Central Asia Journal No. 67
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan Over The Years: Past, Present and the Future
Adam Saud*
Tajikistan has remained under the influence of Islamic teachings throughout the history of Islam in Central Asia. The famous Ferghana valley, which has remained the hub of Islamic activities in the region, is divided among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Southern parts of Tajikistan remained under the rule of Emir of Bukhara. Therefore, Islam is deeply enrooted in the social life of this particular area of the state. On the other hand, northern parts of Tajikistan remained under the suzerainty of czar, hence have more secular setup. Soviet policy of “Collectivization” generated genuine grievances among different ethnicities which never let Tajikistan to construct Tajik nationality in its society.
The old grievances out surfaced after the imposed independence on Tajikistan like other Central Asian States. People from north, who were already occupying key posts in government administration, grabbed almost all administrative posts, denying south to be an effective part of the nation building. Moreover, this was the period of transition from closed to an open society. The situation led to the identity crisis in the Tajik society. Different people and parties, including Islamists tried to chanalized these feelings according to their own political agendas.
But there was no political change in Tajikistan, at least at governmental level. The old Communist party members remained at the helm of political affairs only with the new political names especially, under the banner of People’s Democratic Party. Almost all the opposition parties put their demands in front of government but government did not pay any heed to their demands which resulted in mass protests. Rostakhez (opposition political party) managed to organize huge mass gatherings against government and Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) not only supported but actively participated in those demonstrations. Gradually, IRP got commanding position in those demonstrations and demanded transformation of Tajik society into an Islamic one (but it never asked for a theocratic state).
President Makhamov was forced to resign and fresh elections were held in November 1991, which resulted in Nabiev as a new president of the republic. But these elections brought disaster to Tajik society. Opposition alleged government of rigging and intensified demonstrations and rallies. Meanwhile in 1992 government and opposition reached at an agreement under which a coalition government was formed with a due share to the opposition. But the said agreement failed to bring peace as many regions one by one declared autonomy which led Tajikistan to a civil war which lasted for five years, killing hundreds of thousands beside injuring and misplacing manifold. Nabiev was also forced to resign and Emamoli Rahmanov was appointed as new president by the Majlis (parliament).
In 1997 General Agreement on Peace was signed by all the parties which concluded the civil war. Opposition was given thirty percent share in the government with Daulat Usman, an IRP leader, as vice premier. Some of the small groups of IRP refused to obey the peace accord and carried on their activities. But IRP completely obeyed the agreement and supported government in handling the rebel groups. The party got only two seats in all the parliamentary elections. It has changed its strategy from extremism and violence to cooperation and secularism especially after the death of Said Abdullah Nuri, the first leader of the Party.
Central questions which have been discussed in this paper are what are the basic purposes of IRP? What were the structural factors responsible for IRP’s involvement in the Tajik civil war? What is the social basis for its support? What is its potential? Does it have enough capability to win the elections? And what are the prospects of its success in future?
Islam first came into the region by Arab merchants in seventh century AD. It was then revived and renewed and brought again and again in its various forms by successive waves of conquests, becoming permanent feature of the Central Asian society. From 1867 with the defeat of Amir of Bukhara at the hands of Russians till Soviet disintegration, Tajikistan alongwith other Central Asian states remained under the foreign control. Different resistance movements upraised against the imperialists’ rule but were crushed brutally. Basmachi Movement of late 1910s and early 1920s is the most popular and important. Islam was kept alive underground in Tajik society by clandestine pirs and ihsans in different forms. As stated by Vitaly Naumkin, “during the Soviet period, underground prayers were offered at homes and at public places such as village clubs and tea houses and several private underground circles appeared where youngsters were taught Islam and Arabic.”
Unregistered mosques and madressahs flourished while people used to visit shrines and tombs to celebrate communist holidays where they tried to transform their knowledge of religion to the youth. Many people opened madressahs at their homes clandestinely where people used to pray and perform religious ceremonies at night. There were about 500 shrines served by about 700 unregistered mullahs in Tajikistan during that era. The most important of clandestine madressahs was established by mullah Hindustani. The impact of Islamic Revolution in Iran and Afghan jihad alongwith Perestroika gave boost to the Islamization of the Tajik society.
Establishment of IRP
The Islamic Renaissance Party was established by Tartar intellectuals in June 1990 in Astrakhan, Russia. Ahmad Kazi Akhtayev was elected its first chairman and Vali Ahmad Saddr as its press secretary and chief ideologist. The main objectives of the IRP were to revive Islam in the region including unity among the Muslims, observing its rules, to take part in religious, cultural, political, social and economic life on the basis of Islamic principles and against the accumulation of wealth in the hands of few on the basis of shari’a. In the meeting it was decided to establish different wings at all the former Soviet Union level. The most active and important wing of the Party was established in Tajikistan on 6 October 1990.
