Socio, Culture and Geo Political History*. Peshawar: University Book Agency, 2000), 134-135

⁸ Akbar S. Ahmad, *Social and Economic Changes in the Tribal Areas* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 310-311

⁹ Farooq Yousaf, "Pakistan's "Tribal" Pashtuns, Their "Violent" Representation, and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement," *Sage Open* (January-March 2019): pp.1 –10

¹⁰ Joseph A. Tainter and Donald G. MacGregor, *Pashtun Social Structure: Cultural Perceptions and Segmentary Lineage Organization* (USA: MacGregor-- Bates, Inc., 2011), p.01

Bangash, Orakzay, Afridi, Shinwari, Mahmand, Utman Khel, Tarklani, Yusufzay, Banuchi, Khaṭak, Khalil etc.¹¹

Elite Politics in terms of Malak and Malakism:

The concept of Malak and Malakism can be best explained in terms of theory of elitism. This theory asserts that there are fewer people or families in the society who have the power and social influence. These elites control the society and utilize its influence for gaining political power. They are called political elites.¹² These political elites play an important role in influencing the electoral preferences.¹³ In Pakhtun society 'Malak' (the Tribal Chief) exercise a dominant role in all social and political activities. The Malaks in tribal districts of Pakistan are the local elders with land power in acres. They are patronizing agricultural activities which are mostly done by the peasants or tenants, who live at a subsistence level. In Pakistan, the landlords are known by different names according to their geographical distribution such as these people are called Malaks in Pakhtun society, Chaudhry in the Punjab society, Wadera in Sindh and Saii in Baloch society¹⁴.

Mostly, the Malaks in tribal districts keep the tenants for their own purposes such as for agricultural production, serving the guests in *Hujra* and also to help them fight against their opponents. Economically, they are strong enough having more land and access to all the resources. Mostly, the educational institutions (schools and colleges) are located in these Malaks' land; so they have full control over these institutions. They don't want the children of their tenants to be educated because they consider these children a threat to their (Malaks) future. Before 1996, the Malaks were so strong because only they were entrusted with the right to vote and the local people had no power to exercise this basic human right in the form of casting vote. Prior to 1996, the tribal districts parliamentarians were to be selected for the National Assembly seats through a limited number of *Lungi* holders/Malaks. However, in 1996, the government of Pakistan gave the rights to the people of tribal districts to elect candidates of their own choice for the National Assembly¹⁵.

¹¹ Haroon Rashid, *History of the Pathans* (Islamabad: Brig (R) Haroon Rashid SI (M), 2002), vol.I, pp.iii-vi.

¹² Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 1966):, pp. 285-286; Hashmat Ullah Khan et al., "Role of Elites in Pakistan," *International Journal of Applied Economic Studies*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, (2018): p.19

¹³ Thomas A. Henderson and Walter A. Rosenbaum, "Prospects for Consolidating Local Government: The Role of Elites in Electoral Outcomes," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Nov., 1973): pp. 695-719

¹⁴ Jean L. Mckechine, ed. *Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1098), 679

¹⁵ Mohmand, 15-25.

Malakism is a type of feudalism. The term feudalism is used worldwide while Malakism is limited to the tribal districts only. Malakism is a local term used instead of feudalism in the tribal districts of Pakistan. They are the feudal who dominate the Pakhtun community. Feudalism is a worldwide system which is prevailing in different forms in the world. In the tribal areas of Pakistan the term Malakism is used for feudalism¹⁶. Feudalism (Malakism) was a system of government, whose outstanding feature was the possession and centralization of political authority among a landed aristocracy with a pattern of land holding in which power was shared by the feudal lords¹⁷.

Karl Marx has referred to feudalism in the form of capitalism. Marx has defined feudalism, "as the power of ruling class rested on their control of arable land leading to a class society based upon the exploitation of peasants who farm these lands, typically under serfdom. Marx thus considered feudalism within a purely economic model"¹⁸. In industrialized society the individuals are divided between the capitalist (bourgeois) and working class (proletariat). The bourgeois exploits the proletariat class.¹⁹

Pakhtun's society has two famous traditions, tribal chiefs (Malaks) and code of honour (Pakhtunwali). These two traditions are un-written but in practice they are observed. These two codes of honour differentiate the Pakhtun society from the other societies. *Pakhtunwali* is a traditional code of Pakhtuns' society which covers all aspects of Pakhtuns' life²⁰.

