Pakistan’s Policy Towards Central Asia: An Evaluation Since 1991

Shabbir Ahmad Khan*

Introduction

 

For Pakistan, Central Asia assumes great significance for many reasons. Pakistan’s geographical location vis a vis Central Asia’s landlocked nature and its geo-political and geo-economic importance naturally induce Pakistan to reach out to the region. Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, Pakistan has been struggling to forge closer political and economic relations with Central Asian Republics (CARs) and always sustained hope to become a gateway to Central Asia. This particular paper highlights the recent historical background that created gape between Pakistan and the CARs. The work narrates the objectives, goals and interests of Pakistan in the region and at the same time analyses various economic and geo-strategic factors that have shaped Pakistan’s policy towards Central Asia since 1991. The paper also portrays current geopolitics in Central Asia as an impediment and Afghanistan as bottleneck in Pakistan’s access to Central Asia.

Abstract

 

Political and Security compulsions as well as energy, trade, transit and commercial gains mainly determine Pakistan’s policy towards Central Asia since 1991. Pakistan always sustained hope to become a regional transit trade hub by linking Central Asia, Western China and South Asia. Access to Central Asia’s energy resources is one of the main objectives of Pakistan’s policy towards the region. Economic Cooperation Organisation and Gwadar Port are still valid hopes of Pakistan in this regard. Pakistan actively engaged in Afghanistan for having a stable pro-Pakistan regime there and resultantly easy access to and from Central Asia. However indigenous as well as foreign factors such as lack of economic and financial resources, continued instability in Afghanistan, and regional geo-politics are stumbling blocks in Pakistan’s access to Central Asia.

Recent Historical Background

 

The areas of contemporary Pakistan and Central Asia had close cultural and economic connections. The links between them are rooted in history. Without Timur’s conquest there would have been no Moghul Empire in subcontinent, founded by Babur. During the Moghul period the cultural and economic interaction between the two regions was still greater. The culture of the frontier province particularly is so similar to the Central Asian that Jawal Lal Nehru whenever visited Peshawar during the days of undivided India he is known to have remarked “as soon as I cross Attock bridge across the Indus river I feel as if I am in Central Asia”. Cultural and economic ties were interrupted when Britain occupied India and Central Asia was conquered by the Tsarist Russia in second half of the 19th century. Pakistan’s independence in the 20th century coincided with the emergence of two blocks on global scene i.e. Capitalist and Communist. Soon after independence, Pakistan joined the anti-Communist block and later on actively participated in the Afghan war against Soviet Russia. Pakistan had no direct contacts with Central Asian Republics during Soviet period and therefore could not develop any close and cordial relations with Muslim but Soviet Socialist Central Asia. The Cold War between the then two super powers or the mentioned opponent blocks adversely affected Pakistan’s relations with former Soviet Union and Central Asian Republics consequently looked upon Pakistan with tinted glasses. The military support given by Islamabad to the Afghan Mujaheedin during their eleven years struggle to expel the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the clash of interests in Afghanistan and the regime of Taliban there further added to the cool relations that had developed between Pakistan and the states of Central Asia. Why Pakistan provided military support to the Mujahidin? One can observe that the military establishment of Pakistan viewed Afghanistan, since 1980s, as a ‘strategic depth’ provider to ensure Pakistan’s security against India. It is a fact that before the rise of Taliban, Afghanistan remained a close friend of India. Instead of providing strategic depth, Pakistan viewed Afghanistan as part of a larger Indian strategy to encircle Pakistan. Unable to alter the diplomatic situation with Kabul, Pakistan worked closely with militant groups through the 1980s and 1990s to replace the Afghan government with a pro-Pakistan regime.

