The Status of Islam in the 20th Century Uzbekistan

Aijaz A. Bandey*
Ayjaz Ahmad Wani**

Abstract

Religion is one of the most important concepts in social science. It is considered as a design for living or a roadmap that guides the behaviour of the members of a society. Some consider it as part of culture and opine that it does not remain static and adopts changes with time. The Central Asian societies flourished from the ancient times mostly because of the Great Silk Route that benefited the peoples of Central Asia both materially and culturally. New religious ideologies were assimilated in sedentary as well as tribal areas. Islam was one such religion which created hub of Islamic civilization in Uzbekistan to create institutions that provided growth and development to Islamic ideology. However, the Soviets under the banner of communism were averse to religions and successfully introduced the change in the institutions of religion either by force or persuasion. After the fall of USSR, there started a process of religious revivalism in Uzbekistan but the revivalism is not of such intensity and magnitude to create the atmosphere that would guarantee the religion to control affairs at all levels of life.

Background

Islam was introduced in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, by expanding Arab armies who marched towards there in 7th century , soon thereafter the dynasty of Takarids (821-873) governed major provinces of present day Uzbekistan and propagated Islam in other areas of Central Asia. Subsequently, under Samanids (875-999) and Karakhanids (1000-1211), urban centres like Bukhara, Samarkand and Khiva became major centers of Islamic culture as well as for rich cultural ethos, marvellous arts, crafts, inventions, etc. Islamic learning was imparted through numerous Maktabas and Madrassas and many of these were known for their excellence as in them were taught variety of disciplines to multinational students . In spite of the 13th century Mangol invasion which temporarily halted the prosperity of the Islamic tradition there, Timur (1336-1405) allowed free space to Islamic culture to grow and dominate once again. Side by side, two popular sects of Sufism, Yassaviya and Naqashbandiya, played their role to attract people towards Islam. Their shrines were thronged by the Central Asians to adhere to their teachings.

Ethos of Islamic Civilisation

Islam, as a religion served as a cohesive and vibrant force to unite the diverse ethnic groups in Central Asia besides allowed a complete cultural system to develop. Whatever the status of the Muslims, their rulers adhered to the tenants of Islam, as most of the time governance was based on Islamic methodology; Islamic jurisprudence was prevalent in administration as important matters were settled on the advice of the scholars of Islam. Even though the judicial system was supplemented by the Adat (customary laws) yet the Shari’at and the Qur’an provided basic substance for laws to settle the issues.  There is evidence that Qazi (Muslim judge), heading a court, was appointed on the basis of his merit as were Muftis (Jurists), Ulemas (Learned men in Qur’an), Imams (prayer leaders), Mullahs and Sheikhs (holy men) and all were highly revered and respected by the people. Such learned men were granted endowments, Waqfs, for running the charities including Maktabas and Madrassas. Besides the rich contributed to the Waqfs sometime land was given in charity. The rulers at times were checking if all followed the laws and kept a special force known as reis, to check the women quarters and give punishments for not obeying Islamic law and Shair’at.
Given the geophysical status of Central Asia, Islamic governance was more prevalent in oasis cultures and in urban centres like Bukhara, Samarkand, Merve, Khiva, etc than in the rest of Central Asia; as the terrain was tough and people were, by and large, on the move. Accordingly the five pillars of Islam, the Shahdat, the confession of faith; Salat, the daily five prayers; Si’am, the fasting during the month of Ramdan, the 9th lunar month; Zakat, the mandatory contribution of alms to the poor by the rich; and Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca; were much more known there than in the rest of Central Asia where common people were found avoiding at least the last four pillars.
In spite of this, religious fervour was seen across the region, like on kichik bayram (Eid-ul-Fiter), to celebrate the end of the month of Ramdan, or on qurban bayram (Eid-ul-Duha), the commemoration of Abrahams’ willingness to sacrifice his son. Even though both these occasions have religious significance yet there was festivity associated with them as well. Even if the festivity or the sacrifice was in no case an alternative to escape from the fundamentals of Islam yet it kept them alive to proclaim their faith. Many followed the fundamentals very strictly, besides the rituals but there were others who also mixed folk customs with the fundamentals.
The practice of paying visits to the graves or Mazars of their ancestors and make a material offering there for one or other worldly gains was also seen in Shamanism. Shamanism, the earlier faith of most of the Central Asians, popularised animal sacrifices at the grave sites which subsequently became commemorative with the erection of long poles hoisted with animal (mostly horse) tails. This practice was so common in many parts of Central Asia that commemorative horse tails are still seen in many houses and offices in Central Asia. However, the change inflicted was that  Shamans, seen at such grave sites where people visited for benefits, material gains or removal of diseases etc, were replaced by Shiekhs and Bakshis for similar purposes at Muslim shrines or Mazars associated with the Sufi faiths of different orders like Naqashbandi or Yassaviyas. They, therefore, were not orthodox in nature but practised a sort of popular Islam as they also went to faith healers for curing a disease and wear amulets and tabises. Whether or not all these things were achieved at these places but the blessing of Mullahs/ Shiekhs or Bakshis were abundantly available at such places that were omnipresent in each locality and among the tribes earning their livelihood in response to their jobs rendered to the visitors.
These sorts of composite practices prevailed throughout one’s life irrespective of the fundamental faith in oneness of God, the most merciful and the most benevolent. Material riches not withstanding people in general were simplistic in approach, pure to dogmas set by the traditionalism and customary ritualism of centuries. Traditionalism, during the pre-Soviet times was thus the backbone of cultural ethos, be it in faith or in other matters.

