POLITICIZATION OF MADRASSAHS IN PAKISTAN: A CRITICAL VIEW

Salman Bangash*
                                                                    

Introduction

“Religion is an amazing phenomenon, which plays contradictory roles in the life of human beings. It destroys and revitalizes, puts to sleep and awakens, enslaves and emancipates, teaches docility and revolt.”1
In today’s world the religion of Islam is presented as a religion of ethos of brutality, fanaticism, revolt and chaos. This image stem partly from a lack of understanding of Islam among non-Muslims and partly from the failure of Muslim to explain them.
The staggering events of 9/11 and the subsequent US War on Terrorism had made Religious Educational Institutions or “Madrassahs” the focus of world attention.
 The apparent role of Pakistani madrassahs in harboring and encouraging terrorism has generated intense debates all over the world. World media, governments, policy-making institutions all are concerned of these religious seminaries. The international community is putting weight on the government of Pakistan to bring far-reaching changes in madrassahs system. Attempts by the government of Pakistan to reform and regulate them have failed to bring the preferred results.
The publications and transmit of many news reports, articles and research papers on madrassahs, failed to locate some of the observable facts comprehensively. Madrassahhas been termed as terrorist factories, the incubators of violent extremism, as means of “education of the holy warrior”.
It is very important to understand that the madrassah saga is not just an integral relgio-socio-politico problem of Pakistan but there are certain external factors responsible for heightening this multifaceted, complex and thorny issue.

Theological and Historical Background of Madrassahs

 

The term “Madrassah” is derivative of an Arabic word darsun meaning lesson. In contemporary Arabic the word ‘madrassah means “centre of learning” (the Arabic plural form is “madaris”).2 According to Sadiq N Awann, “the history of Islamic schools trace back to medieval Iran, especially Eastern Iran. The schools were called madrassa and the places of higher learning were known as Dar-ul-alum. The word madrassa is composed of two parts: mad=mind and rasa =relationship. Madrassa means “place of mental exercise.”3
Madrassah is an educational institution offer teaching in Islamic subjects including the holy Quran, the sayings of the holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), jurisprudence and law. Madrassahs are in some ways analogous to a seminary in Christian tradition.
Madrassahs can be considered as the biggest charitable institution which offers in most of cases free of cast religious education, boarding, and food facilities. It is also common that some wealthy and well-off families sent their children to madrassahs for memorization and reading of the Holy Quran or hire a theologin (Maulvi) to teach their children in home.  Madrassahs are not only present all across the Muslim world but also in some predominantly non-Muslim countries.
According to the Encyclopedia of Religion, “Madrassah is an educational institution devoted to advanced studies in the Islamic religious sciences.4 The Encyclopedia of Islam and Encyclopedia of Britannica explain madrassah as an institution of learning where the Islamic sciences are taught, and where tuition is free, food, lodging and medical care is also provided.5
According to credible and tangible chronological accounts, the first formal educational sessions in Islam started at the house of Zaid bin Arqam in the valley of the Safa Hills, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), himself worked as an instructor and some of his early followers and companions became his students. After the Prophet’s migration to Madina, a madrassah, namely the Madrassah Ahle-Suffa was established on a site contiguous to the east of the Prophet’s mosque at Madina.6
The institution of madrassah developed when the Arabs came into contact with other indigenous traditions and languages. It became highly indispensable to make a group of wise and intelligent people who would develop sophisticated and refurbished writings and textbooks on Islamic jurisprudence, Prophet’s traditions, Prophet’s sayings and the interpretation of the Holy Quran, to cater the needs of non-Arab Muslim populations.7
The first prominent institution for higher studies in Islam was established by Al-Mamun the Abbaside caliph in 830 AD in his capital Baghdad. But the first real academy in Islam, according to P.K. Hitti, which made condition for the physical needs of its students and became a model for later institutions of higher learning was the Nizamiyah, founded in 1067 AD by Nizam-ul-Mulk the Persian Vizir (Minister) of the Saljuq Sultans Alp Arsalan and Malik Shah.8 Besides the Nizamiyah of Baghdad the Suljuq vizir is credited with establishing several other Madrassah.9
Tariq Rehman observes, “One of the aims of the madrassa ever since 1067 when Nizam ul Mulk established the famous madrassa at Baghdad was to counter heresies within the Islamic world and outside influence, which could change or dilute Islam”.10
The syllabi adopted at the Nizamiah Madrasshs, went through many transmutations and alterations served as a standard and model for madrassahs elsewhere in the Muslim world. Madrassahs in the past served as the only available institutions of formal education for Muslims. Their alumnae would take the responsibilities of becoming administrators, military officers, Imam in mosques and judges in courts.11
It is pertinent to bring on record that some of the notable and illustrious scientists and sagas of the medieval times Muslim world such as Avicenna (Ibn Sina), Averroes (Ibrn Rushd), mathematicians Arzachel (Al-Zarqali), physician like Avenzoar (Ib Zuhr) and Rhazes,( ar-Razi) were product of those Madrassahs.12
 In the word of Ira M. Lapidus, “The madrasa served as an organizational base for legal teaching, as a vehicle for providing financial support to Muslim religious scholarship, as centers for the training of religious and administrative cadres, and as bases for the conversion of populations as well as for missionary activity”.13
After the ignominious defeat of the Muslim empire one by one at the hands of the crusaders and political rivalries and dissensions among Muslim leaders, Muslim learning and scholarship got a colossal decay and touched the nadir of despair, frustration nostalgia for the bygone glorious for the lost glorious days when Muslim scholars rendered meritorious service in the field of science and learning. These gloomy times in the Muslim history had tremendous repercussions on the role of madrassahs in the Islamic world.14