Initially IRP of Tajikistan demanded Islamization of the society because till then Tajikistan remained under Soviet rule and socio-economic conditions of the state were based on Soviet model. Tajikistan was the least developed of Soviet regions. Independence generated many high hopes among the population for remedies of their problems but joined opposition especially, IRP when their demands were not fulfilled. Many of the mujahidins, who fought in Afghanistan against Soviet forces, also joined the ranks of the Party.
The party is also influenced by the Basmachi movement of early 20th century. It grew out of a clandestine youth organization in the mid 1970s during oppressive Soviet rule, which called itself Somon-i-Javonon-i-Azod or Liberated Youth Organization (LYO) and began operating in Kurgan-Tyube region (which remained the headquarter of IRP during Tajik civil war) led by Said Abdullah Nuri. Tajik IRP was led by Said Abdullah Nuri with Daulat Usman and Sharif Himmatzode as its leaders of military wing. Locally it is called Hizb-e-Nehzat-e-Islami and had its military basis in Garam valley of Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan.
The main goal of IRP was to restore the basics of Islam to society and to begin the process of bringing Islamic knowledge and Islamic values back into public life. Important objectives of the Party were;
After setting up its aims and objectives, the Party started its political struggle to achieve its goals. IRP tried to get registered as a legitimate political party but the Supreme Soviet (state legislature) did not give permission for its registration on the basis of Constitution and Religious Freedom Act which prohibited establishment of political party on religious grounds. Therefore, Party started its agenda illegally. As pioneer of Islamic revivalism in Tajikistan, the Party demanded government to ban all un-Islamic practices including, stores selling pork and alcohol be closed, Tajik streets be renamed, un-Islamic way of cattle slaughtering, and demanded for opening up of more mosques and replacement of Friday with Sunday as a public holiday.
The Tajik leadership did not pay any heed to these demands which resulted in the demonstrations by opposition parties. At the same time Dushanbe housing riots also broke down which emerged after the accumulation of ethnic Armenians in the capital. Another opposition party “Rastokhez” managed to bring thousands of protesters in Dushanbe for rallies and demonstrations. This was an ideal situation for the growth of IRP which led the Party to fully participate the sit in protests along with other opposition parties like Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) and La’li Badakhshan beside Rastokhez.
When situation went out of Qahhar Makhmov’s, the then Tajik president, control he resigned due to massive public pressure. Qadruddin Arslanov replaced him as an acting president who was ultimately replaced by Rahman Nabiev as a result of November 1991 presidential election. Opposition parties alleged that the elections been rigged and demanded for fresh elections. Opposition parties staged very long sit in protest at Azadi (freedom) square in the middle of Dushanbe from 26 March 1992 to 23 April 1992 and 25 April to 5 Amy 1992 to pressurize the government for their demands.
IRP was at the forefront of these demos. The protesters were very strict in their demands and wanted to bring change at any cost. Ahmad Rashid states “I saw their enthusiasm, their apparent indifference to the authorities, and their willingness to sit in the square day after day, hungry and thirsty. It was apparent that something new was happening there. This was a heady time for IRP, who fed and cared for the people living in the streets, receiving their first taste of mass mobilization and political agitation in the process.”
Before presidential elections of 1991, IRP was registered as a political party in November 1991 and it formed a coalition with Rastokhez, DPT and La’li Badakhshan under the banner of Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and supported a united candidate for presidency who was a film director from Pamir area of Tajikistan. His name was Daulat Khudanazrov. When Khudanazrov lost presidential elections, IRP started an intensified political campaign against the government in its newspapers like Charogi Ruz, Minbor-i-Islam, and Adolat. The main participant in those rallies were aggrieved people of Kurgan-Tyube, Garam, and Badakhshan who had historical confrontation with Kulyabis and Khujandis of north (where Nabiev belonged to) due to the Soviet policy of collectivization.
Government also arranged mass rallies in a nearby square to support its policies. Ultimately these rallies ended in violent clashes leaving several dead and injured. At last government and opposition agreed to form a Government of National Reconciliation in May 1992, which included opposition parties as well. Daulat Usman of IRP was made vice premier of Tajikistan. But the hardliners in government undermined the coalition government. The deputies of the Supreme Soviet, who supported the old order, claimed that the new government was illegal. They also demanded the resignation of post-May coalition government. Similarly the proposed new National Assembly never got off the ground. The Supreme Soviet refused to give way to it. Nabiev also denied the creation of this Assembly declaring that such a body could not be created unless Supreme Soviet voted to do so. The situation was further intensified and now Tajikistan was at the brink of civil war.
