THE KHOST OPERATIONS

Syed Fida Yunas*

The General Description of Khost1

Khost, sometime called “the little Moscow” was a division of Paktya province. Now it is a province with Matun its capital. It shares border with Kurram and North Waziristan Agencies (tribal areas of Federally Administered Areas of Pakistan - FATA). Two roads lead out from Khost; one to Gardez via the narrow valley occupied mostly by Zadran tribe and the second to Kabul via Chamkanni, Jaji Maidan and Jaji Hariob which passes through a long mountain defile. These are the main supply routes for the Khost garrison, which can be blocked at several places because of the many gorges and narrow passes. One road leads to North Waziristan and one to Kurram tribal areas and onward to the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The airfield at Matun, which was often the only link to the capital, is within artillery and mortar range from mujahideen who controlled the surrounding hills. Air traffic also could, therefore, be disrupted. Khost had a population of about 100,000.
Khost was garrisoned by about 9,000 Afghan troops and was the headquarters of 25 Afghan Division and two Afghan Border Brigades.
The mujahideen had their strongholds in the surrounding mountains, the important being Jaji in the north, Maidan, Tarin and Zhawar in the south.

The Historical Importance of Khost

Near the end of the 5th century Ephthalites, or “White Huns,” attacked Persia and defeated the Persian king Firuz II in 483. In the same year Nestorianism was made the official faith of the Persian Christians. Kavadh I favoured the communistic teachings of Mazdak (flourished 5th century), a Zoroastrian high priest, and in 498 was deposed by his orthodox brother Zamasp. With the aid of the Ephthalites, Kavadh was restored to the throne in 501. He fought two inconclusive wars against Rome, and in 523 he withdrew his support of Mazdak and caused a great massacre of Mazdak's followers.
Khosrau I, also spelled Khosrow I, called Anushirvan (having an immortal soul), Persian king (531-579) of the Sassanid dynasty was the son of Kavadh I. Khosrau I is considered one of the greatest kings of the ancient Persian Empire. In a series of wars with the Byzantine Empire (531-532, 540-545, 571-576), he extended his domain to the Black Sea. Other military conquests extended the frontier of Persia to the Indus River in the east and from the Arabian Sea far into Central Asia. He was successful in all his Byzantine wars until 576, when the forces of Emperor Justin II of Byzantium defeated the Persians at Melitene (now Malatya, Turkey).2
According to Dr Sher Zaman Taizi, Mazdak lived in Khost and he was killed along with his 20,000 followers by a well-planned strategy. The king invited him to show the strength of his follower. When Mazdak led his followers to the ground, Persian troops deployed around fell on them. Mazdak preached that all resources were joint properties of communities; even women were treated as such.
Saleem Bangash3 contributed two articles to daily the Frontier Post, Peshawar, one on Mirzaka which was published on 11 September 1993 and the second on Gabar which was published on 6 November 1993. Both these places are situated in Mangal territory of Paktya province. Extracts of these articles are placed as under:

Mirzaka

The small beautiful village has two outlets, one leading to Chamkanni and onward to Khost on one side and to Parachinar in Kurram agency on the other side, the second to Gardez linking further Kabul and other parts of the country. The second road remains quite busy.
There are small mounds and hills within the natural precinct of high mountains. Most of these mounds are believed to have been raised by the man like the pyramids of Egypt.
During the reign of Zahir Shah, some people had discovered some relics which could make a little money for them. The news spread and ignited craze of digging and excavation. The raw hand did not mind destruction of relics. The government imposed ban on excavation and raised walls around the place.
When Afghanistan was overtaken by the revolution of April 1978, majority of the people migrated to Pakistan. However, the troops of the Red Army could not reach the area. Hence there was no further exploitation.
Following the fall of Dr Najib, the people returned their homes. The people of Mirzaka took a decision to explore the treasures. They started digging a particular mound and discovered earthenware in shape of water pitchers and jars, and other kinds of household utensils.
About five metre deep, water gushed out with silver and gold. These relics included seals, coins, jewellery, utensils and idols. There were some written golden planks also. The jewellery was carved with images of elephants, tigers, deer and other animals, some being extinct now. The golden idols are in shape of snakes, elephants, tigers, fowls etc. A good number of crowns were also discovered.
The news spread and the people starting visiting Mirzaka to buy the objects at bargain prices, much less than their value. Gradually the rates went up to the market value of silver and gold. European customers also appeared on the scene.
It was not only a small and inaccessible village of Mirzaka that was ruined, but a bright civilisation was also deformed. These relics could have proved very useful in description of the past glories in the area.
The venture has almost been nationalised by the local communities. What they find they pool and sell it. The gains are then divided in tribal fashion in the owner community. Heavy machinery for drilling has been imported from Pakistan for use. Elders of the community supervise the operation to check pilferage.
According to a popular legend, Mirzaka and Takhtabeka were two sisters who lived about four millenniums before. There were two brothers also named Gabar and Zmar in that time. Now there stand villages in their names.
Gabar

