China’s Policy Towards Central Asia Since 1991:
An Overview

Shabir Ahmad Khan*
& Nadeem Akhtar**

Introduction

Breakup of the Soviet Union was one of the major events in the twentieth century that led to the creation of five independent states in Central Asia in 1991. The region has played significant role throughout history. In the modern times, Brzezinski’s theory clearly points towards its geostrategic importance, which states, “control of Eurasian landmass is the key to global domination and control of Central Asia is the key to the control of the Eurasian land mass.” Owing to this fact, the new geographic design forced the regional as well as international players to reorient their policies towards Central Asia. In addition to the strategic location, the vast hydrocarbon reserve has initiated “The New Great Game,” as described by Peter Hopkirk. China, being a neighbour, responded to the situation and this region obtained a major focus in its foreign policy. China’s ‘Go West’ policy naturally demands more attention towards close and cordial relations with Central Asian Republics. The internal policy of bringing and maintaining stability in Sinkiang is one of the primary determinants and reflection of China’s external policy towards Central Asia. This article is a descriptive study carried out through the review of the available literature and an attempt has been made to present an analysis of the major determinants of China’s policy towards Central Asia, which are border issues, restive western province of China, US presence in the region, trade and economic concerns, energy security and Russian factor.

Abstract

China considers post-Soviet Central Asia as its backyard and focused on the region for having smooth political and economic relations. Shanghai Five was instrumental in resolving the border issues between China and Central Asia. The important factors in China’s policy towards the region are to bring peace and prosperity to its restive western region of Xinjiang, Central Asia’s hydrocarbon resources vis-à-vis China’s growing energy demand, US presence in the region and trade and economic issues.

Key Words China, Central Asia, Xinjiang, Russia, Economics, Energy Resources

Long Term Relations and Border Issues

China was among the first countries to recognize the Central Asian Republics (CARs) as early as December 1991 to January 1992. Embassies were established in these states soon and exchange of high level visits took place. The Shanghai Five was instrumental in achieving its aim of resolving border issues between China and Central Asian States and establishing ground for friendly relations and closer economic and political cooperation between China, Russia and Central Asia. Stability in Xinjiang remains at the core of China’s policy towards Central Asia for which the peaceful borders with neighbouring Central Asia was the pre requisite.
China had claims that the Tzarist Russia had annexed thousands of square miles of Chinese territory in the agreements it calls as “unequal Treaties”. In this context, after the disintegration of Soviet Union, talks were initiated in early 1990s for the resolution of border issues with Central Asian Republics. With Kazakhstan, the first boundary agreement was reached in 1994 and two supplementary agreements were signed in 1997 and 1998, hence, resolving the 1700km long border. Similar negotiation with Kyrgyzstan led to the inking of agreement in 1996. Talks with Tajikistan were delayed due to civil war but finally the border dispute was resolved through the agreement of 2002.This treaty resolved a hundred and thirty year old border issue. A noteworthy aspect of China’s policy towards Central Asia after 1991 is that it wants cordial relations on long term basis. In order to establish long term cordial relations with Central Asian Republics, China went up to the extent that it withdrew from its former claim of thousands of kilometre along the border with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, China got only 3.5%, 22% and 32% of its former claim from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan respectively, in the aforementioned border agreements. This provides us enough evidence to conclude that China is ready to make concessions for maintaining favourable relations and peaceful border with these neighbours. It also reflects that China has long term energy, trade and economic stakes in Central Asia which require some concessions, being made from economically strong and stable neighbour. 