Madrassahs in India

In the Indian subcontinent Islam was introduced into an already developed civilization defined by agriculture, urbanization, religions, and complex political regimes.15 Muslim scholars, Sufis (mystics), poets and intellectuals flocked to India, seeking the patronage of the new regimes, organizing colleges and opening the way for the conversion of Indian to Islam.16
In northern India Muhammad Ghori established a madrassah in the town of Ajmer, which he conquered in 1191 A.D, thus begins the establishment and development of many distinguished and notable Islamic seminaries in various parts of India.17
Waleed Zaid is of the opinion that during the Muslim’s rule in India, madrassahs were the cradle of learning welcoming all segment of the society, where law, sciences and administrative subjects were being thought.18
General Sir William Sleeman (1788-1856), writes in his memoirs about Muslims’ position in education in the early 19th century,
Perhaps there are few communities in the world among whom education is more generally diffused than among Muhammadan in India. The young Muhammadan binds his turban upon a head almost as well as filled with things, which appertain to these branches of knowledge as the young man from Oxford.”19
The British after having strong footings in India developed a system of colonial education, its rationale, as Lord Macaulay put it in 1835, was to create “a class of persons Indian in blood and color but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and intellect.”20
It is understandable that Macaulay’s objectives were not merely scholastic. He hoped that, through the introduction of English in the administration and educational institutions, it would weaken the Indian religions as well as its culture.21
The British made English as an official language instead of Persian. This single measure reduced the well-educated Muslim ignorant of English to the level of semi-literate. The crushing defeat in 1857 and the heavy reprisals of the Muslims were not needed to make Western knowledge popular among the Muslims.22
With the establishment of colonial western-oriented institutions of learning the Muslim education was abolished all of a sudden. All traditional Muslim educational institutions were declared unrecognized.23
A deliberate rift based on malafide and malevolent designs was created between what was considered legitimate education which promoted colonial designs and the madrassahs education which was considered as outdated, obsolete and superfluous. State sponsored grants to Ulema institutions desiccated, and the importance and effectiveness of the madrassahs declined accordingly.24
As a reaction to British educational policy four educational trends developed. The first one was of Dur-ul-Ulum Deoband, which was anti-British, founded by Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanutwi in 1867 A.D. in Deoband, UP India.25
The second trend was acceptance of the British system of education and to develop it amongst Muslims with minor modifications. It came in the form of M.A.O collage of Aligarh, founded by Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan in 1875 A.D. The third trend was expression of dissatisfaction both with Dar-ul-Ulum, Deoband and M.A.O collage. Aligarh.It emerged in the shape of Nadwat-ul-Ulema, Lucknow, in 1894 A.D. the last and the fourth one was Jamia Millia Islamia wanted to give national outlook to Muslim education.It was started in 1920 A.D. at Aligarh and latter on transferred to Delhi in I925.26
According to Tariq Rehman, “for the Indian Muslim madrassahs were a response to the dominance of the West. The essence of this response was to create a little oasis of orthodoxy in the midst of the heterodoxy created by the colonial sector. The madrassahs saw themselves as preservers of Islamic identity and heritage during the colonial era where secular studies displaced the Islamic texts as well as the classical languages of the Indian Muslims”.27
There is no doubt that Muslim education system was in need of reform, there was much scope for bringing it up to date and incorporating into it the progress made by Western knowledge but it did not deserve the treatment that it received at the hands of colonial rule. The British made no amends for its loss”.28
The British policy regarding education proved decisive in changing the psyche of the Muslims of the sub-continent. This bifurcation has caused a lethal blow to the unity and moral psychological integrity of the community and the mental and spiritual health of the individual.29
By the time of the establishment of Pakistan the old type of institutions had been reduced to mere shadows of their former selves. The bifurcation cut them off completely from modern developments. Their knowledge and teaching of non-theo­logical subjects became too antiquated to be of any worth. The result was that they gradually turned into theological seminaries. Religious education was thus divorced from general education and lost touch with social and political developments.30

