Central Asia Journal No. 64

Blood Revenge, Pushtoons and Islam in Chilas, Gilgit-Baltistan

 

Muhammad Azam Chaudhary*

 

Abstract

The genesis of blood enmity in Chilas has been sought in the acephalous nature of the society, its particular history, the impact of Pushtoon culture and ideals of mas­culinity. The justification for feuds is taken from Islam. The immediate effect of political modernization and economic development might be a higher mur­der rate (more Kalashnikovs) but eventually both modernization and devel­opment are the most effective measures for eliminating blood enmity.

 

Introduction

 

This paper attempts to understand the presence of blood feuds in Chilas , a mountain region in the Northern Areas of Pakistan. Chilas is approximately 130 km from Gilgit and is the headquarters of the Diamir District. The dis­trict of Diamir has a population of more than 150,000 people and includes the subdivisions of Astor, Tangir/Darel, and Chilas. Astor is the largest of the three subdivisions with respect to size and population, followed by Chi­las. The highest murder rate is in Tangir/Darel, with Chilas having the sec­ond highest. Blood feuds do not exist in Astor . It is important to note that the ethnographic research for the present study was carried out mainly in Chilas and, therefore, the analysis and conclusions are limited to that area. The population of the subdivision of Chilas is approximately 50,000 which include the town of Chilas and a number of valleys, such as Butogah, Thak, Gichi, Thor, Hodur, Thalpan, Ges, and oth­ers. In the views of my informants average number of murders per year is more than 30 to 35 persons. It is important to keep in mind as well the large number of persons who survive the attempt on their lives.

There are few families not involved in a blood feud. People do not dare go into the streets in the dark. Weapons are their permanent companions. They carry at least a pistol or a revolver under their shirts during the day and sleep with a gun at their side at night. Those who are on the revenging side of the feud try to keep themselves informed about the activities of the other party, in order to waylay them. They employ spies for getting information about the other side whereas the other party tries to keep its activities a secret. There is strong pressure from the society to take revenge if it is due. And people are practically forced by this pressure to take revenge. Many people, when asked, express their being fed up with this life of permanent fear and pressure. Blood revenge is taken by the nearest relatives, such as the son, brother, father, uncle, or cousin, and often collectively.

Bearded men with woolen caps, carrying rifles; curious, rather weary faces and the absence of women from the public eye strike a visitor in Chi­las. Every adult male grows a beard to symbolize his staunch religious con­viction. I remember a Chilasi asking me, as I was beardless, whether I would have preferred to be a woman. Weapons are said to be the jewellery of men. They take pride in showing them and talking about their most expensive adornment. An acquaintance proudly told me of possessing as many Kalashnikovs as there were male members in his family. The absence of women in public represents the male dominance and the strong influence of the relig­ion. I dare to interpret the weary and unfriendly faces as a sign of being fed up with blood feuds. Blood feuds are one of the men's most important activities and they claim most of their energy and resources as was also observed by a journalist about Chilas:

They love their feuds more than their children, they rather produce chil­dren for a successful vengeance and for producing many children they marry several wives. They are regular in their prayers and spend more than 90 % of their incomes on litigation.        (Deed Shneed, Lahore Vol. 9, add. 19, 1-15 Oct. 1992)

 

We know from the literature on the history of the area that a century ago blood feuds were not as common as they are today . Furthermore, the present research finds more blood feuds in the remote valleys and villages than in the "town" of Chilas. The questions I want to address are the following: What are the origins of blood feuds in Chilas in their regional context? What has led to the increase of blood enmity in the last century and what is the reason for more murders in the far valleys of Chilas?

This article is divided into five sections. The second section refines the central research questions in the light of history of the area. Besides that this section presents precisely the main arguments of the author. The next section discusses the relationship of modernization, economic development and feuds. The view is presented that only modernization and economic development can prove successful in controlling the high rate of blood feuds. The fourth section consists of mainly the ethnographic data and its analysis before the conclusion in the last section.

