THE LONDON CONFERENCE 2010: AN ASSESSMENT§

Babar Shah*

 

Abstract

 

Considering the United States Democratic Party’s election campaign during the 2008 Presidential elections that used the slogan “Vote for Change”, it looked very clear that there will be major policy shifts on issues of critical interest like Afghanistan and Iraq, if they win these elections? US engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, of course, were among the vital issues in the election debates. Many expected such shifts to appear soon after the Barak Obama Administration moved into the White House and took charge of the affairs in January 2009. However, the first major policy shift regarding the US military involvement in Afghanistan was announced after one year, at the end of the London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010. At the end of this Conference, the US and its allies presented a clearer roadmap for the start of military withdrawal from Afghanistan and shifting the affairs towards a broader Afghan ownership as was suggested by the Afghan President Hamid Karzai to the conference. The 70-member conference unanimously accepted the plan and agreed to support Mr. Karzai’s peace and reintegration plan. This announcement, if on one hand, appeased those who wanted America and its allies to quit Afghanistan, created serious questions about the future state of affairs in the country and the region on the other. At this stage when the conference has been just concluded, it is very early to say anything about the success or otherwise of this plan. However in this article, it has been tried to study the factors that led towards a change of mind in important capitals like Washington, London, Paris, Bonn etc.; what are main points of the Karzai peace and reintegration plan; what is and how could be the Taliban response; how has been Afghanistan’s previous experience in demobilizing, decommissioning and reintegration (DDR) programme; and finally to make an assessment of the situation in the immediate aftermath of the London Conference.

The London Conference

 

The much debated international conference on Afghanistan was held on January 28, 2010 in London where the international community reaffirmed its long-term commitment to help Afghanistan in its overall reconstruction efforts. Since the Bonn Conference of December 2001, this was sixth international conference of its nature and second in London. These were held in Bonn, Tokyo, London, Paris and The Hague in 2001, 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2009 respectably. The 2010 London conference did not bring about any significance outcome on reconstruction issues and the event appeared as a mere a repetition of the already discussed issues. However, this 70-member gathering had one stark difference from the previous ones. The World community, especially big powers, for the first time after the Taliban regime’s ouster showed a unanimity on supporting the Afghan President Karzai.s plan to persuade moderate Taliban fighters to renounce violence with a promise of new Jobs and integrate into the society. Prominent supporter of the Afghan plan included the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany etc. The conference endorsed the Afghan government’s stated goal of taking the lead and conducting the majority of military operations in the next three years and taking the complete responsibility for physical security of the country within next 5 years. It was also agreed upon that Afghan forces would start taking the leading role in providing security in the number of provinces by late 2010 or early 2011 that would pave ways for the reduction of foreign troops in Afghanistan. The international community also committed itself to further support the training programmes for the Afghan National Army and Police and boosting their strength to above 300,000 by October 2011.
The statement issued at the end of the Conference described reintegration as an offer to give an honourable place in society to those who;

• Renounce violence and participate in the free and open society,
• Respect the principals enshrined in the Afghan Constitution,
• Cut ties with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and,
• Pursue their political goals peacefully.  

Participants also agreed to establish an approximate $5,00m Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to finance and support the reintegration plan to provide jobs to the Taliban fighters who choose to join the reintegration programme. President Karzai also vowed to convene a Loya Jirga in the coming spring to further discuss the issue. “We must reach to all our countrymen, especially our disenchanted brothers who are not part of Al-Qaida and other terrorist networks, and who accept the Afghan constitution” said president Karzai. He also requested Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan’s neighbors particularly Pakistan, to secure peace in Afghanistan.

Why a Change of Mind…?

 