After the annexation of the frontier region in 1849, the British got the control of the area. The British introduced Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in 1901, wherein enough powers were exercised by the Political Agent and Malaks. After the creation of Pakistan, the FCR was retained hence retaining Malakism. Malaks were instrumental in keeping the border

¹⁶ Muhammad Akbar Malik, "Role of Malik in Tribal Society: A Dynamic Change after 9/11", *Pakistan*, Vol. 49, (2013): 102-104.

¹⁷ Umbreen Javaid and Tahmina Aslam, "Feudalism in Pakistan: Myth or Reality/Challenges to Feudalism," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. 54, No. 1, (2017): 227-228

¹⁸ Claudio J. Katz, "Karl Marx on the transition from feudalism to capitalism," *Theory and Society* 22 (1993): 363-389

¹⁹ Lars-Henrik Schmidt, "A Marxist Theory of Class Struggle," *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, (1977): pp. 385-392

²⁰ Ghulam Shams-ur-Rehman, "Pashtunwali and Islam: The Conflict of Authority in the Traditional Pashtun Society," *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2015), pp. 297-307

passes open for trade and strategic purposes and in return granted allowances and subsidies which they could distribute among their tribes²¹.

Malaks play a multi-dimensional role in Pakhtun society. Their role is very influential in various aspects of life. They play a key role in resolving the local disputes through an informal judiciary system called *Jirga*. The decision announced by these Malaks is final which must be accepted by both the parties.²² The local administration fully supports these Malaks in their decisions. They receive a type of payment called *Lungi*. Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), Domicile Certificate or any other witness's certificate of local people must be signed from these Malaks. All the developmental projects from the government agencies are implemented under the supervision of these Malaks.²³

Thus, Malaks enjoy a dominant position in the social set up of tribal districts. He is powerful, economically, socially and politically.²⁴ The present article discusses the dominant role of Malaks in the electoral politics of Tribal built in general and Bajaur district in particular.

Scope and Methodology:

This is an empirical research based on quantitative and analytical methods. Primary data have been collected in the form of questionnaire. Keeping in view the nature of the problem and study, purposive / judgmental sampling method is used in this research. The data obtained through questionnaires have been classified, arranged and analyzed in various tables through SPSS software. Secondary data have been studied in the form of reports, journals, theses and books, used for understanding the Malakism and Malak's role. Data was collected from various categories of people as key informants. Much care was taken while collecting the data from such respondents, who were able enough to talk and present their views on this issue of Malakism and its impacts on the people of local community. Hence respondents were selected from various walks of life including Malaks, peasants, common people, businessmen, teachers, students and traders.

²¹ Benjamin D. Hopkins, "The Frontier Crimes Regulation and Frontier Governmentality," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.74, Issue 2, (May 2015): pp.369-75; Altaf Ullah, "Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan: Study of a Special Model of Governance," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol. XXXIV, No.2 (2013): pp.65-71

²² Umbreen Javaid and Muhammad Akram Ul Haq, "Political Challenges and Security Issues in FATA and its impact on Economic Development," *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1, (January – June 2016): pp. 367 – 370

²³Matthew W. Williams, A Monograph on The British colonial experience in Waziristan and its applicability to current operations, (USA: Department of Defense, 2004-05), pp.5-6; Danish Ahmad and Anwaar Mohyuddin, "Role of Malik in Pukhtoon Tribal Areas," *Journal of Studies in Social Sciences*, Volume 5, Number 2, (2013): 239-253

²⁴ Ibid.

Informal discussions were also held randomly with about three hundred persons which helped in comprehending the problem in detail.

