Post Salala Pak-US Relations:
Revisiting Terms of Engagement
                
Umbreen Javaid*
 & Asim Hameed Butt§

Abstract

A unique feature of post 9/11 Pak-US collaboration is that Pakistan, despite being a declared Non- NATO-Ally, has not been fully trusted by the US policymakers and there are most visible signs of estrangement in the apparent declared convergence of Pak-US relationship, especially so after the proclamation  of Af- Pak Policy by the Obama administration in 2008. With the background of Raymond Davis incident and the modus operandi of Osama’s killing, the situation has further deteriorated after US led NATO attack on the Salala check posts. Now, the Pak-US relationship is being considered as on the verge of the most crucial stage of history. This paper is intended to draw an analytical sketch of post Salala Pak-US relations in the light of emerging trends and developments with the objective of arriving at some recommendations for national, regional and global security.

Key Words:      Salala, FATA, NATO, Pakistan, United States     

Introduction

US has emerged undoubtedly as the most powerful and unprecedented superpower of known human history and hence the nature and dynamics of her relationship with any state is a matter of prime concern more than ever.
In terms of its origin, Pak-US relations can predominantly be explained as a marriage of convenience between Pakistan’s Indo-centric threat perception and the US doctrine of   Containing Communism. It has a history of turbulent connections, involving numerous turning points and even u-turns based on accusations and counter-accusations, consisting of intense engagements followed by periods of estrangement, mainly because of shifting American interests in Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance. Pak-US ties have been the product of specific politico-military interests without any deep-rooted historical and ideological roots. As Pakistan has been on the smaller, weaker and recipient end of the partnership, the national interest of US has always dictated its relations with Pakistan. Hence, convergences have generally been of operational and tactical nature, while, the divergences existed at the strategic level.
It was in the 1950s and 1960s that the first ever engagement of USA was seen during the peak of Cold War. In the 1980s the Afghan jihad became the second instance, it was after the 9/11 that United States engaged itself the third time initiating War on Terror. During the Cold War era, Pak-US collaboration, despite all ups and downs, resulted into the so-called Triumph of Capitalism over Communism. In the post 9/11 scenario, the Pak-US bilateral engagement was supposed to have changed the historical pattern of tactical convergence versus strategic divergence, owing to the similarity of shared threat perceptions and commonality of objectives regarding War on Terror. But, during the last decade, despite being the Non-NATO Ally, Pakistan has become the worst victim of the principles of Pre-emptive Strike, Hot Pursuit, Overt Coercive Diplomacy or more specifically the War on Terror.
Rafique (2011) rightly comments: “Ten years after the war on terror began; the focus of U.S. military operations has now shifted to militant safe havens inside Pakistan. The northwest territories of Pakistan, the frontline of the so-called non-NATO ally, are now actually turning into the main frontline of Osama’s war in Afghanistan.”
The germs of divergence were already visible towards the end of Bush’s period when Indo-US Nuclear deal was finalized, combined with the US pressures on Pakistan to do more while accusing the Pakistan of playing double games. However, in the enforcement of Obama’s Af-Pak Policy, Pakistan was truly dragged into a quagmire created by the two self-conflicting legacies of the Afghan War of 1980s and the War on Terror. Year 2011 brought the most miserable events of polluting Pak-US Partnership environment, particularly the killing of Osama which led to the tragic incident of Salala that has created almost a deadlock in Pak-US relations.
A very strong anti-Pakistan campaign  has been launched by many US leaders and  think tanks since Osama’s killing, rooted in the question that  how could the world's most wanted man had been hiding so long in such a  noticeable building  and in a town so close to Islamabad that has a large military presence  including the top military academy. Some most serious allegations have been raised by CRS (2011), D’Souza (2011), Jones (2011), Hrish (2011), Riedel (2011) and Rushdie (2011) which include;