 

The Genesis of Blood Feuds

 

It must be mentioned that the aim of this study is not to provide a simplified model of the genesis of blood enmity. It is a very complex phenomenon which originated from several diverse factors and their particular combinations. This is only an attempt to understand these factors. We begin our analysis from the present Northern Areas of Pakistan, which include the three major regions of Baltistan, Gilgit, and Diamir. Baltistan lies to the east of Diamir and Gilgit to its north. Only the district of Diamir has a system of organized vengeance. The question is: How did blood enmity gain this central role in the district of Diamir and not in the other two regions?

We start with some ethno-historical facts about the area. Gilgit and Baltistan (i.e., the central, northern, and eastern valleys) were divided into several princely states and each was ruled by a more or less hereditary ruler. The southern areas (i.e., the present Diamir District and Kohistan) were without a central government and were called "republican" or "acephalous" societies. Different sects of Islam spread in the three above-mentioned regions through different people. Baltistan became predominantly a Shia, Diamir a Sunni, and Gilgit an Ismaili region . There is a general consensus that there was no great change in the political structure - for Instance from central state to acephalous - of the princely states after the arrival of Islam . This contrasts with the present acephalous or tribal areas including the dis­trict of Diamir. Islam arrived here from the south through the Pushtoons, who also have acephalous or tribal political structures.

Comparing Diamir with the other two regions - since only Diamir has blood feuds - we might hold that tribal nature of the society, the Pushtoon influence and Sunni Islam must be responsible for the origin of the blood feuds, if we put aside, for the time being, the ecological and cultural differ­ences of the regions. One could also see all three reasons mentioned above as one and the same thing, since Sunni Islam was brought here by the Pushtoons, who were tribal. But we want to analyze them separately since the regions under scrutiny are acephalous societies which are not inhabited by the Pushtoons. There are similarly areas inhabited by Sunni without blood enmity.

The first question to be addressed is as follows: Was Diamir already an acephalous state before the arrival of the Pushtoon missionaries? If we suppose that Diamir was already an acephalous society before the arrival of the Pushtoons - due to ecological, economic or other reasons - and accept Gluckman's thesis that peace and social order in tribal societies is maintained through the feuds , we may assume that in the absence of any central government and administration, social order in Chilas, too, might have been regulated by these blood feuds. We may, in that case; assume that blood feuds existed already before Islamization of the area through the Pushtoons. One may feel encouraged to assume further that the Pushtoon type of Sunni Islam reached here because of the similarity of the social structure - tribal nature-of the two societies. The blood feuds were, one could further assume, somehow Islamized. Now women, instead of-or besides-land and irrigation water, became reasons to murder. This could be further used as an argument why only in these regions the Pushtoon type of Sunni Islam could spread.

The alternative view is that before the Islamization of district Diamir by Pushtoons it was a princely state like its northern and eastern neigh­bours. This view is supported by several local, oral, and written traditions . According to John Staley:

“The early travelers recorded traditions that several of the acephalous states were formerly governed by rulers .... In Darel people point out 'the ruler's polo ground'; in Chilas they have preserved the name of a ruler; and in Kandia they still tell stories of Kandi....”                                                                        (Staley 1982: 183)

 

The first question arises why the new religion (Islam) should lead to the change of the political structure in the south, for example in the present Diamir District, but not in the northern and eastern parts, in the present Baltistan and Gilgit districts. Staley again gives a possible explanation:

“.... these missionaries and religious leaders came from countries to the north and west where Islam was well established under centralized rule .... and so they would not have thought it necessary to make political changes. … On the other hand the southern valleys were converted by missionaries who came from further south, from the territories occupied by the Pathans. Indeed most of these missionaries were Pathans, and they approached their task in a different way ... No doubt their thrones and administrations were destroyed too, for these Pathan missionaries, as well as introducing a more orthodox form of Islam, seem to have imposed wholesale the institutions and practices that they were familiar with in the Pathan territories further south.”                                                                            (Staley 1982: 185-87)

 

The further evidence of Pushtoons or Pushtoon missionaries introducing the new socio-political structure is the existence and signs of existence of some of the following typical Pushtoon institutions: the Wesh system (the system of periodical re-allotment of land); Kalang lands (a contract according to which a piece of land is given on a fixed amount of money for an indefinite time under certain conditions); and joint community land and water rights, with the division of the community between owners and non-owners of these rights. The Wesh system is a typical Pushtoon institution, introduced in Swat that lies around two hundred kilometers south of Chilas after its conquest by Pushtoon between A.D. 1500 and 1600 . Thus, the available literature on the history of the area reflects that the Wesh system existed here before it was abolished even in Swat, the area of its origin .

