THE POLICY OF CHINA AND RUSSIA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION:
IMPLICATIONS ON CENTRAL ASIA

Assanbayev Mukhit*

The latest political developments in Central Asia, undoubtedly, have been a consequence of China and Russia’s active involvement in the affairs of the region and inadequate policies of USA and Western block, as well as passive, “wait and see” policy of the Central Asian countries. In this connection, one can make only interim conclusion: political and economic processes in the region mainly reflect the success and failure of the policies of the external centers of power. But if, during the next 10-15 years, Central Asian countries continue to be in the state of indecision and waiting as before, and act only in reaction to the policies of the three external centers of power in the region, then the geopolitical changes in favor of the strengthening of one of external centers of power, are imminent.
The strong involvement of China and Russia’s interests in the region is seen on activation of Beijing and Moscow policy in the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
The phenomenon of Shanghai Cooperation Organization or why do China and Russia dominate in SCO? In connection of the domination of the interests of China and Russia, the following must be understood. As far as the strengthening of the strategic cooperation of the Central Asian countries with China and Russia within the framework of SCO is concerned, the unjustified criticism and political pressure from West, based on the so called principle of “protection of human rights”, during the electoral and politically unstable periods (such as on the eve of the presidential and parliamentary elections and during intra-political crises in Central Asian countries) have, in many respects, greatly influenced the current policy of the Central Asian countries. But, perhaps, the greatest incentive for the Central Asian countries to come closer to China and Russia was the US participation in the preparation for the replacement of the ruling regimes in the post-Soviet space which has been greatly undermining the mutual faith between them. The events in Georgia (in 2003), Ukraine (2004-2005), Kyrgyzstan (2005) gave start to review their attitude towards the West.
Here it can he said that the political pressure put by the West under the banner of “protection of’ human rights” and the US attempts to replace the ruling regimes in the post-Soviet space are simply pushing the Central Asian countries towards a closer cooperation with Russia and China which is giving birth to unity of views between them regarding the Western strategy of “evolutionary development” directed towards the change in the existing structure in the Central Asian countries. And against this background of the Western criticism, since Moscow and Beijing are, as a rule, the only countries openly supporting the acting leadership of the Central Asian countries during the period of complex political processes (as was the case of criticism by the countries of EU, OSCE and USA in connection with the events in Andijon), all the latest changes in the geopolitical configuration inside and around SCO have, naturally, developed in favor of’ Russia and China. It is therefore not surprising that once the events in Andijon were over the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov flew to Beijing and Moscow, and the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev, after the Presidential elections were over, made his first foreign visit to Russia.
Thus, as soon as USA and the European Union took a rash step in connection with the events in Andijon, Tashkent simply shifted its foreign policy emphasis in the direction of strengthening of cooperation with Russia and China in the framework of SCO. But if there was no criticism, pressure, blackmail etc. of a truly foolish and irrational approach on this issue, there would have been no strengthening of the influence of’ SCO or removal of American base from Uzbekistan. The outside players see only what they wish to see and what they are the most afraid of.
In China, on the other hand, it is very clearly understood that as long as the Communist leadership of the country openly supports the rulers in Central Asian countries as a counterbalance to the pressure from the West, SCO will play in their hands and will reflect to a greater extent their interests with respect to the West.
As a result, at present, much more activeness in the political and economic processes in Kazakhstan and in Central Asian countries is shown by China and Russia. That is why those are the places visited by the Presidents of the countries of the region after or before all the important political events.
At the same time there is a serious difference of opinion between Russia and China on the question of further development of SCO, since each of these countries defines the priorities of the organization in its own way. Each of them looks at the future of SCO from the angle of its own national interests in the region of Central Asia. As a matter of fact, despite the present unity of opinion regarding the presence of the West in the Central Asia, from the long-term perspective, the contradictions between China and Russia will only increase. Their essence is simple: Russia strives to retain its influence in Central Asian countries and protect this region from the increasing influence of China. On the other hand China strives to increase its influence in the region on account of the weakening of’ the Russian influence. This can explain the existence of several disputable and contradictory issues between Russia and China and they will have a tendency to increase in future.

Russia and China’s Increasing Contributions within the Framework of SCO

Very few people know that within the framework of SCO several concrete differences of opinions exist between Russia and China, which mainly come down to the question of the future status and perspectives of development of SCO as a regional organization. Among them one can separate out three most prominent issues.