• “Pakistan’s credibility has suffered a serious blow as Osama’s presence in Pakistan proves that either Pakistani officials were involved at some level in hiding the him or the country’s military and intelligence services were seriously incompetent in their search for top AQ leaders”;
• “Pakistan has played a double game since 9/11 by capturing and handing over selective jihadis only while protecting others”;
• “Anti-India sentiment has developed a strong nexus between military and radical Islamists and it would continue to exist and flourish during military rule in Pakistan. Only democracy can gradually save Pakistan from Islamic extremism”;
•  “ISI is still in partnership with like Lashkar e Tayyiba, the group that attacked Mumbai in 2008, and the Afghan Taliban that fights NATO” ;
• “Several family members of the American victims have accused the General Nadeem Taj of complicity in the planning of the Mumbai attack in a New York court case. The fact that he  was in command of the Kakul Military Academy in 2006 and in September 2007 became DG/ISI , makes his position along with ISI suspicious regarding the presence of Osama in Abbottabad”;
• “Without dismantling the sanctuaries and terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and breaking the linkages of these groups with Al-Qaeda, it would be foolhardy to predict an early end to the conflict in Afghanistan.”
• “The jihadist penetrations in Pakistan Army makes vulnerable the security of Pakistan’s nukes”;
• “The extremist jihadists have an ambition to take control of Pakistan and its nuclear weapons”;
• “Pakistan's A.Q. Khan is a rogue chief nuclear scientist and is still under government protection. He was the most dangerous liaison to would-be nuclear terrorists”;
• “Perhaps Pakistan should be declared a terrorist state and expelled from the comity of nations”;
• “A swift end to Indian-Pakistani conflict can eliminate extremism in Pakistan”;
• “Winning the fight for control of Pakistan and its nuclear weapons is a global priority.”

Contrary to these serious allegations, it is remarkably clear that the US Government had followed a comparatively softer diplomatic language towards Pakistan and hence endorsed the fact that US officially recognized, to some extent, the delicacy of the situation in which Pakistan had been dragged, and also acknowledged the need for continued Pakistani support for US War on Terror. This can be observed as follows;
In his formal pronouncement of Osama’s killing, US President Obama talked about Pakistan in these words: “Over the years, I've repeatedly made clear that we would take action within Pakistan if we knew where bin Laden was. That is what we've done. But it's important to note that our counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding. Indeed, bin Laden had declared war against Pakistan as well, and ordered attacks against the Pakistani people. Tonight, I called President Zardari, and my team has also spoken with their Pakistani counterparts. They agree that this is a good and historic day for both of our nations. And going forward, it is essential that Pakistan continue to join us in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates.”
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted ‘Pakistan’s great contributions to dismantle al Qaeda’ and ‘help that led U.S. to bin Laden’ while claiming a commitment to this partnership in the best interest of the security and safety of the United States.
Defence secretary Robert Gates declared that he had seen no evidence to suggest that the top Pakistani civilian or military leaders were aware of Osama’s presence while stressing significant US interests in Pakistan and the need to continue the assistance for the benefits the Pakistani people. US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen also endorsed Robert Gates and called the US relationship with Pakistan as ‘long-term strategic partnership’ a valuable one. Marc Grossman, special representative for Afghanistan/Pakistan stressed the continued need for Pakistan's cooperation, to move forward, to give Pakistan credit and not to focus excessively on the negative. John Brennan, President Obama’s counterterrorism coordinator, admitted: “Pakistan has been responsible for capturing and killing more terrorists inside of Pakistan than any country, and it's by a wide margin. And there have been many, many brave Pakistani soldiers, security officials, as well as citizens, who have given their lives because of the terrorism scourge in that country.”
It is noteworthy that Pakistan’s response to Osama’s killing was much ‘delayed’, ‘inconsistent’ and ‘confusing’ showing a clear cut split between the civil and military responses to this incident. While President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani were immediately calling it a great victory, the military spoke persons remained silent for a number of days in the face of strong criticism; one by international media for having connections with Osama’s friends and the second from national media for being incapable of tracing or resisting the American action in Abbotabad violating Pakistan’s sovereignty. Later, a consistent stance was witnessed when Pakistani Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir and the Pakistan army spokesman Major General Athar Abbas spoke in similar tones by describing the incident a violation of Pakistani sovereignty and warned of ‘disastrous consequences’ for any  other military actions in Pakistani territory ‘without prior authorization’ of Pakistani authorities and rejected all blames as ‘a part of a well orchestrated smear campaign against Pakistan’s security organizations’ who actually have ‘suffered the most’ as well as ‘delivered the most’ against al Qaeda. Meanwhile, prospects for a revised Post-Osama collaboration was being sought in Pak-US relationship.
In Islamabad on November 25, 2011, the Chief of the Army Staff had a meeting with the NATO commander in Afghanistan regarding communication and coordination at the Pak-Afghan border. Within 24 hours tragic incident of Salalah happened to jeopardize all the melting ice efforts. This attack led to tense relations between United States and Pakistan which already were not very cordial. As a result Pakistan strongly reacted by blocking NATO supply through Pakistan and got the Shamsi Base vacated.  