Hence, if we support the alternative that an acephalous system and Islam were brought to the region by the Pushtoons and the blood feuds began after this new religio-political change , the question arises whether the blood feuds were a by-product of the new religion, (Sunni Islam), or the result of the Pushtoon acephalous culture. The two are very often mixed together but this differentiation is important because of its political implications, on the one hand, and in seeking an end to this social evil, on the other hand.

I start my analysis with the assumption that Sunni Islam gave birth to the blood feuds. As previously mentioned, the district of Diamir consists of three subdivisions, Astor, Tangir/Darel, and Chilas. We have also seen (note 3) that in Astor which is, according to population and area, the biggest of the three, the average number of murders per year is between one and two. It is interesting that the Astoris, too, confess Sunni Islam, a Sunni Islam, though, that came to Astor via Kashmir.

The other incidence of Sunni Islam is in the Kaghan Valley, the south­eastern neighbour of Chilas; there again, we find no system of blood feuds. Kaghan, too, received Sunni Islam via Kashmir. It is interesting that even Chilas received the first wave of Islam via the Babusar Pass (Kaghan ), but later on, the Pushtoon influence from the south became more dominant. This is perhaps one of the reasons that until the end of the nineteenth century the blood feuds in Chilas were less frequent than today (see note 5). And even today the ratio of blood enmity is higher in Tangir/Darel , as has already been mentioned, however, this point is addressed later.

In concluding the analysis, it might be said that the acephalous or tribal political structure, introduced by the Pushtoons, is responsible for the origin of the blood feuds in Chilas and that Islam is used to legitimate it. Before going over to how Islam serves the justification for blood enmity we should try to understand the question raised in the introduction that is: Why have blood feuds increased in Chilas during the last century and why are there more blood feuds in the side valleys than in Chilas?

During the present century, the people of Chilas experienced several basic political changes: introduction of an acephalous society, colonization with the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), accession by Pakistan (giving the Northern Areas a special status), and abrogation of the FCR. All these rapid political and administrative changes left no chance for the people of Chilas to adjust to their new societal structure. One of the results of these changes might be an increase in blood feuds. How this could have happened is analyzed below:

a) Yaghestanis (free and lawless people), as the Chilasis called themselves, had the "notorious" tradition of raiding their neighbours . With the colo­nization of Chilas and the neighbouring regions, Astor, Baltistan, and others, the Chilasis lost their additional source of income, their common enemy, and robbing/raiding as their sporting activity. One can assume that the absence of an outside enemy - raids were fined very heavily, some prominent Chilasis were kept as hostages in Astor as a matter of routine - the loss of additional income and the lack of community "sporting" activities, led to the entire energy of the Chilasis being then inverted to the internal feuds.

b)   Before colonization and the introduction of the FCR the blood feud was a private affair . The FCR made the blood feuds an affair of the state for which the members of the jirgah (council of elders and respectable)were asked to make their deci­sions. Later, these members of the jirgah were also made semi-govern­ment employees . The special treatment of the blood feuds by the FCR (i.e., the settlement of the feuds), keeping in view the so-called customs and traditions of the Chilasi society, encouraged blood feuds. The FCR made it lawful for a husband to kill his wife and her paramour if he detected both the offenders inflagrante delicto. He could even postpone this right to kill them for a favourable opportunity if one, or both, escaped. This law was so liberal and liable to misinterpretations that it did not only make the women the main, if not the only reason, for blood feuds but also must have led to interesting discussions about what is law­ful and what is not .

c)   Within less than 50 years, the third major change came when Chilas acceded to Pakistan. A weak and insufficient, hence inefficient, police and court system was introduced and the FCR was abrogated under the central administration. We may say that the policy of a gradual centralization with a weak administration produced more internal strife.

d)   Modern weapons have played the most important role in the increase of the murder rate and, as a result, the blood enmities as well. Before the construction of the Karakorum Highway money was rare as were also modern fire arms. Knives, axes, clubs, and, rarely, simple rifles were used for killing and revenging. The construction of the highway opened the way to the most profitable business of selling wood. The new cash was used, among other things, for buying weapons which were now freely available due to the Afghan war. The use of modern fire arms like Kalashnikovs caused more murders which automatically led to more blood feuds, since more killings were possible. In the absence of these weapons, dis­putes might have ended in a quarrel rather than with a murder.