Interests of Pakistan in Central Asia

 

Pakistan’s objectives in Central Asia are determined by its political and security imperatives; its economic and commercial gains, countering Indian influence and Pakistan’s desire to be an energy transit corridor in South Asia and the Asia Pacific. Most of the policy makers in Islamabad refer Pakistan as a gateway to Central Asia and strongly believe that close relations with Central Asia would not only bring economic benefits but would also enhance its security. It is a fact recognized by even Indians that Pakistan’s geo-strategic location makes it difficult for Central Asia to ignore it. Both geographically and historically, Central Asia's most logical route to the seas is through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. Karachi is the nearest port city for Central Asia and by air Islamabad is closer to Tashkent than it is to Karachi. Dushanbe is only an hour’s flight from Islamabad. By road through Afghanistan the distance from Dushanbe to Karachi is 2,720 km. In contrast, the port of Bandar Abbas is 3,400 km, Vladivostok 9,500 km and Rostov on the Don 4,200 km away. This makes Pakistan important for the CARs. Pakistan’s long-term interests and objectives in the region can be classified as follow:

• Political and Security Compulsion & Imperatives
• Energy Resources
• Economic and Commercial
• To Counter Indian Influence

(i)   Political and Security Compulsion/Imperatives
The end of cold war and the break of former Soviet Union added much to the significance of Central Asia for Pakistan. The American presence, increased competition among regional states and Indian maneuvering in the region vis a vis Pakistan’s future needs of energy resources impel Pakistan to play a key role in the regional politics. It is obvious that Pakistan’s active involvement in Afghanistan and the support for Taliban during the 1990s had to serve two pragmatic purposes; Firstly, a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan and secondly a capable force of establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan. These two conditions were to provide the framework for effective Pakistani role in Central Asia as the main artery for trade. Unfortunately that did not happen for Pakistan. Further the continued American presence in Afghanistan presents domestic complications for Pakistan. The US forces active on Pak-Afghan border occasionally enter Pakistan causing upheaval in Pakistan over national sovereignty. In addition, the idea of ‘Balkanization of Pakistan’ has enlarged the trust deficit between US and Pakistan.

• Energy Resources

Central Asia’s hydrocarbon resources attract Pakistan more and access to the energy’s resources makes core of the national policy. Given Pakistan’s energy requirements and to cash its geographical location, Pakistan has been actively pursuing the policy to become a regional energy transport hub. Former president of Pakistan, General Pervaiz Musharraf, during his visit to Central Asia in 2006 stated “Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia, We offer the critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra- regionally and inter-regionally”. Despite little success so far, Pakistan is trying to improve its connectivity to the CARs through Afghanistan and China. The project of Gwadar port has to play a vital role in this connection. For this purpose three options are available to Pakistan regarding Central Asia;

• Extension of Karakorum Highway (KKH) to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

(b) The reconstruction of road linking Peshawar with Termez in Uzbekistan involving a distance of 880 km and that provides easy access to the remaining four Central Asian Republics.
(c) Land route linking Chaman with Kushka in Turkmenistan involving a distance of 1170km.

• Economic and Commercial Gains

An important element of Pakistan’s strategic goals in Central Asia is the promotion of regional economic integration. There are enormous gains for Pakistan in establishing strong trade and economic linkages with CARs. In realm of economic relations with CARs, a fast growing market offers tremendous potential for our consumer goods, textiles and light engineering products. Some estimates even suggested that the region had a potential market of $80 billion and if Pakistan secures even 5 percent of this market, it could earn up to $4 billion a year. Pakistani companies with some assistance may undertake Joint Ventures in CARs in area of our strength particularly garments, agriculture auto parts and food products etc. However, non-availability of direct land routes and continued chaotic conditions in Afghanistan has contributed to the stagnation of Pak-Central Asian trade. The trade between Pakistan and Central Asia has declined from a total of $81.19 m in 1997 to just $20.16 m in 2003, and currently (2008-009), with a slight increase but still a fraction of its true potential, is only $45.3 million.  