Clash of Pak-US Versions on Salala Tragedy

On the 26th November of 2012, every newspaper in Pakistan carried the headline that US/NATO airplanes and helicopters had committed an attack on two border check posts of Pakistan at Salala, named Volcano and Boulder Posts, in Mohamand Agency (FATA). The seriousness of this tragic incident was highlighted due to the fact that 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed, and 13 seriously injured. In response, an emergency meeting of the Cabinet’s Defence Committee was convened by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani. Also the Army Chief Gen Kayani convened a meeting of the senior army officers, and decided to send a strong signal to Washington and Brussels, in addition to declaring the incident unacceptable NATO supply routes to Afghanistan were also blocked.
The Report of US Investigation on Salala, conducted by Brigadier-General Stephen Clark, was released on December 22 which contended that Pakistani troops provoked a US response by opening the fire first which resulted into a series of mistakes by both ISAF and Pakistani troops and led to the deadly firefight.
In response to Clark’s Report, Pakistan released a detailed and comprehensive 25 paged Report on 23rd January containing a point to point rejection of every excuse contained in the Clark’s Report. Ignoring some more technical points, the most important arguments contained in the Report (Inter Services Public Relations [ISPR] Report, January 23, 2012) can be noted as follows;
“The US / ISAF Investigation Report into the 26th November 2011 incident, apart from being factually incorrect, also brings to fore the larger issue of lack of trust of US / ISAF towards the Pakistani Military; Unfortunately the impartiality and transparency of the investigation was adversely affected when senior US officials repeatedly stated that the incident was “not intentional”, without waiting for completion of the Investigation. Pakistan believes that this stance may well have influenced the findings of the report;  The unprovoked engagement of Pakistani Posts located inside Pakistan was a clear violation of US / ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone; Pakistan was considered in an adversarial role and not part of friendly force; The current incident was preceded by four others ……..First on June 10, 2008, at Goraprai Post located in Mohmand Agency, an unprovoked US/ISAF aerial strike killed 11 Pakistani soldiers and injured seven others; Second on September 30, 2010, at Kharlachi Post in Kurram Agency, an unprovoked US aerial strike killed three soldiers and injured three others; Third on June 17, 2011, there was an incident at Ziarat Post in the same Mohmand Agency close to the area of November 26 attack; and Fourth on July 19, 2011, an unprovoked US/ISAF mortar and artillery fire in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency killed four Pakistani soldiers; Despite promises of thorough investigations, US / ISAF failed to hold anyone accountable after each of these incidents; The US Investigation Report is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to facts and therefore self serving; Sustained aggression which continued for as long as “90 minutes” despite US / ISAF being informed about the incident at multiple levels by Pakistan Military within minutes of initiation of US / ISAF fire, belies the “self defence” and “proportional use of force” contention; The fundamental cause of the incident of 26th November 2011 was the failure of US / ISAF to share its near-border operation, with Pakistan at any level; Failure to share information about a near-border operation with Pakistan at any level was a major US / ISAF / NATO omission, as were several others, like the complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement as well as lack of unified military command in Afghanistan; Investigating an incident which involves breach of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and putting in a recommendation of how to do it better next time is potentially troublesome for any future cooperation and border coordination.”