 

Political Modernization, Economic Development and Feuds

 

Within approximately the last century, Chilas has moved from an acepha­lous society to becoming a part of the country with a central government. This overwhelmingly rapid change of the political structure was accompa­nied by an equally rapid economic development, with the construction of roads, business centres, schools, colleges, hospitals, police stations, courts, and the like. Along with these developments, blood feuds have also got intensi­fied. However, it would be unjust to make the blood feuds a dependent variable of political modernization and economic development as Keiser's analysis of the Thull (Dir) shows. He is of the view that"... political modernization and economic development helped initiate dushmani" (blood enmity) in Thull (Keiser 1991: 70).

After discussing how the Nawabs' policy of keeping Thull (Dir) backward and isolated helped to keep the number of blood feuds low, Keiser proceeds with a discussion of the economic and political development after independ­ence in 1947. He recounts different developments and their effects, as in the following:

“They constructed schools, administrative offices, medical clinics, and police posts.... began work on an extensive network of roads to link hith­erto isolated villages.... A bus company initiated service to Rohistan .... Installing electricity as part of a rural electrification project... Crews strung telephone lines in many parts of the district. And in Thull, like the flu in January, mar dushmani swept through the network of social relation­ship .... The most important external change effecting dushmani was the construction of a transportation system linking Thull with the rest of Pak­istan .... Following construction of the road and the establishment of regu­lar bus service, an ever-increasing number of religious leaders from Thull traveled to Mardan and Peshawar to study in centers of Islamic learning.”

(Keiser 1991: 50-51)

About another development, he writes:

“The most important principles of economic life in Thull - the discontinuity between subsistence and cash-related activities, and the weight given the cash side of the economic equation - lie beneath these features.”            (Keiser 1991: 69-70)

 

He raises the question: What should the people do with this cash?

“Thull has no electricity, so buying television sets, computers, or state-of-the-art audio systems would be useless. Thull has no streets, so buying that new BMW would not demonstrate rational economic behaviour .... Money might not buy much, but it does buy guns; men may not care about owning that shiny new Camaro, but they love trips to the gun bazaar in Bajour to pick out that shiny new Kalashnikov (AK-47) assault rifle. And once they own it, like Americans with a new car, they itch to try it.”                                               (Keiser 1991:70)

 

 

Besides contradicting arguments ("Thull has no electricity": electricity was installed as part of a rural electrification programme; or "Thull has no streets": roads were constructed and a regular bus service established), and representing the classical anthropological position - modern economic development is catastrophic for the traditional societies - Keiser has ignored the long term effects of modern political and economic development. There is no doubt that modernization, and development, were accompanied by an increase in the murder rates, but this is an immediate short term effect. This is especially evident from the higher murder rate in the far away valleys of Chilas than in the town of Chilas, if we could make this division. The town of Chilas is, as has already been mentioned, the headquarters of Diamir District, the receiving point of all the economic and political development, such as police, courts, education centres, medical hospitals, streets, cars, electricity, and commercial centres. The opening of the Karakorum Highway has allowed all these developments to reach Chilas quickly and to help Chi­las serve as a transit for the road traffic further to the north and east. This provides increasing business and job opportunities, and those who are employed or have a business cannot afford indulging in a blood feud. I came to observe some cases of families getting involved in feuds and thereby los­ing their jobs or destroying their businesses. This serves as a warning for the others as well. The roads are not only used by the religious leaders for going to the centres of Islamic learning (if the roads are, as Keiser seems to think, a cause of blood enmity), they are also used for going to colleges and uni­versities in Karachi and Islamabad (a lot of students from Chilas study in Karachi, Islamabad, and other Pakistani towns). Cash is used not only for buying weapons but also for medicine, cars, new houses, and paying for, among other things, education. New, better, and improved shopping centres are appearing as well in Chilas.