Sovietisation and Islam

Soviets were opposed to all religions and Islam was considered the most potent threat since it had its own distinctive social, educational and judicial system. Notwithstanding the ideological requirements of Communism and Socialism, Soviet policy towards Muslims of Central Asia changed over the years, granting concessions sometimes otherwise repression against Islam was adhered. Since after October Revolution,  the political expediency in Central Asia demanded a conciliating attitude towards Muslims and their institutions during initial stages (a period of civil war and consolidation)  Lenin,  addressed the Muslims of Central Asia  in the decree of December 1917 as:
“All you, whose mosques  and shrines have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been violated by the Czar’s and oppressors of Russia  hence forward your belief and customs, your national and cultural institutes, are declared free and inviolable! Build your national life freely and without hindrance. It is your right. Know your rights, like those of all the people of the Russia, they will be protected by the might of revolution, by the councils of workers, soldiers, peasants and deputies”.  

Following the decree, the mosques confiscated by the Czars were handed back to the people, the Shar’iat courts were restored, the religious schools were reopened and even the Friday was declared as national weak-holiday. This order lived for a small period of time. Since confrontation between the religion and communism was inevitable, the veil of tolerance was thrown off as soon as Joseph Stalin (1924-1953) took over the reins of the Union. In the years to follow the Soviet approach towards Central Asia was a combination of cultural oppression and economic development, called generally “assault period”. On the one hand striking changes were introduced into social structure to establish institutional mechanism for reshaping traditional societies and on the other a massive campaign was launched against Islam and its institutions.
To begin with a series of attacks for abolishing the mosques was initiated in 1928. Mosques, numbering 20,000 according to an estimate in 1917 in whole of Turkistan including Khanate of Bukhara, Khiva, and step region were reduced to 3,000 or 2,000 when Khurshchev (1953-1964) took over, most of these were converted to non religious institutions, like schools, clubs, cinemas, reading rooms and hotels, etc. This number would have been still lesser before the World War II when certain relaxations were granted and the intensity of persecution was changed, allowing some of the mosques to reopen where elderly people offered prayers. It was then that Soviets created four Spiritual Directorates for Islam, each under the chairmanship of a Mufti, one for Central Asia and Kazakhstan had its headquarter in Tashkent. It was given the permission to publish Qur’an as well as some religious calendars, but in Tashkent facilities for printing the Qur’an was not made until 1948. These directorates under the control of the State followed almost the earlier policy and for the sake of name allowed Muslims to do only such practices that were not fundamentally against the Communism. Accordingly Islam was allowed to be a cultural entity rather than a universal religion. Once World War II ended, the government also created a Council for Affairs of Religious Cults, which later became the leading Soviet state organ to curb Islamic fundamentals and reduced it to the legal status of a “cult”. This official Islam was developed in order to gain foothold in the Arab world by the Soviets after United States of America made strategic front ports there. To popularise the thought that Soviet Union was not behind the propaganda of anti Muslims in Central Asia, they opened two Madrassas in Bukhara and Tashkent where official Mullahs trained people in both Islamic and Soviet Studies. This policy continued in the Brezhnev era (1964-82) and again then Islam was used as a strategic and diplomatic weapon for Soviet foreign policy, and accordingly several more mosques were reopened or remade. The Grand Mosques in places like Bukhara and Samarkand became public show cases for visiting diplomats and other dignitaries. Many of these were renovated by the Soviets with beautiful tile work still available there.  