Universe of the Study:

The universe of the study is Bajaur district. It has two sub-divisions, namely Khar sub-division and Nawagai sub-division under the administration of two Assistant Commissioner. The Khar sub division has been further sub-divided into three tehsils, namely, Khar, Uthman Khel and Salarzai. The Nawagai Sub-division has been further divided into five tehsils, namely Nawagai, Lowi-Mamond, Wara-Mamond, Barang and Chamarkand. The data was collected from various walks of life in the targeted area. The data is collected from male respondents only because the researcher has no access to females.

Sample Size and Procedure:

In order to get representative sample size, over 210 respondents have been selected on the basis of purposive sampling in the targeted area by the following stages.

Stage 1: There are two Sub-Divisions in Bajaur i.e. Khar and Nawagai sub-divisions. The Khar sub-division has three tehsils, namely, Khar, Uthman Khel and Salarzai while the Nawagai sub-division has five tehsils, namely Nawagai, Lowi-Mamond, Wara-Mamond, Barang and Chamarkand. From Khar subdivision the tehsils of Uthman Khel and Salarzai were randomly selected while from the Nawagai subdivision the tehsils of Nawagai, Lowi Mamond and Wara-Mamond were randomly selected.

Stage 2: In this stage, 42 respondents were selected from each tehsil, 14 were commoners, 14 were Malaks and 14 were peasants' families. Respondents were selected through judgmental sampling. Data was collected from male respondents because the researcher has no access to female respondents. Out of a total 210 questionnaire administered, the researcher could get only 204 duly filled and returned.

Statistical Techniques for Measurement

In this study, the descriptive and inferential statistics have been used for analysis with the help of SPSS software. The descriptive statistics refers to frequencies, percentage, valid percentage and Cumulative Percent. The inferential statistics have been based on regression, coefficient of regression and ANOVA.

(1) Employment Health facilities (2) Developmental work (3) Educational and (4) Nothing

5. In your opinion, if the supported candidate wins the elections, does Malak deliver benefits to his subordinate people?

1) Yes 2) No

All these five questions have been symbolically represented as IIPAE, MPOS, MTTHS, MPFHS and MDBS respectively.

Independent Variables

For this study, Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income have been taken as independent variables.

Data Analysis

Data analysis is divided into two parts i.e. the descriptive and the inferential statistics. The descriptive part provides data analysis in the form of frequencies, percentage, valid percentage and Cumulative Percent. The inferential part includes tests in the form of regression, coefficient of regression and ANOVA. This type of data analysis is carried out with regard to each dependent variable after making an association with independent variables of Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income.

Model No.1

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1

Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	152	74.5	74.5	74.5
No	52	25.5	25.5	100.0
Total (N)	204	100.0	100.0	

Inferential Statistics
Table 2
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	Coefficients^a					<u>ANOVA^a</u>					
	Unstandardized Coefficients					Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.	Model 1	Sum of Squares	Df
Model 1	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.	Model 1	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
(Constant)	1.409	.151		9.310	.000	Regression	7.241	4	1.810	11.434	.000 ^b
Age	-.125	.033	-.241	-3.759	.000	Residual	31.504	199	.158		
Education	-.176	.058	-.195	-3.041	.003	Total	38.745	203			
Profession	.086	.022	.258	3.884	.000						
Monthly_Income	.108	.034	.211	3.177	.002						

a. Dependent Variable: IIPAE

b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly_Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

Table 1 shows that majority of the respondents (74.5%) are interested in politics and elections. In informal discussion they added that in the presence of FCR, the dream of true democracy is not possible. They added that electioneering process and right of an independent vote can change their destiny. But in the presence of this black law such efforts are futile. They asserted that their parliamentarians have powers to make laws for other parts of the country, but have no powers to make law for their own area tribal districts. Informal discussion with Malaks shows that they were too interested in politics and elections but at the same time they supported FCR because they are its direct beneficiaries.

The ANOVA test applied in table 2 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significance level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. The signs of coefficient show that Age and Profession are inversely related to IIPAE. As the age decreases the interest for politics and elections will increase. On the other hand, Profession and Monthly Income are directly associated with IIPAE i.e. as the Monthly Income increases, the interest for politics and elections will increase. In other words, one can say that high income families have more interest for politics and elections as compare to low income families.