• To Counter Indian Influence

In fact, Pakistan’s foreign policy, since independence, has been shaped by two interrelated factors, i.e., the fear of India and an urge to seek a strategic balance with India. The historical rivalry between Pakistan and India has profound effects on their policies towards Central Asia. Both the countries are involved in a zero sum game regarding Central Asia where one country’s gain is considered as other side’s loss. Pakistan cautiously views the increased influence of India in the region including military presence in Tajikistan with the clear objective of carving a new market for their industry as well as to encircle Pakistan from the rear. Indian products are reaching Central Asia mainly through Iran. The construction of road linking Chabahar with Termiz through Afghanistan would enable India to further its objectives in Central Asia. India supposedly believes that it can find access to Central Asia circumventing Pakistan or even excluding or marginalizing it. Marginalization should be understood in the context of leadership role in the region. It is therefore imperative for Pakistan to pro-actively upgrade political and economic contacts with the CARs. Pakistan focuses on the policy of making itself a regional energy and trade transportation hub which will enhance its strategic importance manifold. It is also a fact that Pakistan may have less projects in Central Asia but India also has to go a long way before it can be called a dominant or even influential.

Pakistan’s Policy Tools

 

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the break up of Soviet Union Pakistan had lost its front line status thus losing its strategic relevance to the US. It was also experiencing the consequences of new US doctrine aimed at containing nuclear proliferation and Islamic fundamentalism that led to the convergence of Washington and Delhi interests. Therefore, the 1990s offered a very different geo-strategic configuration. Communism was defeated as an ideology and the West started looking at Islam as the other rival ideology. Pakistan faced tough curbs from its close Cold War capitalist ally the US. At that moment Pakistan desperately needed foreign allies and therefore opted to court the friendship of CARs into dependable regional allies to get an edge over India. Pakistan was second after Turkey to recognize CARs and immediately extended diplomatic missions to the republics. Pakistan also started Special Technical Assistance Program with the CARs in 1992-93. Under this program Pakistan provided training courses on English language, Banking, Accountancy and Diplomacy, fully funded by the government of Pakistan. There was euphoria in Pakistan to cultivate close political and economic relations with CARs by offering outlet. A group of intellectuals and policy analysts in Pakistan advocated that Pakistan should mobilize all its resources and energies and devote all its efforts toward strengthening relations with the CARs. Common cultural linkages, religious bonds and geographical proximity coupled with the enlarged Muslim bloc were some of the considerations that provided basis for policy formulation regarding Central Asia during the early post Soviet period. In the economic spheres the region was assumed to be targeted as an emerging consumer market as well as hydro-carbon resource base and to present Pakistan as a viable economic outlet for the land locked Central Asia. Thus the main but limited policy tools available to Pakistan during the decade of 1990s were (i) common cultural heritage (ii) religious bonds and (iii) economic card i.e economic outlet.

(i)   Cultural Card
The areas currently comprising Pakistan had close cultural and economic links with Central Asia as mentioned earlier. With the break up of former Soviet Union Pakistan tried to revive the historical cultural bonds to establish linkages with the CARs. Though such bonds certainly don not account for long-term relations but they do add strength to the overall relationship and people to people contact.

(ii) Religious Card
Maintaining friendly ties with all Muslim countries forms a basic component of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Central Asia was approached on this common faith perception. Pakistan having limited tools to influence CARs, overemphasized on religious card. The emergence of the CARs were perceived as an opportunity to form a large regional grouping stretching from the Arabian Sea in the south to the Black Sea in the west based on the common religious identity of Islam. Importantly, it was seen to offer a huge political and economic benefit to Pakistan. Pakistan assumed that in Muslim republics of Central Asia, a true Muslim was hidden who had always struggled to come to the forefront but was prevented from doing so by adverse circumstances. Though it is fact that religious freedom has come to Central Asia new mosques have been built and number of people attending prayer and keeping fasts increasing, this does not mean that the leadership in CARs are welcoming the emergence of Islam as political force. As the soviet legacy they are scared of challenge to the status quo and keeping religion and politics separate to maintain their secular outlook. The ruling elite has been suppressing any Islamic group and opposing CARs’ grouping with Muslim states only on the basis of Islamic civilization. Further the grouping of these states with other Muslim states was also discouraged by the West in general and by Russia in particular.