 

Causes and Justification of Blood Enmity

 

There are different apparent reasons for the start of a blood feud, among others being political opposition, or land and water rights, but the women stand at the centre point of blood enmity. We shall, therefore, concentrate here on those blood feuds that revolve around issues relating to the women.

The main issue among them are illicit sexual relations, and suspicions and rumours about such sexual relations. The reason why illicit relations, suspicions about and rumours of sexual violation, are punished by killing is based on the ideals of masculinity - ghairat - prevailing in the society. Islam is misused as a legitimation for killing by misinterpreting Islamic punishment of illicit sexual relations. The failure of the official sys­tem of justice in implementing its laws is responsible for the survival of blood enmity.

For understanding how the ideals of masculinity lead to blood feuds, and how Islam is used for legitimizing these killings, we have to start with the rules followed in blood enmity.

 

The Rules Followed in Blood Feuds

 

This section describes important rules followed in pursuing the blood feuds including some case studies for illustration. If a man and a woman are caught in flagrante delicto, according to the local customs both could be killed. If both are killed no blood revenge normally follow. It is important that both must be killed together on the spot. If they are killed in different places, blood revenge may be taken. Similarly, if the family of the murdered man does not accept the charge, revenge may also be taken. An example of this is as follows: Zafaran's sister and her paramour were seen together in the fields. The brothers took out their rifles and killed both on the spot. One of Zafaran's brothers presented himself before the police and declared that he had killed his sister and her lover on the spot as he saw them making love.

In the village, there were other stories told which differed from the story told by the family of Zafaran. For example, that the family of the man killed was very poor, and that he was the only son. The real affair was with another rich man but the family of Zafaran did not dare to start a feud with that family. The affair was known in the village and this was a good chance to restore the ghairat (may be translated here as manliness). The brothers of Zafaran, though collaborators, sent the youngest of the brothers, who was jobless, to confess the assassination. The eldest brother who had actually killed them remained in the background to arrange his release. The peace was concluded between the two families and Zafaran's brother was set free within less than six months.

If, after suspicion or rumour of an illicit sexual relation, only the man is killed, the blood revenge is sure to start. By far the most common reason for killings are rumours of illicit sexual relations. A rumour is worse than an actual affair which is not known; therefore, even when the family of the woman is sure of the purity of the two accused, they will kill, at least, the man.

The cases of Said Noor and Javaid provide appropriate examples: One was killed as the result of a rumour and the other killed only out of suspicion. When Javaid came home he found his neighbour in his house where his sis­ter was alone; he took his rifle and killed him on the spot. The woman fled to the police. The medical examination of the woman proved their inno­cence. Peace was arranged between the two families and Javaid was released.

In the other case, Said Noor went to drink water at the house of his cousin who was not at home. When Said Noor was coming out of the house some neighbours saw him and rumour spread that there was an affair. His cousin killed him some months later. There were attempts to make peace but the family of Said Noor was against any peace. It is sometimes mentioned that men kill their wives together with an enemy to get rid of both an enemy and an unwanted wife. But such killing could give rise to a double feud since the family of the wife would want to seek; revenge for her murder.

Another example of how a feud may begin because of women is by declaring a woman one's wife. If, for example, a man loves a woman but does not receive her in marriage due to a high bride price or because the father of the girl wants her to marry someone else, the man may fire his gun in the air and declare the woman his wife. In this case, the members of the woman's family will try to kill the lover and marry the woman according to their wishes. However, the lover may kill anyone marrying her. This is a competition about the manliness of the two, the lover and the father, who act according to the ideals of masculinity.

Another possibility is the competition and jealousy between two men loving the same woman. Similarly, if childhood engagements, which are quite common, are not honoured, or if the marriage is against the wish of the man and the woman, or if a poor young woman must marry an old man, then love affairs could result. In one such case, the woman did not like her husband and had a lover whom she told to kill her husband. He cut the husband to pieces, threw him into the Indus river and was subsequently sent to jail. The girl's parents married her off later on to another man. In extreme cases, a man found trying to approach or tease or even get the attention of a woman or even a suspect man found in the vicinity of the house could be killed.