1. In Russia lately they have started discussing the rationality of the further widening the field of activity of SCO as a regional security structure, since the strengthening of this organization will obstruct the development of CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) which is another organization, more important from the view point of ensuring security and territorial integrity of Russia and CIS countries on the whole. Here, Russia as well as other CIS countries clearly understand that as military-cum-political structure CSTO should not allow under any circumstances the interference of third forces (including China) in the affairs of the countries united under its banner. Only in that case CSTO can effectively supplement CIS and EEC, and cooperate with NATO and SCO in the global context.1

Moreover, it must be noted that Russia doesn’t want erosion of’ the functional boundaries of CSTO and in this connection its measures for resolving the contradictions between CSTO and SCO in the sphere of security will be directed towards the rec­onciliation of the zone of responsibility of SCO in the direction of South Asia, particularly by including into the framework of SCO such member’ countries as India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.2
In turn, all this shows that Russia traditionally considers the countries of Central Asia as a strategic buffer against external threats and many foreign policy interests force Russia to retain the given region within the sphere of its influence. Moreover, the protection of economic interests is one of the most important foreign policy aims.3
This is confirmed also by the fact that in none of the basic documents of Russia, approved in the beginning of V. Putin’s Presidency — Concepts of’ Foreign Policy (approved by President of Russian Federation on 28th June 2000) and Concepts of National Security (approved by’ the order of President V. Putin on 10th January 2000) -there is no mention of SCO, although SCO started functioning as early as April 1996 when an agreement on strengthening the confidence military sphere in the border districts was signed in Shanghai. There was no mention of SCO also in the speech of the Minister of External Affairs of Russia V. Lavrov during the 60th session of’ the UN General Assembly in New York on 18th September 2005. In this speech the main attention of this head of the foreign ministry was focused on the formation of a balanced and safe international system based on respecting the peculiarities of each country, sovereign equality and collective responsibility and organization of struggle against terrorism.4

1. The second no less important contradiction between the views of China and Russia are the discussions about the priority direction of’ development of SCO in future. ‘This contradiction is particularly noticeable in the background of activation of China in Central Asian countries at the bilateral level as well as at the level of SCO.

Thus China thinks that in the nearest coming years SCO should transfer the centre of gravity of its work from the sphere of security and the confidence building measures to economy and energy sector because the further development of this organization will become difficult without cooperation in economy and energy sector.5 Therefore Beijing is insisting on the creation of an integration space within the framework of SCO in the nearest future.
Russia, however, proceeds from the understanding that the preferred direction of development of SCO as before, should be the cooperation in the sphere of security, and “insists on continuing the traditional activity of’ SCO in the sphere of light against terrorism, extremism and separatism,”6 and that too at the present level of interaction because originally the organization was created for’ these very purposes and this continues to be an issue of principal importance.
So far as the Chinese proposal of creation of a single integration space within the framework of SCO is concerned, in Moscow it is assessed as a distant task since at present one can talk only about individual sub-regional integration projects between 2 or 3 countries with comparable economies.7
Complexity of the given situation consists of the fact that the Central Asian countries themselves haven’t still firmly determined their view on this issue. At least no Central Asian country has so far made any official statement on this question. One would like to believe that soon the position of the countries of the region on this question will become clear and it will reflect the Russian point of view because the political elite of the region cannot ignore point of view of the people of the region who negatively assess the perspective of the increase of China’s economic influence and interests in the Central Asian countries, particularly when it concerns the active expansion of the Chinese oil companies in Kazakhstan.
Moreover Russia is already carrying out, together with the Central Asian countries, the regional economic integration within the framework of EEC (Eurasian Economic Commonwealth) and EES (Eurasian Economic Space). Thus, in this regard, the integration and cooperation within the framework of EEC arid EES is which more important than SCO for Russia as well as the Central Asian countries. Accordingly one can expect that the strengthening of the integration processes within the framework of EEC will further increase the Russian-Chinese contradictions in SCO.