Notwithstanding these policies, Soviets pressurised people not to offer five time prayer on the ground that it caused stoppage of work which was considered economic sabotage and involved serious retribution. In fact they considered Islam reactionary and Mullahas were perceived preventing the progress and education and therefore the policy was to convert the people into urbanised proletarians. Accordingly economic development was pursued in a manner that education was popularised vigorously that provided no moral education but transformed the people in gaining material well being. Friday from 1930 onwards was declared as working day there by restraining the Muslims from offering even the congregational Friday prayers. There were nevertheless exceptions like some currents of “unofficial Islam” were going on side by side. One was that at places people did offer the prayers but without causing the Soviets to alarm. Even during the time of Great Purge the daily practices were performed in one way or other way, in the absence of the Imams, prayers were lead by elders of a village, or in a collective farm and were held secretly in local chaikhanas (tea houses). But as Soviets, in particular Muslim soldiers, lost their lives during the World War II, people in a state of fear restarted offering the prayers openly. This rethinking and reposing belief in God was not stopped by Soviets. Most of them were elders, primarily because they knew how to offer it. It was a disturbing trend for Soviets as not only believers but even atheists were turning back to Islam once they reached the age of 40-45. Thus during 1950s the number of worshipers started increasing. By the time this elderly generation was replaced by younger ones the practice almost disappeared even in the homes and thus the mosques available for prayers after 1965 were poorly attended, for the reason that Islam was no longer strong in Uzbekistan. Surveys conducted during the 1970s demonstrate that daily prayers had not been widely observed. According to Soviet sources only 30% and non-Soviet sources 30-40% of the adult population regularly performed the daily prayers.    
Similarly fasting in the month of Ramdan was a particular target because it was thought that it reduces the efficiency of workers and those observing the fast were severely punished . Several methods were used to curb the practices. It was reported that many times in the month of fasting “officers used to hold the conferences with the subordinates where they offered drinks or cigarettes” and refusals to accept it were deemed tantamount to the observance of fasting and lead to expulsion from work. Despite the destructive policy of Soviets against Islam, the Ramdan survived and people in one way or other performed it in 1940s. Although during 1960s to 1970s 50% Muslims were observing fast in urban areas and 80% in the rural areas throughout the month but in 1980s especially younger generation was observing it en masse.
Administrative pressures and punishment were also used against the payment of Zakat and performance of Hajj was forbidden by the Soviets. During World War II Hajj highly on a selective and controlled basis was allowed for the officials in the spiritual directorates but general public desirous to perform this obligation found it very difficult to fulfil. The trend continued thereafter as well even though certain relaxations were granted during the Brezhnev era. Most of the time their applications were rejected on health grounds, at other times on the ground of prevalence of epidemics in Middle East or refusal of the neighbouring Muslim states of transit visa.