Gabar valley starts from about 40 kilometres north west of Khost and stretches up to Gardez, with abundant sweet water of numerous springs and a perennial stream amidst thick forests of pine trees. In local parlance, Gabar means grave. But according to a legend Gabar was a prisoner of Zmar, a king of Gardez. Some people think that he was a prince. However, identification of the area in the name of Gabar is based on different theories, one being the burial of treasures and building of mounds over them, which are considered graves, like Egyptian pyramids.
Gabar proper is 48 kilometre away from Mirzaka. Both these villages are located in Gabar valley.
The people of Gabar valley also started digging of mounds in their area, which they consider artificial, for hidden treasures. They also discovered some earthenware in shape of pitchers, jars and cauldrons. The cauldrons were big and full of ashes. There were large bones which the people could not discern whether they were of the human being or animals. They also found coins, idols and images of animals like snake, deer, horse, etc. made of stones.
The progress was impeded by a big stone wall. This wall had been made of huge slabs, some estimated to be three metre long and two metre high, the width is yet to be discovered. It was perceived that there is a large hall behind the wall.
The diggers were excited by this find. The perception of a hall, considered fabulously a court, precipitated the team to dismantle the wall at any cost. They used dynamites also but could not succeed to break through an inlet. The people then turned to other such mounds to dig with hope to find the inroad to the entrance of the hall. This wall generated a mystery and every body is curious to know about its other side.
Since these relics are sold at exorbitant rates, the tribe has organised the operation at local levels to share the spoils. They do not know the significance and value of these relics but bargain them at rates as high as possible.
Unfortunately there is no government in Afghanistan to stall destruction of this evidence in hand of the past civilisation of this area. At this juncture when Afghanistan has entered the severest anarchic age of its history at the hand of its sons, once called the Mujahideen, it is being stripped incredulously of its natural resources and underground treasures which would darken more its future.
These mounds have revealed sufficient relics to show that there was once prosperous civilisation in this area. But the relics dug out of them are spoiled by the wild and greedy nature of tribalism.
The sketch that Saleem Bangash has drawn reflects prosperous civilization in the past.
Khost has played always important and significant role in the turbulent history of Afghanistan, most because of its geographical location, terrain and the independent nature and character of its people.
It was during the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 that the Afghan Commander, General Mohammad Nadir Khan, moving through Khost and receiving support and co-operation of its people, had successfully attacked the important British cantonment of Tall in Kohat district – bordering North Waziristan and Kurram agencies.
During the year 1928, it was the area and people of Khost and Paktya that the famous Lawrence of Arabia had targeted for launching incriminating propaganda campaign against King Amanullah Ghazi of Afghanistan. He had based himself in the Frontier Corps Officers Mess of Miran Shah cantonment in North Waziristan and Naik (Non-Commissioned Officer) Gul Dad, a Jani Khel Wazir of the British Intelligence Service was attached to him as a guide and translator. (Guldad, father of Major [retired] Gulzar Wazir, a known newspapers' columnist and Mohammad Javaid Wazir, a [retired] senior civil officer of the Pakistan government, finally retired from the Pakistan Intelligence service as Honorary Captain. He was rightly referred to as "Baba-e-Intelligence" – the father of Intelligence.
In 1929, Khost and Paktya came once again into prominence when General Nadir Khan, in exile in France, travelling through British India entered Afghanistan via Khost and fighting his way all through reached Kabul and ousted "Bacha-e-Saqao".
Basing his knowledge on the location and history of the people of Khost and Paktya, Captain Guldad, after the Communists take-over of Kabul in April 1978, would always say that the eventual success of the mujahideen against the Communists lay in the consolidation of their position in Khost and transforming it into a launching pad for their further operations against Kabul.
The mujahideen had also appreciated the importance of Khost and Paktya and had tried to make that area their stronghold for further operations.