Model No.2
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3
Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
To Great Extant	144	70.6	70.6	70.6
To Some Extant	24	11.8	11.8	82.4
To Limited Extant	21	10.3	10.3	92.6
Absolutely Not	15	7.4	7.4	100.0
Total (N)	204	100.0	100.0	

Inferential Statistics
Table 4
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	<u>Coefficients^a</u>			<u>ANOVA^a</u>							
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.	Model 2	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Model 2	B	Std. Error	Beta								
(Constant)	.781	.327		2.385	.018	Regression	35.178	4	8.795	11.871	.000 ^b
Age	.222	.072	.198	3.097	.002	Residual	147.425	199	.741		
Education	.306	.125	.156	2.442	.015	Total	182.603	203			
Profession	-.179	.048	-.246	-3.718	.000						
Monthly_Income	.199	.073	.180	2.715	.007						

a. Dependent Variable: MPOS

b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly_Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

All the above tables show that a large number of respondents (70.6%) are of the view that Malak, to a greater extent, pressures their subordinates in elections to support his electoral candidate. The respondents who did not support the above contention were (7.4%).

In informal discussion with respondents they added that Malaks have strong control over the electioneering, because they do not want the success of their opponents which upholds the analysis that right to vote of a layman is being violated at the hands of Malaks which is unconstitutional and against the fundamental rights of the people. However, informal discussion, the Malaks denied such type of allegations.

The ANOVA test applied in table 4 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significant level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. The signs of coefficient show that Profession is inversely related to MPOS. On the other hand, Age, Education and Monthly Income are directly associated with MPOS i.e. as these variables increase, the MPOS will also increase.

Model No.3
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5
Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Drives him out from home	114	55.9	55.9	55.9
Only annoyes and do nothing	12	5.9	5.9	61.8
Assign him more work as a punishment	22	10.8	10.8	72.5
Creates problems on various occasions	56	27.5	27.5	100.0
Total (N)	204	100.0	100.0	

Inferential Statistics
Table 6
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	<u>Coefficients^a</u>					<u>ANOVA^a</u>					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients								
Model 3	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.	Model 3	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
(Constant)	1.065	.473		2.250	.026	Regression	50.188	4	12.547	8.111	.000 ^b
Age	.230	.104	.146	2.215	.028	Residual	307.851	199	1.547		
Education	.404	.181	.147	2.228	.027	Total	358.039	203			
Profession	-.187	.070	-.184	-2.690	.008						
Monthly_Income	.298	.106	.192	2.810	.005						

a. Dependent Variable: MTTHS

b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly_Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

These tables show that most of the respondents (55.9%) affirm that Malak force his subjects to vacate the house if they vote to his opponent. They added that if a delay is brought about, then force is used against them for vacating the house. While (27.50%) respondents asserted that Malaks tease the people one way or another by creating various problems for them if they do not cast vote to their favourite candidate. For example, they are not being supported in Deputy Commissioner office; their domicile is not signed by them, they are not supported in a *jirga* (assembly of the elders) etc. Some of the respondents (10.8%) asserted that if a subordinate vote the candidate other than the Malak, then the Malak increases work load on him. A lesser number of the respondents (5.9%) opined that Malaks only annoy and do nothing against his subjects if they cast voting to the opposing candidate. The Malaks in informal discussions denied these opinions and added that the voters are free to vote according to their sweet will.

The ANOVA test applied in table 6 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significant level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. The sign of coefficient show that Profession is inversely related to MTTHS. On the other hand, Age, Education and Monthly Income are directly associated with dependent variable. As these variables increases, the certainty of ill-treatment by Malak with his subjects (MTTHS) increases.