Having taken a short account of the London conference, which had its prime focus on reconciliation with the Taliban fighters, the question arises what has led/forced the over forty-member strong international coalition to bring a policy shift towards the Taliban? Whether this change of mind appeared overnight or is an outcome of a gradually increasing realization among the coalition members about the effects of their involvement in Afghanistan for the last nine years.  Ignoring about the conspiracy theory that may be the US and its close allies have some other game plan for undisclosed objectives behind this shift, and basing our assessment on the given circumstances it seems as the US and its NATO allies are looking for an exit plan. Prominent Pakistani Defence and security analyst, Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, is of the view that it has become very clear now that there is an ever widening divide among the perception, interest and understating of the Afghan situation among the various stakeholders in Afghanistan. The argument of difference among the NATO and other coalition members seems very relevant. Soon after international involvement in Afghanistan in 2001, a persistent reluctance is being demonstrated by NATO members in making human and material contributions to the US-led War against Terrorism in Afghanistan. This shows that they either don’t fully own the cause, or have difference of opinion, perception, or objective. Immediately after the recent London conference was concluded, the New Zealand foreign Minister, Murray Mc. Cully said that his country will not contribute to the fund to be set for the Taliban fighters’ reintegration. “Anything that involves significant amounts of money being used for reintegration needs to be looked at very carefully to make sure that these funds are not traveling to the people we would not want to be supported” the New Zeeland Herald quoted Mr. Mc. Cully.
Although the American officials explained that the Obama Administration is yet to take a final decision on withdrawal of troops form Afghanistan, however it has become very clear that US and its NATO allies are looking for an exit and want to have some face saving method. Various methods are being considered by the US to attract the Taliban including the use of money and carefully applying the divide & rule policy through which good Taliban could be separated from the bad Taliban.
Here perhaps good Taliban refers to fresh generation of Taliban who have joined movement for social and economic reasons. This generation, considered not to be strong ideologue, is thought to be more willing to strike deals with the Karzai Administration and its supporters than the older generation. Similar remarks were made by the US senator, Carl Levin, on Sep 11, 2009 when he returned from a visit to Afghanistan. He said, that “We should accelerate our efforts to improve the Afghan security forces in their efforts to become self sufficient in delivering security services to their nation. These steps include increasing the sizes if the Afghan Army and police at a much faster speed than presently planned; provide more trainers and equipment, and work to separate local Taliban fighters from their leaders and attract them on the side of the government as we did in Iraq”. He further built on the July 2009 remarks of General Mc. Chrystal, the US military commander in Afghanistan, regarding the potential of reintegration of the Taliban fighters into the Afghan society. He had argued that the Taliban fighters are largely motivated by the need for job or loyalty to the local leader who pays them and not by ideology or religious zeal. An effort to attract these fighters to the government side could succeed if they are offered security for themselves and their family, and also if there is no penalty for any activity against us.
Taking the mood in the concerned countries as well as the patterns of opinion making in the media during and before the conference in to account, it appears that grounds were being prepared for an exit plan, partial or complete not clear at this stage. President Obama’s first state of the union address on January 27, 2010 was also reflecting the changing mood. He re-emphasized on an early need to start bringing back US troops from Afghanistan by 2011 to satisfy his own people who don’t want engagement in a distant war. So it can be assumed that after;

• Killing of thousands of people from both sides.
• Wasting of billions of dollars.
• Damaging of a large part of the Afghan infrastructure.
• And above all taking a long time of nine long years.

A realization seems to be emerging that Afghanistan cannot be won or stabilized militarily and political discourses are must to be used to in this regard.

• Whether President Karzai’s reintegration plan yields the desired results?
• How Taliban respond to these reconciliation offers?
• Whether all fighters are Taliban?
• How other Afghan political groups and power wielders react to such change of mind?
• How neighboring, regional, and ultra regional actors perceive and respond?

All these and many other such questions are to be answered as the conference has just been concluded and all practical steps are yet to taken in this regard. Some facts, however, have become clearer that:

• The former US president George W. Bush’s logic to invade Afghanistan and his expected outcomes were very weak, illogical, and short sighted
• US army cannot conquer any place on the earth whenever it wanted
• Democracy cannot be spread every where, nor is it the solution to all problems.

This is clear from the present day state of affairs in Afghanistan where the outcome of nine years of military operations in Afghanistan seems almost nothing.

Afghanistan‘s DDR Experience 2002-6

 

Here we need to have a look at a previous Disarmament, Decommissioning and Reintegration (DDR) effort made in Afghanistan in the previous years. This will help us know its results and reason of its partial success, try to find possible differences in the freshly announced DDR programme, and then assess the possible outcome. President Karzai seems to be inspired by the previous Disarmament, Decommissioning and Reintegration programme carried out in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2006 in order to disarm, disengaged and reintegrate militias of the former warlords who remained united as the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. The Northern Alliance was party to the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, and had become a part of the Afghan Interim Administration after the ouster of the Taliban regime
After the establishment of the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) in 2001 different militias and militant groups who had fought against the Soviet occupation, or had emerged during the civil war in the decade of the 90s, were brought under the control of the Afghan Ministry of Defence, and called Afghan Military Force (ANF), However, they continued their allegiance and support to their respective political groups and leaders that necessitated reorganization of Afghan National Army (ANA) as a new ethnically balanced organization. So in December 2002 the AIA announced the establishment of the Afghan National Army (ANA) with a strength of 70,000 personnel, and the Afghan Military Force was to be gradually disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated as was decided in the Bonn Agreement.
The DDR programme was initiated in Afghanistan as a component of the Afghanistan New Beginning Programme (ANBP) in March 2003. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was requested to implement this programme on behalf of the Afghan Government, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the Government of Japan. Japan was the main donor in this programme. USA, Germany, UK and Italy supported other components of the ANBP that were reorganization and moderanisation of the Afghan National Police Force, Anti-drug Measures and Justice Sector Reforms etc. Two commissions had already been set up in this regard in 2002:

• The disarmament commission
• Demobilization and reintegration commission.