Since the shrines of the Sufis had played a significant role in socio-political character of Uzbekistan, these were also closed for the visit of the people and some of them were changed into museums and stores. For this the government used the official Muftis of the directorate of Tashkent to issue several futwas (legal pronouncements) against the practice of visiting Sufi shrines. However, the dimensions of the World War II and the killing of the people in the war as well as denial of travelling for the performance of Hajj made people to throng the shrines to seek the help. By 1964, forty nine such shrines were operating in Uzbekistan and appeared to have become the centres of religious activities in the urban areas. Not only the less-educated but even highly educated people visited the shrines. The pilgrimage was also made to those shrines which were once converted into non-religious museums by the Soviets, as was the case of the tomb of Bahauddin Naqashbandi in Bukhara, the founder of Naqshbandiya order.
The people in Uzbekistan found a novel way of making it possible to visit these shrines and most of the time they held public ceremonies and festivals there. Many of the people visited shrines soon after the marriage ceremony was conducted, either through Islamic pronouncement of nikah or civil court. Likewise some of the shrines were used to commemorate a festival like Eid where fairs were held to make merry. Eid-ul-fitr was commonly celebrated at these places with an iftar (fast breaking party) and despite the restrictions or surveillance, Eidprayers were offered at the shrines and even in the mosques that were allowed to remain open. It is reported that in 1960s many Kolkhoz members in Uzbekistan abstained from work to attend the necessary prayers of Eid. Nevertheless, kurban barham (Eid-ul-duha) lost its significance as a public celebration that required sacrifice of an animal on the eve which was not possible either because of the nationalization of the stocks or these were not readily available in the markets. Many people did observe the Eid within a house, “windows shut and doors locked” to slaughter an animal very secretly. The situation continued almost up to the middle of World War II, but it got relaxed of its own once people in the war got killed and for the fear many more may be done away people restarted slaughtering of the animals at a larger scale on the Eid and other occasions in particular at the shrines.
On the other hand, to undermine the influence of Islamic festivals in Uzbekistan, Soviets attempted to replace some of the religious rituals with secular alternatives, such as agriculture festivals were observed with hue and cry in place of certain religious ones. They also were successful in attempting to eradicate religious mind of the people and what was untouchable till then was forced upon them like the introduction of the pig farming which grew at an alarming pace in the erstwhile Muslim Central Asia.
As per their policy Waqaf grants were liquidated and Muslim theological institutions like Maktabas and Madrassas which prior to 1920s, existed in thousands were closed. From 1920-1941 all the religious schools were closed and all religious instruction came to an end, the government organs deployed different means to cut their funding, closing them by transferring educational responsibilities to new state schools. But after the World War II the government opened two Madrassas in Bukhara (1945) and Tashkent (1958). Under the official control these Madrassas started providing training to Muslim clergy all over USSR. Some Muslim students were allowed to go abroad (usually to Al-Azhar University in Cairo) for further studies. All this was done to silence the opposition of some of the countries that always accused Soviets or else the political situation that arose after the conflict in West Asia.
Since the spread of the Communist ideology was the sole objective of the Soviets, the Shari’at courts in Uzbekistan were done away and Muslim clergy was targeted. The Muslim courts which functioned in accordance with Islamic laws and adat (customary laws) and to which local people turned for social and theological justices from centuries were banned and systematically cases transferred to civil courts. In 1925 eighty seven Shari’at courts existed in Uzbekistan but within next three years not a single existed in the entire Central Asia. Qazis of Shari’at court were dubbed as deceivers of working people and were put into prison. They were charged with the crimes like bribery, theft, corruption, and finally with immorality.
Post Soviet Era and Islamic Resurgence