CRS (2012) on Pakistan U.S Foreign Aid Condition states: “The 112th Congress continues to debate levels of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in light of signs that Pakistan may not be a fully willing and effective U.S. partner, and that official Pakistani elements continue to support Afghan insurgent forces. During a period of economic and budget crises in the United States, Obama Administration officials and some senior Members of Congress have voiced concerns about the efficacy of continuing the flow of billions of U.S. aid dollars into Pakistan, with some in Congress urging more stringent conditions on, or even curtailment of, such aid. At issue is whether Pakistan’s civilian government and security services are using the aid as intended domestically while actively supporting U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and combat regional insurgent and terrorist elements. Existing aid restrictions and the certification process required for greater accountability on the part of Pakistan are thus under scrutiny. Pending bills include measures that would totally eliminate aid to Pakistan “under any provision of law,” and provide no waivers or certification requirements; one that would eliminate all aid unless new certification regarding the Pakistani government’s knowledge of Osama bin Laden is provided; one that would eliminate all aid except for aid that would ensure the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; and one that would prohibit all non-security aid. Increased reporting and certification requirements also are included in many of the bills currently before Congress.”

The First Post Salala US Generals’ Visit: the US Offer

Hussain(2012) , while reporting on the surprise and to some extent unwelcome Islamabad visit on 28th  March, 2012 of two top US military officials’ (General James N Mattis, commander US Central Command and General John Allen, commander ISAF) crucial meetings with the Pakistani military leadership General Khalid Shameem Wynne, the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and  Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, claims that US has offered Pakistan, in exchange for an early reopening of NATO supply routes, to slash the list of targets for drone attacks in the Tribal Areas and limit it only to top al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, instead of hitting all miscreants and that too when those few attacks are approved by Pakistani authorities but  General Kayani told the US officials that the matter was now before the parliament which will decide about the resumption of NATO  supplies.

The PCNS Recommendations: Unconditional US Apology

Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS), responding to the given the task to revisit “terms of engagement” with the United States in the aftermath of NATO Attack on Salala Check posts, had presented its first report in the joint session of Parliament on March 20, 2012, after almost  three weeks’ of further deliberation upon the issues that were highlighted by the opposition parties, especially PML (N)’s serious reservations on the clause related to giving official permission to the presence of foreign spy agencies, the revised recommendations of the PCNS were presented and approved in joint session of the parliament on April 12, 2012.The 14-point recommendations were presented by PCNS chairman Senator Raza Rabbani.
“The Committee’s revised recommendations include: to seek unconditional apology from United States over Salala attack; to forbid military equipment and ammunition in Nato supplies transiting through Pakistan; no verbal agreement with any foreign government regarding national security; no use of Pakistani bases and airspace by foreign forces; no hot pursuit or boots on ground; no covert operations on Pakistan’s soil; no foreign private security contractors or intelligence operatives shall be allowed; cessation of drone attacks; to seek civilian nuclear agreement with United States and not to succumb to US pressure but keep on pursuing gas pipeline project with Iran… The resumption or closure of NATO supply lines for non-lethal items has been left to the government.”(Zulfqar, 2012:1)