The Operations

The Khost garrison was under the constant attacks of the mujahideen. During the second week of May 1979, a motorized brigade of the Central Army Corps 7th Division was despatched from Kabul to fight the mujahideen in Paktya province. On 17 May it set out from Gardez on the road to Khost and made contact with a mujahideen force. But the disillusioned brigade commander surrendered his entire formation to the mujahideen, along with the armoured vehicles and heavy weapons, apparently on the condition that they be able to keep their army uniforms and weapons and join the fight against the government. The defection of an entire brigade of perhaps 2,000 men together with its armoured vehicles and heavy weapons was a serious blow to the government. This development had set pace for further surrenders.
An army attack on the powerful Zadran tribe on the road from Gardez to Khost during 1979 suffered a humiliating defeat and set the scene for future battles in the area.
During June 1980 at least one motor rifle company of the Soviet 201st Motor Rifle Division, which had launched operation in Gardez-Khost area was said to have been wiped out in an ambush of the mujahideen. Such actions had become the stuff of mujahideen legend.
The government attempts to block the mujahideen supply routes from Pakistan had remained largely ineffective. Various methods were tried. Increasing use was made of air dropped PFM-1 mines. These weapons referred to in the West as “butterfly” and among Soviet soldiery as “green parrots”, were scattered usually by helicopters in huge numbers along the supply routes.4 Other measures to stop the mujahideen included fresh attempts to buy the services of tribal groups near the frontier. The task was assigned to Tribal Minister Sulaiman Laeq. This tribal recruiting drive had met with some success. In several places tribal Revolution Defence Groups were formed. In Paktya province, during 1981, the 300-strong militia group “TOURI” was raised at Mangal and the 60-man unit “TUFAN” at Khost by Laeq.5
Since the early days of the war, Khost, which is closer to mujahideen bases across the Pakistan border than it is to any Afghan garrison had been difficult to re-supply. It depended on one road, which was often roked by mujahideen fire. It had an airfield which was frequently under fire and when helicopters could not land supplies had to be parachuted in. The garrison was under strength and by 1988 totalled about 2500 men with around a500 in Khost itself and others in outlying posts. The Soviet advisers numbered about two dozen.
Correspondingly the strength of the mujahideen in the area was growing quickly and they were also well armed.
The Soviet pilots dreaded flying into Khost because of the mujahideen occupying bases on the hills surrounding Khost. According to a Soviet pilot the airfield was packed with burnt out aircrafts making landing at and take off from Khost difficult.
In early 1983 an outlying post, belonging to the 59th Brigade ex-25th Division, in Nader Shah Kot, fell to the mujahideen and 130 government troops were killed or surrendered in this action. Some soldiers before their surrender had killed their officers. Emboldened, the mujahideen started tightening their ring around the Khost garrison. In June 1983, the Afghan army sent Colonel Farooq’s 38th Commando Brigade to try breaking the siege of Khost, but it failed.
Urgun in Paktika province was a smaller target than Khost. Its garrison consisted of the 18th Brigade. This Brigade under command of Colonel Rahman consisted, in mid-1983, of about 900 men. About 600 of those were in Urgun itself and the remainders in outlying posts. The number of Soviet advisers was estimated at only five. The Brigade had a battery (six) of D-30 122mm gun howitzers, 5XT-55 tanks and several APCs. The Brigade was supplemented by a Revolution Defence Group, which apparently included a few dozen local women.
In autumn 1983, two tank crews defected from the garrison, bringing their T-55 tanks with them. Though the arrival of the armour could have been a boon it actually provided an enormous row over their possession among the various mujahideen groups.
The siege of the town had, however, continued and was lifted at the end of January 1984. The failure of the mujahideen was mainly due to the disunity amongst the various groups and their inability to clear the minefield around Urgun. They did not have sappers for the job.
The situation in Khost, Paktya and Paktika was becoming serious for the regime with every passing day. A composite force of a brigade and an artillery unit ex-8 Mechanized Infantry Division, Qargha, and 37th Commando Brigade of Colonel Shah Nawaz Tanai was formed as duly supported by Soviet aircrafts, and launched into Paktya on August 13, 1983. The 37th Brigade was flown into Khost by helicopters as the situation there had become critical. Fighting around Khost continued during the months of August – October 1983, and the mujahideen were pushed back. The 37th Commando Brigade, which had faced the main brunt of the attacks, was airlifted back to Kabul.
The mujahideen had gained in strength during 1983. They were receiving greater amounts of heavy weaponries, had developed better field cooperation and deployed quite large forces against Khost and Urgun. At the year’s end both towns remained besieged.
On 22 January 1984, the Kabul regime announced that the siege of Urgun had ended. The 15th Brigade with about 600 men and a further 150-200 militia, under command of Colonel Rehman, had held off a force of about 2,000 mujahideen. The reasons for the mujahideen failure were the usual disunity and rivalries and leaving of positions by many due to the prolonged length of the siege and the onset of winter. Also the 15th Brigade’s positions were surrounded by dense mines which the mujahideen, due to lack of knowledge, could not clear and penetrate.6
 During 1984, the Kabul regime was successful in buying support of some tribals in Paktya and Paktika. In January they had announced for formation of the 1st Tribal Regiment. This unit was made up of Pushtun tribals from the Rud-e-Ahmadzai area of Paktya province.
The breaking of the siege of Ali Khel garrison (also called Jaji) in Paktya province, which had remained surrounded by the mujahideen for most part of 1984, was the next target of the Communist regime. In August that year the Soviets undertook that operation by employing their 70th Motor Rifle Brigade as assisted by a regiment from the 104th Guards Air Assault Division from Kisarabad, Transcaucasus Military District, the Afghan 38th Commando Brigade and some elements of the Gardez based 12th Infantry Division. The operation was successful and the mujahideen were driven back. During mid-November 1984 sweeping operations were conducted with MI-6 helicopters around Khost and the mujahideen supply routes from Pakistan, but with no favourable results. The mujahideen strongholds in Jaji and Zhawar also remained safe.
During June 1985, the mujahideen planned to take Khost; the men mostly involved being those of Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani (of Maulvi Khalis group) and Effendi Gailani’s National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. Attacks on Khost, defended by 25 Infantry Division, the 2nd Border Brigade and the 37 Commando Brigade, continued throughout the month of July, but with no success.
To relieve pressure on Khost, the Soviet and Afghan forces, composed as under, planned one of their biggest offensives on August 20, 1985:

1. The Soviet Force
1. One Motor Rife Regiment of the 108th Motor Rifle Division
2. Elements of 103rd Guards Air Assault Division;
3. 66th Motor Rifle Brigade

1. The Afghan Force
1. Elements of 8th, 11th, 12th and 25th Divisions;
2. 37th Commando Brigade;
3. 1st, 2nd and 8th Border Brigades;
4. 466th Commando Battalion.

 

The offensive was launched on 21st August. A mechanized column reached Logar region on 23rd August after clearing oppositions around Bagrami and enroute. The second column was sent from Jalalabad on South-Westerly direction. A third column was moved out of Khost towards Jaji and on August 28 it attacked Tani. From there on, the advance towards Zhawar had become extremely difficult because of the stiff opposition from the mujahideen. A distance of 20 kilometres was covered in 10 days. When the attackers reached close to Zhawar base, several hundred Afghan refugees from different parties left their refugee camps inside Pakistan and came to the rescue of Zhawar post. The post was saved by the combined action of several mujahideen parties, showing unity. Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani was pleased with his men’s performance and his standing increased.
By mid-September the regime’s operation was called off.
The siege of Khost was broken, at least, for the time being.

The Zhawar Base

The Zhawar base was organized as per proper military technique;

1. An outer perimeter of defensive trenches was connected together by tunnels;
2.  Several dug-in tanks (captured from the enemy in the previous engagements) provided defensive fire;
3. Anti-aircraft guns and surface to air missiles gave protection from aerial strikes; (3 X 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, dozens of heavy machine guns and several SA-7).
4. Various trenches were linked by communication channels;
5. Arrangements were made for repair and maintenance, with overhead covers;
6. Inside the six tunnels caves (each about two average size bedrooms); there were generators and a field telephone system linking different areas.

After the failure of the Kabul regime in taking the mujahideen base of Zhawar in September 1985, Haqqani had declared it as invincible. The government thus planned another major offensive in March 1986 and concentrated the following forces in Paktya:

1. The Soviet Force
1. 40th Guards Air Assault Regiment ex 103rd Guards Air Assault Division in Dar-ul-Aman, Kabul;
2. Air support.

1. The Afghan Force
1. Elements of 12, 14 and 25 Infantry Divisions;
2. Elements of 8 Mechanized Infantry Division (ex-1 Corps)
3. No 88 Artillery Brigade Group;
4. 37th Commando Brigade;
5. 466 Commando Battalion from Kandahar
6. Engineers

 

The over-all operational command rested in the hands of Major General Shah Nawaz Tanai and he had his deputy as Brigadier Abdul Ghafoor.
The operation was planned to:

1. Ensure safety of the military convoy carrying goods to the Khost Garrison;
2. Re-enforce 25 Division and No 2 Border Brigade Group;
3. Capture the mujahideen strong hold of Zhawar; which is at a distance of 2 to 3 KMs from the Pakistan border;
4.  Expand the defensive areas of Khost.