(iii) Economic Card
Since 1991, Pakistan has vigorously advocated its geographical location to present itself as viable and economic outlet for the land locked Central Asia. Pakistan has been trying to make itself more relevant to Central Asia by offering several proposals for creating trade and transport corridors and access to ports. It also aimed access to the Central Asian market by conducting commercial ties with them. It was planned that the Pakistani companies as well as the Multinational Companies operating in Pakistan would target the Central Asian consumer market via Afghanistan but like gas pipelines this also remains a dream due to continuous instability in Afghanistan. Pakistan has also been trying to expand its economic relations with CARs through the ECO. The enlargement of the ECO by the inclusion of CARs and Azerbaijan, Pakistan hoped for increased trade and economic cooperation within the block however the organization has been poorly successful in achieving its targets. Pakistan’ limited economic resources could not influence the Central Asian Republics because the capital and technology that the Central Asian need are beyond Pakistan’s capacity. A major project like electricity generation in Tajikistan ran into trouble where investment requirements inside Pakistan took precedence over cross border needs.

Pakistan’s Hopes: ECO and Gwadar Port

 

Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) was considered as Pakistan’s road to Central Asia during the early post Soviet period. Pakistan seemed more successful here by lobbying CARs’ membership in ECO. In the Ashkabad summit held in May 1992, the heads of member states declared that economic and trade relations constitute the sole component of their relations and they will endeavor to increase trade volume and implement joint investment projects. The advantages offered by ECO can be summarized as:

• It provides an excellent platform to coordinate economic policies and to increase trade volume among member states by removing trade restrictions.
• ECO offers opportunities to CARs to share their experience of economic transition with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran.
• The landlocked member of the organization can get ready access to sea ports thereby cutting the distances involved.

However despite high hopes, the intra-regional trade with in ECO could not be profoundly enhanced and it has been around 5% though the member states receive preferential treatment. Intra regional trade is promoted when the member states have comparative advantage in diverse products and exhibit strong trade complementarities. Pakistan’s trade with in ECO accounts for only 3% of its total trade. The main hurdles in trade promotion with in ECO are:

• ECO members are characterized by an almost identical pattern of comparative advantage in a relatively narrow range of products and consequently they have weak complementarities in their bilateral trade structures. Trade complementarity may zero if no good exported by one country is imported by the other.
• ECO member states are deficient in capital. Their industrial base is hardly diversified resulting in lack of export diversification. The regional exports largely consist of raw materials and traditional products. Where they have comparative advantage there they are competitors in the world market rather than trading amongst themselves. Resultantly ECO trade is tilted towards developed countries.
• Lack of transport communication has greatly reduced the intra-regional trade because seven of the ten member states are landlocked. Pakistan trade with CARs is almost totally dependent on Afghanistan. Afghanistan also links all the member states of ECO and the continuous instability there has been worsely affecting trade within the Organisation.
• Apart from problems on economic front, political priorities of the ECO member states are divergent and therefore political differences have undermined efforts to further regional economic cooperation. Current geo-politics in Central Asia has been refraining ECO to grow as an Organisation because its goals are often in divergence with great power’s interests. Sergey Slepthcheko has also expressed this as “the concept of regionalization is almost always antagonistic to global geo-politics”.

Nonetheless, despite many impediments and obstacles ECO has made headway in achieving regional economic cooperation to some extent. The ECO member states are on the path of trade liberalization through agreements like Preferential Trade Agreement. (Preferential treatment is granted to the member countries in the form of reduction in the import duty on their exports). Economic Cooperation Organisation Trade Agreement (ECOTA) was signed on 17 July 2003 in Islamabad. The member states at the summit held in March 2009, vowed to make ECO region a Free Trade Areaª by 2015. Another important development has been the establishment of ECO Trade and Development Bank on August 3, 2005 by the organization’s founding members. The bank focuses on financing development projects at reasonable costs with a favorable repayment conditions as pursued by World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank.