History of Madrassahs in Post-Independence Pakistan

When Pakistan emerged on the map of the world there were only 137 madrassahs in the country. By 1950 the number reached to 244 and to 671 in 1960.31 By 2005 the number of madrassahs reached to 14000, serving an estimated one million student.32All madrassahs in Pakistan including the Shia’s one teach the Darsi- Nizami which was for the first time introduced by Mullah Nizamuddin Sihalvi (d.1747). The curriculum of Darsi Nizami is not the same as that associated with the madrassah Nizamiah.
 According to Mumtaz Ahmad, the curriculum thought in Pakistan consisted of 20 subjects broadly divided into two categories.33 In terms of levels of education, the madrassah in Pakistan are categorized as: Ibtedai (basic), Vustani (middle level) and Fauquani (advanced level).
Madrassahs in Pakistan is mainly in private sector, where as few others are managed by the Auqaf Department.34 Most of the funding is provided through endowments (tithes, gifts, donation by rich, and from abroad.35
The early problems of Pakistan and international scenario of 1950s and 1960s greatly effected Pakistani’s future and indirectly helped the cause of the religious groups. Throughout the early decades of Pakistan’s existence, the country’s leaders had used Pakistan’s strategic vulnerability as arguments to convince Washington to keep Pakistan under its military wing.36
Secondly, most of the religious parties were against the very idea of Pakistan. However, as Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, the political leadership of the early years, despite being secular, often resorted to the slogan of religion to create national unity and order.37
Mr. Hussain Haqqani, stated that Pakistan had adopted a premeditated policy of Islamization as early as the 1960s in order to accomplish Pakistan’s domestic and foreign objectives.38
Where as Tanvir Ahmad Khan a former foreign Secretary is of the view that not a single government in Pakistan since 1950s that did not trade off political support from the religious forces for deliberate appeasement, only to turn its back on the compacts of expediency. This opportunism he said by itself radicalized the religious elements.39
The other reason that helped the cause of the mullahs (Theologists) was the cold war. Western think tanks believed that the religion of Islam if transformed into politics would become a potent force to appose the communist world. Therefore the US government started to develop serious and close relationship with Islamist .Great Britain and France helped USA in this venture.40
Like the rest of the Muslim world Pakistan’s religious silhouette caused little anxiety to the United States; in fact, it suited the United States as the religion provided for both a measure of internal stability and a defense against communism.41
In 1951 the U.S. National Security Councils “top secret”, maintained “in Pakistan, the communists have acquired considerable influence in press circles among intellectuals and in certain labor, unions,” and argued that conversely domination of “Pakistan by unfriendly powers, either directly or through subservient indigenous regimes, would constitute a strategic danger to the national security of the U.S.”42
The American government strengthened Pakistan’s defense capabilities and potential for economic development. But in doing so the United States also helped promote undemocratic tendencies in the country.43
By the time the 1956 constitution came into being, the religious forces of the country had consolidated their position quite considerably. Among other things, the communist-inspired military coup attempt in 1951 had inclined the government of the day to view religious parties with certain detached, if not benign, neutrality.44
Pakistan’s façade of parliamentary rule was maintained until a military coup by General Ayub Khan in 1958 and the country’s second constitution, which in 1962 installed a centralized, presidential government.45
Ayub Khan who himself studied in a local madrassah before shifted to an English language school where his talents began to flower46 was somewhat ambivalent regarding the role of Islam in Pakistan’s political life. He favoured Islamic identity for Pakistan but with direct control of government over religious institutions, thus marginalizing the ulema.47
Initially the alliance between Ayub Khan and the mullahs worked as both considered communism as a threat to the country and those who supported that ideology were considered as enemy of Islam and the country.48
But that matrimonial alliance did not lost long. Ayub Khan in a bid to contain and exercise control over religious institutions, established an Awqaf property department (non-transferable religious endowments) on which almost all Madaris were depending to meet their expenses. In response to this five Waqafs or federations of madrassahs were organized.49
Ayub Khan introduced madrassah reforms in order to enable the madrassah graduates to play more positive and practical role as a citizen of this country. Ayub reforms failed because most of the religious parties with the exception of Jamaat Islami rejected the reform efforts50
In 1970 and 1971, the government under the rule of general Muhammad Yahya Khan used the religious groups against the separatist in East Pakistan. In this unholy drama, Jamaat-i-Islami formed an alliance with the army in East Pakistan and played an active part in the military action against what they believed to be enemies of Islam.51 Its student wing, the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT) was transformed into a militant force, willing to meet violence with violence.52

The Era of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
 
In 1971 Pakistan lost its eastern wing in a brutal civil war resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a charismatic leader became the Prime Minister of the remaining part of Pakistan tried to give a new identity to the country for which he needed the support of Islamic parties. Bhutto attempted to rejuvenate national identity by conflating theology with socialism.
The Islamic parties influenced the 1973 constitution, declared Islam the state religion.53 The 1973 constitution commanded the council of Islamic ideology to recommend measures and evolve modus operandi so as to implement Islamic system in Pakistan. In order to accomplish it, religious education was imparted in schools, Islamic/religious education was made part and parcel of the syllabi. Arabic was made compulsory subject at middle and secondary schools levels. The education sector was nationalized; however most of the madrassahs remained independent.54
The mullah’s having their first significant victory when, under pressure from the religious parties of Pakistan, Bhutto amended the constitution of the country to declare the Ahmedis as non-Muslim.55
The moment of ease and comfort was proved to be a sojourn. In 1977 the religious parties were united and formed a joint opposition and led a national movement against the Prime Minister in the wake of elections were engineered. The Movement launched by PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) which was popular in urban areas. The more the government suppressed the elements of PNA, the more they showed resilience.56