The military convoy was to be conducted to Khost via the valley of Chamkanni and Jaji Maidan.
Throughout March 1986, troops concentrated in Paktya area.
The attack commenced on 3 Aril 1986 by first bombing of Zhawar Base. Immediately thereafter the specially trained counter-insurgency Soviet forces landed by helicopters near the base to carry out its destruction. A total of 500 commandos participated in the attacks with the object of cutting off all exit and entry points to the Zharwar Base and then launch attack from Khost outwards. Brigadier Ghafoor used the hammer and anvil tactics. Another strong Soviet/Afghan force moved towards the base duly supported by air and artillery bombardment. The Afghan commandos ran into a mujahideen patrol immediately on disembarking from the helicopters. Two of the MI 8’s were destroyed and over half of the commandos killed. The other half surrendered to the mujahideen.
The first phase of the Zhawar Operation by the Soviets was designed to capture and hold the base by the Commandos force till relieved by the garrison at Khost. This plan failed because for lack of proper intelligence and inability of the main garrison to provide assistance whenever the Commandos were surprised by a mujahideen ambush.
The Zhawar post was pounded with massive artillery and air attacks. SU-25s dropped laser guided bombs into the caves mouths killing many mujahideen. In one of these attacks Haqqani himself was injured and was sent to Pakistan for medical treatment.
Seven thousand Soviet-Kabul forces attacked Zhawar after three weeks of heavy shelling. The mujahideen had perforce to vacate the area.
On 20 April 1988 the Afghan troops reached the Zhawar base. It needed another four days of hand to hand fighting before the base was cleared. The caves and bunkers were destroyed. Several other bases in the area were also taken.
After another encounter in April 1988, Brigadier General Arif, Commander 25 Infantry Division at Khost, claimed that the Afghan armed forces had achieved another victory of wiping out the “bandits’ from Zhawar where encasements were built by US, Pakistan and China.
The mujahideen casualties were estimated by others at over 1,000 as against mujahideen’s own claim of being 250 killed.
Commander Haqqani had not succeeded in over-running the Khost garrison which had continued to receive supplies and re-enforcements by air and land from Kabul and Gardez. It was mentioned that the tribes living in Pakistan had been clandestinely providing food and ammunition to the Khost garrison for large sums of money.
After the fall of Zhawar, Jaji was the next target of the regime. On 6 May 1986, the Soviets started bombing and shelling the area. On 11 May a joint Afghan force attacked the mujahideen bases in the area but with not much of success. The forces, therefore, withdrew on 18 May.
The mujahideen once again resorted to offensive actions. During late 1986, they evicted the 907th Border Battalion from its position near Tani, the home town of General Shah Nawaz Tani. Fearing that the success may not encourage the mujahideen to threaten Khost and other areas, General Tani flew to Khost on 5 December for recapture of his hometown. He was soon successful. His co-tribesmen had supported him in the operation who were also mostly Khalqis like him.
With a view to destroying the supply dumps of the mujahideen, the Ali Khel (Jaji) area was subjected to heavy bombing on May 20, 1987, and after a few days a joint Soviet-Afghan ground force of 3,500 strong attacked the town, which was defended by men of Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar), Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis) and Islamic Society of Afghanistan. The whole operation did not yield the desired results, mostly because of the effective anti-aircraft actions of the mujahideen who had also effectively used the stingers.
The mujahideen were desperately in need for a liberated area close to Pakistan border into which the Afghan interim government (AIG) could move and establish a government inside Afghanistan. Capture of Khost, after the Jalalabad, debacle could have been a face saving it.
Strategically Khost gave protection to Gardez, the capital of Paktya, and was, therefore, strongly held to prevent a threat developing to a provincial capital. Dr Najeeb and his Defence Minister Shah Nawaz Tanai both came from Paktia area and there was, therefore, an emotional reason for the defence of Khost as well.
Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani had been operating in the area around Khost for a long time. He knew the terrain very well. Supply of weapons and ammunition would have not posed much of a problem as the ammunition dumps were only a stone throw away and safe in Pakistani territory. Every thing pointed to a sure success, except that the regime enjoyed total control in the air. Stingers, Blowpipes and the Chinese anti-aircraft weapons could bring down a few aircraft and helicopters, but they could not prevent massive aerial bombardment by high flying Soviet built bombers. But still the mujahideen, emboldened by the possession of stingers and blowpipes, had started their control further in the area and brought Khost under siege, denying supplies to the army garrison and civilians therein both by air and through roads – Pakistan – Khost and Khost – Gardez.
Supplies in Khost, where about 40,000 civilians and 8,000 soldiers were living, were running short. The situation was exploited by Dr. Najeebullah during the Loya Jirgah of 29-30 November 1987, and it was decided to send a peace Jirgah to Zadrans, living astride Khost-Gardez road, to influence them for reconciliation and dissociation from the other mujahideen. An ultimatum of 20 days was simultaneously given to the mujahideen for lifting the siege, which expired on December 19, 1987, with a negative response from the latter. The efforts of the constituted ‘Local Jirgah’ also could not succeed with the Zadrans.
The plan of Dr. Najeebullah to send Jirgah to the Zadrans and other local tribes was, believably, aimed at achieving one or more of the following:

1. To gain more time for giving final touches to the plan of their attack and also divert the attention of the mujahideen;
2. To use tactics of bribe through the jirgah and otherwise for creating a peace zone in Khost and to thereafter declare the success of national reconciliation programme of his government;
3. To portray himself before the Afghan refugees and the world as a man of peace;
4. To impress upon the Soviets that the Afghan armed forces were as yet not able enough to meet the situation inside the country by themselves and hence the Soviet troops remained indispensable to the existence of the present Afghan regime.

By August 1987 the Regime’s air and ground operations in the border lands had somewhat declined resulting in the increase in flow of weapons to the mujahideen. With the ever increasing tightening of the siege by the mujahideen, the Afghan army as directed and assisted by the Soviet armed forces, had started stock-piling war material and other supplies in Gardez and Ghazni, the staging areas for relief efforts of Khost. Movement of large armoured and supply convoys out of Kabul towards Gardez and Ghazni, with air cover, was then an almost daily feature. To reach Gardez, the Soviet and Afghan troops had to first clear the road through Logar, where occasional fighting had started taking place since early October 1987.
Composition of the troops involved in the ‘relief operation’ of Khost was as under:

1. Soviet Troops
1. Regiment of paratroopers from Kabul, commanded by Lieut Colonel Vostrotin;
2. Elements of Gardez based Air Assault Brigade;
3. One Battalion of Motor Rifle Troops from Ghazni;
4. An Artillery Regiment of 103rd Guards Air Assault Division;
5. One Regiment of helicopters, deployed at Gardez;
6. One Sapper Battalion from the 40th Army Engineers Sapper Regiment.
2. Afghan Troops
1. 37th Commando Brigade;
2. Elements of 12th and 28th Divisions;
3. About 1,000 WAD (Afghan Intelligence/Security) personnel;
4. About 2,500 militiamen.

Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, Commander of the 40th Army, was in overall command of the Soviet troops. By one estimate total strength of the two troops was about 18,000. As against this figure, the mujahideen, drawn from Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar), National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA of Effendi Gailani), Islamic Unity (Professor Sayyaf) and Hizb-e-Islami (Maulvi Khalis), were about 8,000 at the start of the operation but had swelled to about 10,000 by the end. Apart from this a powerful contingent of local Zadran tribesmen, armed with latest weapons, supplied by Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani, controlled the Sate Kandao pass on the Gardez-Khost road.
All the advanced arrangements for the Khost operations aside, significant was the absence from the scene of battle of General Shah Nawaz Tanai, the Afghan Army Chief of General Staff. He is the officer who had always been leading his troops personally in Paktya area and even the Soviets had also tipped him earlier for undertaking the Khost operation. He had accompanied President Najeebullah from December 24 to 31, 1987, on his official visits to Vietnam and Kampuchea with night stop-over at New Delhi. His absence was generally attributed to one or more of the following reasons:

1. The plan of operation was made by the Soviet Commanders, who, as a subsequent thought, wanted to implement it themselves with no interference from any high Afghan Army officer. In the presence of General Shah Nawaz Tanai, they could not possibly have their own way, though, earlier they had tipped Tanai for it. Tanai comes from Paktya province and is intimately acquainted with the locals, the area and the conditions;
2. Back home the Soviets wanted to get credit for the achievements in Khost. With this success the Soviet Army could claim that they were quite capable of dealing with the mujahideen and that the reversals were faced by the Afghan armed forces. The “invincible Red Army” could not then be called a “defeated army”;
3. General Tanai had more important tasks in Vietnam in obtaining agreements in training of the Afghan armed forces in guerrilla warfare;
4. Both the Soviets and Afghan armed forces were sure of their success in the Khost operation and hence presence of General Tanai considered not that much important.