China’s ‘Go West’ Policy

There are some, internal as well as external, security concerns vis-a-vis Central Asia and Xinjiang which are having a profound influence on the formulation of China’s foreign policy towards Central Asia. One of the crucial elements that China aims to address in its ‘Go West’ policy is economic disparity in western region, which in turn has sparked ethnic and religious nationalism in parts of western provinces i.e., Xinjiang. The construction and development of two important regions i.e., Kashgar and Hoergosi as special economic zones in western China (Xinjiang) illustrates the essence of China’s ‘Go West’ policy. The prosperity and economic development would consequently bring peace and stability to Xinjiang which is a pre-requisite for increased trade and energy transportation in the western direction.
The unstable situation that prevailed in Xinjiang during the 1990s played a significant role as a determinant of China’s policy towards Central Asia. The ethnic Uighur community of Sinkiang province of China are making efforts for independence. There are approximately three hundred thousand ethnic Uighur in the three neighbouring Central Asian countries. The Uighur of Xinjiang have strong relations with those residing in Central Asia. The Uighur of Xinjiang were cherishing the idea of the establishment of an independent ‘East Turkistan’ and could have support from their co-ethnic inhabitants of Central Asia. China became extremely concerned about this secessionist movement and took measures to counter such efforts. This element became a visible determinant of Chinese policy towards Central Asia and it was thought that the establishment of friendly relations with the leadership of the CARs can play an instrumental role in minimizing the support for Uighurs of Sinkiang.
During the Soviet era, Islamic teachings and practices remained under extreme oppression. The region, once a seat of Islamic learning, lost its valuable heritage. After independence, the leadership that these states got was the continuation of the Soviet legacy. Against this backdrop, and due to domino effect of the neighbouring Islamic countries, religious nationalism cropped up. After independence the general masses did not observe any visible positive changes on the political as well as economic fronts, hence leading to frustration and the inclination to non-state actors. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) are notable in this regard. They worked for overthrowing the ruling elite and establishing an Islamic Caliphate. In addition to Central Asia, The Uighur Autonomous Region of China was considered as an integral part of this Caliphate. On the other hand the ethnic Uighur, who are Muslims by religion, were also having separatist ideology. These circumstances made China highly vary of the development in its western region as well as its western neighbouring areas and paid attention to it in policy formulation towards Central Asia. The relatively underdevelopment of western China also contributed to the instability in western parts of China. In fact, China’s ‘Go West’ policy is to address this issue and bring the western region economically at par with the eastern China. Thus the stability in western parts would serve dual purpose for China; firstly it will provide a safe and secure platform for furthering economic and energy interests in Central Asia and secondly stable and prosperous Xinjiang would further bind it to the rest of China.

US Presence

After 9/11 the US started ‘War on Terror’ and attacked Afghanistan. The above-mentioned threat perceptions in China forced her to support the US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. With the passage of time the Chinese support started eroding and the policy analysts became increasingly suspicious about the prolongation of the duration of the operation, as well as the real objectives of the US presence in the region. It has been mentioned by M. Ashimbayev, and M. Laumlin that an important factor determining China’s foreign activity in Central Asia is the aspiration to counter the unipolar system and the leading position of USA in the region. The United States established military bases in Central Asian States and increased its involvement in the political and economic spheres. The US military base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan is just 100 kilometres from the Chinese border. The phenomenon of ‘containment of China’ is a prominent feature of the international affairs. Prolongation of the stay of the United States in Central Asia is perceived by China as a step towards its encirclement. China is using the instrument of unilateral as well as multilateral forums to neutralize the influence of the United States and the West on Central Asia. The bullying conduct of USA has driven China and Russia towards closer collaboration. The joint statement from the forum of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Astana, 2005 for the evacuation of US military bases in Central Asian Republics substantiates such efforts on the part of China. The SCO’s agenda seems to be infused with Chinese and Russian suspicion of U.S. designs in Eurasia and their desire to reduce US influence in Central Asia. Both Russia and China consider the region of Central Asia their backyard and therefore their sphere of influence exclusively. Both China and Russia are in collaboration to counter US influence in the region and gain the support of Central Asian Republics in this context.  

