CHINA’S MINORITIES:
ETHNIC-RELIGIOUS SEPARATISM IN XINJIANG*

 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on the northwestern part of China borders three Central Asian Republics (CARs)—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Russia, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. In terms of territory, XUAR is the largest province of China with Uyghur Muslims as the majority. A sizeable Muslim population in almost all the countries (except Mongolia) bordering this region, a complex geography, history, ethno-cultural and religious diversity as well as abundant natural resources like oil, natural gas and minerals have catapulted XUAR into one of China’s most important and strategic regions.
Though Xinjiang’s connection with China dates back to more than 200 years, the area has remained under the effective control of China only intermittently. Even during the Ching rule (1755-1911), Chinese authority was subverted for brief periods by successful rebellions led by Khoja Muslim leaders like Jahangir, Yousuf Katta Tora and Walli Khan Tora (in early nineteenth century) and Yakub Beg (1865-77), all having come from Kokand. During their short lived successes, these Khoja leaders set in motion a process of religious frenzy and a number of Chinese soldiers, civilians, artisans and traders were killed. It was only in 1884 that Xinjiang was brought within the regular administrative structure of Chinese empire and made a full-fledged province. After the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the consequent extermination of Ching rule, Xinjiang entered into an era of warlordism which lasted till mid-1940s. All the successive provincial leaders were Han Chinese - Yang Tseng-hsin (1911-28), Sheng Shih-tsai (1933-44), whose authoritarian and exploitative policies acted as a catalyst for a series of Muslim uprisings, that rocked Xinjiang from 1931 to 1949. Efforts to set up the Independent Republic of East Turkestan in 1933 and 1944 ended in failure and Xinjiang was completely brought under control by the Chinese Communist forces in 1949. Xinjiang became an Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China in October 1955. The Uyghurs’ demand for a separate homeland out of China since the Manchu Qing period, which has been very vocal in the recent times, has brought this region into the focus of national and international attention.
Some major issues in Xinjiang’s early history continue to affect perceptions of the region in the recent times. Both Uyghur and Chinese historians and scholars differ in their perceptions of the history of Xinjiang. According to the Chinese account, Xinjiang’s Chinese connection dates back to more than two thousand years. During the reign of Manchu-Qing dynasty, the region was absorbed into the Chinese empire and its name was changed from ‘Chinese Turkistan’ to Xinjiang, literally meaning the “New Territory” of China. Though the pan-Turkic Islamic forces joined hands to carve out independent East Turkistan Republic twice, first in early 1930s and then in early 1940s, the Chinese authorities succeeded in defeating these attempts.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed numerous violent incidents in Xinjiang including bomb blasts, arson, racial attacks and hate campaigns by the Uyghur separatists against China’s rule in Xinjiang. After 9/11, China enlisted external support in its campaign against terrorists. Through Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), it has been able to persuade the Central Asian Republics to take a common stand against extremists and terrorists. In order to bring the non-Han people into the national mainstream, and integrate the minorities both in economic, educational, social and political realms, China has initiated steps aimed at uplifting the local economy. One hopes that greater economic integration envisaged under the Great Western Development Programme would bring Uyghurs closer to other minority nationalities as well as the Central government.
The situation in Xinjiang worsened following the disii~tegration of erstwhile Soviet Union and emergence of the independent Central Asian Republics (CARs). Most of the non-Han people in Xinjiang. particularly the Uyghurs, are Sunni Muslims with Turkic ethnic background having a strong affinity with the Muslims of Central Asia. Hence, there has been close relationship between Xinjiang’s Muslims and their ethnic cousins in the neighbouring CARs. The Islamic fundamentalist forces, which were dormant over a period of time, tried to fill the ideological vacuum created after the disintegration of USSR.

Uyghur-Han Relation

With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Xinjiang became increasingly integrated with other regions in China. The process of Han Chinese settlement in the region since the beginning of the Communist rule has irreversibly altered the demographic balance of the region, causing fierce resentment among the indigenous population, including the Uyghurs and Kazakhs. Uyghurs view the Han migration as an attempt by Beijing to colonize the region.
It was the Qing dynasty (1644 AD-1911 AD) that initiated the process of Han immigration into Xinjiang. During Qing rule, the Imperial Court in Beijing encouraged the Han Chinese to settle in Xinjiang. It issued an edict in 1776 AD to grant subsidy to all Han Chinese settlers in the northwest region. Even the Qing ruler sent Han General Zuo Zongtang to put down the rebellion by Yakub Beg as well as to consolidate the Qing authority there.

Table 1: Population Trends among Uyghurs and Hans in Xinjiang
(1949-2000)

Year	Total Population	Uyghur	% of total population	Han	% of total population
1949	4,330, 000	3,291, 000	75	291, 000	6.7
1964	7,440, 000	4,020, 000	54	2,440, 000	32.8
1982	13,082, 000	5,950, 000	45.5	5,287, 000	40.4
1990	15,156, 000	7,195, 000	47.5	5,696, 000	37.6
2000	18, 459, 511	8,345, 622	46	7,489, 919	40.6

Source: Prepared by the author as per the data given in Remi Castets (September-October 2003), “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang: The Malaise Grows”, China Perspectives, no. 49, p. 38.

Large scale Han migration into Xinjiang has been perhaps the single largest source of hostility between the Uyghurs and Hans. The Uyghurs view it as a way of diluting their culture and ensuring Beijing’s firm control over the region. They consider Han influx into Xinjiang a means of deluging them with foreign overlords who take land and jobs from local people leaving their independence in jeopardy. The Hans treat the Uyghurs as ‘ignorant’ and ‘barbarians’, and Uyghurs describe the Hans as ‘arrogant trespassers.’ While the communists charged the Uyghurs as local nationalists, the Uyghurs made a counter charge against the Hans, calling them “new colonists and exploiters.” According to the Uyghurs, “Hans ate up all rice, held the best jobs and left the heavy work for the local people.” Uyghurs not only accuse the Chinese of “adding sand to thicken the cement,” which has also created a dual structure of ethnic composition, threatens Uyghur group identity, but also fear the loss of their age-old identity due to the Han influx. Slogans like “Han People Leave Xinjiang” reflect the simmering discontent and resentment among the Uyghurs. At the same time, the Hans find it inconvenient to pass through localities dominated by the Turkic people. Many scholars subscribe to the view that Han immigration is one of the main sources of Uyghur resentment in Xinjiang. According to Nicholas Becquelin, opening up of new land through reclamation brought Han settlers in large numbers to reinforce Chinese political consolidation in Xinjiang who have the best jobs and enjoy grossly unfair share of the wealth produced in Xinjiang now. The problem of Han immigration has been growing since the last decade of the 20th century and it shows no signs of decreasing.

Table 2: Population of Uyghurs and Hans in Xinjiang’s Major
Cities (1991 and 1997)

	1991				1997
Cities	Population	Uyghur	Han		Population	Uyghur	Han
Urumchi	1,175,546	18 %	76%		1,361,236	13%	76%
Aksu	397,517	46%	52%		481,564	41%	57%
Yining	267,262	51%	32%		325,075	16%	38%
Kashghar	230,397	75%	24%		259,435	77%	22%
Turpan	220,823	72%	19%		244,509	70%	21%
Karamay	210,208	15%	76%		253,260	15%	76%

Source:  Stanley Toops (2000), “The Population Landscape of Xinjiang/East Turkestan,” Inner Asia, 2 (2), p. 163.

Local Uyghurs, who feel they have been marginalized, allege that the Chinese government has siphoned off Xinjiang’s rich natural resources for catering to the need of the already developed eastern coastal belt of the country. They claim that though the Chinese government’s Great Western Development Project aims at creating job opportunities for the Uyghurs, the major chunk of the benefits goes to the Han Chinese, leaving the local populace in a quagmire of poverty. The socio-economic development of the region is abysmal and quite low in comparison with the national standards. The following table indicates the Lower level of educational development in Xinjiang as compared to other provinces of the five regions of the PRC.)

Table 3: Comparison of Xinjiang’s Educational Level with that of other Provinces

Regions	Provinces	No. of Universities/ Colleges	No. of Middle Schools	No. of Primary Schools	Literacy rate (%)
North China	Hebei	46	5, 076	46,243	85.70
North East China	Liaoning	62	3,517	14,386	87.87
East China	Zhejiang	35	3,444	19,700	82.39
Central South China	Guangdong	42	4,795	24,700	93.14
Northwest China	Xinjiang	18	2,090	6,962	75.32

Source:  Abanti Bhattacharya (July-September 2003), “Conceptualizing Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism”, Strategic Analysis 27(3), p. 369.

China’s Policy in Xinjiang Since 1949

Immediately after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops too control of Xinjiang in 1949, Chinese Communist Party announced its policy in 1950 for the minority nationalities of the region, which was based on the goals of stabilization, consolidation and gradual development of the region. This policy was governed by Beijing’s desire to build up Chinese authority in an area where it previously had no real base and where anti-Han sentiments were strong.1 Between 1949 to 1957, the Chinese authorities adopted a strategy of gradual reform of the existing political, economic and cultural order with the help of the local ethnic elites,2 besides cores of workers, farmers, intellectuals, labourers and patriots.3 For better understanding, the China’s policy in Xinjiang have been elaborated in this chapter under several heads such as: military-civilian administration, population transfer, economic development, religious and language policies.