Once the killing starts, it continues turn by turn. The killing of the women alone is seldom. The rules followed in pursuing a blood feud are similar to those known among the Pushtoons, which are: Women, children, old people, as wellas guests are exempted from revenge. The party of the murdered person attacks and the other party only defends and does not plan attacks.

Blood feuds may be brought to an end through the intervention of the eshteros (i.e., numberdars) and by respected members of the village, after the formal consent of the court. The peace talks could normally begin when the number of murders on both sides is equal, and/or the feud is very old, or where the man and woman both were killed. If both parties are ready to accept the peace and agree with the members of they/rga, the council of elders and respected persons, both parties become, what the people call, deaf and dumb. In this case, they must agree on the conditions of the agreement reached by the jirga. The members of the jirga judge for themselves; they hear both sides, may initiate an investigation and may decide about how much blood money, or blood animals, or the like, should be paid. They also arrange the. exchange marriages of women from both families. Peace is also sometimes possible without equal numbers of murders on both sides, pro­vided both families are willing and especially if the family of the murderer is prepared to accept the humiliating conditions of the grieving family. The family of the murderer may have to choose to send one of their women, preferably an unmarried daughter or sister, to the house of the enemy, with her head uncovered and the Quran in her hands, requesting peace. The head of such a visitor is immediately provided with a head cover by the family of the murdered and normally her request is not refused. In such cases, the humiliation involved is so enormous that people are seldom ready to accept these conditions. This is still no definite guarantee to end the blood enmity; sometimes people accept peace because of the pressure of the relatives or respected members of the community but revenge is, nevertheless, taken at the next possibility.

 

Islam as the Justification of Blood Feuds

 

It has already been mentioned that illicit sexual relations are the cause of many killings in Chilas, which then result in blood enmity. We want to ana­lyze why people murder sexual deviators. Is it due to Islamic law or is it due to the local custom, and is Islam only used as a justification? For such analysis, we have to compare the Islamic punishment for adultery/fornica­tion and its application in the customs in Chilas and its functioning.

The Quranic punishment for illicit sexual relations is flogging or stoning of the culprits, carried out by the state or community, after at least four trust­worthy eye witnesses testify having seen the accused inflagrante delicto . This punishment presupposes the existence of a community or state system (courts) where a complaint could be lodged, eyewitnesses could be pro­duced, and after due process a decision could be made and implemented.

In Chilas, the punishment of illicit relations is the killing of both man and woman by the immediate relatives of the woman (husband, brother, father, etc.), without any trustworthy eyewitnesses testifying to it or without any due process. Derived from this right is killing based on suspicion and rumours about illicit relations, the extreme case being the killing of the man suspected of trying to approach or getting the attention of a woman. In such cases, it is only the men who are killed. The overwhelming majority of the murders are based on rumours and suspicions of illicit sexual relations and only men are killed. The characteristic feature of this system is that it is based on the private individual's conception of justice. The blood enmity could be brought to an end if the right to kill could be withdrawn from the individual.

If Islamic punishment is recognized by the state or community system (courts) and Chilasi customs are based on the private individual's conception of justice, one may ask: What role does the Pakistani justice system play in Chilas?

The official Pakistani justice system recognizes the Islamic punishment of illicit sexual relations as stated in the Quran. The people of Chilas complain that the police do not take any action against adultery, or suspicions and rumours of illicit sexual relations; of course they expect the men suspected of wrongdoing to be punished. The problem for the police and courts, besides corruption and inefficiency, is that it is nearly impossible to prove adultery under the above-mentioned Islamic rules (we need only to mention the difficulty in finding four trustworthy eyewitnesses for an adultery case). This means, according to Islamic law, even when a person has seen one of the women of his family sleeping with a man she is not married to, no action could be taken against the woman and the man, if four trustworthy eyewit­nesses do not exist. But people want to take action. Therefore, they take the law into their own hands and kill the suspect or those about whom there is a rumour. Those who take the law into their own hands and kill the suspect are not properly punished. For example: Zafaran's brother confessed before the police to having killed his sister and her supposed lover in flagrante delicto. After six months he was free. There are several such examples. The belief held that nothing happens when one complains to the police and the mild punishment of those who are involved in the killings encourage blood feuds.