The Civil War (1992-1997)
Hardliners violent policies led IRP and other opposition parties to resort the same tactics. The Islamists launched guerilla war against government forces and the Kulyabi militia. Their main bases were in Karategin and Tavildra vallies, Kurgan-Tyube and Northern Afghanistan. Heavy fighting broke out in Dushanbe. In the meantime, the grand mufti of Tajikistan during the last years of Soviet Tajikistan, Qazi Akbar Turajonzode also joined IRP which further strengthened the Islamists’ cause. He was immediately sent into exile in Iran. He traveled to many of the Muslim countries for financial as well as political and diplomatic support for IRP.
President Nabiev was forced to resign in September 1992. It is said that Nabiev was taken hostage by a group of aggressive “Youth of Tajikistan” at Dushanbe airport and forced to resign. His powers were temporarily transformed to Akbarsho Iskandarov. Russian forces under the treaty of CIS landed in Dushanbe to protect the capital as well as Tajik-Afghan border from Islamists’ infiltration. Russian forces alongwith Uzbek forces fully supported the new president Emamoli Rahmanov who was appointed on 16 November 1992 by Tajik parliament. Rahmanov, a kulyabi, gave control of almost all the government departments in the hands of Kulyabis, thus, leaving no room for the government-opposition patch up.
In 1993 Tajik Supreme Court outlawed IRP, accusing it of violating the Public Association Act and certain provisions of its own rules. On the other hand IRP was strengthened by the Islamists in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. IRP also formed an alliance in 1995 with opposition political parties with the name of United Tajik Front (UTF). This led to the development of the rising tide of Tajik nationalism and self consciousness. During the civil war many regions of Tajikistan formed their own forces and ignored the central government’s authority. Some of them even declared their autonomy.
The civil war displaced hundreds of thousands of people who fled mainly to Afghanistan beside taking refuge into Uzbekistan. Russia and other neighboring states realizing the heart of instability in the region due to Tajik conflict tried to pacify the intensity and forced both the groups to sit for table talks. Different rounds of negotiations were held between 1994 and 1997. Moreover, both the sides realized that neither is stronger enough to defeat the other. Therefore, they agreed to conclude a peace agreement in 1997 which ended this bloody civil war.
The General Peace Accord provided opposition to be incorporated into the central and local government bodies according to 30% quota. IRP’s armed formations underwent a gradual process of reintegration in state’s military, police, and civil government bodies. The ban on IRP was lifted on 2nd August 1999 and the Party legally assumed its political activities on 18 September 1999. IRP was badly affected by the clash of within in its leadership because some accepted the Peace Accord and others did not. Moreover, the former even assisted the government to crush the later.
The implementation of Accord was not supported by the dire state of Tajik economy. Agriculture was severely disrupted, factories were shut down, hundreds of thousands were living as refugees in other states and there was massive unemployment. The international community also did very little for Tajik reconstruction. Under these circumstances, many of the unemployed youth joined lucrative drug mafia. According to the UN Drugs Control Agency, Pamir region of Tajikistan is one of the major hubs of drugs trade. Ashambaev stated that “the inevitable result of catastrophic social and economic position of the Tajik society becomes the criminalization of the separate kind of economic activities and drug trafficking, representing the real threat to Tajik security, the Central Asia in the whole.
Before discussing the post-civil war activities of IRP, it is very important to study the external actors which remained involved in the civil war of Tajikistan. Most important of these were Russia and Uzbekistan but there were many others which actively supported either government forces or the opposition. President Karimov of Uzbekistan wrote a letter to the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali that the threat of anarchy and chaos looms over the entire region due to Tajik instability. Karimov regime also decided to intervene directly in the Tajik conflict. It trained pro Nabiev brigade and provided them with military hardware, including gunship helicopters , which brought huge destruction on the part of Islamists.
Russian troops immediately took control of Dushanbe and Tajik-Afghan border. Russia could not bear any Islamic threat in its neighborhood which could spark the Islamic feelings in its own 300,000 Muslim population. Russian foreign ministry indicating Afghanistan declared that Tajikistan was in its zone of vital interest; therefore, no interference in Tajik internal affairs would be tolerated from any quarter and for any reason. Islamists received all kinds of trainings mainly in Kunduz and Taloqan in Afghanistan. Some of the Islamists also got training in Iran by Islamic Revolutionary Guards. But Iran pursued a balanced approach towards Tajik civil conflict. On the one hand, it criticized human rights violations against IRP and on the other; it invited Tajik president for an official visit. Therefore, active support to IRP by Tehran seems to be least. China remained neutral during the conflict.