Gwadar Port is yet another ray of hope for Pakistan to become a regional transit trade-hub particularly for Central Asia. It is strategically situated at the cross roads of Middle east, Central Asia and Southwestern provinces of China, the regions that are rich in natural resources. Central Asia’s independence coupled with disturbed geopolitical situation of the Middle East and world’s growing requirement of energy resources  have bestowed world focus on Central Asian hydro carbon resources as a strategic alternative. Likewise the landlocked nature of CARs and the geographical location of Pakistan (in proximity to the crucial trade form the Persian Gulf and the largely untapped resources of Central Asia) has bestowed upon Pakistan one of the vital import export corridors in the region. The Gwadar Port has the potential to act as hub port not only for the natural resources of Central Asia but also for regional trade in all kind of consumer goods, electronic items, and garments imported by Afghanistan and CARs that ought to flow through a seaport. Similarly the exports of CARs including cotton, metal ores, machinery gas and oil could also find way through the Gwadar Port. More importantly the Quadrilateral Trade Agreement between Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan along with the extension of KKH contribute profoundly to the regional significance of Gwadar Port.
The Gwadar Port complex would provide facilities of ware housing, trans-shipment, transit coastal trade and provision of commercial and industrial facilities for international export, import trade particularly of CARs. The port is advantageously located to serve South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and western provinces of China as compared to the other competitor ports. Thus Pakistan has been pursuing the policy, according to its potential, to transform itself into the economic and transport hub of the region as it provides the shortest and economically most feasible transit route to CARs to the Arabian Sea and beyond. However to materialize all this for Pakistan, a favorable regional geopolitical situation particularly stability in Afghanistan is imperative, because the situation of Afghanistan is turning all positives into negatives for Pakistan.

Afghanistan: The Bottleneck

 

Before entering any state of Central Asia the territory of Afghanistan has to be crossed and therefore stable and peaceful Afghanistan is the pre-condition for Pakistan’s access to Central Asia. Main concern of the CARs is also security arises out of Afghanistan which is intimately linked with Pak-Central Asia relations. Disintegration of former Soviet Union coupled with the collapse of central government in Afghanistan resulting in complete lawlessness in the country making it an unsuitable conduit for trade. Trade convoys were routinely robbed and drivers injured or killed and rival Mujahiddeen factions extorted money at numerous checkpoints across the country. The clash of interests of regional and extra regional states in Afghanistan contributed much to the instability in that country.  Burhanuddin Rabbani during his rule from 1992-1996 was backed by India, Iran and Russia had to stick to his anti Pukhtun stance while Hikmatyar backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued attacking Kabul druign the same period. Similarly Raheed Dostum was financed by Uzbekistan to contain the Islamic Movement , and Ismail Khan, supported by Iran controlled Herat.
The hope of access to Central Asia was one of the major reasons forcing Pakistan to extend its diplomatic support to Taliban government in 1995. The world viewed Pakistan’s support for Taliban government as an outcome of Islamic zeal but in fact this support was based on some pragmatic purposes. The Taliban was the only force that brought peace to Afghanistan with a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul while earlier governments were closer in relation to Delhi than Islamabad. However times had changed, the policy of supporting the militants while worked during the 1980s, it became an international debacle in the 1990s. The civil war and then the prevalence of Taliban in Afghanistan only alienated Pakistan from Central Asia and the regional backlash against the Taliban also reverberated against Pakistan. This created regional suspicions about Pakistan. A direct air link between Pakistan and Uzbekistan, which gave air impetus to quicker and easier travel between Pakistan and Central Asia earlier, came to an end in 1998 and resumed after a break of almost 9 years. CARs became vary of Islamic type revolutions in the republics and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan closed their borders with Afghanistan. Even after the removal of Taliban and the formation of western backed government under Karzai, Afghanistan has fell down in worse problems. Dangerous security situation is not hidden from any one and the “Afghan Corridor” still blocking Pakistan’s way to Central Asia. Only it’s unblocking with strong central government capable of bringing peace and security will materialize Pakistan’s links and connectivity with the CARs.