General Zia ul Haq and the Madrassah Boom

The new military ruler, general Zia-ul-Haq was known for his strong religious proclivities and he believed fervently in establishing a more ideological state. Zia’s Islamization policy was twofold: first, changes were made in the legal system. The second level targeted the electronic and print media. Ordinances were issued to Islamize the civil, armed forces and education system,
Weighing up the importance of the religious madrassahs, the government offered productive incentives by opening 5000 mosque, schools and by instituting a national committee so as to deliberate in transforming madrassahs into an important part of the educational system. In this regard Dr. A.W.J. Halepota, an eminent academician in Ayub’s era conducted a national survey, who came out with illustrious and remarkable, proposal to improve the economic condition of madrassahs and modernizing them with the objective of integrating the religious and the formal education sectors while “conserving the independence of madrassahs”.57
President Zia relations with the outside world in particular and with US were not cordial due to internal situation and just when bets began to be taken as to when Zia was likely to be bow out, the Soviets marched into Afghanistan. Zia became indispensable to the West. The U.S. attitude toward Pakistan, as Thornton put it, “overnight, literally . . . changed dramatically. Pakistan became a frontline state.”58
John K. Cooley mentioned that, “the CIA, with Saudi finances as well as Pakistani logistical support, managed the raising, training, equipping, paying and sending into battle against the Red Army in Afghanistan of a mercenary army of Islamist volunteers. Many of them were religious fugitives from their own governments or soldiers of fortune from all over the world”.59
Pakistan’s tribal northwest became the indispensable base to raise, train and launch an Islamic guerrilla army against the Soviet invaders.60 Thus started one of the biggest covert operations since the Second World War. General Zia “established a chain of Deeni Madaris on Pak-Afghan border in order to make a belt of religiously oriented students who would assist the Afghan Mujahideen to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan.61
Another important dimension of this particular war was that after the Soviet intervention Afghan nationalist sentiment and the cry of “Islam in danger” provided fertile ground for armed resistance.62
Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway, stated that, “ International patrons supplied arms and armada and also religious literature both published in Dari and Pashto designed by the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska-Omaha under a USAID grant in the early 1980s flooded Pakistani madrassahs”.63
Another expert on the subject, Mahmood Mamdani points the finger directly at the US, suggesting that some top Afghan fighters were trained in America including High Rock Gun Club in Naugatuck, Connecticut, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the CIA’s own Camp Perry in Williamsburg.64
America did not much care what happened to the country after that, as is evident from the statement of the U.S. States Department’s Michael Armacost: “Our main interest in Afghanistan was getting the Russians out. Afghanistan, as such, was remote from US main concerns. The United States was not much interested in the internal Afghan setup and did not have much capacity to understand this.”65
In a letter to the New York Times, (May 23, 1989), Anthony Beilenson, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on intelligence described American policy in Afghanistan since 1980 in these words,
 “Some of the largest and best-equipped factions of resistance are made of Islamic fundamentalists whose goals for a new Afghanistan are in stark contrast with our own. We have been willing to ignore the ideology of the rebels while they were fighting the Soviets… but now we face an entirely different situation that demands a cutoff of our military aid.”66
Another blunt and arrogant remarks was put forward by Brzezinski’ the National Security Advisor in Carters presidency the man who master mind the Afghan war when asked by a French journalist regarding American role in supporting the Afghan resistance which resulted in religious extremism. His reply was, “Which was more important in world history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet empire? A few over-excited Islamists or the liberation of Central Europe”.67
Thus Red Army assault and occupation of Afghanistan was the turning point for the madrassah system in Pakistan, Thousand of madrassahs were established allover the country thanks to the foreign aid which flooded the country. Zia–ul–Haq deliberately promoted the madrassahs system in the country in order to get the support of the religious groups for his personal rule and to enlist fighters against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.68
Another event, which greatly enhanced the position of mullahs, was the Islamic Revolution in Iran. According to Fazl-ur-Rehman Marwat, “Despite of sectarian and ideological differences the success of Islamic revolution in Iran was a great boost, and encouragement to the Mullahs in Pakistan. Nature favoured them in the shape of Afghan war, which became a symbol of resistance and a place to show their strength.” The professor further said, “Interestingly United States of America opposed the Islamic revolution in Iran where as in Afghanistan Islamic ideology was utilized very successfully against the Godless soviets”.69