Energy Security

Growing Energy Needs

China is one of the fastest growing economies of the world and has maintained double digit growth rate for the last three decades. Maintenance of economic growth at such a level is not possible with consistent supply of energy. China’s energy requirement is growing with a high pace and its daily oil consumption has already reached 4.1 million barrels. International Energy Agency has forecasted that in the next two decades the combined consumption of energy of China and India would be more than half of the energy requirement of the whole world i.e., sixty percent oil, twenty percent gas and eighty percent coal of the world demand.
A comparison of China and Japan clarifies the picture. Energy requirement of China is estimated to rise rapidly. Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) has projected energy demand of the two countries from 2007 to 2035. Oil requirement of Japan is estimated to decrease from 514 to 508 million tons between 2007 and 2020 and further decreasing to 493 million tons till 2035. In contrast to it, the requirement of China is projected to witness a rise from 1756 to 2539 million tons between 2007 and 2020 and further increasing to 3451 million tons in 2035. It is also projected that China will constitute about thirty percent increase in the energy demand in the above mentioned period. Currently China is meeting its requirement of oil and gas by importing 51.8% and 11% respectively. Keeping in view the Chinese growing energy needs, the oil and gas rich Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) are readily available options in the neighbourhood.

Diversification of Sources

China is mostly dependent on its energy imports on Gulf region and it is using maritime transportation routes passing through the Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca and Strait of Taiwan. Keeping in view the growing imports, the transportation of oil through the Malacca Strait is expected to increase from 11 million barrels to 22 million barrels per day. This transportation route is extremely vulnerable and blockade of energy imports can lead to the economic death of China. It is not having favourable relations with Taiwan and furthermore, presence of US military presence throughout this route is another factor adding to the lack of security of Chinese energy imports. China is cognizant of the situation and has started working on alternatives. Hence, the process of energy sources diversification has been initiated. Central Asia is one of the options, since it is having the third largest reserves of hydrocarbons after Gulf and Siberia.  The estimated oil reserves are 250 billion barrels, with the possibility of 200 billion barrels additional reserves. Natural gas reserves are estimated at 328 trillion cubic feet. China is developing close links in order to get a secure source of energy, especially avoiding water route and utilising land communication.
In this regard, China signed an agreement with Kazakhstan for the construction of Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline. The agreement was inked in 1997 and the pipeline became operational in 2006. This pipeline takes oil from Atyrau in Kazakhstan to Alashankou in Xinjiang province of China. The total length of the pipeline is 2,228 kilometres and it will transport 20 million tonnes of oil annually to China. Similarly the Turkmenistan-China Gas pipeline project was conceived. The agreement for this project was signed on 3 April 2006. This pipeline starts in Turkmenistan and passes through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and finally enters Xinjiang. The leaders of the three counties visited Turkmenistan for the inauguration of the Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline on December 14, 2009. Total length of the pipeline is about 1,833 kilometres. It will supply gas up to 40 billion cubic meters annually at its peak capacity, 30 billion from Turkmenistan and the remaining from Kazakhstan. This is about fifty percent of the total gas production of China in 2007. Yet another pipeline has become operational from Kazakhstan to China recently. Oil and gas supply from Central Asia would contribute significantly towards meeting the energy requirement of China. Moreover, it will also make supply increasingly secure, since it passes through land route where the US military is not present like the sea routes.

