The Vicissitudes Of Russia-Syria Relations: Form Cold War Era To The Arab Spring

Imrana Begum*

Abstract

The Arab uprising convulsed the Middle East power politics. After two decades of post-cold war the United States and Russia are again confronting each other on the issue of Syria. In the beginning of the Arab spring the western and Russian reaction was similar. Both took same stand against the overthrowing of autocratic rulers and violation of human rights but the brutal killing of Muammar Qaddafi parted their ways. When the west wished to replicate intervention in Syria like Libya, Russia firmly stood up in favour of Bashar al Assad and repeatedly vetoed UN Security Council Resolutions that could allow the west to intercede in Syria. Since three years Syrian uprising has been continued neither the regime has toppled owing to Russian support nor the insurgences achieved their goal despite of full western patronage. The paper traces the history of Russia-Syria military, economic and strategic relations from the era of bipolar to unipolar world. It inquires the purpose behind the sudden tilt of USSR towards the Arab world and its role in the Arab-Israel wars. Furthermore, the reasons behind Russian strong support to Syria in the Arab uprising have also been explored.

Key words: autocratic rule, Golan Heights, human rights, non-interference, overthrow soft influence, uprising, veto power, Zionism.

Introduction

The Arab uprising began through streets protests in Tunisia in December 2010 and spilled over the neighbouring countries that had deposed secularist dictators in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and looked to end up regimes across the region. International community showed cautious reaction towards it. Russia supports democracy and human rights values all around the world since the disintegration of Soviet Union. It supported Tunisians, Egyptians even Libyan peoples civil right of social change but in the case of Syria, an old and loyal ally of Russia, the policy turn out to be entirely different. It is backing Bashar al-Assad regime against whom Syrians have been struggling. Bashar al Assad is using force to suppress rebellions. It has been reported that about 200,000 people have been killed in Syria since the beginning of the country's uprising in March 2011.

Russia has vetoed three times the UN Security Council resolutions against the intervention in Syria apparently to protect the civilians. It shows radical change in Russian policy towards Syria. Mounting international pressure has failed to bring any flexibility in Russian policy. It seems that Arab uprising has stuck in Syria even though it has toppled authoritative rulers in other Arab countries within months. Now Russia has been more assertive in international politics. The logic behind Russian strong backing to Syria can be understood by taking vicissitudes of their about seven decades old relations.
 
Soviet-Syria Relations in the Bipolar Wold
 
The European powers exhausted by the war in 1945, began the gradual process of decolonization. French control over Syria and Lebanon was terminated, and Great Britain started to dismantle its mandate in Palestine. The age of imperialism was drawing to close. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union began expanding on all its peripheries: into Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. The USSR assumed the new role of superpower with remarkable forcefulness and resiliency. The ideological disparity between the superpowers underscored the intense bipolarity of the new global system.
Russia had always been interested in the eastern Mediterranean and its Arab nations for geopolitical, economic, and cultural reasons. The eastern parts of the Black Sea’s coastline, which were still under Moscow’s control, provide a waterway to the Mediterranean Sea, linking Russia to the Middle East, southern Europe, Africa and Asia. This waterway was crucial to Russia, and Moscow continued to view the countries located in the Eastern Mediterranean as necessary partners, even though they were not Russia’s direct neighbour.
In the final years of World War II, Moscow established its diplomatic links with Syria in 1944, even before the country was formally recognized as an independent state on April 7, 1946. Syria was probably more important for Russians for two reasons. First, its geographical location provided a chance to outflank Turkey and Iraq, which were firmly in the western camp, secondly the Syrian communist party and its allies, had already acquired some influence in Syrian politics. But still, during the first decade after World War II, Moscow’s relations with Damascus were cold. However, Stalin’s death in March 1953 and Nikita Khrushchev’s rise to power opened a new chapter in Soviet third world relations, including the Arab world and Syria. In the beginning two decades of Soviet-Arab relations Moscow considered Egypt its most important partner, but Syria was not neglected.