President Musharaf and Religious Extremism

The extremism spawned by the Afghan jihad not only shaken the region but radiate far beyond. Despite that the United States sneaked away from the region as soon as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.70 The United States distance itself from Pakistan, closing off the financial spigots that had once flooded Islamabad.71
According to Burhanuddin Hassan, “The America's friendship with poor, Third World countries with strategic relevance is based purely on self-interest. It remains intact as long as it serves that interest, and fades away as soon as the interest has been served. Although US claims to be a champion of democracy and wants to promote this system of governance worldwide, when it comes to its own strategic interest, it helps kings and military dictators alike financially as well as militarily.”72
The abandonment of Pakistan by America left it more than 3 million Afghan refugees to care for; thousands of Madrassahs (religious seminaries) funded by Saudi money to militarize the youth and convert them to the intolerant brand of Wahhabi Islam.73
During 1990s a network of madrassahs spread with the construction of hundreds of mosques and seminaries producing thousands of graduates.
The culmination of Afghan war and the return of Pakistani holy warriors exacerbated extremism in Pakistan. In addition to the Madaris established to fight the Soviets, sectarian madrassahs flourished during the same time in Pakistan in order to safe guard and spread their version of Islam; sectarianism has become a grave and serious internal challenge for Pakistan.74
According to Vali Nasr, “the largely theological differences between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims have been transformed into full-fledged political conflict, with broad ramifications for law and order, social cohesion, and government authority. The Pakistani government has essentially allowed Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran to fight a proxy war on Pakistani soil, with devastating consequences for the Pakistani people”.75
Through out 1990s the sectarian violence reached its peak, but the political leadership failed to gather the courage to counter the growing strength of the jihadis.76
Some observer contends that few of the madrassahs in Pakistan advocate violence, while some of them pretend to provide clandestine military training.77
The turning time came in the rise of religious students or Taliban. The Taliban took over most of Afghanistan in 1994 and only three countries all over the world i.e. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate and Pakistan recognized them.
John K.Cooley blames Saudi Arabia; Pakistan along with the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States for the creation of what he called the ‘monster of religious extremism, the Taliban Movement.78 At the height of the Taliban advance it is estimated that 30% of fighters were students from Pakistani madrassahs.79 The US policy makers viewed the Taliban through their strategic interests. Apart from other things Taliban would contain Iran and Russia’s interests in central Asia.80
In 1996, Bhutto’s government was removed from office before it had the chance to impose any of the intended plans it had for the madrassahs, which included the introduction of compulsory audits, new curricula and registration. It was in the time of Taliban’s rule that Madaris in Pakistan mushroomed.
According to Hassan Abbas, “Musharraf stepped in as head of state on October 12, 1999, the harvest he was left to glean was significantly bitterer than those of the leaders who had gone before him. Through the active fostering by Zia ul-Haq, the funding of Saudi Arabia, espousal by the United States, and the venal abandon of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the seed of religious fanaticism sown more than two decades earlier had come to confront him as fully grown trees perversely balanced by the empty coffers of the state”.81
The frightening events of September 11 had once again made Pakistan into the limelight of US national security concerns. This recent contretemps as Stephen Philip Cohen stated, “repeats as an old pattern of alliance and estrangement that has characterized US-Pakistan relations since the early 1950s.” However, he said this time there is a difference Pakistan is a critical ally but also a potential source of terrorism.82
Soon after 9/11 Pakistani government under pressure from west announced a plan to monitor and supervise madrassahs and overhaul their administrative, financial and educational structures. This step was taken mainly to satisfy the international community who were raising fingers towards religious Madrassahs blaming them to be the breeding grounds for terrorists.83
In order to deter and check the religious extremism, the government of Pakistan has passed two credible laws.84
President Musharraf, as part of madrassah reform, on August 16 2005, promulgated yet another ordinance by amending the Societies Registration Act, 1860. According to the Ordinance 2005,a new section, titled, ”Registration of Deeni Madrassahs “ has been added to the Societies Resistration Act,1860. The main aim of this act was to register madrassahs with the government.85
There is hardly any realistic information on the unregistered madrassahs. However, their own central organizations or boards control those, which are registered. The government of Pakistan’s started a process of reforming the madrassahs with US financial assistance.
The salient features of the project are, to prescribe textbooks in formal subjects in madrassahs. Examinations will be conducted by the relevant Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE) at Secondary and Higher Secondary Levels in the formal subjects. The Ministry of Education and Provincial governments will select Madrassahs.86
Many writers have written about the involvement of madrassahs or madaris in terrorism but some revisionist questioned that theory. In Christine Fair view there has been no persuasive authentication that terrorist and militants are coming in majority from madrassahs. While it is likely possible that the madrassahs in Pakistan may foster conditions that are conducive to support for terrorist.87
According Peter Bergen and Swati Pandy, “Madarasas should not be a national security concern for western countries because they do not provide potential terrorists with the technical skills”.  They further said “this does not mean that madrassahs do not pose a threat. For them madrassahs should remains on policy maker’s minds as a regional concern. Not a security concern for the western countries”.88
A meticulous and discrete examination of 79 terrorist who were responsible and were declared main intriguers, in five of the most horrible attacks - reveals that hardly and seldom madrassahs inmates were involved. All the attackers who committed heinous crimes and masterminded the five terrorist attacks were the alumni of colleges and universities and no one had attended any madrassah at any moment of their lives.89
There is no gainsaying the fact that extremism has no determined region or nationality and extends beyond the religious schools. Even highly educated and well-read individuals remain in schools for wreaking havoc through their terrorist acts. The quality of education should have been a dominant factor in determining terrorist activities but it has proved a farce in taking view of the ground realities.90
Pakistani government efforts to reform the madrassahs, Candland observes, “have some shortfalls not only due to the inflexibility of the ulema, but by the limitations of the government’s strategy in dealing with the problem. Reforming the madrassahs cannot be done through coercion or intimidation. The ulema, many of whom favor reform, must be vital associates in this effort; the state must work with them, rather than attempt to circumvent them”.91
The governments efforts at “mainstreaming” madrassahs, as exemplified through programs such as the “model madrassahs”, is not likely to succeed because it is perceived as an external imposition. As noted by Rahman and Bukhari the government’s forced reform and its apparent association to Western powers has “awkwardly hindered the reform movement that was launched by the madaris’ own initiative. This is because maintaining the status quo in a defensive mode itself becomes a need in a hostile environment.92
The question of madarassah enrollment figures has assumed considerable importance in world media. There are different estimates that ranging from 1 to 33 percent enrollment.
The World Bank report stated that the figures for madrassah enrollment usually seen in the western press are wildly exaggerated.93
Candland, on the other hand, writes that the assumptions used by the authors of the World Bank study are faulty, and therefore, that there figures for madrassah enrollment are misleadingly low.94
Tariq Rahman remarks that reforming only madrassahs curricula will not diminish the anger towards the west felt by many madrassahs students, unless and until the issue of Kashmir, Chechnya, Palestine, etc are not solved.95
According to Salim H.Ali, “Any public policy issue can only be successfully addressed if the “issue analysis” or problem diagnosis is correct.”96
In order to bring reform to the madrassahs United States of America is providing financial assistance. In August 2004, Lee Hamilton 9/11 Commission Vice Chairman told a House panel that the current USAID program for Pakistan education reform was a “drop in the bucket.”97
President Musharraf is facing a dilemma on one side there is tremendous pressure from America and the West to do more against the extremist groups and to act against the madrassahs on the other hand due to his tactics resistance against him is increasing day by day.98
On the other hand the religious parties denounced the west’s malicious propaganda and termed madrassahs as flagship institutions of the Muslim culture. Where as the government expressed its resolve to reform and modernize them. Unfortunately in the heat of emotions, the problem was never studied seriously or scientifically.99
The Lal Masjid episode is an eye opener that force against the religious institution can have dangerous consequences. The government should take great care in taking such actions. Such actions do have negative implications.
Enlightenment does not come through posh mannerism or language skills of unelectable leaders, snazzy billboards and a few scandalous TV shows, but through effective education that cultivate thinking individuals.100 Pakistan’s successive constitutions have assigned Islam a prominent place in public life, and many among the ulema have remained active in the effort to define an Islamic identity for Pakistan.101 The total number of madrassahs has increased, not diminished in Pakistan since its inception and despite the emergence of the new religious intellectuals; madrassahs primarily sustain the structure of religious life.103