Russian Factor

Russia factor is also playing a role in the determination of Central Asian policy of China. China recognises the importance of Russia’s historical, military and economic presence in Central Asia and without Russian nod it could have been difficult for smooth walk over in the energy and trade sector of Central Asia. China was prudent enough to move towards Russia first and then got improved its relations with neighbouring Central Asia. It seems that Russia has also selected China vis a vis USA to side with and share the riches of Central Asia. Russia is having upper hand in Central Asia due to its historical legacy, has invested for almost a century in Central Asia, and still considers it as her backyard. Russia is having monopoly over the routes of communication and all the gas and oil pipelines pass through the Russian territory. Likewise, it is still the largest trading partner of the Central Asian Republics. Keeping in view these realities China may come in confrontation sometime in the future but currently there is a complete convergence of interests between China and Russia regarding Central Asian energy resources, and geopolitics. At present this phenomenon of confrontation is not clearly evident due to the combined threat perception for both China and Russia in the form of US presence in the area. Thorough analysis of the situation shows that signs of this competition are present.
The two countries have seen many ups and downs in their relations. After the independence of China and during the era of Communism, they enjoyed good relations but could not maintain it for long and in 1960s border dispute further deteriorated their relations. After the disintegration of the USSR, improvement was witnessed in their relations. On the International level cooperation is visible in the stand of Russia and China regarding the global crises. Even in the United Nations Security Council the two countries mostly support each other, for instance, both of them voted against the West on independence of Kosovo as well as sanctions against Iran. Similarly they are against the phenomenon of uni-polar world and the sole monopoly of the United States on the global level. The active participation in the regional organizations and even showing willingness to cooperate militarily shows that they share common perception about the hegemonic approach of the US. In 2007 the military forces of the two countries carried out combined exercises due to which an impression created about their strategic alliance. But analysts opine that such closeness is the direct result of the military presence of the Unites States in the region. In fact, the interest of both Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia is the same. China needs Central Asian energy and Russia is trying to maintain its monopoly over the energy transportation routes. Hence, the visible alliance is not a long term phenomenon and underneath the calm surface is the growing competition between them as far as Central Asia is concerned; a region considered by both as their backyard. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor in chief of the journal “Russia in Global Affairs” states about Sino-Russian relations vis-a-vis Central Asia, “I wouldn't say it is a conflict; that is too strong a word, we will see a soft competition that could heat up as China becomes more successful. Russia doesn't want to be China's junior partner in this region.”
Russia has taken some practical steps which reflect the presence of the competition. Russia was buying oil and gas from the Central Asian States at very low prices compared to those prevailing in the international market. For instance, it was paying seventy to hundred and fifty dollars for 1000 cubic meters and was selling it in the European market at a huge profit, because the Central Asian Republics (CARs) are landlocked and are dependent upon the Russian pipeline system. In 2009 Russia agreed to purchase gas from Central Asia at prices comparable to that of the international market. Although the rate was not announced, it was speculated to be between 350 to 400 US dollars/1000 cubic metres. It is believed that this change in attitude on the part of Russia is because of Chinese presence in the Central Asian energy market and its investment in providing alternative transportation routes for Central Asian hydrocarbon resources.
China is certainly concerned about the military presence of the United States in Central Asia but geopolitics is not the single primary element for shaping the policy of China towards Central Asia. China’s growing energy demand and the availability of oil and gas in Central Asia is also one of the prime determinants of China’s policy towards the region which is being discussed below.