Model No.4
Descriptive Statistics
Table 7
Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Employment	80	39.2	39.2	39.2
Developmental works	52	25.5	25.5	64.7
Education and Health	35	17.2	17.2	81.9
Not Anyone	37	18.1	18.1	100.0
Total	204	100.0	100.0	

Inferential Statistics
Table 8
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	<u>Coefficients^a</u>					<u>ANOVA^a</u>					
	Unstandardized Coefficients					Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.	Model 4	Sum of Squares	Df
Model 4	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.	Model 4	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
(Constant)	2.283	.397		5.756	.000	Regression	42.696	4	10.674	9.826	.000 ^b
Age	-.251	.087	-.188	-2.889	.004	Residual	216.182	199	1.086		
Education	.442	.152	.189	2.909	.004	Total	258.877	203			
Profession	-.167	.058	-.192	-2.858	.005						
Monthly Income	.296	.089	.224	3.327	.001						

a. Dependent Variable: MPFHS

b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly_Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

These tables show that (39.2%) of the respondents claim that Malaks want vote from the dependants for their electoral candidate and in turn ensure them jobs. While (25.5%) of the respondents have the views that Malaks take vote for their candidate from the subjects on the behalf of developmental work. While (17.2%) respondents opine that Malaks demand vote from the subjects in elections for their candidate and take the responsibility of health & educational progress in the area. A lesser number of the respondents (18.1%) have the opinion that Malaks do not make promise during the election campaigns. The Malaks in informal discussion denied that view that they do not ask for vote from their subjects on the basis of provision of jobs or anything else.

The ANOVA test applied in table 08 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significant level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. The signs of coefficient show that Age and Profession are inversely related to MPFHS. As the age increases, the certainty of the provision of benefit by Malak to the subjects, decreases. On the other hand, Education and Monthly Income are directly associated with MPFHS. As these variables increases, the certainty of the provision of benefit by Malak to the subjects increases.

Model No.5
Descriptive Statistics
Table 9
Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	57	27.9	27.9	27.9
No	147	72.1	72.1	100.0
Total	204	100.0	100.0	

Inferential Statistics
Table 10
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	<u>Coefficients^a</u>					<u>ANOVA^a</u>					
	<u>Unstandardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Standardized Coefficients</u>								
Model 5	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.	Model 5	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
(Constant)	1.516	.158		9.614	.000	Regression	6.880	4	1.720	10.010	.000 ^b
Age	.122	.035	.230	3.535	.001	Residual	34.194	199	.172		
Education	.191	.060	.205	3.156	.002	Total	41.074	203			
Profession	-.069	.023	-.199	-2.958	.003						
Monthly Income	-.118	.035	-.225	-3.345	.001						

a. Dependent Variable: MDBS

b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

All the above tables show that majority of the respondents (72.1%) asserted that after winning the polls, neither the Malak nor his successful candidate pays any attention to the development of the area. The respondents who did not support the above contention were (27.9%).

In informal discussion, the respondents added that if their winning candidates start some developmental works in their area, unfortunately it smells nepotism, irregularity, favouritism and corruption.

The ANOVA test applied in table 10 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significant level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. In this table, the variables of Profession and Monthly Income are inversely related to MDBS. As the Monthly Income increases, the certainty of providing benefits by Malak to the subjects after elections, decreases. On the other hand, Age and Education are directly associated with MDBS. As the age increases, the certainty of providing benefits by Malak to the subjects after elections, increases.

Conclusion

Malaks are exercising a dominant position with reference to social, political and economic status in Tribal districts. As such, Malakism is one of the leading factors in determining the electoral behaviour in tribal areas including Bajaur. Due to the influence of Malakism, the electoral candidates are always in contact with the Malaks for winning in the polls. Malaks use local people as well as peasants for their own purposes during the elections in Bajaur. Malaks compel the subordinates in elections to cast vote for their nominated candidates, and in the case of opposition by these subordinates, the same Malaks make their lives miserable and dislodge them from their houses or creating problems on various occasions ranging from non-signing of the domicile certificate to the lack of support in the office of Deputy Commissioner and *jirga*. Although peasants cast vote to the candidate of Malaks and in return make some promise with peasants. However they forget all these promises after winning the polls. Moreover, it is observed that after their success, the concerned Malak does not provide any sort of benefits to their electorate. Thus, majority of the respondents asserted that Malaks do affect the voting behavior in Bajaur.

All the people are interested in holding general elections in Tribal districts. However, the respondents asserted that in the presence of FCR, elections and democracy have no meaning for them. Since FCR is giving a dominant status to Malak, therefore, the influence of Malak on common voter is inevitable in making the electoral preferences. So FCR is a big hurdle in deciding a true electoral choice and installing a true popular democracy.

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