Conclusion

 

The culture of Madrassahs is not new and novel in Pakistan. It dates back to the 12th century A.D. when madrassahs have been the bastions of imparting education. When there was no concept of separate secular/worldly disciplines or separate institution. While being at its zenith, these Islamic seminaries produced most illustrious and notable scientists and sagas. The arrival of the Britishers in the sub-continent heralded the bifurcation of education system into two chief fragments, i:e  religious and secular ones. These madrassahs deemed western educational onslaught as a potent threat to Islamic social norms and values generally and to their religious identity in particular. After the creation of Pakistan the cleavage between the two separate modes of education kept on widening and the educational policy makers of Pakistan failed to cement this cleavage.
Through out the Cold War the western power in order to counter communism propagated and encouraged the religious tendencies through out the Muslim world and Pakistan was not an exception. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan completely changed the history of madrassahs in Pakistan. Thousand of madrassahs were established, the notion of jihad was revived to counter communism in Afghanistan. After the Soviet defeat America left the region without any suitable solution. The events of 9/11 had made Islamic seminaries or madrassahs once again the focus of world attention. In order to evade the blitz of western decision-makers, a strong need was felt to assess the effectiveness of the madrassahs.
During the past three decades, the poor socio-economic conditions and lack of good governance in the country, intervention of the then Soviet Union in Afghanistan, tension with India had provided an opportunity to the religious institutions to take advantage of the situation for various gains. The rise of Taliban phenomenon in Afghanistan in 1996 further added to their strengths.
Like the successive governments in the past the present government initiated efforts to reform the madrassahs system and bring them into the main stream of development but failed to bring the preferred outcome. The reality is that the need for reform and changes is also felt by a great number of people associated with madrassahs. But reform efforts thus far have not been successful because of the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. The madrassahs should not be considered as separate entity. A unified educational system is a must without which all reform effort would have no results.
Given the strong identity of Pakistan as a Muslim state, any reform pertaining to Islamic content will have to be approached with trepidation. Imposed secularization of the curriculum is not likely to work and would be counterproductive. There is a need to initiate a process of dialogue. The pressure from abroad is going to complicate the issue. The reform processes need time and one should remember that madrassahs have strong roots in Pakistani society.

*   Lecturer, Department of History, University of Peshawar.

1   Dr. Ali Shariati, What is to be done: The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic Renaissance (Houston: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986),  P. 48.

2   A number of alternate spellings exist for this word, including “madrasa, madrassa, and madrassah plural madrassahs or madaris.” For the purpose of this study, I use the spelling “madrassah.” Direct quotations nevertheless, maintain the author’s original spellings.

3   Sadiq N Awan, “A Brief History of Islamic Schools and Their Impact on World Affairs”. http://www.cct-cce.com/islam.pdf    Accessed, August, 2007.

4   The Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol.9 (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987). p.77

5   The Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol.5 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986),”Madrassah,” by R. Hillenbrand, p.1124 & The Encyclopedia of Britennica, Vol.6,”Madrassah”by William Benton, 1973,p.567.

6   Saleem H. Ali. Islam and Education: Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan and beyond. (Unpublished) p. 31-32.

7   Ibid.

8   P.K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (London: The MacMillian Press, Ltd.1994),  p. 412.

9   Ibid; 410

10      Traiq Rehman, “Madrassa: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan”
http://ipripak.org/journal/winter2005/madrassas.shtml    Accessed September 2007

11    The courses were Naqli ‘Ulum (revealed science), including the Holy Quran, the Hadith, Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and Tafsir (Quranic commentary), and the Aqli ‘Ulum (cogent sciences), including Arabic language, grammar, logic, rhetoric, philosophy, astronomy, medicine, physics and mathematics
Yogindar Sikand, “Reforming the Indian Madrassas: Contemporary Muslim Voices”.
http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach6.pdfAccessed August, 2007

12     Uzma Anzar. “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices”.
http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/madrassah-history.pdf Accessed July 2007
For more on the Muslim contribution to knowledge and its influence on western scholars see. John William Draper, “Intellectual Development of Europe”, Robert Briffault, “The Making of Humanity”, P.K. Hitti, History of the Arabs. (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd. 1994).