The operation was conducted in three phases:

1. Phase-One. It began on 19 November 1987, involving the Afghan troops. By November 29 areas around Gardez were cleared and advance was made up to Shabak Khel near Sate Kandao;

1. Phase–Two. It commenced on 30 November. About 900 Commandos were landed by helicopters in the Shabak Khel valley. The road beyond was gradually cleared of mines and slightly improved for vehicles movements, by the Soviet sappers. The Afghan troops were continuously being attacked by the mujahideen inflicting heavy casualties. Detachments of the 25th Division, based at Nader Shah Kot, started advancing from the easterly direction towards Sate Kandao.

 

1. Phase-Three. This phase was launched around 18 December. The Soviet paratroopers were committed for the battle for control of Sate Kandao. The heights around the pass were seized during night heliborne assaults. The mujahideen stingers positioned on heights were ineffective against the helicopters which were flying very low almost along the valley floor. By 23 December Sate Kandao fell to the combined Soviet-Afghan troops. Losses to both sides were heavy, though comparatively more to mujahideen.

By 29 December the Sappers had opened Gardez-Khost road. The two columns from either side had linked each other on December 30, 1987, in the vicinity of Khost. Relief supplies were immediately moved into the city of Khost through a different route. The close-by presence of loaded relief convoys gave an impression that the Soviet-Afghan forces were convinced that the mujahideen, like before, would not attempt on putting up a standing fight like a regular army, but rather concentrate on inflicting casualties on the advancing forces and then withdraw in the manner of the usual guerrillas.
The Afghan army alone could have not possibly ventured on such difficult operation.
The siege of Khost was lifted.
The defensive ring around Khost airfield was extended so as to make it less vulnerable to mujahideen attacks.
It was being said that Maulvi Haqqani, after the Zhawar Operations, had been trying to impose his authority over the commanders of other parties, participating in the Khost operation, which had caused heart-burning, with consequent setback to the operations as well.
The Kabul TV had been showing only the Afghan troops during the Khost operation (and not the Soviets), having captured large quantities of arms and ammunitions from the mujahideen, lying in dumps inside and at the mouths of tunnels, dug into the hills. The captured weapons laid out in perfect order stacks gave the impression that the mujahideen did not have the time or any advance plan in their hands for their destruction/demolition before withdrawal and evacuation of the place.
The Khost operation had gained significant prominence because of the extensive publicity given to it, before, during and after its success. It had been equally successfully exploited by President Najeebullah during the Loya Jirgah of 29-30 November 1983.
With completion of the first phase of the Soviet’s troop’s withdrawal, the Afghan army, in their re-deployment programme, withdrew troops from certain places, correspondingly encouraging the mujahideen for increasing their pressure on the Kabul regime. On 5 October 1988, Sherane, the capital of Paktika province, fell to the mujahideen. It had been evacuated by the government troops leaving behind a large quantity of weapons.
After the unsuccessful attempt to capture Khost the mujahideen once again turned their attention towards it. All the Peshawar-based parties and their commanders in the field coordinated their efforts to try once again to liberate Khost.
The following forces of the Regime defended Khost at that time:

1. ARMY

Formation                                                 Strength (all ranks)
a.    No 25 Div Khost                                                1500
b.   No 2 Border Bde Gp                                             800
c.   Descent/Para Bde                                                 666
d.   No 37 Commando Bde Gp                                     300
e.    No 53 Jauzjani Div (of Gen Dostam)                    1100
f.    Re-enforcement from Kabul                                  500
      Total                                                                 4866

1. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

a.    Khost Police Force                                               500
b.   Defence of Revolution Unit                                    500
c.   Police Re-enforcement                                          500
Total                                                                 1500

1. MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY

a.    Guard Bde Gp                                                      600
b.   Descent/Para Guard                                              200
c.   State Security Khost                                             300
d.   Re-enforcement                                                   200
Total                                                                       1300
(Source:                General Azimi; 460. According to Azimi, had there been NO ‘traitors’ and the weather was NOT unfavourable (for air action/support), the defending forces of Khost would have had a definite advantage over the mujahideen.)