Religion, traditions and customs of pre-Soviet era have assumed new significance in the post Soviet era. All Soviet propaganda has disappeared, atheism is getting dismantled, and religious preachers have surfaced. Accordingly a new socio-cultural order is developing where remote past and immediate past are getting mixed up as we see in the present Uzbekistan.  Before the breakup of USSR there was some kind of Islamic resurgence in Uzbekistan, when a sort of scandal came into forefront in 1989. It led to demonstrations in the streets of Tashkent against MuftiShamsuddin Babakhanov, chairman of the Tashkent Directorate, whose reputation was summed up by one elderly Uzbek: "Our mufti is a terrible man. He drinks, he smokes, he plays billiards, and he's been photographed with prostitutes in Sochi. There are five Islamic laws and he breaks them all." As a result of the public outcry, Babakhanov was forced to resign. What the demonstrations therefore allow to deduce is that even during the Soviet period, in spite what the regime pronounced and enforced, common man had not altogether forgotten the past.
In spite of the Soviet government polices there was an upsurge to adhere to the Islamic code and fundamentals, more so during the latter period. Congregational Friday prayers were being offered in bigger mosques. Otins, the female religious teachers,were somehow, spreading the word of Allah among the younger people keeping them close with the religion. Sensing the demise of USSR, Islam Karimov, therefore in May 1991, attacked the cultural policy of Soviets and announced that, “everything was banned, religion was persecuted, mosques were closed down, and everything that was deeply national was suppressed, mocked and discredited”. It was, besides political reasons, an announcement that was aimed to find support for the revival of religion.
 After the disintegration of the Soviet Union Islam has played a significant role in unifying the people of Uzbekistan. Soon after its independence, a new wave of ethno national and religious resurgence swept the region and Uzbekistan as a result experienced a significant revival of the practices of Islam. To honour the sentiments of the people the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, took his oath on the Qur’an and went to Mecca for Umerah and Bukhara renamed “Dome of Islam”. Uzbekistan has witnessed an Islamic renaissance; mosques have once again become a common feature in the towns and villages of the country. In 1994 it was estimated that 7,800 mosques were opened in Central Asia, of which half were located in Uzbekistan alone.   The early years saw that many Muslim countries helped these new states to establish the Islamic institutions and funds were made available for the spread of Islamic faith. At times there were nongovernmental organizations as well that spread their networks in the region. They came from various schools of thought, and from many countries in the neighbourhood and as far away as Saudi Arabia, Egypt etc, to help the people to adopt the faith in true spirit. Accordingly religious literature became increasingly available and programmes were broadcasted on television and radios to educate the people.
Uzbekistan by 1997 had 5,000 religious schools. Also in 1997 the Uzbek government helped to establish the first Islamic University in Tashkent strictly controlled by Muslim Board of Uzbekistan. The university explores the tenets of Islam as well as historical and philosophical origins. Also the number of students has tripled in the two major Madrassas of Mir Arab and Barak Khan, enrollment in Al-Bukhara Higher Education Institute for Islamic Education has doubled since independence. In addition several students have been sent to various Middle East countries to receive Islamic training.
Uzbekistan is the only country in Central Asia to have two Madrassas for women, in Tashkent and Bukhara. Although these Madrassas are run by the women, they too are governed by the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan. The board appoints the directors, the teachers and other personnel. There are classes five days a week and no classes on Fridays and Saturdays. The curriculum is dictated by the Board and includes the history of Uzbekistan, the knowledge of president’s books, the constitutional history of the country, the history of religion, the recitation of Qur’an, Islamic jurisprudence, Uzbek literature, geography, pedagogy, English language, cooking, sewing etc. The Madrassa not only teaches girls but also adult women who receive a diploma after four years of study. Besides, some women have managed to travel aboard to study at prestigious religious institutes such as Al-Azhar in Egypt. Another Madrassa in Tashkent is Ahmadcan Kari Madrassa that provides free and voluntary education for men and women and is supported by a waqf. The Madrassa teaches ritual prayers and observance of other religious practices and is also under the supervision of Muslim Board of Uzbekistan.