Regional Geopolitics: an Impediment

 

Break of the Soviet Union, economic potential and geo-strategic location of Central Asia has made the region an arena for great powers to play for political and economic influence. The regional geopolitics has mainly two aspects, firstly the struggle for natural resources particularly hydrocarbon i.e. control over its production as well as its marketing and secondly to supervise regional powers and have an edge over them. Centre of gravity of world power as well as world economy is shifting towards Asia because of its larger manpower and resource base. The focal points for Asia’s large economies to link up are the areas where Pakistan and Afghanistan lie. With the control over Afghanistan comes the control over land routes between South Asia and Central Asia as well as of a potential corridor to the Middle East and rest of the world via Arabian Sea. It is obvious that in the 21st century this region is going to shape new equations and balances in world order. Denial of the area would slow the rise of Asia and prolong US and European control over the world financial and trade systems. Thus the long term interests of great powers and regional players seem clearly divergent in nature which has evaded regional cooperation, imperative for regional security. Regional cooperation is only possible through give and takes, for instance if most of Pakistan is dependent on water from India, India should be dependent on Pakistan for access to Central Asia. Similarly Russia’s role in regional security is of vital importance but it would not come on the expense of its own interests. Iran has its own legitimate concerns about the long-term US presence in the region and the emerging China has expanded its interests in the region while USA has been preoccupied by war on terror. The last so many years have reflected that US capability and potential as a sole guarantor of security has been diminished. Similarly no single power has the ability to maintain security and also provide sufficient resources for the development of the region. It is therefore necessary for all powers, regional and extra-regional to cooperate and form a strategy where all the stake holders have their part in maintaining security and sharing resources/benefits of the region. Single power’s hegemony in the region is neither accepted to regional powers nor is in the interests of regional states. The constant fear of regional and world powers of single power’s hegemony over the region has always aided to escalation of conflicts and gave rise new ones. Pakistan’s policy of strategic depth has been dashed by regional politics and it faces serious consequences from the events in Afghanistan. In sum, the complicated regional geopolitics has made it difficult for Pakistan to formulate let alone implement a coherent strategy towards Central Asia.

Conclusion

 

Since independence, Pakistan’s foreign policy has been shaped by two interrelated factors, i.e., the fear of India and an urge to seek a strategic balance with India. Another important element of its foreign policy has been a strong attachment to Islamic ideology. These two factors seriously shaped Pakistan’s policy towards Central Asia. Pakistan over emphasized on the religious factor in approaching Central Asia on the hope to replace ruins of cold war alliances through the Islamic factor. But Central Asia’s relations with Pakistan and other Muslim stases under the umbrella of Islam has been opposed and discouraged by not only their national leadership but also by the West and Russia. Despite the fact that most high level delegation visited Central Asia to negotiate for itself a new place in the regional alignment and many agreements signed with Central Asia Republics, progress on the ground remained negligible. The slow progress on the ground can be attributed to both internal as well as external factors. Internally Pakistan faced and still facing the issues of transparency of the political system, efficiency of the economy, redefining the economic role of the state, strengthening and rebuilding Pakistan’s economic and political institutions and the lack of economic resources. During the 1990s, almost even split of domestic political forces (internal division) between the main camps, Nawaz and Benazir, made political power volatile and seduced the politicians to lookout for flashy issues. Internal chaotic political situation, instable Afghanistan, regional geopolitics for influence in Central Asia and the political and economic transition of Central Asia itself, all complicated Pakistan’s policy towards Central Asia. With the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan further lost the bargaining power in regional affairs. However, the fact remains that Pakistan can’t be marginalized vis a vis Central Asia due to its significant geographical location though the policy of strategic depth derived from Indian fear has been dashed by regional politics.
On economic front Pakistan lacked resources, capital and technology to assist Central Asian states during their transition. Due to internal political disturbances of Pakistan, it could not develop a consistent policy towards Central Asia. With in ECO a certain degree of competition between Pakistan Iran and Turkey for influence has been hampering its development. On the other hand CARs first looked towards the west and now back to Russia for economic, political and security assistance. However, besides these factors the bridge between Pakistan and Central Asia i.e. Afghanistan as the cornerstone of the region, must be stabilized for any headway in the direction of Central Asia. If normalcy does not come to Afghanistan, pipeline and trade routes will bypass Afghanistan and Pakistan for better and many available alternatives.

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