13      Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.174.

14     Uzma Anzar, “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices”.

15     Ira M. Lapidus. p. 437.

16      Ibid. 443.

17      Yogindar Sikand, “Reforming the Indian Madrassas: Contemporary Muslim Voices”.

18      Waleed Zaid, “Madaris in Perspective”.
http://www.geocities.com/ziadnumis/thenews Accessed June 2007

19     Salim Mansur, Khalid and M.Fayyaz Khan,Pakistan: “The State of Education.” MuslimWorld, Vol.96, April 2006, pp.305-322. See also Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996).

20     Akhbar S. Ahmad, Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society (Lahore: Vanguard Publisher, 1988), p. 126.

21     I. H. Qureshi, Education in Pakistan: An Inquiry into Objectives and Achievement (Karachi, Ma’areef Ltd., 1975), pp. 9-10.

22      A History of freedom Movement. Vol: 2 (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1961), p. 359.

23    Muhammmad Hamiuddin Khan, History of Muslim Education (712 to 1750). Vol: 1 (Karachi: Acedamy of Educational Research, 1967), p. 41.

24      Waleed Zaid. Madaris in Perspective.

25      Muhammad Sharif Khan. Education, Religion and Modern Age. (New Deihi: Ashish Publishing House, 1990), p. 56. See alsoBarbara Metcalf Daly, Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

26     Ibid.
See also Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996)

27    Traiq Rehman, “Language, Religion and Identity in Pakistan: Language-Teaching in Pakistan Madrassashttp://ices.lk/publications/esr/articles_jul98/TARIQ.PDF    Accessed September 2007

28     A History of Freedom Movement. Vol: 2 p. 362.

29     I. H. Qureshi. p. 20.

30     Ibid; 20

31     Musa Khan Jalalzai. The Sunni Shia Conflict in Pakistan (Lahore: Book Traders, 1998), p. 306.

32     Pervez Musharaf, In the Line of Fire (New York: Simon and Schuster 2006), p.312.
The international Crisis Group (ICG) lists estimated madrassah totals of 137 schools in 1947,401 in 1960,893 in 1971,1745 in 1979,3000 in 1980, and a total of 10340 madrassahs in 2003. (The international Crisis Group 2005.) p.67.

33     The subjects include Life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), philosophy, Arabic literature, dialectical theology, Islamic law, Jurisprudence Hadith, Tafsir (exegesis of the holy Quran. medicine, mathematics, polemics, grammar, rhetoric, prosody, and logic.
Mumtaz Ahmad, “Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh”.
http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach5.pdf   Accessed July 2007.

34      Ibid

35     Ibid.

36     John K. Cooley. Unholy War: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 1999), p. 53.

37     Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan Through the Lens of the “Triple A” Theory. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2006): 181-192.

38      http//:www.usip.org/congress/testimony/2005/0630_fair.html    Accessed September, 2007.

39     Tanvir Ahmad Khan. Dark Shadow of Lal Masjid. Dawn International, Pakistan, July 2007.

40      John K. Cooley, p.1.

41       Touqir Hussain. Special Report: “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond”. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr145.pdf Accessed August 2007.

42        “A Report to the National Security Council by the Executives Secretary On the position of the United States with Respect to South Asia (Declassified on 11 Feb. 1977),”January 5, 1951, NSC93, NND867400, available at Digital National Security Archive.

43       Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), p.29.

44        John K. Cooley, 50.

45        Saleem H. Ali. Islam and Education: Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan and beyond (unpublished). p. 46.

46       Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 251

47        Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military. ICG Report, 20 March, 2003, p. 2.

48        Pakistan: Madrrasas, Extremism and the Military. ICG Report, 29 July, 2002, p. 6.

49       Ibid.

50        Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military. ICG Report, 20 March, 2003, p. 8.

51        Ibid.

52        Pakistan: Madrrasas, Extremism and the Military. ICG Report, 29 July, 2002, p. 6.

53       Sheikh Ebrahim. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Lahore: PLD Publication 1999), p. 2.

54       Highest Deobandi degree was made at par with master’s degrees in university provided madrassah’s student passed a bachelor’s level English course.
Pakistan: Madrrasas, Extremism and the Military. ICG Report, 29 July, 2002,

55       Ibid.

56     Ibid. See also Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque And Military (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005)

57     Saleem H.Ali, 50

58     Dennis Kux. The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchantd Allies (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003),  p.245.

59 John K. Cooley, 2.

60  Ibid; 47

61  Kamal Matinuddin. The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan, 1994-1997 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 14.

62  Dennis Kux, 253. Joe

63 The US Government spent millions of dollars to deliver Afghan schoolchildren with textbooks crammed with sadistic images and militant Islamic teachings, part of covert attempts to stimulate resistance to the Soviet occupation
Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway, “The ABC’s of Jihad in Afghanistan”. The Washington Post, March 23, 2002. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5339-2002Mar22?language=printer     Accessed September 2007.

64 Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim; America, the Cold War and the roots of terror”. (New York, Pantheon, 2004.

65 Dennis Kux, 287.

66 Kurt Lohbeck. Holy Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA’S secret War in Afghanistan. (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1993), p. 173.