Since Uzbeks have for generations together believed in the liberal rather in orthodox Islam for which shrines played significant role, the government, therefore, accorded highest priority to reopening these and restored to the people of Uzbekistan those which were closed by the earlier government. People, after independence, throng these shrines with the same faith as was prevalent before the Soviet period; evidence available at the Shrine of Bahudin Naqashbandi where people enter bear footed to pay reverence, a practice not available during the Soviet era. The government also constructed new roads to make these shrines easily accessible. This patronization of shrines has been one of most common reference point for the government to mark the rehabilitation of the age old traditions, the agenda Islam Karimov recognises most. Today, the government has separated out religion from politics and thus non-religious secular thinking parallel to Islam is growing. In fact Karimov has promoted the idea that such ideology gives “richness, variety and development” to the human race           
This “new thinking” of Karimov developed more because of Fargana uprising. Till then his government allowed many institutions and organizations of various schools of thought to come to Uzbekistan. But people were caught in a dilemma as to which school of thought was suitable for them. Debates were held on the Iranian and Turkish models or else free secular model was also discussed. Since the constitution of Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted on December 8, 1992, guarantees the freedom of conscience, and prohibits propagation of religious ideas in forceful manner and forbids the formation of associations and parties on the basis of national and religious differences as well as declares the separation of religion from state, the government therefore took a stand to screen such activities. To curb those who claim greater role of Islam in political and social life the government in 1998 passed law on religion that sharply restricted all forms of religious practices which are not regulated by the state. From 1997 some 27 students have been expelled from schools and universities for refusing to abandon the fundamentalist practices like wearing of veil by women and keeping of beard by men. The Uzbek nation today faces the dual challenges of building a secular democracy and allowing for free practice of Islam and other religions. All of the post-independence constitutions of the Muslim states of Central Asia emphasize their secular nature, as well as the principle of the separation of church and state. All these constitutions also state that there should be no discrimination among citizens based on ethnic, religious, or gender differences. The emphasis on the secular nature of the Central Asian governments means that Islam does not occupy any special position in relation to other faiths, such as being the state religion.
Accordingly all Muslims in Uzbekistan do not offer five prayers a day and in a mosque many of them do not yet know how to offer it. Islam is therefore part of culture and not necessarily a religion to be followed as per its fundamentals. Even though Hajj is officially sponsored   and many elderly people perform it yet it is also true that many others take vodka even when they go to shrines to seek blessings. The government encourages such happenings and it is why that at a shrine a cultural programme including dance was performed in order to not to stick to the true spirit of Islam. For the said purpose the SADUM has been replaced by the Muslim Directorate of Uzbekistan (O’zbekiston Musulmonlar Idorasi), which functions as an organ of the state, firmly under the control of the regime. It is to check and watch the activities of the people that live there, in particular of people like those who were responsible for the events like Andijan, in May, 2005. The political regime does not allow any kind of relaxation in the strangulations it has put on them by curbing the activities of organizations like Hizb-i-Tahir and others. Accordingly the government has promoted a religious culture that does not stress too much on following the fundamentals of Islam but allows pursuing a moderate way, thus non followers have even share to build the ethno-cultural state. The Muslim Directorate of Uzbekistan cannot promote to create a theocratic state but it is also not promoting true essence of Islam. It is there to create secular attitude and promote visits of people to the shrines for nationalistic reasons.

Conclusion

The present status of Islam is not therefore of an orthodox religion, when 1/3rd of Uzbeks are not able to translate correctly the Shadah- the first canon for the belief. There are 44% who, claim following the religion of Islam, do not offer prayers and only 23% do it occasionally. Today Uzbeks have moved away from godless society to a God fearing one where only such religious practices are being promoted which do not, in no way, stop Islam Karimov to rule. One can also add hastily that authoritarianism, in the proclaimed democratic set-up has not allowed any individual organization to spread their word beyond the given proportions. One can hardly expect that people in a country like Uzbekistan will be able to follow their life as per the dictates of Qur’an, till they manage to get Islamic education properly. Ideological doctrines of Communism are no more promoted but its physical appearance is still available in many ways in the country. It may take many more years to eradicate once the socio-political apparatus changes to a true democratic one. The present religious condition, therefore, is carefully tempered and monitored as per the wishes of the government in place.

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