Military-Civilian Administration

After the Xinjiang’s independence in 1949, People’s Liberation Army’s First Field Army took direct control of the Chinese military administration in the region which reflected China’s response to Russian influence in Xinjiang. Besides, Chinese authorities expressed concern over the US attempts to arouse ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, support to establishment of an Islamic republic in China as well as seize uranium resources in Bortala and Altai Shan at Koktogai areas in 1940s. Apprehending danger in Xinjiang, the Chinese authorities directed the First Field Army to expand its control over the region besides making efforts at territorial integration. As of 1949, the military in Xinjiang had 200,000 soldiers consisting of 25,000 soldiers of Ili National Army (East Turkistan Islamic Forces), 80,000 Guomingdang troops and 100,000 soldiers of People’s Liberation Army. By the 1960s, the number of soldiers increased to 500,000. Now around a million soldiers of People’s Liberation Army are stationed in Xinjiang besides 100,000 People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) troops, communication units, border guards and fourteen divisions of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) with 2,480,000 cadres.
Both the Chinese Communist Party and the First Field Army, who solicited active cooperation of the local leaders in an effort to overcome all the problems in Xinjiang, devised the “United Front” policy, under which, the officials appointed by Guomingdang were retained. For example, Burhan Shahidi, the last Governor under the Guomingdang, and the Deputy Governor, Saifuddin Azizi continued in their posts. Even Commander Tao, who was appointed by Guomingdang, served as second-in-command of the region’s military forces. In 1953, the “National Minority Identification Programme” was started. In Xinjiang, the official national minority status was conferred only on 13 minority nationalities. Seven of these minorities were given some form of autonomous government in 1954. Xinjiang was renamed as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on 1 October 1955, with Saifuddin Azizi as its first Chairman. Xinjiang comprised three municipalities, seven administrative districts, five autonomous districts, 73 counties, six autonomous counties with a population of 4,874,000 (as per the 1953-54 Census of China), out of which 4, 300,000 were non-Han people including 3,600,000 Uyghurs.
The policies during the Great Leap Forward period (1958-66) were a systematic campaign against the rise and influence of Islam and the Soviet influence in Xinjiang without paying any heed to the local problems. When the relations between China and Soviet Union deteriorated during this period, many minority and Han cadres having pro-Soviet or anti-CCP views were eliminated. The policies during this period included the launching of communes, abolition of material incentives, curtailment of private plots, virtual closure of rural markets and bazaars, attacks on religions particularly Islam and more emphasis was laid on the policy of assimilation or fusion. Again there was less consideration to local issues as these policies had a more radical and strictly Maoist character. Local minority groups, mainly Uyghurs, launched agitation for greater autonomy and demanded separate Communist Party for each nationality, immediate expulsion of Hans from the minority areas as well as the formation of an independent East Turkestan.
Post-Cultural Revolution period saw a major policy shift and a new era of reform, reorientation and reconstruction. The Chinese Communist Party made renewed efforts to win the hearts and minds of the minorities. Deng Xiaoping appeared as the most powerful leader, but visionary to the core, with reforms in mind. In Xinjiang, one measure of the policy shift in this period was the increasing number of minorities holding government posts. At the lower level of the government, all the chairmen of the standing committees and many of the leadership post were held by national minorities. In 1978, five of the thirteen vice chairmen serving the regional government in Xinjiang were minorities. In 1973, there were only two minority vice chairmen of the regional government. In 1979 and 1983, Chairman of the Regional People’s Congress was Tomur Dawamut, a Uyghur and half of the vice chairmen were national minorities each in both 1979 and 1983 regional governments. Again in 1979 and 1983, a Uyghur named Islamyil Aymat headed the regional government. By 2003, the proportion of the ethnic minority deputies in the total number of Xinjiang’s deputies to the National People’s Congress have exceeded 63 per cent, which was higher than the proportion of such ethnic populations in the region’s total population. The number of cadre personnel was 12,841 in 1950, 1,06,000 in 1965,80,000 during the Cultural Revolution period (1966-69) and 1, 81,860 in 1983. By 1990, the CCP claimed that there were a total of 2,25,000 minority cadre, which is about 46 per cent of the region’s total cadres. The government also asserted that 65 per cent of the members on the Standing Committee of the Regional People’s Congress were minorities, almost 64 per cent of the regional government staff. By 2003, there are 3,48,000 minority cadres in Xinjiang, accounting 51.8 per cent of the total number of cadres in Xinjiang. The number of women ethnic-minority cadres has exceeded 46 per cent of the total number of women cadres in the whole region.

Population Transfer

Between 1950 to 1978, around three million people migrated to Xinjiang. While the Chinese government defends its policy of transferring Hans to Xinjiang, which aims at populating the border region to secure the territorial integrity and reducing the problems of minority nationalities, the Uyghurs in Xinjiang accuse the Chinese authorities of diluting the ethno-­religious and linguistic concentration of the non-Han population besides creating a Han working force and militia in this remote province alienating the local populace.
Yuan Qing-li describes migration of people from other Chinese provinces to Xinjiang since Chinese independence in 1949 to early 1980s in five different phases.
1.   From 1949 to 1953: With the state sponsored programme of population transfer, a large number of cadres of the People’s Liberation Army, political cadres, engineers, doctors, college students and skilled workers migrated to Xinjiang to establish firm control over the areas dominated by non-Han people, particularly where Muslim population was more than 90 per cent.
2.   Between 1953 and 1961: Between 1954 and 1961, the total number of immigrants was 1,523,200 and in 1959 alone, it was 511,000. From 1954-58 period, the number of immigrants was the highest. During this period, many young women from Hunan and Shandong provinces joined the Army of Xinjiang with the aim of sorting out problems such as the settlement of ex-­military personnel after 1949 and the sex ratio imbalance among the Hans. In 1958, the Chinese Communist Party had decided to send more than 2,000 labourers from eastern provinces (Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan and Anhui) to Xinjiang as part of the second Five Year Plan (1958-62).
3.   1961-62 period: There was a decline in migrant population in 1961, during which only 16,000 people migrated to Xinjiang. This was not due to the famine, but because of the stable situation in other provinces which prompted many immigrants returned to their original hometowns. Some Han immigrants did not prefer to stay in the rural pockets of Xinjiang.
4.   1962-76 period: During this period, many people from the poorer rural areas coming to towns, cities, state­-owned and non-state farms in Xinjiang in search of work and higher income. The educated youths from other provinces did not prefer to migrate to Xinjiang.
5.   1976-84 period: During this period, there was a decrease in the number of immigrants due to restriction of the hukou (household registration) and socio-economic progress in rural areas of Chinese provinces. However, in 1980, the Hans were 41.6 per cent of the total population of the Xinjiang region.

The 1990s period saw more migration of Han Chinese from provinces due to the increasing emphasis on economic and industrial development in northwestern part of the country, particularly the Xinjiang region, which was part of China’s liberalization and globalization programme. Besides, Xinjiang’s rich oil and natural gas as well as mineral resources attracted a large number of people from other parts of China. From 1990 to 1995, more than one million inter-provincial migrants entered Xinjiang, with business purpose. The Great Western Development Strategy attracted many Hans to Xinjiang. The construction of railway network to Kashghar in 1999 also encouraged the Hans to migrate to interior parts, which have been predominantly Uyghur areas for decades and have resisted the earlier transfer of Han people to Xinjiang. The Han population grew by 31.6 per cent between 1990 to 2000, which was almost twice the growth rate of the non-Han population (15.9 per cent). The Han population, which was 37.6 per cent of Xinjiang’s total population in 1990, is 40.6 per cent now. In a statement in September 2000, XUAR’s Chairman, Abulahat Abdurixit attributed the population growth in Xinjiang to the ethnic minority people, not to the Hans.
Two Chinese scholars have described the impact of population transfer in Xinjiang as given in the following:
1.   Socio-cultural impact: It has resulted in a major change in nationality composition since 1949. The Han population, which was less than seven per cent in 1949, is now close to the population of the region’s majority people, the Uyghurs. The national minorities, whose number has increased from 13 in 1949 to 47 now, follow different religions, Languages, cultural ethos, customs and traditions. The Han immigrants now identify themselves as the people of Xinjiang, following the customs and traditions of the region. On the other, the minority people have also emulated some habits of the Hans, for example, Learning Mandarin language. The intermarriage between Hans and the non-Han people, including the Uyghurs, is the most important impact of the China’s policy of population transfer.
2.   Economic impact: The closed economic policy of earlier years is replaced by an open one. Development in infrastructure (transportation and communication network) has resulted in economic progress of the region.
3.   Environmental impact: Increased farming and industrial activities have led to depletion of valuable resources in the region, desertification, deforestation and environmental degradation.