1. In Russia today there is an increasing fear that close political and economic cooperation with China at bilateral Russian—Chinese level and particularly “the disproportionately large percentage of Chinese investments in the economy of the country is clearly dangerous from the strategic point of view and is not in the long—term interests of the country.”8 Russia has gradually’ started realizing that by promoting the strengthening of China in its economic growth and in increasing its political influence in Eurasia, Russia is subjecting itself to a great danger in future since the economic integration of Russia and China can have very sad demographic consequences for Russia while the increase in Chinese influence in Central Asian countries will lead to weakening of the Russian influence and, in future, to loss of this region.

V. Putin’s last visit to China in the spring of 2006 has to be considered in this context since it became clear then that Russia is in no hurry to implement the construction of the oil pipeline branch to China from the oil pipeline being constructed to Japan and Korea (the length of’ this oil pipeline from Siberia, being constructed along the Japanese coastline of Pacific Ocean. is 4100 km) precisely because of “the factor of Chinese demographic expansion in Siberia and Far East.”9

Commenting on V. Putin’s China visit, one of the ideologists of’ modern Russia, having great influence on the Russian political elite, A. Dugin writes that “by supplying oil to China we (i.e. Russia) are strengthening the economic position of our possible competitor: the Chinese demography is capable of sharply flooding the Eastern Siberia and Far East and, as a matter of fact, easily break it away from Russia later.”10
“There is always a danger of becoming too dependent on China. And I think that Russian government well understands this threat”. Thus explains the situation V. Larin, Russian expert on China working at the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the People of Russian Far East in Vladivostok.11
Such opinions, in case of their strengthening in Russia, can possibly become decisive while defining Russia’s foreign policy strategy on China, including the sphere of further cooperation in SCO. It is sufficient to note that many Russian experts have started doubting in general the strategic advisability of increasing Russia’s contacts with China, including those in SCO, since Beijing will never take Russia or the states of Central Asia, i.e. its partner’s in SCO, seriously in visible future.12
Many Russian researchers, such as S. Luzyanin, link Russia’s fears on account of the activation of Chinese politics in Central Asian countries with the increase in the Russian-Chinese competition for transport and power markets and corridors.13
Similar opinion about the future conflict between China and Russia on account of’ rivalry’ is expressed also by the Kazakh expert M. Laumuhin: “China is demonstrating an active, aggressive nature of its vision of the future of Central Asia. Such a strategy is bound to lead in future to sharpening of Chinese-Russian relations and can lead to the change of the format from cooperation to rivalry for the right to be the main active power in the region.”14
Western experts also mention the change noticed in the foreign policy priorities of’ the Russian leadership. Thus, according to the experts of The Heritage Foundation, starting from 2004 the highest Russian bureaucrats have been emphasizing Moscow’s negative attitude towards China’s military presence in Central Asia and have been speaking out more and more often against the increasing Chinese strategic role.15 In this connection a whole series of publications on the theme of Chinese threat to Russia has appeared in the Western Publications as well.16
It is not a matter of chance that in Russia itself the criticism of’ the close cooperation of the border regions of the country with China has become much more frequent. One can say that the anti Chinese call in Russia is increasingly becoming a part of the politics during the period of elections to local executive and legislative body of power in a number of districts of the country bordering with China.
SCO and further political developments in Central Asia: Implications for Central Asia. Particularly all the Central Asian countries (and even neutral Turkmenistan) look at the geopolitical game around the region in two ways. On the one hand, each country of the region recognizes the helplessness of the situation when the region, rich in natural resources, unavoidably becomes object of constant attention of the international centers of power – USA, Russia and China. In this situation they have no other choice but to occupy a position equidistant from the main centers of power who are actively involved at present in the geopolitical processes in the region. Accordingly, practically all the countries of the region are adopting a similar policy which can be characterized on the whole as intermediate or interim policy, aimed at the resolution of short-term and medium-term tasks. Moreover, the current i.e. short-term vector of direction of the development of their foreign policy will depend upon the position and politics of USA, Russia and China in the region. Therefore, one doesn’t have to talk about any influence of the regional internal political processes on the foreign policy of’ the Central Asian countries. On the contrary, any change in the configuration in the region is a response of’ the Central Asian countries to the dynamics of change in the politics of the external players in the region. Here, the main role is played by the evolution of bilateral relationships between the Central Asian countries and the external actors - USA, Russia and China.
On the other hand, the Central Asian countries have taken a rather comfortable stand of “wait and see” at the present moment, looking at these external players from the point of view of correspondence of their politics to the long-term national interests of the countries of the region. In this respect, naturally, one needs time to determine the potential and possibilities, tactics and strategy of USA, Russia and China who are actively claiming the wealth and future development of the region. I can dare to affirm that in the fraternity of experts of Central Asian countries for quite a long time there exists an opinion that it is high time for USA, Russia and China to listen to the opinion of the Central Asian countries themselves before drawing up a geopolitical apportionment convenient for them (external powers). And it must be admitted that various experts and governments of the Central Asian countries are actively working out an alternative vision of region’s future, or rather a vision of its possible cooperation with the external world. The opinions, of course differ on this issue, yet the common character of interests has been developed. The common nature of interests of Central Asia consists of’ the following approaches, namely:

1. None of the super powers, conducting active struggle with its competitors and striving to strengthen its position in the Central Asia at the cost of any harm to individual interests of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgyztan, Tajikistan or Turkmenistan, will have a long-term success in the region in future. As is well known, if necessary measures are not taken, the contraposition of interests between USA on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, will only promote active expansion of the influence of external forces in the region. Such a situation, obviously, cannot remain outside the attention of the countries of the region since the fight is not in their own long-term national priorities. Therefore, sooner or later change in direction away from USA, Russia and China will be observed and it will strengthen, because in this respect it is much more advantageous for countries of the region today to attract to the region an alternative axis of European Union - Japan. It is these countries - and not USA, Russia and China - that are interested in implementing the entry of the countries of the region into the global market with more secure, from the point of variety of geopolitical risks, opportunities. Therefore, sooner or later USA, Russia and China will have to take this into account and amend their policies. Central Asia hasn’t still expressed its view. It is waiting for a more pragmatic and reliable partner.

In the sphere of ensuring security, territorial integrity and sovereignty Russia will continue to be the undoubted preference for the Central Asian countries. Russia was, and continues to be a strategic partner of the countries of the Region with whom the governments, as well as the people have been linked through ancient and strong political, economic, cultural and historical bonds. However, Moscow has to understand that in future good neighborly and strategic relations between these countries and Russia will depend on whether or not Russia is able to build its relations with these new sovereign states on an equal and worthy footing. Here, any possible manifestations of negative foreign policy tendencies in Russia expressed in the form growth of hegemonistic or revanchist aspirations, will lower Moscow’s influence in the region. And if Moscow is able to form an integral and consistent policy in the spirit of equitable partnership relations with the Central Asian countries, then there is 110 question of any increase of the influence of West or China in the region. West is too far and China is too near to risk the future of the whole region. All this rhetoric about the prospects and necessity of further development of SCO is only a phantom in whom China very much wants to believe and West is very afraid of.
The logic of all the latest initiatives and proposals within the framework of China’s cooperation with the Central Asian countries in the fields of energy, finance and economy indicates that China’s geopolitical interests are behind all such moves. Here, the level of China’s cooperation continues to vary. While it is too early to talk of the dependence of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the fast growing Chinese economy faced with the China’s fast growing geopolitical expansionist policy Kyrgyzstan is today certainly the most vulnerable economy in the region, with Kazakhstan’s economy being the next in line.
In other words, economic interaction and integration of the Central Asian market with the Chinese market is an important component of Beijing’s long - term strategy vis-a-vis the Central Asian countries. The fast increasing cooperation between them and Central Asia in the fields of energy and economy is cardinally changing the geopolitical situation in the region in favour of increased Chinese influence. The reason that a common market is being formed between China and the Central Asia is the result of the China’s active, massive and consistent politico-economic policy along with Russia’s weak involvement and the wait and see’ policy of Central Asian countries. As a result, one can see today how the regions of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and even Russia, bordering China, are experiencing economic dependence on the Chinese market and are getting integrated with it. The day is not far when whole regions will see China as the centre of economic activity. Moreover, China is undertaking similar active economic expansion in the border regions of Russia - Siberia and the littoral area.
Therefore, today the Central Asian countries have to be afraid of only one thing the possibility of implementation of Chinese plans of expansion and growth of cooperation between the SCO countries in the field of economy and energy and of creating a unified market in this region. One would like to believe that the governments of this region clearly understand and share the opinion of the people and experts about the danger and fateful consequences of the integration of the economy of region with China within the framework of SCO.