These commissions further had their officer in various provinces who were working in collaboration of local representatives. The programme was open to all AMF personal. By the closing date of the programme, 30 June 2006, 63,380 former officers and soldiers of the AMF had chosen to participate in it. Of that 62,044 proceeded to demobilization and, 60,645 chose reintegration either in the new Afghan army or in other professions. 70,000 weapons were collected till 30 June 2006. This programme also faced certain difficulties but generally it was regarded as a partial success if not full. The following can be considered as the supporting factors towards success of the programme;

• From start to end this was a political process including government and political leaderships of the concerned militias. Financially and administratively it was a well planned programme that is why it was well   conceived and implemented. Taliban as such don’t have any political organization that could make the contacting and negotiating process difficult.
• These militias had proper political leadership structures, so contacting and negotiating with top leaderships was not a problem. Since these leaders had already become part of the government after the Bonn agreement and were also preparing to pursue their future political plans, this allured them to cooperate in the DDR programme thus bringing success to it. Taliban have nothing to lose politically that will bring them to talk from a position of strength. 
• Almost all of these militias remained politically and militarily together as the Northern Alliance when they were fighting a common adversary i.e. the Taliban. They as such were not pursuing an ideology, and were merely engaged in a power struggle. The cohesion of alliance weakened with the Taliban ouster and emergence of new power patterns in the country in which they had different, rather conflicting interests, and where showing support to the new system was the key rise up. This added to the DDR Programme’s success. The Taliban case is altogether different; they are pursuing an ideology and are fighting many common adversaries that are a source of cohesion among their ranks and files.
• Other important feature of that DDR programme was that it was offered across the board, to all from top commanders to foot soldiers. Though it was not a kind of amnesty but they took it as an opportunity to get a Mr. clean certificate as many of them were involved in war crimes and human rights violations. Offering it to the Taliban with strings like good Taliban and bad Taliban and other precondition would make the process difficult.

Reintegration Taliban………?

 

No concrete future steps or mechanism have been announced for the proposed Taliban Reintegration Programme except that a Loya Jirga would he convened to discuss the matter, and the reintegration programme will be carried out in the sole ownership of the Afghan government. Presumably, the Afghan cabinet and parliament will be having an important role in this regard. Interesting to note is that except Hamid Karzai and his Interior Minister, nobody from the present Afghan Administration has shown any optimism on this Programme. Equally important, that the present parliament has almost completed its tenure, and it has also become clear that Karzai, after his recent reelection as the President, is not comfortable with the incumbent parliament. This is visible from the rejection of many of his proposed cabinet members by the parliament. Why Karzai has delayed the general elections by few months? Has that some connection with the reintegration promgramme? It is a question.
More interesting to note is that so for only Karzai has appeared as the sole driving force behind the idea of the Taliban reintegration. In the face of the forthcoming general elections in the country, the response of the existing political groups especially non-Pukhtoon, will matter a lot as they would not like to loose political space to new Pukhtoon entrants. Their cautiousness is already reflecting from their grave silence on the issue.
It can be said that by bringing the Taliban, who are predominantly Pukhutoons, in to the political main fold of the country, Karzai wants to have a strong political base that he direly needs to have after getting a tough time from the existing political opponents in the recent the presidential elections, or at least regain the lost political space by using the Talilban card. His eagerness for this is clear from his quick visit to Saudi Arabia after the London Conference and seeking Pakistan’s support to quickly contact the Taliban.
The Taliban leadership has very tactfully raised three points in a statement in response to the London conference declaration. They did not call them demands or preconditions for considering the peace process, however, these could he called confidence building measures before the contacts begin.

• First point calls that all Taliban prisoners of war (POWs) should he released whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan or else where.
• Second point demands that not few names, all of the 144 Taliban names be removed from the blacklist of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
• Third point asks that the US and NATO should not be sending more troops to Afghanistan, if they seriously want to support the Karzai-led peace process.