However, IRP kept its promise and did not carry out any sort of armed struggle against the government. It declared its new strategy and objectives after the conclusion of civil war, which are;
i) Ensuring the development of economic, social and cultural life in the republic,
With its new political campaign in September, 1999, IRP started preparations for the next parliamentary elections. IRP got only two seats in these elections. Although, the party alleged government for rigging, it accepted the results and continued its political struggle. On the other hand, the Communist Party got 30 percent of the seats which indicated that IRP lost its credibility because it was blamed and labeled as pro government party. IRP supported almost all the policies of the government after the Peace Agreement. Moreover, it could not present a comprehensive agenda for the solution of economic and social problems.
Reports submitted by the OSCE research center indicated that IRP and other (moderate) Islamists clearly show a change in their profile, that is, a transition from hitherto radical to a moderate, reforming tendency.
So far terrorism is concerned; the Party adopted an anti-terrorist stance right after the Peace Accord because the Party knew it very well that it doesn’t possess much of strength to implement its program militarily. Said Abdullah Nuri declared that armed struggle could not be the only function of the Islamic movements of Central Asia. Similarly, Muhiddin Kabiri, the new leader of IRP declared that jihad cannot be the only criterion as advocated by the IMU. What is needed is a political structure that can further the cause of Islam. It criticized the incident of 9/11 and showed sympathy with the American people. It also strongly criticized the activities of IMU, whose leadership once fought alongwith the IRP in Tajik civil war, which resorted to violent means after Tajik civil war. IRP also criticizes the activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the basis that it is not a registered party and IRP obeys Tajik laws.
IRP has resorted to peaceful means for the purification of Tajik society. These means include, holding seminars, conferences, lecture series and discussion on social evils. Women assemblies of such kind are worthy. It gives special attention to the youth in its newspapers as well. Through publishing different articles, the Party tries to bring up the youth in spirit of Islam. The party that in the past focused exclusively on attracting individuals from religious backgrounds will now seek to recruit new members from among intellectuals and students. In general, the current head of the Party, Muhiddin Kabiri promised to bring in more young members having modern education and skills. Kabiri knows that long-bearded Islamic scholars will not find support among the population in Tajikistan. Therefore, he focuses on younger people to strengthen the party and build up its support base for the future political battles.
The basis of political mobilization in Tajikistan has always remained on regional and ethnic and not on ideological or religious basis. It has remained the major hindrance in the way of IRP to develop itself as a national party. Although IRP called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Tajikistan as an ultimate end, it was vague about what that would mean. To the extent that IRP leaders identified more specific objectives, these embodied the concerns with popular sovereignty, civil liberties, and economic reforms that were typical of the opposition as a whole, whether secular or Islamic. The leadership of IRP in Tajikistan repudiated extremism and advocated religious freedom for Muslims as well as the non-Muslims. In an interview, both Abdullah Nuri and Kabiri rejected an Iranian style of republic, Taliban type of Shari’a and a caliphate.
The IRP’s leadership called for the unspecified economic policies that respect both the traditions as well as Islamic values. They also asserted that only the electorate should determine whatever form of government Tajikistan would have. The Party right from the beginning had flexibility to be molded according to the changing circumstances. Its alliance with secular parties before and during civil war and government after civil war are clear examples. Turajonzode stated many times that Tajiks were so poorly informed about Islam that the establishment of an Islamic form of government was impossible in the near term.
On the question of Islamic state, Turajonzode stated that “first Tajik society is not ready for a person with a spiritual background to become head of government, second, the region is not ready to have an Islamist as president, third, the West and especially Russia wouldn’t agree to have an Islamist as president. And ultimately when an Islamist is trying to become the president or even run as presidential candidate, this could aggravate situation in the country. That is not in the interest of either state or people.”
Government also propagated against IRP and labeled it as “Islamic Fundamentalists.” However, they never tried to implement Islam by force. Only negation of rights led them to resort violence and that too with secular sections of Tajik society. In the short lived coalition government, the first deputy chairman of Tajik KNB (secret agency) dismissed such allegations against IRP and declared that these are politically motivated attempts to discredit the opposition and gain support for the hardliners in Russia and the west. The Islamic fundamentalist threat is not more than a myth. Unfortunately, these acts have only fueled the process of radicalization.
One of the major causes for the decline of Party’s popularity is a soft attitude towards governmental policies. People demand change in their lifestyle. They want an improved life which is marked by the provision of all the basic necessities of life. But pro government attitude of IRP has disappointed the public. Some of them have left interest in political process while many others have joined other radical Islamic organizations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir. It has given a free hand to the government to execute even non-violent members of the Party in the name of supporting terrorism.