Though the policy of population transfer by the Chinese Communist Party has encouraged socio-economic development in the Xinjiang region, it has been a major source of discontent among the non-Han people of the region, particularly the Uyghur national minority. Uyghur people consider Han immigration as the single largest cause of their socio-economic backwardness

Economic Development

In July 1955, Mao called for an increase in the pace of cooperativisation, after which reforms in the pastoral areas of Xinjiang were stepped up. By the spring of 1956, there were 8,500 lower-type agricultural producers’ cooperatives in which ownership of private property was permitted to a certain degree. These agricultural producers comprised around 45 per cent of the total farming population of the region at that time. During this plan period, per capita food grain production in southern part of Xinjiang was 800 pounds, which later increased to 1,100 pounds in 1958 and 1,320 pounds. Similarly, per capita cotton production in 1958 rose to 68.8 pounds from a mere 22.8 pounds in 1949.
In 1949, there were 2.4 million hectares of irrigated areas in Xinjiang. The construction of hundreds of reservoirs and canals that extended the irrigated areas to 5.6 million hectares in 1958, resulted in bumper agricultural harvest in Xinjiang same year (1958) with three million tonnes of foodgrain, which was three times the production in 1949 (one million tonne). Besides, 58,000 tonnes of cotton were produced in 1958, which was eleven times that of the production in 1949. The number of livestock in 1958 increased to 22 million, which was 17 million in 1954.
Industrial development wasanother landmark of the second Five Year Plan period. The Chinese authorities put emphasis on production of petroleum, coal, iron and steel, electric power etc. Industrial facilities were increased from 64 in 1955 to 1,500 in 1985.51 Oil industry of Xinjiang, which was started during the World War II, produced 22,000 to 29,000 tonnes of oil by the end of the war in 1945, mainly in Hungtungshan (Kotayalun) and Tushantzu. New oil fields were discovered in Karamay and Uerho in the northern part of Zhungaria Basin. One of the oil wells of Karamay oil field produced 30,000 tonnes of oil in the year 1959 alone. In 1958, oil production in Xinjiang was 330,000 tonnes, which later rose to 400,000 tonnes in the first six months of 1959.52 Coal production in Xinjiang was 3,600,000 tonnes in 1958. After an Iron and Steel Plant was built in Urumchi on 1 August 1951 with Soviet assistance, Xinjiang produced 17,230 tonnes of iron and 14,640 tonnes of steel in 1957. Though the production of iron marked an increase in 1958 (18,500 tonnes), steel production decreased to 11,000 tonnes. Besides, hydro-electric power production increased in Xinjiang after the construction of hydro­electric plants in Urumchi and Kashghar and nearly 200 small hydel plants in other parts of the region. In the first half of 1959, hydro electricity production in Xinjiang was 100 million kw.
The Gross Domestic Product in Xinjiang, which was 11,200 M million yuan in 1985, rose to 220,000 million yuan in 2004. 62 In 2000, Xinjiang ranked first among the western provinces and twelfth among all the thirty-one provinces in per capita Gross Domestic Product, with the top eleven positions being taken up by the coastal regions such as Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong. Throughout the eighth and ninth Five Year Plan (1996—2000) periods, Xinjiang received billions as state subsidies and infrastructure investment.
Between 1978 to 1998, there was some development in the infrastructural sector. International airports connecting directly to cities of Central Asia and Russia started functioning. The development of transport, post and telecommunications during this period led to increasing contact between minorities and the majority Hans. It has also brought individual minority nationalities like Uyghurs closer. As a result, trade within and among individual minority groups witnessed an upward trend.

Table 4: Total Sum of Exports and Imports in Xinjiang: 1990-2004
(in million US dollars)

Year	Total trade	Exports	General trade	Border trade	Imports	General trade	Border trade
1985	291.97	180.2	NA	NA	111.77	NA	NA
1990	410.25	335.3	NA	35.06	74.95	NA	34.16
1991	459.33	363.17	NA	50.25	96.16	NA	49.31
1992	750.39	453.86	NA	164.74	296.53	NA	155.55
1993	922.1	495.09	NA	289.06	427.01	NA	288.06
1994	1040.53	576.12	291.06	239.32	464.11	160.36	273.35
1995	1427.98	768.8	445.5	275.62	659.18	176.4	418.88
1996	1403.67	549.75	302.81	186.47	853.92	259.82	544.84
1997	1446.67	665.47	360.61	229.62	781.2	240.61	520.31
1998	1532.14	807.89	322.68	375.99	724.25	209.72	493.54
1999	1765.34	102.47	371.2	573.29	737.91	257.23	449.76
2000	2263.99	1204.08	550.6	580.2	1059.91	280.2	73.95
2001	1771.48	668.49	295.23	184.18	1102.99	248.95	796.61
2002	2691.86	1308.49	544.04	472.18	1383.37	260.28	1071.52
2003	4771.98	2542.21	711.15	1604.11	2229.77	725.1	1435.04
2004	5635.63	3046.58	501.94	2237.82	2589.05	1015.4	1470.58

Source:  Calculated by the author from the data in Xinjiang Statistical Year Book (2005), Beijing: Beijing Information Press.

Table 5: Xinjiang’s External Trade with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (1990-2001)

Year	Exports(in million US dollars)			Imports(in million US dollars)
	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Total	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Total
1990	NA	NA	335	NA	NA	75
1991	NA	NA	363	NA	NA	96
1992	173	16	454	117	15	297
1993	143	31	495	186	57	427
1994	86	28	576	163	72	464
1995	62	105	769	270	120	659
1996	41	65	550	283	35	854
1997	55	65	665	353	36	781
1998	149	166	808	351	25	724
1999	457	95	1,027	481	32	738
2000	449	99	1,204	791	67	1,060
2001	201	51	668	772	42	1,103

Source:  Calla Wiemer (2003), “The Economy of Xinjiang”, in Frederick Starr (ed.), Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Frontier, London and New York: M. E. Sharpe, p. 171.

Religious Policy

One of the major causes of Muslim separatism in China is the ideological cleavage between communist state and religion. Subscribing largely to the Marxist diction that “religion is the opium of masses”, China has neither recognised the concept of minorities nor any religion. Instead, it has termed the ethnic minority groups in the country as minority nationalities. Out of 56 nationalities in China, only ten (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks, Tatars, Salars, Tajiks, Bonans, Dongxiang and Hui) are known to be Muslims.
Religious clerics are allowed to participate in the deliberation in the administration of state affairs. Presently, more than 1,800 religious clerics in Xinjiang have been elected as the members of the People’s Congresses and committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Out of these religious personnel, one is in the National People’s Congress, four in the National Committee of the CPPCC, 21 in People’s Congress of the Autonomous Region and 27 in the Regional Committee of the CPPCC. The religious personnel now get access to scriptures and other religious publications. A number of Islamic classics, including the holy Quran and religious books and magazines in various languages such as Uyghur and Kazakh have been translated, published and distributed in Xinjiang. China’s Muslims, a journal in the Uyghur and Han languages is widely read in Xinjiang. Besides, stores specializing in selling religious publications have been set up in various parts of Xinjiang. An Islamic college specializing in training senior religious priests is established in Xinjiang. Islamic bodies in Prefectures and Prefectural-level cities have started Islamic classes to train clergies. The Central government has also allocated funds for training of the clergies besides bearing the expenses of their religious tour to broaden their religious knowledge. The regional government in Xinjiang has promulgated the “Provisional Regulations for the Administration of Religious Activity Venues in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” under which religious believers carry out religious activities. Tens of thousands of Muslims have made pilgrimages to Mecca. Muslim college students have participated in competitions for recitation of the Quran both at home and abroad.
Chinese package of religious freedom and other related incentives have, however, not been able to satisfy the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. They still feel the Central government under the Chinese Communist Party has the major say so far as the religious freedom of the national minorities, particularly the Uyghurs, is concerned. They believe that their religious identity is at stake under the communists, who do not at all believe in religion and follow atheism. The emergence of five Central Asian Republics, where the Turkic brethren of the Uyghurs follow Sunni Islam and enjoy far greater religious freedom, has encouraged the Uyghurs to demand the Chinese government for more religious freedoms. The demand for a separate homeland for Uyghurs, which had ethnic factor as the most important one, is now being strengthened by the religious factor.

Language Policy

Though transfer of Han Chinese population to Xinjiang and economic disparities have been the causes of tension between Chinese and Uyghurs, it is Chinese Communist Party’s language policy towards minority nationalities, which has created more mutual discontent between the Uyghurs and the Central Government. Beijing sees this as necessary to ensure political stability for the continued economic development of Xinjiang. But to Uyghurs, the recent language policies, which include the expansion of Chinese language domains in education and the media as well as a reduction of the language domains of the minority nationalities are a direct assault on Uyghur culture and a significant example of Sinification of Xinjiang.
To sum up, minority nationalities policies of the Chinese Communist Party have not been able to suffice to all the needs and aspirations of the minority people. The dissatisfaction of the minority people over the policies particularly during the Great Leap Forward (1958-66) and Cultural Revolution (1966-69) periods is still there. The change of script in the 1960s and 1970s had brought about severe discontent among the minority nationalities, particularly the Uyghurs. Uyghurs consider the language policy of the Chinese Communist Party a threat to their own language. Though efforts were made in the reformist period to bring the western regions parallel with the eastern regions in terms of economic development, the northwestern region of Xinjiang groaned under poverty. Besides, the emergence of linguist nationalism in the neighbouring Central Asian Republics has spillover effects on the Uyghurs, who now want to strengthen their language identity by adhering only to their own language. Since Religion, language and culture are central to identity of the minority nationalities like Uyghurs, Chinese authorities need to ponder over this and devise more minority friendly measures to stave off the threat of separatism.
Chinese authorities have to take care of the basic needs and demands of the ethnic minority nationalities. The Central government can work towards ending the feeling of racial segregation and political alienation among the Uyghurs. China must take effective measures to redress the long-standing grievances within the Uyghur community and stop putting pressure on other states to prevent Uyghur Diaspora organizations and individuals from engaging in peaceful and legitimate activities for achieving their fundamental freedoms.
Xinjiang now needs large scale investment to harness its rich mineral resources. Keeping in view the poor economic condition pf the CARs, and other potential foreign investors, Xinjiang will have to depend upon China for investment. At the same time, China needs Xinjiang’s energy resources to fulfil its growing energy demands. So, mutual trust between Chinese authorities and minority nationalities in Xinjiang is an urgent need. As democracy and market economy are the main buzzwords of the present day society, China can bring all round prosperity for the Uyghurs and can assimilate them into the national mainstream.

Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang

Khotan Uprising (1954)

The first major resistance to the Chinese was the Khotan uprising in December 1954 in southern Xinjiang. The main cause behind tis uprising was agricultural cooperative movement in China in mid-1950’s which gave birth to People’s Communes during the Great Leap Forward period (1958-66). Creation of Communes and its implementation by low level cadres in an oppressive manner paved the way for an anti-Chinese rebellion. Abdimit, a Sufi Sheikh from Khotan and Badirin Mahsum, who were believed to have links with Muhammad Amin Bughra (1901-65), spearheaded the Khotan uprising. Abdimit, who became the head of a Committee that aimed at establishing a pan-Turkic Islamic state in Xinjiang, travelled throughout the Xinjiang region to preach Jihad through religious ceremonies and Islamic literature, posters and pamphlets. A document titled The Guidelines for an Islamic Republic prepared the main agendas of this Islamic republic.

Ili Disturbances (1962)

Though Khotan uprising failed, it became a major source of inspiration, particularly the people of Ili, who voiced protest against the grain rationing system, Han immigration, rivalry between Military Land Reclamation Units of XPCC and the local residents over scarce agricultural land, water and pastures. This resulted in a major disturbance in the city of ii in April-May 1962 leading to the mass exodus of 60,000 people (mostly Kazakhs and Uyghurs) and 3,000 cattle to former Soviet Union. Those, who fled including the former officials of Chinese Communist Party, government, military and public security, set up Turkistan People’s Liberation Committee in Exile, which acted as a forum for expatriate political activities. On 29 May 1962, small groups of people from Tacheng and other counties attacked a bus station in Ili city damaging the offices of the bus station, local government and party organizations, equipment and documents of Foreign Affairs Office. They shouted slogans like “Xinjiang is Ours, the Han Chinese Have Occupied Our Land”, “Down with the Communist Party” and “Exterminate the Dark Lords”, besides distributing leaflets, posters and pamphlets for the establishment of Uyghuristan.

East Turkistan People’s Revolutionary Party (ETPRP)

The late 1960s was one of the most chaotic phases in China’s contemporary history because of the Cultural Revolution and reign of terror by Red Guards. During this period, some secret groups and clandestine agencies in Xinjiang raised their voice against the Chinese authorities. The East Turkistan People’s Revolutionary Party (henceforth ETPRP) was one such underground group, which was founded in October 1967 under the name of Uyghuristan People’s Party. It is now considered to be the single largest organization in Xinjiang offering resistance to Chinese authorities since 1949. During the Cultural Revolution the period, the ETPRP became one of the most influential and organised anti-Chinese groups with a Central Committee and Political Bureau of its own. There were three organizations of the ETPRP named as—”Youth Organisation”, “The Avengers of the Tengritagh (Tianshan)” and “The Avengers of the Urals.” The ETPRP had members from different sections of Xinjiang and students. The Avengers of Tengritagh recruits mainly the young of and impressionable secondary school students. Between January and April 1969, the ETPRP set up its branches in Ili, Aksu,
Tacheng, Bortala and Urumchi, besides 78 grassroots level groups local operating in twelve Counties and 22 regional level units of This Xinjiang.” The ETPRP’s aim to establish an independent Turkistan is described in the documents of The Destiny of Uyghuria, constitution and the General Programme of the ETPRP.

Baren Uprising (1990)

Against Central government measures towards national minorities, a group consisting mainly of Uyghurs showed their dissent while attending prayers at a mosque in Baren on 5 April 1990. They used loud speakers to call for Jihad against the Hans dubbing them infidels, which resulted in one of the sanguinary conflicts after the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989. However, the real reason behind the incident was the ban on the construction of a privately sponsored mosque near the oasis of Kashghar. The Uyghur rebels promised paradise for those who sacrifice their life for this Jihad. On 6 April 1990, there were more attacks against police and other officials and government buildings, during which small arms and bombs were used. The situation took a serious turn the same day (6 April 1990) at around 11 o’clock in the morning, when the jeep of Xu Xinjian was stopped on a bridge about one km. away from Baren Townhall. Xu Xinjian was the Deputy Political Instructor of Akto County Border Defence Regiment and head of a four member liaisoning team. The agitated mob attacked Xu with axes and long knives, killed all inside the vehicle by overturning it. Shortly afterwards, the Deputy Commander of the Sixth Company of the Second Battalion of the Kashghar armed police detachment, a squad leader and a deputy squad leader, who were on their way to inspect the situation in the disturbed area, were also attacked on the same spot. Two of them were killed and one of them grievously injured. The agitators took control of the government building and issued notice to all the personnel in the Township to vacate as early possible. The heavy exchange of gunfire, which started in the evening, continued for two days.
On 22 April 1990, the Chinese Language Channel of the Xinjiang Television showed a video footage of Uyghur language cocements which had given instructions for a jihad and an armed struggle for the creation of an East Turkistan Republic. Though the Chinese reports did not rule out an Afghan Mujahideen link ot this episode, the Chinese authorities particularly blamed the Uyghurs exiled in Turkey mobilized by Isa Yusuf Alptekin. In September 1990, in the northern Xinjian near its border with the  former USSR, a low intensity disturbance occurred, but was suppressed.
Though the Baren uprising was ruthlessly suppressed by the Chinese authorities, they failed to subdue the underground Uyghur organizations. Some stray incidents of violence occurred in the Xinjiang region from time to time. On 28 February 1991, separatist rebels exploded a bomb at a video theatre of a bus terminal in Kuqa County of the Aksu Prefecture, killing one person and injuring thirteen othersY In mid-May 1991, an armed mob took over the government building in Tacheng (Chaguchak), a predominantly Kazakh area. Troops sent from Urumchi came down heavily on the rioters and more than 140 rebels were reportedly killed, wounded or jailed. On 11 and 12 June 1990, more than three thousand people gathered in front of an office building in Bole (Bortala), south of Tacheng, demanding Soviet citizenship and democratic elections in the region. They stormed the building, set it ablaze and shot at Chinese cadres. After the military intervention, nearly 500 rioters were killed or wounded. Later in the second half of October 1991, several hundred rebels staged protest demonstrations in Urumchi and other cities alleging lack of religious freedom in Xinjiang and called for independence and democracy. They humiliated and even thrashed Han people during the weeklong violence.
One Western scholar, Cohn Mackerras attributes the violent incidents in Xinjiang in 1980s and 1990s to the deteriorating relations between the Uyghurs and Hans caused by Uyghur resentment over Han immigration, Han chauvinism in urban Xinjiang and the marginahization of Uyghurs in education and work. Making an important observation regarding the current situation in Xinjiang, another scholar is of the view that the instability in Xinjiang arises from the Uyghurs’ sense of spiritual, cultural and political alienation from the People’s Republic of China. With their religious and ethno-national identity inextricably interwoven with each other, the Uyghur resistance to Beijing is seen in a ‘Muslim versus non-Muslim’ framework, which is of paramount interest in the light of the dynamic political nature of Islam today and the threat of Islamic radicalism.

Soviet Disintegration and Independence of CARs

AS mentioned earlier, Xinjiang occupies an enviable geo­strategic position at the crossroads of five cultural and geographic regions such as Russia, Central Asia, India, Pakistan, Tibet and China. These countries have been facing minority related problems and almost all of them, except Tibet, have the problen4 related to Islam. This geo-strategic situation, which had made Xinjiang a pawn in the Great Game in 19th Century, has made it a key strategic frontier for China in this century.
During the last one and half decades, the Chinese government’s concern over growing ethnic nationalism in Xinjiang has been reinforced by the ongoing regional, political, economic and ethnic conflicts. Ethnic nationalism and Islamic which try to undermine China’s position in Xinjiang, are coupled with the possibility of inter-state competition for the economic resources of the Central Asian Republics. The challenges to China’s control over Xinjiang, therefore, come not only from non-state actors (ethnic groups or Islamist political groups), but also from various external actors who claim to have a stake in the new (Great Game. In the recent years, the lone superpower, other great powers and the regional powers evince considerable interest in the area stretching from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang. Huge oil and natural gas reserves as well as the strategic and commercial importance of this region have attracted the attention of the world powers. Besides, the South and Central Asia region has witnessed five major and potentially destabilizing regional conflicts or crises during the 1991-2001 period—Afghan conflict and the rise of Taliban (1996-2001), civil war in Tajikistan (1992-96), volatile situation in Ferghana Valley and Indo-Pak conflict (Kargil War in 1999). The impact of ethnic nationalism and militant Islam on these conflicts has been significant. Xinjiang’s proximity and susceptibility to these external influences is indubitably a potential threat to the authority unity and territorial integrity of China.