Marc Grossman’s First Post-Salala Visit: Collapse over Apology

On 25th April, 2012, Marc Grossman, United States Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan headed the first high level delegation after Salala incident and held meeting with Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and called on Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. It was expressed by Marc Grossman, that President had already showed his regrets over the incident and offered condolence to the families killed in it.
According to a recent report of The New York Times (April 28,2012) , Marc Grossman’s Islamabad visit, consisting of two days of discussions, ultimately proved to be a failure mainly because Obama Administration has refused to apologize on Salala tragedy, contending instead that the April 15 multiple simultaneous attacks in Kabul and other Afghan cities were directed by the Haqqani network. This is much more serious than the general Pak-US disagreement about the precise sequence of events ‘in the deadliest single cross-border attack of the 10-year war in Afghanistan’. Hence, Pakistan’s refusal to reopen NATO supply routes into Afghanistan and US’s withholding of $1.18 billion to $3 billion of promised military aid to Pakistan has converted the ‘continuing deadlock’ into  a ‘stalemate’ which would not be resolved quickly.

The Way Ahead

Scholars and think tanks of any orientation almost universally agree that Post Salala Pak-US relations have entered into a new phase of partnership and onus lies on US to shift her militaristic considerations towards a developmental outlook in the region. Post 9/11 US Policy has generally been criticized for being unilateral and over aggressive, particularly so in the case of Pakistan where, only because of being a frontline US ally state in war on terror, the magnitude and size of sufferings and disasters, faced by both the state and society collectively, is in no proportion to the actual losses of the 9/11 tragedy. There exists a lot of distrust and ill will among the most of the Pakistanis regarding the actual US intentions about Islam in general and Pakistan in particular behind the official war on terror campaign. Most of the religious parties and groups present enormous conspiratorial theories in this regard which get public acceptability after each drone attack in Pakistan. In fact, what US has missed since the beginning of her relationship with Pakistan, is the opportunity to build a national level confidence building in Pakistani public by helping them to overcome their socio-economic challenges of poverty, unemployment, inflation, corruption, law and order, thoroughly backward public health and education sectors, sanitation & sewerage problems and above all the most resounding energy crisis; instead ironically US can be held responsible for all these issues because in pursuit of her political and geo-strategic goals, US patronized a strong military establishment in Pakistan at the cost of her actual development. This seems particularly true in the latest post 9/11 phase in which the basic infrastructure of Pakistan has been the prime victim of war on terror. Whatever US aid programs have been in Pakistan, they have never been by any standards in proportion to the US security-oriented allocations and in this regard US failed to develop a societal bond in Pakistan, as US had developed in Europe through programs like Marshal Plan. 
Jamil (2012) suggests:
“Differences notwithstanding, this relationship has to be mended. The US should show some compassion towards Pakistan for having suffered enormously in the war on terror. The US should help Pakistan economically and militarily so that it can effectively fight terrorists and destroy them hook, line and sinker… The United States must realise that drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas are counterproductive because the drones kill hundreds of innocent civilians, which in turn provide opportunity to the terrorists to have fresh groups of new militants…The cooperation between US and Pakistan should therefore be focused on taking number of initiatives in the field of power generation, creation of economic activity zones in FATA, actionable intelligence sharing etc., which will help restore the lost confidence and trust.”

On the other hand, US has also failed in understanding or recognizing Pakistani establishment’s prime concern, i.e. ‘the survival against Indian threat’. Again, it’s mainly a post-9/11 development that US has started to follow an overt policy of  close alignment with India especially in the form of civil nuclear deal from which Pakistan has been kept out deliberately. Rafique (2011) has rightly remarked: “It is essential for the United States to deal with Pakistan as a regional player facing problems of much greater magnitude than its own capability to solve. The remarkable U.S. shift towards India is a huge dent in Pakistan-U.S. relations. It could inspire Pakistan to distance itself from America and find new reliable alliances in future.”
Perkovich (2011) suggests:
“The army’s claim to power depends on India being the omnipresent cohering threat and the army being the virtuous competent defender against it…The army’s and ISI’s obsessions are too neurotic to be affected by American techniques of behavior modification. And it would be exceedingly dangerous for anyone to seek to defeat the army and ISI in war. The only constructive alternative is democratization. The creation and protection of space for people and groups who offer a more positive identity for Pakistan could enable them to dislodge less constructive actors and reform the state’s mission and actions. The military’s psychology and exploits have put the country into a tailspin from which democratization offers the only rescue. Concentrating U.S. security assistance on the project of protecting Pakistanis is one element of a ‘stop-doing-harm’ strategy. A second is to lower tariffs on Pakistani textile and apparel exports to the United States.”