The regional and clan influence in Tajik society is another hurdle in the way of Party’s ineffectiveness. IRP has never been able to come out of this problem. It is unable to project and build itself as a national political party. Even the Communist Party of Tajikistan has a better nationalistic exposure than IRP and it has more representation in the Majlis than IRP. Moreover, little or no access to electronic media makes it unable to propagate its agenda among the masses. The label of conservative party also hinders the progress of the Party. People in Tajikistan think it as a rural and conservative party with weak agenda for the political, economic, and social reformation of Tajikistan.
The Party is trying to come out of this perception. Kabiri stated that he wants to develop a new outlook of the Party by recruiting women and young technocrats as party members. He says that in 1990, there were only two or three people with university degree among IRP leadership. Now all of our 49-members board of the party leaders has university degree and several of them have PhD degrees in various fields. Women make up over 60 percent of the membership of the party. The party doesn’t want to establish Islamic republic in Tajikistan. It wants to establish an Islamic society where all the people have access to the basic necessities of life along with social justice (which is the base of an Islamic society). Kabiri criticizes the underground groups declaring them harmful to the nation’s interests.
Result from Tajikistan’s parliamentary elections shows the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) led by President Emamoli Rahmanov winning 54 seats in the 63-seat lower chamber. Other parties, namely the Islamic Revival Party, the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party and the Economic Development Party won two seats each. Political analysts were expecting something major from IRP in the 28 Feb 2010 elections. Even they declared that future contest will be between Rahmanov’s PDP and the IRP but election results surprised many but not Parviz Mullojanov.
Mullajonov, a political analyst, had given a realistic analysis of the Tajik politics before the elections. He said “they (government) may try to limit the IRP to just one member, and adjust the number of communist party members either upwards or downwards,” he further said “they might even back third and weaker party and help it get into the legislature, so as to make the new parliament look more presentable and improve its image.” Experts feared that independent opposition parties will be denied representation in the 2010 elections through fraud, whereas loyal opposition parties such as the Party of Economic Reform and the Agrarian Party of Tajikistan will win seats. How perfect their analysis was as two new parties, Agrarian Party and the Economic Development Party won two seats each.
Muhiddin Kabiri optimistically predicted before the vote that the IRP would win 10 seats. Kabiri has also insisted, since results were announced, that his party claimed at least 30 percent of votes cast, far more than the 7.7 percent officially attributed to it. Although, IRP showed the same results in the Feb 2010 results, still it is optimistic about its future. The party has alleged government for rigging in the elections. Kabiri, even, declared before elections that these would be rigged but showed firmness to face all the situations. Even Rahmatullo Valiov, deputy chairman of the Tajik Democratic Party stated that “the forthcoming (parliamentary elections 2010) elections will be marred by numerous violations in the same way that previous ones were.”
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the elections is the IRP’s decision to exit the Social Council of Tajikistan, created in 1996 as part of the effort to end the 1992-1997 Civil War. Although the IRP’s action does not suggest that the party is returning to civil war rhetoric, its stance shows that its leaders are convinced that they have substantial support among the population in the form of anti-government stance.
IRP’s shift from militancy to moderation has shown that if given chance, Islamists and opposition parties can be effective in nation-building in Central Asia alongwith ruling political parties. It also indicates that cooperation instead of repression is the key to peace and stability. IRP is an Islamic Nationalist party which does not want to implement Sharia laws in its strict sense but want to modernize Tajik society on Islamic principles. Such an open political situation also compels Islamists/opposition parties to behave and act in a decent manner. As stated by Kabiri “as the only officially registered Islamic party, we are somehow seen as representatives of Islam and all religious people. We have to be absolutely careful because there is no room of error for us. If we make mistake, it will make Islam and the Muslims bad. As long as IRP remains the country’s major opposition party, Rahmanov has a good argument that the only alternative to his regime is Islamic regime.
The IRP has served over the past ten years as a small but persistent counterweight to the PDP. Without criticizing the president directly and publicly, the IRP has been able to build grass-roots support by sponsoring sporting events, religious events, community events, and small-scale protests throughout Tajikistan.
Though the IRP could not gain strength in political system in Tajikistan, the political environment of Tajikistan shows that political Islam would exert its influence on the political conflict in the state. Abdul Ghani Mamadazimov, Chairman of Tajikistan’s National Association of Political Scientists claims that “there can only be one kind of colored revolution in Tajikistan: a green revolution,” referring to the green banner of Islam and that too under the leadership of IRP.
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