In the light of these three points President Karzai, who is supposed to lead the peace process, appears totally powerless rather irrelevant, because these points are directly addressed to the UN, US and NATO, who actually matter and are the real parties to the Afghan conflict. This means Taliban actually want to test the seriousness of the actual parties than listening to the rhetoric of a helpless president.
Contacting Taliban leadership itself will be a question. As compare to those groups who participated in the previous DDR process, Taliban are a vast but not as political organization. Their lines of command and organizational structure are not known. So far, they have never forwarded any political objective publicly.
More than political, Taliban are a military organization and hard-line military commanders, who did not abandon their leader Mulla Omar in thick and thin, are now calling the shots in the Taliban movement. It on the one hand reflects their fighting capabilities and their strong ideological commitment on the other that enabled them sustain their resistance against far superior adversaries for nine years and gained so much support that today they have shadow government in 34 provinces of the country. Considering this facts it looks very hard to dent, or find moderate element among the Taliban leadership.
The former Taliban leaders who are now in the Kabul’s protection, such as Wakil Ahmad Mutawakal, Mulla Abdul Salam Zaeef and Abdul Hakim Mujahid etc. are referred as moderate Taliban and considered as a mean of possible contact with the Taliban. However, the Taliban have already made it clear that they are no longer part of the Taliban nor they represent the movement.
Pakistan is considered as another possible source for contacting and persuading Taliban towards reconciliation. She has already offered to play its role in this regard. But how much influence Pakistan has, and on which groups is a question? Despite bundles of reports/writings on Pakistan’s links with Taliban nobody has been able to bring forth any credible proof in this regard. Pakistan certainly enjoyed influence over the Taliban leaders before 9/11, but the record shows that Taliban never listened to Pakistan on important issue, whether handing over of Osama Bin Laden, or demolishing of the Bamyan Buddha statues etc. Persuading Taliban to break links with Al-Qaeda will be a test of Pakistan influence over the Taliban. Because the same factor Pakistan had based on to reverse its policy on towards the Taliban. The question arises, why would they severe their contacts when they are fighting the same adversaries i.e. the Afghan Government and the foreign forces on the Afghan soil?
At the some time in the changed Afghan, regional and global paradigm Pakistan will also have to bear its own limitations in the mind. Such as, it can’t over advocate the cause of the Afghan Taliban to avoid further tagging as a Taliban supporter from its arch adversaries. Nor can it exert too much of force to persuade them for talks. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have close links and over-supporting or over-forcing the Afghan Taliban may create problems at home, such as similar political demands from local Taliban or in the shape of backlash in support of the Afghan Taliban. Good about Pakistan, however, is that it has never been part to any direct military action against the Afghan Taliban.
Assuming that all those who are fighting the Kabul and foreign troops in Afghanistan are Taliban, cannot be true. Afghans have an indelible history of fighting-back foreign invasions and occupations. Today, a sizeable Afghan population looks at the presence of foreign troops on their as an occupation. Such feelings are further strengthened by these troops’ treatment of the common Afghan and heavy losses of lives and properties in military operations as well. It is possible that the Afghans, who are highly trained in guerilla warfare, have activated local resistance cells and are operating independently without any association to bigger groups like Taliban etc. More important, the role andimpact of major non-Taliban groups like Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar may not be ruled out, which is also strongly opposed to the presence of foreign troops and their activities in Afghanistan.
And the last point the conference stressed about organizing, training and strengthening of the Afghan armed forces, taking over the responsibilities of security, and the foreign troops start leaving the country. More important is to take measures for the economic revival / recovery of the country. Because institutions need regular input, and long-term support in different forms to sustain and strengthen over times. Economic revival would ensure resource generation to sustained institutions including military and police. New institution can be sustained in wealthy and resourceful countries like Iraq without economic revival, but not in a poor country like Afghanistan. Mere organizing, training and leaving may lead towards an immediate collapse of the system after the withdrawal and beginning of a new phase of disturbance at Afghan/ regional level as the Afghan history shows during the post Soviet withdrawal years.

Conclusion

 

It is extremely hard to judge whether the Karazi peace and integration plan would yield the desired results as practical steps are yet to be taken. A very important fact, however, remains that the Taliban who are and would be the major party in all this process were neither invited nor formally contacted at the time of the conference. Equally important, they would be in a position of strength to talk as the international coalition had not been able to eliminate them despite continued military action against them since 2001. This also reflects their growing strength and support that is now recognized by their opponents too. This also shows the emergence of a realization that use of force is not only solution to such problems, engagement, negotiation and reconciliation is to be given space.
Another critical question appears regarding the capability and capacity of the future set-up in the country. Will Taliban accept to the conditions set by the Karzai administration? If yes, will it be able enough to deliver while it has already earned a name in corruption, inefficiency and poor performance.
The last but extremely important point; America’s behaviour concerning Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has not been very pleasant. Immediately after the Soviet pull-out from Afghanistan in 1989, America just washed-off its hands of the Afghan issue without caring for the post-conflict stability and reconstruction and went away. This was true demonstration of what Americans often say that their foreign relations are always based on national interests. If one assumes that the London Conference declaration is a change in interest then how she will behave after the withdrawal starts? Will that environment remain free of implications?