Conclusion 

Foreign policy making in US has been a strong factor in transforming US in to superpower and has evolved as a more and more complex and sophisticated process, which is truly pluralistic in nature.  Foreign Policy makers in US not only include the formal actors like the President, the Executive, the State Department, the Embassies, the Congress, the Pentagon, the CIA, think tanks and similar other agencies but also informal actors like the media, the military complex, the public opinion, lobbies and interest groups, etc. Hence, how and when a certain event would affect US foreign policy can not be predicted accurately. This is particularly true in the case of post Salala US foreign policy towards Pakistan where the dust has not settled yet and a genuine deadlock now exists in Pak-US relations on the issue of implementing the PCNS’ recommendations.
One most credible interpretation of the situation is that in the post-Cold War scenario, the Pak-US relations had already undergone a drastic change because of a major shift in the US foreign policy in the region which can be described as ‘Containing China through building India for the continued US power and influence in regional and global affairs’, in over-simplified terms. Another notable feature of the US foreign policy is the continuity and even a phenomenal accretion of the influences of CIA, Pentagon and the Military complex after 9/11, which has played a decisive role in the current major shift in the US policy.
Post-Salala tensions in Pak-US relations are being aggravated by the apparent delay and perhaps actual refusal of US apology on Salala attack, ‘the discontinuity of NATO Supply’, ‘the increasing cuts and sanctions on the US military aid and CSF dues for Pakistan’, ‘the drone strikes’, ‘the Resolution on Balochistan by the US House of Representatives’, ‘the US allegations against the safety and proliferation of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal’,  ‘the US pressure on Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline project’, and ‘a fresh (in May,2012) wave of accusations and threats against Pakistan for having terrorists’ safe heavens through ISI-Haqqani Network liaison’, etc.
Under present circumstances, US apology on Salala attack does not seem likely as Americans have developed a negative mindset against ISI’s role in FATA and on the contrary they have decided to manipulate the American media’s propaganda against Pakistan’s nuclear program and create potent leverage on their exaggerated concerns about safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to dissuade any possibility of concluding Pakistan-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement. But, one can not rule out the possibility of a soft statement attached with the opening of NATO Supply under a revised package of terms of engagement. On Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, United States might try to force Pakistan to abandon the project and seek alternative sources to overcome its energy problems.
The core of post Salala Pak-US deadlock is that Pakistan has decided to positively resist the new US strategic design of building India as a custodian of American interests in the region while using, blaming and even victimizing ISI and Pakistan’s military establishment for ‘not doing enough’ and ‘playing double games’ in the so-called collaboration in war on terror. Pak-US relationship has always been based on short-term goals and could never develop a lasting and durable partnership. Washington and Islamabad both face a dire need to successfully negotiate new terms of engagement by exploring and focusing on the new areas of common objectives to convert their tactical partnership into a strategic one. They must realize that foreign policy is primarily an executive function and unilateralism of any kind can be most lethal for all sorts of diplomacies to attain regional and global peace and security. Despite being a weak relationship between the two unequals, keeping in view their unavoidable mutual interdependence, Pak-US relations should and can be normalized by concluding an entirely new diplomatic deal through mutual gives and takes, but the onus of a bigger initiative lies on the US policy makers as the other great players in the region have key concerns in the dynamics of Pak-US relations. One most opportune event can be Pakistan’s attendance at a NATO meeting in Chicago in a few weeks which should be positively ensured by a new US initiative and utilized for a breakthrough in this regard.
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