Turkey and Uyghur Separatism in Xingiang

The Uyghur community in Turkey was led by Isa Yusuf Alptein and Muhammad Amin Bughra, who had finally settled in Istanbul after spending a few years in Kashmir following their flight from Xinjiang in 1949-50. After the death of Muhammad Amin Bughra, Isa Yusuf Alptekin remained the uncrowned leader of the Uyghurs single-handedly carrying out the movement in. the Turkish territory. During a meeting with the Turkish President Turgut Ozal in 1992, Isa Yusuf Alptekin presented the Eastern Turkistan flag to Ozal urging him to support the Uyghur cause. Ozal accepted the flag and readily agreed to extend support for the independence of the ancient homeland of the Turkic people. Turgut Ozal and former Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel talked of a Turkic homeland stretching from the Balkans to the Great Wall of China to the east of Xinjiang. Though Isa Yusuf Alptekin was struck by blindness in the last years of his life, he did not give up the mission until: his death in 1995.
In March 1993, Isa Yusuf Alptekin led the East Turkistan delegation at the World Turkic Conference, which was organised by the Turkish government. He met Turkish President Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and Vice Premier Erdal Inonu on the sidelines of the Conference to solicit their support for an independent East Turkistan. The Conference denounced Chinese atrocities against the Turkic people in Xinjiang and urged a dialogue with the Chinese authorities in this regard. Isa Yusuf Alptekin built a strong rapport with the media and Turkish politicians to nourish his goals for creation of an independent East Turkistan. His commitment to pan-Turkism paid rich dividend in 1994 when he was acknowledged as the leader of the East Turkistan movement. He was conferred with an Honorary Doctorate Degree from Selchuk University. During his visit to Turkish capital Ankara in 1994, the Chairman of the Turkish Parliament and the leaders of several political parties in Turkey—Chairmen of the Motherland Party and the Welfare Party and Bulent Ecevit, the Chairman of the Democratic Social Party—accorded him a ceremonial welcome.
Under the leadership of Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Uyghurs set up associations, launched publications, organised cultural activities and developed interaction with international leaders and organisations. Two important goals of the Uyghurs at that time were, firstly, to muster support, acquire recognition and promote unity and solidarity for the cause of East Turkistan outside the community, and secondly, to preserve Uyghur collective identity to sustain Uyghur culture and language and to revive the memory of the two defunct Eastern Turkistan republics (one in 1930s and the other in 1940s). Within the community, the Uyghur leaders tried to promote their cause by making fervent appeals and writing letters to world leaders, meeting NGOs and regional inter­governmental groups such as Arab League and attending conferences. In a special memorandum to a number of Islamic meetings in the early 1960s, Isa Yusuf Alptekin made an impassioned plea before the world Muslim leaders to implement resolutions regarding Eastern Turkistan. Isa Yusuf Alptekin attended two Afro-Asian conferences, one in 1960 and the other in 1965. He also attended Baghdad Conference of Islamic Countries (1961), Islamic Conference (1963) and the World Congress of Islam in Karachi (1964).
Erkin Alptekin, son of Isa Yusuf Alptekin, has taken up the leadership of the Uyghur movement and has been very much instrumental in internationalizing the issue of East Turkistan. He paid frequent visits to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in 1992 to gamer support for this cause. He thanked Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev for his cordial gesture towards the ethnic Uyghurs of Kazakhstan. It showed some promise about the possible closeness between exiled Uyghur leaders and the CARs, especially Kazakhstan. But the solidarity between the Uyghurs and the Kazakhs waned after the relationship between China and Kazakhstan improved. Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to Kazakhstan as part of his tour to Central Asia in 1994 consolidated this relationship further.
The Turkish National Television brought the live telecast of Isa Yusuf Alptekin’s funeral ceremony after his death on 17 December 1995, which was a cause of consternation between Turkish and the Chinese authorities. China wielded diplomatic pressure on Turkish leadership to stop supporting the Uyghurs and their anti-Chinese activities. The Chinese authorities asked Turkish Foreign Ministry to close a park named after Isa Yusuf Alptekin in the Sultanahmet (Blue Mosque) section of Istanbul, remove the Eastern Turkistan flag and dismantle Isa Alptekin’s memorial. Despite the Chinese pressure, 300 Uyghur separatists in Ankara founded the Eastern Turkistan National Centre on 14 December 1998, which aimed at achieving Xinjiang’s independence. Turkish government spokesman and some legislators applauded the move which became a nail in the coffin in the Sino-Turkish relationships. With the support of the US Congress, Radio Free Asia launched the only Uyghur Radio Programme outside Xinjiang.

Iran Factor

Islamic resurgence in Central Asia in 1980s and 1990s is also due to the “spillover effects” of the Great Islamic Revolution in Iran in late 1970s as well as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Export and spread of Islamic Revolution became the official policy of Iran under the spiritual leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini who aimed at becoming the ecclesiastical head of Muslims all over the world. The Iranian ideologues spread Islamic Revolution to vulnerable areas including China by launching extensive propaganda of Islamic fundamentalism through mass media and fomenting trouble and turmoil by arousing religious passion. They denounced the existing diluted form of Islam and tried to replace it by puritan Islam as followed in Iran.
China expressed concern over Iran offering scholarships in the region without consulting the state sponsored China Islamic Association. Chinese authorities used the China Islamic Association to limit the spread of Islam by controlling and occasionally curtailing the number of mosques and Imams and also by closing many rnadrasas. China was very much averse to the Iranian practice of approaching Muslim students individually instead of generally inviting students to apply for scholarships.
To the Uyghurs, the socio-political model promoted by the Islamic movements abroad was a viable alternative to the Chinese model which they perceived as colonial and culturally invasive. This brought some militant Uyghurs close to the Islamic movements and inspired them to establish a political and social order putting Uyghur Muslims at the centre of the system. Some Uyghur militants were also influenced by the idea that imposition of a strict Islamic framework might find a viable solution to the present social problems. Some Uyghur movements saw the “Islamic card” as a veritable means of highlighting the solidarity between Muslims within the Ummah in order to win political support, fallback bases, even training facilities and financial resources to continue their struggle against Chinese authority in Xinjiang.
In the new era of liberalization, the opening of frontiers and the loosening of restrictions on the pilgrimage to Mecca, Uyghurs traveling abroad came into contact with proselytizing forces active in Pakistan, Central Asia and also in some Arab countries. Many young Uyghurs, who went abroad, took religious courses in Quranic schools and seminaries attached to Islamic movements. Some Uyghurs, who went to Central Asia, joined radical groups such as Islamic Renaissance Party (Kazakhstan), Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Kyrgyzstan) and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan). The Islamic principles expounded during the Islamic Revolution in Iran became a source of strength for the Uyghur Muslims to fight their cause on the basis of religion, i.e. Islam.

Taliban-Al Qaeda Links and Drugs

A sensational revelation regarding the link between the Uyghur separatists and the Al Qaeda was made by Mutalif Hasm, a member of ETIM and now a Chinese prisoner convicted for threatening state security. Mutalif gave information about ETIM’s plans to establish an Islamic Emirate in Xinjiang by means of violent armed struggle. Hinting about the links between East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) leader Mahsum and Osama bin Lad en, he told that an estimated 500 Uyghurs had been sent for training in Afghanistan through Mahsum’s arrangement. The boarding, lodging, medical care and the training costs were borne by Osama bin Laden. He confessed to have met Osama once in an Al Qaeda camp in October 1997. Describing the role of Taliban in providing weapons for training, he informed that there were more than 100 tanks at Mahsum’s camps, all provided by the Taliban. According to him, many such trainees from Xinjiang fought on behalf of the Taliban and dozens were killed.
Chinese authorities claimed that an organisation named Uyghur East Tujue Network has close links with the Taliban and receives help from other terrorist cells to carry out assassinations and bomb attacks. The Uyghurs were also being trained at camps in northern Afghan town of Mazar-e-Sharif, run and managed by Tahir Yuldashev, the head of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These camps were set up in May 1999 to provide training to around 200 to 300 militants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uyghurs from Xinjiang province.
Expressing deep concern over the gravity of the situation in Xinjiang, Wang Lequan, Chinese Communist Party Secretary in the region pointed to the existence of twenty training bases in Xinjiang. He admitted that hardcore terrorist elements receiving instructions in Afghanistan were enticing the youth to violence on the pretext of religion. Wang stated on 22 January 1999, “Xinjiang is the constant target of the separatists both inside and outside the country.” Huge quantities of consumer goods, foodstuffs and drugs like heroin are smuggled across the border between Afghanistan and China. Arms, ammunitions and explosives used by Uyghur rebels against Chinese security forces in recent months have come from Afghanistan. Uyghur separatists are believed to have resorted to opium trade to fund their activities which has led to growing drug abuse. The UN officials confirm that China has one million drug addicts, many being along Xinjiang’s border with Afghanistan. The Chinese authorities believe that the profits from the heroin trade are meant for funding anti-Chinese Islamic and nationalist movements by the Uyghurs.
Though the real link between the Uyghurs and the fundamentalists in Afghanistan is hard to be found, the Hamid Karzai government in Afghanistan claims that it has only a few Chinese prisoners and has promised to hand them over to the Chinese authorities. A dramatic increase in cross-border relations between Chinese minority groups and the “Golden Crescent” (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) has led to a rising problem of drug smuggling. Beijing expressed grave concern when there were fears of ethnic wars and disputes in these states spilling over China’s northwest.
It has been alleged that the Chinese military had sent Uyghurs for combat training in Afghanistan during 1980s as part of an alliance with the Mujahideen against the Soviet forces. It has also been alleged that the PLA was involved in training the Mujahideen both within Pakistan and in camps inside Xinjiang. This might have seemed a sensible Chinese strategy to build up its credibility in Central Asia during the Sino-Soviet dispute. China supplied large amounts of weaponry through the local people, who knew the terrains in Xinjiang and the Pamirs, to support the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. So, Chinese support to the radical factions backfired on the Chinese government as it happened to the US government During the Taliban regime, it was easy to use these channels to get weapons back into Xinjiang. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in late 1970s and 1980s, the Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers—USA and the Soviet Union, led USA to aid and abet the local Mujahideen providing all kinds of support on men, material and logistic means. These were used against the USA when Taliban and Al Qaeda jointly spread their network against the enemies of Islam like the USA.
Though the external factors or actor did play an important role in bringing out and spreading radical Islam in Xinjiang, the internal factors, especially the Chinese government policy also contributed towards the radicalization of Uyghurs. But perhaps the most important reason for an upsurge in Islamic radicalism in Xinjiang in the 1990s, especially in southern Xinjiang, is the growing hostility between Uyghurs and the Hans and the suppression of religious freedom including restrictions on teaching of Islam in the mosques. Religious activities outside the state controlled religious organization were deemed illegal and invited prosecution. The Central government’s Bureau of Religious Affairs directed the provincial administration to supervise the nature of the Islam taught in mosques.