67   John K. Cooley, 19.

68   Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture”,
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jstern/pakistan.htm     Accessed July 2007

69 Prof. Fazl-ur-Rehman Marwat. (Interview) Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, August 1st, 2007.

70 Touqir Hussain, Special Report: “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond”  http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr145.pdf  Accessed August 2007

71 Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, “When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S Strategy toward Pakistanhttp://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_cohen-chollet.pdf    Accessed September 2007
Burhanuddin Hassan. An Alliance of Convenience. The News International, Pakistan 7, June 2007.

72 Burhanuddin Hassan. An Alliance of Convenience. The News International, Pakistan 7, June 2007.

73 Hassan Abbas, p.11.

74 Uzma Anzar. Islamic Education: “A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices”.

75   Jessica Stern. “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture”.
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jstern/pakistan.htm

76 Candice Lys, Demonizing the “Other:” “Fundamentalist Pakistani Madrassahs and the Construction of Religious Violence”
http://web.uni-marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/journal/mjr/art_lys_2006.html    Accessed September

77   International Crisis Group, “Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism”, ICG Asia Report No.73, 2004.p 12.
According to Dr. Isaac Kifr, there are around 245 religious parties in Pakistan, of which 215 have their own seminaries,104 focus on jihad,82 are sectarian,20 are oriented towards tabligh (preaching) and 28 take part in the political process http://www.ict.org.ii/apage/12482.php   Accessed September 2007
Possible consequences of exposure to violence include psychological problems on the students such as increased hostility anti social behavior, deficient emotional regulation and difficulty expressing feelings, and negative self-images.

78   John K. Cooley, 3

79   Report of the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism Assessment Mission: Pakistan Education, April 2002
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/rrm/pakistan_02.pdf Accessed July 2007

80 Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Region. 2001, pp. 198-199.

81   Hassan Abbas, Pakistan Through the Lens of the “Triple A”

82 Stephen Philip Cohen. “With Allies Like This: Pakistan and the War on Terrorism” http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817945423_103.pdf    Accessed  August 2007

83 Tariq Mahmood Sumair. Seminaries Have Never Backed Jihadi Organizations. The News, International, Pakistan, August 7, 2005.

84   The first one is Pakistan. madrassahs education Board Ordinance notified on August 18 2001, another law was introduced to control entry of foreigners in the madrassahs and keep check on them. This law Voluntary Registration and regulation Ordinance 2002 was also rejected by most of the madrassahs, which are against  state interference in their affairs.
Tariq Rehman, “Madrassa: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan” http://ipripak.org/journal/winter2005/madrassas.shtml  Accessed September 2007.  See also Wafaqul Madaris vol.3 no. 9 2002)

86   Saleem H Ali, 143

87   C. Christine Fair. “Islamic Education in Pakistan”
 http://www.usip.org/events/2006/trip_report.pdf Accessed October 2007

88 Peter Bergin and Swati Pandey. The Madrasssa Scapegoat. The Washington Quarterly - Volume 29, Number 2, Spring 2006, pp. 117-125

89   Ibid
Like the world Trade Centre bombing in 1993,the Africa embassy bombings in 1998,the September 11 attacks, the Bali nightclub bombings in 2002,and the London bombings on July 7,2005. According to them madrassahs are less closely correlated with producing terrorist then are the Western colleges, where students from abroad may feel alienated or oppressed and may turn toward militant Islam

90 America’s elusive bomber was a Harward graduate; Abimael Guzman, the leader of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso, was a university professor, and the intellectual leader of the Maoist rebels in Nepal, Baburam Bhattarai, has a doctorate in urban planning. Among the A1 Qaeda hierarchy, Osama bin Laden an engineer Aimen Al-Zawahry is a medical doctor, and Mohamed Atta was an engineering student fluent in three languages. Such examples clearly show that education is not a sufficient condition for tolerance or conflict reduction.
Saleem H. Ali, “The Educated Terrorist”
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/09/06/the_educated_terrorist/ Accessed July 2007

91   Education reform in Pakistan; Building a Future. Essay by   Chritopher Candland, “Pakistan’s recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education”. pp.151-165
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/FinalPDF.pdf     Accessed  October 2007

92 Rehman and Syed Rashad Bukhari, Pakistan: Religious education and Institutions,Muslim World, Vol:96,April 2006, p. 337).

93 World Bank Report WPS 3521,   http://www.worldbank.org.pk 
    Also see Tahir Andrabi, “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data”
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~akhwaja/papers/madrassa_CER_dec05.pdf Accessed September 2007  

94   Chritopher Candland, “Pakistan’s recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education
Tariq Rehman, Tariq Rehman, “Madrassa: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan” 

95   Tariq Rehman, Tariq Rehman, “Madrassa: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan” 

96   Saleem H  Ali

97   CRS Report for Congress. “Education Reform in Pakistan”.  2004
 http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS22009.pdf    Accessed July 2007
Chritopher Candland, “Pakistan’s recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education”.

98 Mir Jamilur Rehman. Blow Hot, Blow Cold. The News, International, July, 28, 2007.

99 Muhammad Zakria Zaker. Madrassahs and Modernity. DAWN International, Pakistan, July 10, 2007.

100 Baber Sattar. Lessons from the Lal Masjid. The News, International, Pakistan, July 7, 2007.

101 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: the Madrasa in British India and Pakistan”  
     http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=1936   Accessed September 2007 FF
103  Ibid.