Trade and Economic Interests

The fast pace of Chinese economic growth, on the one hand require energy security and on the other hand needs market as well. China is into a long term game in Central Asia and China’s economic, energy and security concerns complement each other because for smooth energy and trade transactions, peace and stability in Xinjiang, on the borders and in Central Asia is a pre-requisite. In the long term, relations are dependent upon the development of infrastructure in Central Asia. China is investing in the development of highways, railways and air communication as well as pipelines. One such project is the construction of highway between Xinjiang and Lake Issykul in Kyrgyzstan. China National Petroleum Corporation is providing support to Uzbekistan in oil and gas exploration. In addition to the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, China has recently completed work on another gas pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, which is currently operational. China is not only constructing pipeline for transportation of hydrocarbons but is working on other options as well. Horizon Petroleum and Gas Inc. (HPGI) has been established specifically to construct railway lines. Twenty-one new projects are in the pipeline and eight of them are specifically for the transportation of oil and gas. Besides, China-Kyrgyz-Uzbek rail road is also part of the overall development programme of the means of communication. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are rich in water resources therefore; China is providing support to develop the hydro-electricity system. China is investing in the Central Asian mining resources too.
China is replacing Russia in many sectors and is becoming the main source of trade and investment in Central Asia. China National Petroleum Corporation bought fifty percent shares in Petro-Kazakhstan: the largest oil company of Kazakhstan. Gazprom, the Russian energy giant was also its competitor. Similarly State Development Bank of China invested four billion dollar in the gas sector in Turkmenistan. The fourth largest reserves of gas are in Turkmenistan and China is the largest purchaser of Turkmen gas than any other country in the world.  Kazakhstan is a leading oil exporting country and China is buying one fourth of its oil. Likewise China has signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to purchase 30 billion cubic meter of gas per year for the next thirty years. Russia has dominated the Central Asian market for a long period but now food items and textile from China are the major articles seen in Central Asia. Russia is still the largest trading partner of CARs but China’s trade with Central Asia is growing with a fast pace and it is right behind Russia.
This shows that in order to reach its economic interest in Central Asia, China is busy in the creation of “New Silk Road” consisting of railways, highways, pipelines, airlines and energy cables. The traditional Silk Road was just route for camel caravans passing through Central Asia, transporting goods and ideas from and to China but now the new one has made Central Asia the focus of attention and a destination in itself, especially for China’s investment; almost twenty five billion dollars until now. An American author Parag Khanna, says in his new book, “How to Run the World” that these new pipelines, highways and railroads radiate out of China into Central Asia, “like five fingers on a hand.” 
Economic relations between China and Central Asia have strengthened and bilateral trade has increased significantly during the past decade. China-Kazakh bilateral trade witnessed a rise from 1.5 billion dollars in 2001 to 5.8 in 2005 and 20 billion dollars in 2011 while Russia-Kazakh bilateral trade reached 23 billion dollars in 2011. In fact, China has already replaced Russia as a major trade partner in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan where the Chinese trade remained at 1.5 billion dollars and 5 billion dollars respectively in 2011 in comparison to 1 billion dollars Russia-Tajik trade and 1.4 billion dollars Russia-Kyrgyz trade. Kashgar hosts the world biggest market where every Sunday 150000 businessmen come from Central Asia and exchange commodities with their Chinese counterparts.
China is not only investing in developmental activities directly, it is also providing loans to Central Asian Republics on very soft terms:  $10 billion, $4 billion and $360 million to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan respectively. Central Asian States prefer these loans because they are not linked with strict conditionalities like those of the other international financial institutions. In the political sphere, Chinese influence is minimum, which is part of its broader global policy. China considers economic influence as a more effective instrument to maintain its sphere of influence. China due to geographic proximity, dynamic economy and trade promoting policy towards Central Asia is designed to maintain political stability through economic development. China uses Central Asian raw material and mineral bases effectively to advance its own interior areas which on the other hand proving a good market for Central Asian mineral and hydrocarbon resources.

Conclusion

China has a significant geostrategic role in Central Asia throughout history. Due to the Soviet occupation this region remained isolated from the world for almost a century but the breakup of USSR, once again brought it into the lime light of international politics. Regional as well as international powerful nations took keen interest in Central Asia. China due to various internal as well as external elements laid special focus on the region. China’s ‘Go West’ policy undoubtedly focused on economically developed and thus a peaceful ‘West’ i.e., western region of China. Defusing discontent in its western region Xinjiang was one of the primary determinants of China’s Central Asian policy during the decade of 1990s. Close relationship with the leadership of Central Asian Republics can prevent support to Uighur of Xinjiang from Central Asian co-ethnic brothers. China, therefore, concentrated on creating peaceful borders with Central Asia throughout the 1990s while later on started focusing on trade and economic relations.
China also remains suspicious about the intentions of the US presence in Central Asia and it is using bilateral as well as multilateral forums to minimize its influence on Central Asia and safeguard its own interest. Chinese economic growth is one of the highest in the world and its demand of energy is increasing day by day. US military presence along the water route can affect China’s import of oil and therefore Central Asia is an alternative source of energy from where transportation through land routes is very much feasible, secure and economical. China also realised the fact that Russia due to its historical legacy is present in all the social, military, political and economic spheres of Central Asia. China therefore improved its relations with Russia in order to have access to Central Asian consumer and energy markets though the US presence also pushed China and Russia closer. All these factors have shaped China’s policy towards Central Asia and it is into a long-term partnership with Central Asia, for which it has been investing heavily in the development of basic infrastructure especially the means of communication and pipelines for energy transportation. Chinese multi trillion dollar projects in Xinjiang to develop two special economic zones on Pak-China and China-Kazakh borders will turn the western land locked areas of China into a regional trade hub. Scholars at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences stated that “China is not investing massively in its trade infrastructure with Central Asian countries for reasons of charity – but to stabilize its own restive Xinjiang Uygur province by turning it into a trade hub for this region” .