In summary, Islam, as we have already concluded, was not the originator of blood feuds in Chilas. Islamic procedure and punishment of illicit sexual relations do not agree with those practiced in Chilas, but what takes place in Chilas is very often justified as being the Islamic punishment. Some people say, "since our official system of justice is not Islamic, we have to act indi­vidually."

For many, the question of being Islamic or not Islamic does not arise. It is the pressure from the society which is crucial. From the point of view of this pressure which we call here the ideals of manliness, the more severe the punishment the better the better it is.

 

Ideals of Masculinity and Blood Enmity

 

We have examined the Islamic punishment of adultery and the customs in Chilas. We want to know whether it is because of Islam that people murder and take revenge or whether it is the custom of the society which forces people to murder and take revenge. Women are considered the honour, called ghairat , of men. The ideals of masculinity demand that this ghairat must be defended and controlled. Defending one's honour calls for the pro­tection of the sexuality of the women of one's family, whether it be a daughter, sister, wife or mother. The best situation would be to frighten any man from daring to even look at the women of one's family. The women are, similarly, supposed to be under the control of the men. They should remain at home and be loyal to the men/family and not offer their sexuality. Ideally, then, the men should keep a distance even when they are approached by women and the women should not only remain at home but should also pre­vent any attack by men. Therefore women offering their sexuality are equally responsible for damaging the ghairat of the men of their family. Ghairat could, therefore, only be restored by killing both the man and the woman and not only one of them, unless it is clear that only the man has crossed these above-mentioned boundaries and the woman behaved as she was expected to. This could be an explanation why sometimes only men are killed.

Those males who cannot protect and control their women become honourless and are called baighairat, which is the worst insult for men. Fearing such an insult, men may punish those who are only suspected of having sex­ual relations or those who are suspected of having such intentions. In these cases the men do not need to kill their women, unless it is known that the women were also involved.

Ideals of masculinity demand the relatives of the murdered not to go to the police but to take revenge themselves. But since it is the duty of the police to investigate a murder case, the relatives of the murdered do not co-operate with the police and instead take revenge directly. The murderers, following the ideals of manliness, present themselves before the police, especially if they kill both, since jail is sometimes a safe place. Another interesting aspect about the ideal of masculinity is the contrast between how men are supposed to behave towards their women and the way they behave or at least wish to behave towards the women of other men .

 

Conclusion

 

This paper discussed the emergence of blood enmity in Chilas. The blood feuds emerged in Chilas at the same time as this region was Islamized. Islam came here via the Pushtoons who influenced the basic nature of the local culture. Before the arrival of the Pushtoons Chilas was a small kingdom with no tradition of blood feuds. Pushtoon cultural values like badal (revenge), ghairat (masculine honour) and a whole range of tribal political culture like jirga and acephalous system were introduced. There is a sizeable Pushtoon population living in Chilas now. Most of these Pushtoon had flown from the area of their origin as a result of blood revenge. The nature of the local geography – high and dry mountains with very unfriendly climate (very hot in summer and very cold in winter) – led fleeing Pushtoons select this area as their home. The local people did not only accept the religion of the new comers but also their culture (blood feuds). Blood feuds are an important part of the acephalous societies. This paper rejects the view that blood feuds are part of Islam or Sunni Islam because we have neighbouring societies like Astor where Sunni Islam was introduced by Kashmirs and there are no blood feuds there.

My experience is that the people of Chilas are, in their own way, very religious and are convinced that they are acting according to Islam and have the silent support of the maulvis in their actions. Any reform, then, based on my experience, must be seen as following Islamic principles. We have also mentioned that Islam does not support any individual private justice but that it supports the community or official justice system. Therefore, a strong and efficient official justice system that does not recognize the right of killing by individual, treats every kind of killing as a breach of law, punishes severely those who take the law into their own hands and above all is able to take away all weapons from the people could reduce the mur­der rate.

 

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