Internationalization of Uyghur Separatist Movement

 

Uyghurs have been making sincere efforts even at the international level to liberate Xinjiang from Chinese rule. Erkin Alptekin, son of Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who chairs the General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in the The Hague (The Netherlands), said in 2002 that only a referendum on Xinjiang’s status can meaningfully answer questions about the spread of Uyghur separatism. He said, “the citizens of Xinjiang only have to decide whether Xinjiang should stay a part of China or it should gain independence. Uncoordinated groups behave very actively in Xinjiang and they are able to commit one time actions against the Chinese people. Special services of China cannot either control these organizations from without or incorporate their emissaries. That is why we cannot say these organizations are financed by foreign Uyghurs.
The Uyghur American Association (UAA) has been very much instrumental in internationalizing the Uyghur cause. As a prominent diaspora organisation of the Uyghurs in the United States, UAA is based in Washington DC. As a non-political, non­profit and voluntary association, it works as an umbrella organization for the Uyghurs residing in different parts of the United States and Canada. It arranges religious festivals, social get together, cultural events and participates in the cultural life of the local community as representative of the Uyghur culture. The UAA has undertaken the Uyghur Human Rights Project in order to find out feasibility towards improving human rights conditions of the Uyghurs.

China’s Response to Separatism

Economic Strategy

Beijing realizes well that only by improving the economic well-being of the Uyghurs, their attention could be deflected from their persistent demands for a separate homeland out of China. Chinese strategy for promoting and accelerating Xinjiang’s economic development aims at integrating the region into an emerging Central Asian market. As early as 1994, China was well aware that Central Asia constituted an important export market for products from Xinjiang and other parts of China. It was corroborated by Chinese Premier, Li Peng who gave a clarion call to revive the fabled ancient commercial Silk Route through a network of roads and railways.
China’s modernizing economic agenda is primarily based on the fact that economic well-being of Xinjiang’s ethnic population would lessen ethnic separatist tendencies and activities. The government’s economic development plan for Xinjiang in the Last decade has been based upon: (a) Re-centralization of economic decision making; (b) Han in-migration; (c) Exploitation of Xinjiang’s hydrocarbon resources; and (d) Strengthening political, social, economic and cultural ties with Central Asia. Xinjiang’s former Chairman, Abulahat Abdurixit has laid stress on the importance of economic development and political stability in Xinjiang.
Due to the “Opening up Policy” taken up during Deng Xiaoping’s reign in 1980s, Xinjiarig had a favourable tilt towards Central Asian economies. Central Asia-Xinjiang trade and commerce registered sharp growth, which prompted the Chinese leadership to reintegrate and assimilate Xinjiang with the domestic economy and tighten the region’s economy. Xinjiang appears to have served two purposes in China’s Open Door Policy—(1) a regular supplier of raw materials to the eastern coastal belt for further export or use in domestic industries; and (2) a hub of Silk Route economy in the Great Islamic Circle. The former requires strong linkages to the domestic economy as the latter does to the Central Asian economy, i.e. a double opening (both domestic and foreign) for Xinjiang.
In the 1990s, the Chinese authorities maintained a strict state control over majority of the industries in Xinjiang. They even tied the minority region’s economic development to neighbouring provinces and let the region depend heavily on the Central government on the economic front. However, these developments occurred in concert with developments that suggest continued regional autonomy in some spheres of developmental policies. It also signalled the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). In 1993, Xinjiang developed its own policy to open its borders with Central Asia to set up economic zones supported with appropriate transport linkages, to open major cities combined with economic zones and other cities and to promote trade and economic cooperation with the newly created Central Asian Republics. Consequently, all 33 border counties and cities in Xinjiang are now open and cities like Yining, Tacheng, Bole and Kashi enjoy similar preferential treatment as open cities on the country’s east cost.

Military Strategy

The persistent violence perpetrated by the Uyghur rebel activists compelled the Chinese authorities to devise a new strategy in the mid-1990s and the offshoot was “Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure Campaign” or yanda which was initiated in the Conference of the Bureau of Public Security.

Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure Campaign

Though the campaign, in its letter and spirit, aimed at launching a crackdown on criminals in general, it targeted the unofficial anti-government political organisations and particularly the separatists in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. The statement of the Bureau of Public Safety confirmed this when it demanded that “the crackdown should mainly focus on the violent and terrorist cases organized and manipulated by national separatist forces.”
The Xinjiang Party Committee, which linked separatism with unlawful religious activities, also confirmed the religious colour attached to the separatist activities. Chinese authorities corroborated the above fact in April 1996, when a 13-article document was prepared outlining regulations for controlling Islamic books, periodicals, and audio-visual products by the Chinese Communist Party’s Propaganda Department, United Front Work Department, Press and Publications Bureau, Culture Department, Public Security Department and Nationalities Affairs Commission. The regulations stipulated thorough scrutiny and prior approval of the government for that all publications connected with Islam. When peace, tranquility and stability in Xinjiang were at stake and there was a potential threat to the territorial integrity of China, the CCP Central Committee Document No. 7 came to the fore. The highlights of the document are:
•     Necessity of ideological unity, consciousness-raising, leadership strengthening and a clear sense of duty.
•     Strengthening of all levels of government, especially the basic level, and creating a team of politically dependable cadres. The onus is on every level of party and organisation.
•     Comprehensive and correct implementation of CCP’s ethnic and religious policy and strengthening legal control of ethnic and religious affairs.
•     Stabilization of the ideological and cultural stronghold against separatism by strong propaganda and investigate and organize schools.
•     Empowering democratic dictatorship organisations and fully utilize their functions in dealing with separatist and sabotage activities.
•     Strengthening of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC).
•     Strengthening the PLA in Xinjiang against ethnic separatism.
•     Reinvigoration of diplomatic activities to checkmate foreign influence on the separatist activities in Xinjiang.
•     Thorough preparation for any eventuality or emergency situation.
•     Speed up economic development and improve local people’s standard of living.

Under the Campaign, Chinese security forces arrested 1,300 criminals, including frontline separatist leaders and activists destroyed 70 criminal outfits and recovered a huge cache of arms, ammunitions and large amount of hard cash. Attacks on police, government officials and other vital installations in Urumchi were ruthlessly suppressed. Some pro-independence organisations like United National Revolutionary Party informed that during the Strike Hard Campaign, military and public security agencies lost 450 lives and more than 1,000 were injured. The exiled separatist leader Yussupbek Mukhlisi, speaking from his base in Kazakhstan, claimed that there had been at least 50 bombings in Xinjiang since the end of July 1996, which was refuted by Chinese authorities.

Diplomatic Initiatives

With the break-up of the former Soviet Union and creation of five new Central Asian Republics, the entire region adjacent to the northwest region of China underwent a dramatic change. New issues emerged and new problems cropped up leading to new types of conflicts and tensions. The old Great Game of 19th Century was revisited with several actors staking their claims from their respective angles and making efforts to influence the entire region. Leading powers of the world like Russia, the US, China and India and other regional powers like Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan evinced interests in the resource rich Central Asian region. This situation caused concern for China because its restive northwestern province of Xinjiang has not only a 2,060-mile long border with the three Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but also same cultural, language and religious affinity with the people of these newly independent states.
In order to uphold its territorial integrity as well as to keep the disturbed region of Xinjiang away from these adverse external influences, China took some stern measures at the domestic as well as international level. It embarked upon new but viable diplomatic efforts to maintain warm relations with the Muslim world because of its solidarity with the predominantly Muslim province of Xinjiang.