Bibliography

Ashimbayev, M., Laumlin, M., Ye. Tukumov and others, ed., New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia: After September 11. Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Behera, Bhagaban. Central Asia-China Relations since 1991.Delhi: Vista International Publishing House, 2006, 167-8.
Bhattacharya, Abanti. “Conceptualizing Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism” Strategic Analysis. Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul-Sep 2003): 357-381.
Brooke, James. China Displaces Russia in Central Asia, Accessed on 23 Feb., 2012; available from http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/China-Displaces-Russia-in-Central-Asia-108478134.html.
Burles, Mark. Chinese policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics. Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 1999.

Daly, John .Central Asia's Energy Chessboard. Accessed on 12 Feb., 2012; available from http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/3067/central-asias-energy-chessboard.

Dwivedi, Ramkant. “China’s CA Policy in Recent Times.” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2006): 139-159.

Gurt, Marat. China extends influence into C. Asia with pipeline. Accessed on 12 Feb., 2012; available from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/12/14/china-pipeline idUKSGE5BD0BQ20091214?sp=true.

Herberg, Mikkal. E. “Pipeline Politics in Asia: Energy Nationalism and Energy Markets” in “Pipeline Politics in Asia: The Intersection of Demand, Energy Markets, and Supply Routes,” The National Bureau of Asian Research special report No. 23, September 2010.
Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Kondansha International, 1992.
Itoh, Shoichi. “The Geopolitics of Northeast Asia’s Pipeline Development” in “Pipeline Politics in Asia: The Intersection of Demand, Energy Markets, and Supply Routes,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, special report No. 23, September 2010.
Jackson, Alexander. “China and Central Asia.” The Journal of the Turkish weekly, No. 33 May 19, 2009.
Kazakstan-China oil Pipeline. Accessed on 12 Feb., 2012; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstan%E2%80%93China_oil_pipeline

“Kazakhstan expands China oil pipeline link,” Reuter, Jul 1, 2009.

Khanna, Parag. How to Run the World. New York: Random House, 2011.

Kimmage, Daniel. Central Asia: Turkmenistan-China Pipeline Project Has Far-Reaching Implications. Accessed on 12 Feb., 2012; available from http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1067535.html

Lukyanov, Fyodor. Sino-Russian relations. Accessed on 8 Feb., 2012; available from http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/person/Fyodor_Lukyanov

Nurshayeva, Raushan and Zhumatov, Shamil. China's Hu boosts energy ties with Central Asia. Accessed on 12 Feb., 2012; available from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/12/12/china-kazakhstan-idUKGEE5BB01D20091212?sp=true.

Olcott, Martha Brill. “Central Asia’s Catapult to Independence” Foreign Affairs. Summer 1992.
Page, Stephen. “The Creation of a Sphere of Influence: Russia and Central Asia” International Journal, Vol. 49, No. 4, Autumn 1994.
Pant, Prem Kumari. “SCO is a partnership not a military alliance,” The Mirror, vol. 42, No. 10. 8th June 2012.
Pantucci, Raffaello and Li Lifan, Decision time for Central Asia: Russia or China? Accessed on 01 Feb., 2013); available fromhttp://chinaincentralasia.com/2013/01/30/decision-time-for-central-asia-russia-or-china/
Ramachandran, Sudha. China plays long game on border disputes. Accessed on 12 Feb., 2012; available from Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA27Ad02.html.
Sino-Soviet Relations. Accessed on 12 Feb., 2012; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_relations.
Whitmore, Brian. Central Asia: Behind The Hype, Russia And China Vie For Region's Energy Resources. Accessed on 12 Feb., 2012; available from http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079674.html.