On March 2, 1991, the mujahideen started advancing towards this garrison town, known as ‘little Moscow’. They eliminated the border security posts around the city and simultaneously occupied the mountain passes which connected Khost with Gardez to prevent re-enforcements coming. Both the old and new airports of Khost were then their next objectives. Both the airports had become unusable when the mujahideen advanced to within 200 metres of them and the Kabul regime forces could no longer use them for resupply of their besieged garrison town. They lost two aircrafts on 26 and 29 March while attempting to do so because of the automatic fire from the ground.
On 31 March 1991, Khost was in the hands of the mujahideen. About 2200 officers and men of the Afghan army, including some Generals were taken prisoners. A large amount of heavy weapons, tanks, artillery guns and aircraft had come in their possession. About 500 regime soldiers were killed.
Three Afghan Army Brigadiers – Abdul Halim Commander Guard-e-Khas force in Khost, Atta Mohammad head of the KHAD force and belonging to Ghazni province and Abd-ur-Rehman from Kabul province, also belonging to Guard-e-Khas force, were included in the 306 prisoners who were captured by National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA of Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani). They were held in a NIFA facility at Shagai.
Brigadier Gul Aqa, along with his 60 soldiers and officers, had surrendered to Maulvi Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani. Gul Aqa had served as a commander of the 19th unit in Khost for six years. He was appointed commander 25th Brigade in Khost when the mujahideen had increased their pressure on Khost one year ago.
Mujahideen’s casualties were said to be 200 killed and 500 wounded in the battle.
General Rahim Wardak who was Kabul’s Military Attaché in India but defected to the mujahideen in 1978 (to Effendi Gailani’s NIFA) and (June 2007 – Afghan Defence Minister in President Karzai’s government in Kabul) said that: “The victory in Khost is more of a moral booster for the mujahideen. The fall of a city, known as little Moscow, has helped the mujahideen regain self confidence”. (The News; 07 April 1991).
After the fall of Khost Afghan President Najeebullah wrote to the Presidents of Iran and Turkey, seeking their help to halt, what he called, Pakistan’s interference in Khost. He asked the two Presidents to stop “Pakistan from aggression against our country.” Pakistan had already denied sending any troops to Khost and said that the offensive was planned and executed by the Afghan mujahideen on their own. (The News; 04 April 1991).
On April 07, 1991, I, the author, then Pakistan’s Charge d’ Affaires in Kabul, was called to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a protest was lodged over the visit of Amir Jama’at-e-Islami, Pakistan, Senator Qazi Hussain Ahmad to mujahideen controlled Khost, and thus entering the Afghan territory without passport and visa. Lodging of protest and counter-protests and rejection had become almost a routine affair. After relaxation of the charged atmosphere, when both sides were in a lighter mood, I thanked the Afghan official for officially recognizing the Durand Line as the international border. He just smiled. The Ministry’s officials, except for the few diehard communists, were always very courteous. We had developed fairly good understanding with each other.
After the capture of Khost the mujahideen had formed “Shura-e-Aali Wilayat-e-Khost (The High Council of Khost Province) to run the administration of that province. Composition of the same is at Annexure A.
According to General Nabi Azimi from 7 Saur 1357 (April 27, 1978 AD) to the downfall of Dr Najeeb government (April 1992), 44 AN-32 aircrafts, 7 AN 26 aircrafts, a total of 51 aircrafts, with an estimated cost of 340 million US $ were damaged/destroyed at Khost unmettled airport, while conveying relief goods/equipments etc to the Khost garrison. (P: 452).

Annexure A

SHURA-E-AALI WILAYAT-E-KHOST
(The Higher Council of Khost Province)

After the fall of KHOST to the mujahideen in 1991, a Higher Council was formed of the following members, to run the administration of the province:

1	Maulvi Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani	Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis)
2	Haji Ibad-ur-Rehman	Mahaz-e-Milli NIFA Effendi Gailani
3	Arman Sahib	Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar)
4	Maulvi Mirajan	Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami (Maulvi Nabi)
5	Haji Parokai	Nijat-e-Milli (ANLF Prof Mojaddedi)
6	Commander Sher Khan	NIFA
7	Maulvi Mohammad Sharif	Jamiat-e-Islami (Prof Rabbani)
8	Dr Hazratullah	Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis)
9	Maulvi Pir Mohammad	Ettehad-e-Islami (Prof Sayyaf)
10	Haji Bahadur	Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami (Maulvi Nabi)

The distribution of ministries amongst the various par ties was made as under:

a.	Finance	Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar)
b.	Justice	Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami (Maulvi Nabi)
c.	Interior	Hizb-e-Islami (Maulvi Khalis)
d.	Information and Publicity	Hizb-e-Islami (Maulvi Khalis
e.	Health	Jamiat-e-Islami (Prof Rabbani)
f.	Reconstruction	NIFA (Pir Gilani)
g.	Communication	ANLF (Hazrat Sibghatullah Mojaddedi
h.	Nationalities	Ettehad-e-Islami (Prof Sayyaf)

The secretariat was to be manned by Eng Hikmatyar.