China’s Diplomacy with Iran

Iran took interest in Central Asia eyeing the rich natural resources of the region besides seeking to promote the cause of Islam. China feared that Iran’s active interest in Central Asia could, directly or indirectly, affect the situation in its Xinjiang region. To marginalize Iran’s influence in Central Asia as well as Xinjiang, Chinese authorities resorted to active diplomatic initiatives. Both countries focused more on cooperation in the atomic energy projects with each other’s help. They reached an agreement in 1991 on this issue after a delegation of Iran’s Centre for Strategic Research visited China. There were several high level diplomatic and political exchanges between the two sides. In October 1992. Chinese Defence Minister visited Iran and held meetings with Iran’s President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Iranian Defence Minister. It was perhaps the first visit made by such a high ranking Chinese Minister since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran entered into agreement with China on nuclear cooperation in September 1992 during Iranian President Rafsanjani’s visit to China. Rafsanjani even visited Xinjiang and met the regional government Chairman of Xinjiang, Tomur Dawamat and discussed economic, commercial, scientific, technological and cultural exchanges including talks on Iran-­Xinjiang joint projects. China has also maintained a cautious approach with regard to the recent crisis over Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme and sincerely wants to resolve the crisis by diplomatic means as against the wishes of the Western powers.

Sino-Pakistan Engagements

China has traditionally followed a favourable policy towards Pakistan as against India that provided political asylum to the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama. The memories of Sino-Indian war of 1962 and stalemate over Sino-India border dispute are other factors influencing China’s tilt towards Pakistan. Since then China and Pakistan have maintained an “all-weather friendship” based on their mutual interests in protecting their borders and also to check the Indian influence. Their friendship was concretized through the opening of the Karakoram Highway in 1982.
In Pakistan, China found a natural ally and soon Pakistan became its leading arms customer. Besides, China developed a very warm economic and diplomatic relationship with Pakistan. In spite of the value of the Karakoram highway for both the countries, this highway was used throughout the 1990s for exchange of arms, drugs and religion affecting their friendship. Pakistan’s Islamist connection with the Uyghurs of Xinjiang has strained Beijing-Islamabad links.
Chinese authorities expressed their concern over the Pakistani hand in training, aiding and abetting the Uyghur separatists. It was reported that Pakistan has been one of the sources of Islamic literature swarming Xinjiang, either directly or as via media for religious materials coming from Afghanistan or further west. Beijing claimed time and again that members of the Pakistani security forces were providing combat training to Uyghur separatists in Afghanistan who were then travelling back to Xinjiang to use their expertise against the Chinese. Beijing has curtailed border trade, lodged strong protests with the Pakistani government, and even closed the Karakoram Highway for a brief period. In August 1997, China announced a plan to erect a security fence along the Sino-Pakistan border to prevent terrorists and drug smugglers from entering the region. In February 1998, the Xinjiang Legal Daily reported. “there is also evidence of trade in heroin and weapons over Xinjiang’s borders with Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), Afghanistan and three Central Asian Republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.” On 6 January 1999, the Chinese authorities lodged a protest with the Pakistan Interior Ministry after sixteen Uyghurs were arrested in Xinjiang. The Chinese stated that the arrested persons admitted during interrogation that they had received guerrilla warfare training in camps at Jalalabad in Afghanistan and Landi Kotal in the Pakistan’s Khyber Agency. In May 2002, Chinese authorities announced that Pakistan had detained a Uyghur separatist leader, Ismail Kadeer at a secret meeting in Kashmir. A People’s Daily article in November 2003 reported that some separatist Muslims from Xinjiang have received training in Al Qaeda camps in Pakistan. In order to assuage China’s fears, Pakistan since the late 1990s has taken stern measures like closing the Uyghur settlements in Pakistan, arresting and deporting Uyghurs and killing Uyghur terrorist suspects.
In December 2000, the Pakistan army closed two Uyghur community centres called Kashgarabad and Hotanabad that had for decades provided shelter to Uyghur immigrants in Pakistan. Islamabad also put pressure on religious leaders running madrasas not to accept any Uyghurs. During a visit to China’s Shaanxi Province in 2001, Pakistan’s President, General Pervez Musharraf met the Imam of the Grand Mosque in Xi’an and urged all Chinese Muslims to be patriotic, shun violence, and “work for the good of China.” General Musharraf assured the then Chinese Vice President and the present President Hu Jintao that “Pakistan would wholeheartedly support Chinese action to strike against the East Turkistan terrorist forces.”
During a visit to China in November 2003, General Musharraf reportedly told Chinese President Hu Jintao that Pakistan would never allow anyone, including the terrorist forces of East Turkistan, to use Pakistani territory for carrying out anti-China activities. Both leaders signed the China-Pakistan Joint Declaration calling for bilateral cooperation in numerous areas including combating “separatism, extremism, and terrorism.” The provisions of this declaration, along with the recently concluded Sino-Pakistan Extradition Treaty, make Pakistan’s current zero tolerance for Uyghur militancy abundantly clear. In December 2003, Pakistani authorities confirmed the killing of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) Chief, Hassan Mahsum on October 2003 during a Pakistani military operation in South Waziristan.

Securing Support of the CARs

Though China’s relation with Central Asia is inextricably interwoven with the desire to strengthen its political control over the region and develop trade and business linkages, security in Xinjiang remains the most important issue. Since the brouhaha regarding Central Asia energy and hydrocarbon resources in the early 1990s immediately after the Soviet disintegration, China emerged as a major actor in the region. China realized the importance of the newly created independent states three of which Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are direct and closest neighbours along the Xinjiang border. These republics are also home to Turkic ethnic groups including the ones who had migrated from Xinjiang decades ago.
Chinese government claims that with the increase in trade between Central Asia and Xinjiang, many people, who had migrated to Central Asia in the late 1940s and early 1950s, are returning back to take advantage of the economic boom in Xinjiang. Addressing the National People’s Congress in Beijing in March 1992, the Regional Secretary of Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang, Song Hanliang expressed satisfaction over the possibility of export opportunities from Xinjiang to Central Asia and other parts of the world. The Chairman of Xinjiang’s provincial government, Tomur Dawamat visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in November 1990 and signed trade agreements. Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev predicted considerable economic and political benefits from the developing rail network in Xinjiang.
Though this process has been positive for the development of Xinjiang, there are many problematic issues such as religious extremism, weapons and drugs trafficking. The narcotics trade in Xinjiang has steadily increased with a rising number of drug addicts among the minority nationalities in Xinjiang. Lack of adequate employment opportunities has furthered the feelings of marginalization, frustration and alienation among the Uyghurs, some of whom have resorted to drugs. With the influx of drugs and the shared use of contaminated needles, HIV/AIDS rates in Xinjiang have grown in alarming proportion. Xinjiang has the second-highest HIV/AIDS infection rate in China and about 85 per cent of all HIV/AIDS affected people in Xinjiang are Uyghurs. 96 per cent of reported infections have been detected among intravenous drug users and in some communities living along the border, the infection rate among them now is more than 70 per cent. Though this sorry state of affairs has led to perpetuation of economic and political instability in this volatile region. China’s new found relationship with Central Asian states, especially the three republics close to its border along Xinjiang province— Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—has been very promising to combat the problems plaguing the region.

China’s Post-9/11 Crackdown on Separatists

Historically, the relationship between Uyghurs and the PRC has revolved round a cycle of violence, insurgency and repression. There is growing apprehension that these problems will continue in all likelihood without being sorted out. The international war against terrorism has set off the intensification of the China’s anti-separatist campaign in the Xinjiang. China was among the first few nations which wholeheartedly supported the US “War against Terror.” US launched a massive crackdown against the terrorists after the deadly attack on World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the US on 21 September 2001. Similarly, China initiated military action against the Uyghur separatists.
In December 2002, China again highlighted the threat posed by “East Turkistan terrorist forces” in a White Paper on “China’s National Defence in 2002” published by the State Council. It included a long section identifying terrorism” as the key security                                issue. The White Paper reiterated that “China, too, is a victim of terrorism,” and that “the ‘East Turkistan terrorist forces’ are a serious threat to the security of the lives and property of the people of the ethnic groups and the country’s social stability.”
According to the present report of Amnesty International in 2004, the Chinese crackdown on the so-called three “evil forces” (separatists, terrorists and religious extremists) is resulting in serious and widespread human rights violations in Xinjiang. On 16 January 2002, Human Rights Watch’s Research Consultant, Ms. Mickey Spiegel said that political prisoners have been executed in Xinjiang. She questioned the Chinese government’s charges against Uyghur separatists as there is no evidence of violent acts by the Uyghurs in many cases. Mickey added that it is very difficult to get information about the names of prisoners, the charges brought against them and their legal fate.

 

APPENDIX I

 

Uyghur Organisations World Wide

1.      Allied Committee of the peoples of Eastern Turkistan. (Tibet and Inner Mongolia)
2.      Australian Turkistan Association
Chairman: Ahmet Igamberdi Headquarters: Australia
3.      Belgium Uyghur Association Chairman: Sultan Ehmet Headquarters: Brussels [Belgium]
4.      Bishkek Human Rights Committee Chairman: Tursun Islam Headquarters: Bishkek [Kyrgyzstan]
5.      Canadian Uyghur Association Chairman: Mehmetjan Tohti Headquarters: Toronto [Canada]
6.      Central Asian Uyghur Hezbollah, Kazakhstan.
(Links with Al Qaeda)
7.      East Turkistan Association
Chairman: Faruk Sadikov
Headquarters: Stockholm [Sweden]
8.      East Turkistan Grey Wolf Party
Headquarters: Urumqi [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region]
[It is backed by teachers, students and other intellectuals. It is said to be Turkic oriented.]
9.      East Turkistan Independence Organisation Base: Khotan [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region] [It claims the support of some young farmers, unemployed youths and young officials.]
10.    East Turkistan Information Centre Chairman: Abduljelil Qaraqash Headquarters: Nurnberg, Munich [Germany]
11.    East Turkistan Islamic Party
Base: Kashghar and Khotan [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region]
[It is supported by religious fundamentalists, conservative forces and farmers.]
12.    East Turkistan Liberation Front
Base: Turpan and Kumul [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region]
13.    East Turkistan Liberation Organisation (See Appendix 3)
14.    East Turkistan (Uyghuristan) National Congress
President: Enver Can Headquarters: Munich [Germany]
15.    East Turkistan Revolutionary Party (Urumqi and Ghulja). (It claims the support of intelligentsia like writers and progressive students.)
16.    East Turkistan National Freedom Centre (Established in 1996)
17.    East Turkistani Government in Exile Prime Minister: Anwar Yusuf Turani
Headquarters: Washington DC [USA]
18.    Eastern Turkistan Charity Funds
19.    Eastern Turkistan Cultural and Social Association (Established by Erkin Alptekin)
Headquarters: Munich [Germany]
20.    Eastern Turkistan Cultural and Relief Organisation
Chairman: Mehmet Canturk. Headquarters: Kayseri [Turkey]
21.    East Turkistan Culture and Solidarity Association Chairman: Abubekir Turksoy
        Headquarters: Kayseri [Turkey]
22.    Eastern Turkistan Cultural Association General Secretary: Omar Kanat.
23.    Eastern Turkistan Cultural Centre in Europe Chairman: Erkin Alptekin.
24.    Eastern Turkistan Foundation, Turkey. Chairman: Mehmet Riza Bekin Headquarters: Istanbul [Turkey]
25.    Eastern Turkistan Information Centre Head: Dilxat Raxit Headquarters: Sweden
26.    Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (See Appendix 2)
27.    Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah.
28.    Eastern Turkistan Islamic Resistance Party Headquarters: Turkey.
29.    Eastern Turkistan Liberation Front Organisation
Head: Ahxil Vyiding
Headquarters: Kazakhstan (Registered in 1994)
(Banned by Kazakhstan government)
30.    Eastern Turkistan Liberation Front
Headquarters: Istanbul.
(It was earlier led by Isa Yusuf Alptekin.
It publishes Voice of East Turkistan)
31.    Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organisation, Central Asia.
32.    Eastern Turkistan National Centre
Head: Reza Berken (a retired Colonel of the Turkish Army)
Headquarters: Turkey
33.    Eastern Turkistan National Committee Chairman: Yusuf bek Muhlisi. Headquarters: Almaty [Kazakhstanl
34.    Eastern Turkistan National Revolutionary Front.
35.    Eastern Turkistan National Salvation Committee.
36.    Eastern Turkistan Solidarity Association, Turkey.
Chairman: Seyit Taranci Headquarters: Istanbul [Turkey]
37.    Eastern Turkistan Union in Europe, Germany.
Chairman: Asgar Can Headquarters: Munich, Germany
38.    Eastern Turkistan World Union, USA. (Gulamettin Pahta is associated with this organisation)
39.    Eastern Turkistan Youth League, Switzerland.
40.    Eastern Turkistan, Mongolian, Manchurian and Tibetan Peoples’ Federation Committee.
41.    For a Free Uyghuristan
Headquarters: Kyrgyzstan (Established in June 1992)
42.    Front for the Liberation of Uyghuristan.
43.    International Uyghur Union, Almaty. It was established in
16 January 1992.
President: Kehriman Khojamberdiev.
44.    Islamic Holy Warriors.
45.    Kazakhstan Regional Uyghur (ittipak) Organisation Chairman: Khahriman Gojamberdi Headquarters: Almaty, Kazakhstan
46.    Kazakhstan Uyghur Unity (Ittipak) Association Chairman: Sheripjan Nadirov Headquarters: Almaty [Kazakhstan]
47.    Kyrgyzstan Uyghur Unity (Ittipak) Association Chairman: Rozimehmet Abdulnbakiev Headquarters: Bishkek [Kyrgyzstan]
48.    Nevada Semipalatinsk Movement Headquarters: Kazakhstan.
(It has a separate department to mobilize support against nuclear tests in Lop Nor region of Xinjiang)
49.    “Nozugum” Foundation
Headquarters: Almaty [Kazakhstan]
50.    Republic Uyghur Cultural Centre
Headquarters: Kazakhstan.
51.    Republic Uyghur Unity Organisation
Headquarters: Kazakhstan.
52.    Tigers of Lop Nor.
53.    Turkistan Party, Pakistan.
54.    Uyghur Association of Russia
Chairman: Serip Haje
Headquarters: Moscow [Russia]
55.    Uyghur American Association (established in May 1998)
President: Rebiya Kadeer
Headquarters: Washington DC [USA]
56.    Uyghur House
Chairman: Shahelil
Headquarters: Holland
57.    Uyghur Human Rights Coalition
Headquarters: Washington.
58.    Uyghur Information Agency
Headquarters: Washington DC.
59.    Uyghur International Union
Head: A Uyghur researcher of the Kazakhstan Academy of Science. Kazakhstan
60.    Uyghur Liberation Organisation Headquarters: Almaty [Kazakhstan] (Established in 1991)
61.    Uyghur Youth Alliance, Kyrgyzstan
Headquarters: Bishkek [Kyrgyzstan]
(Its President Nighmet Bosakof was shot dead in March 2000
in front of his house in Kyrgyzstan by the members of Eastern
Turkistan Liberation Organisation.)
62.    Uyghur Youth Union of Belgium
Chairman: Seydullam
Headquarters: Brussels [Belgium]
63.    Uyghur Youth Union, Kazakhstan Chairman: Abdurexit Turdeyev
Headquarters: Almaty [Kazakhstan]
64.    Uyghur Youth Union, UK Chairman: Enver Bugda Headquarters: London [UK]
65.    Uyghuristan Freedom Association Chariman: Sabit Abdurahman Headquarters: Almaty [Kazakhstan]
66.    World Uyghur Youth Congress Chairman: Dolqun Isa Headquarters: Munich [Germany]
67.    World Uyghur Congress President: Erkin Alptekin Headquarters: Munich [Germany]

 

APPENDIX 2

Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

 

Countries of Operation: China, Afghanistan (during Taliban regime)
Founding Philosophy: ETIM is an Islamist extremist group based in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. While the ETIM’s name would suggest that the group is interested in creating an Islamic state exclusively in the Xinjiang province (“Eastern Turkistan”), to some analysts, this group along with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), aims to create a pan-Islamic Turkistan state that would include portions of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang.
Current Goals: ETIM, with unknown number of members, has been linked to Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Al-Qaeda has provided the group with training and funds. As far as the group’s strength, ETIM has been described as a small terrorist group that demonstrates limited allegiance among the ethnic Uyghurs of Xinjiang. Furthermore, China shows absolutely no signs of acquiescing to any of ETIM’s terrorist demands. ETIM comprises eight major factions (listed below), which are committed to terrorist attacks in the name of an Eastern Turkistan Islamic state. ETIM has been implicated in terrorist plots against US installations in the Central Asia region, including an abortive bid on the US Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.
First Mentioned: 1990
Classification: Religious
Key leader: Hassan Mahsum (In a joint anti-terror raid along the border of Pakistan-Afghanistan on 2 October 2003, Pakistani troops gunned down Hasan Mahsum)
Related Organisations: Central Asian Uygur Hezbollah (Kazakhstan): Faction
•     Eastern Turkistan International Committee: Faction
•     Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (Afghanistan): Faction
•     Eastern Turkistan Islamic Resistance Movement (Turkey): Faction
•     Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organisation: Faction

APPENDIX 3

 

East Turkistan Liberation Organisation (ETLO)
(Sharq azat Turkistan in Uyghur language)

 

Countries of Operation: China and Kyrgyzstan
Founding Philosophy: The East Turkistan Liberation Organisation (ETLQ) is one of several ethnic Uyghur organisations operating in Central Asia and Xinjiang. The ETLO is one of several factions of the ETIM, an umbrella organisation dedicated to the foundation of an Islamic State in Xinjiang. Although the ETLO has been blamed for several small attacks in both China and Central Asia, their lone definitive attack was the assassination of the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy and a companion, a Kyrgyzstan citizen in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. China has called for designating the ETLO as a terrorist organisation by the United States and UN. As yet, only the ETIM has been recognized as such, and the ETLO is seen solely as a faction of that group.
Current Goals: The ETLO under the umbrella of ETIM has indirect links to Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban. Al­Qaeda has provided both financial assistance and training to the ETIM, which in turn has supported their numerous factions, in­cluding the ETLO. The ETLO’s current goal continues to be the foundation of an Islamic state in Xinjiang province.
Lone Major Attack: 30 June 2002
Strength: Unknown number of members
Classification: Religious, Separatist

Related Organisations:
•     Central Asian Uygur Hezbollah (Kazakhstan): Ally
•     Eastern Turkistan International Committee: Ally
•     Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (Afghanistan): Ally
•     Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM): Umbrella Organisation
•     Eastern Turkistan Islamic Resistance Movement (Turkey): Ally