Soviet Role in Arab-Israel Conflict

The creation of Israel, in the aftermath of World War II, had remained the core issue of the Arab world and Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict began since the birth of Israel on May 14, 1948. Joseph Stalin favoured Zionist movement in the Arab world and opted a pro-Zionist foreign policy; ostensibly believing that the newly born state would took on socialism and fastened the decline of British control in the Middle East. The Soviet Union with its partners cast a positive vote to the UN partition plan for Palestine in November 1947 that paved the way for an independent state of Israel.
 The Arab world rejected the creation of Israel in the heart of Arab soil and next day of its creation, May 15, their troops moved into Palestine. On third day May 17, the Soviet Union recognized Israel and contributed to the Israel’s victory in the first Arab-Israel war. It provided Israel both military and diplomatic aid. Since Israel had the full support of the West, the USSR began reversing its alliance from 1955 onwards. It now supported the Arab Nationalism Movement and the states over which, what was seen as Western imperialism had established its control. The US had become the influential power in the region while the British and French influence was on the wane. Israel began to be seen as the mainstay of American policies in the Middle East. Moscow now opened its arms to the Arab world and its slogan was anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. This greatly appealed to the Arab countries. In the second Arab-Israel conflict in 1956 both super powers the US and USSR opposed the tripartite Franco-British-Israeli attack on Egypt.
After each of Syria’s major wars with Israel, Soviet involvement increased in the country. Following its stunning defeat in 1967, Syria was forced to rebuild its armed forces almost completely; a task that could be only accomplished with massive Soviet assistance and the investment seemed worthwhile for Moscow.
The third Arab-Israel war 1967, left deep imprint in the Arab world and its politics. It is still impossible for Syria to get rid from the consequences of that war in which Israel seized the Golan Heights, the swath of Syria. As the war began Syria tried best to prevent Israel from capturing the Golan Heights, the juncture of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. Though the Golan Heights had less than 1% of Syria’s landmass and spread on only 690 square miles, it nevertheless possessed agricultural and water resources. After the war the Golan Heights became a symbol of Israeli aggression and a source of Syrian irredentism. Even today, the essence of Syrian foreign policy, as it has been for more than four decades, is the return of the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 line, the Syrian-Israeli border before the war commenced. Any Syrian leader cannot enter into a peace agreement with Israel without demanding the return of the Golan. The Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel on 10 June to register displeasure with Israeli actions in the Golan and to make clear indication that Israel would not move further, specifically as the road to Damascus was lay wide open only some forty miles away from the Golan Heights.
The “Six Day War” did not end. Small-scale clashes continued along the Suez Canal, with the population of the cities along that water way evacuated. In March 1969, the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasir declared a war of Attrition involving regular artillery barrages.  The Soviets provided arms on a massive level that soon replaced the losses of 1967. For the first time, Soviet Union acquired naval facilities in Egyptian ports.
After the war of Attrition, the USSR avoided a new Arab-Israeli war and a confrontation with the US. Following Nasser’s sudden death, his successor General Anwar Sadat started preparation of a new Arab coalition war against Israel during 1971 to 1973. The planning of Arab coalition war was an absolute secret without any Soviet support, while Syria undertook a massive Soviet supported military build-up to reconquer the Golan Heights.
The fourth Arab-Israel war known as Yom Kippur War fought on October 6-26, 1973 to take back from Israel the Sinai desert and Golan Heights. It was a surprised two front attack by Egypt and Syria on the main and sacred Jewish holiday. During the Yom Kippur War, the USSR undertook its most ambitious international air and sea-lift of military supplies to Egypt and Syria (78,000 tons in total), replacing the heavy Arab combat losses with Soviet equipment taken directly from Soviet/Warsaw Pact depots, while other Arab states also provided weapons and financing. All efforts were outdone by the massive US air and sea-lift to Israel approximately 112, 395 tons in total as a US-USSR mediated UN cease-fire came into effect on October 22.
Since 1973 there has been no major Arab-Israel war endangering world stability and increasing the risk of confrontation between the two superpowers such as there was in 1956, 1967, and 1973, this is certainly because the Lebanese territory served as a limited zone of confrontation between regional and international forces aiming at ensuring, restoring or developing their hegemony over this highly strategic region of the world. That is why Israel, by invading Lebanon in 1982 and besieging Beirut had broken the rules of a cruel but delimited game.

Soviet Strategic Loses in Egypt: Compensated by Syria

The Soviet–Egyptian relations deteriorated with the rise of Sadat in Egypt. The expulsion of the Soviet military advisers (nearly 15,000-20,000) from Egypt in 1972 gave a new turn to the Soviet-Syria relations. In the revised Soviet foreign policy, Syria assumed greater importance for Moscow as some of the strategic losses in Egypt were to be compensated by facilities in Syria. To maintain good rapport the Soviets undertook many development projects in Syria i.e. the widening of Syrian ports, built air facilities, and increased the number of advisers in the country. Deliveries from a new, large arms deal signed in July 1972, began to arrive quite ostentatiously in the autumn of 1972 as Moscow strove, in propaganda as well, to prove that its relations with the Arab world were a closer to ever, despite the falling out with Egypt. Following the Arab defeat in Yom Kippur War on March 22, 1976, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union signed in 1971 was formally abrogated by Egypt, ending two decades of close Soviet-Egyptian ties.
Now the Soviets began to place greater reliance on their ties with Syria to maintain their hand in the military confrontation with Israel. But Syria did not offer the USSR increased use of military facilities to compensate for the loss of those in Egypt; Assad refused to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR; and Damascus took position far from the Soviet line on several important issues. Even, after the 1973 war, relations improved between Washington and Damascus.  
For many years Hafez al Assad guarded Syrian independence by refusing to enter into a friendship and cooperation treaty of the type negotiated by Moscow with Egypt in 1971 and in Iraq in 1972 as well as number of other third world states.
The most serious Soviet-Syrian differences grew in connection with the Syrian conflict with the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon in 1976. Syrian intermittent intervention began in Lebanon from January –June 1976 after this conflict Assad regime was becoming increasingly isolated once again in the Arab world, mainly because of its politics in Lebanon. The Syrian move was viewed in Moscow as a sample of Assad’s aspirations or perhaps pretensions for expansion of Syrian power.
Syria felt vulnerable due to the Egyptian-Israeli peace Treaty signed in 1979 in the aftermath of 1973 Arab-Israel war. The treaty virtually eliminated Israel’s western front.  Consequently the Assad regime, reluctant to sign any friendship agreement with the USSR, signed a truce of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow in October 1980. The Friendship Treaty was considered some achievement for Soviet policy against the American success of Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace Treaty. It also helped to counter Muslim criticism in the wake of the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Indeed Syria was most cooperative in opposing condemnation and spearheading support for the Soviets with regard to Afghanistan. Syria went far ahead in Soviet favour that it abstained in the UN vote condemning the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and it also refused to attend the OIC summit devoted to the same subject on the grounds that Syria’s priorities lay with the struggle against Zionism.
Early in the 1980s, the Middle East turned into a focal point of the USSR-US geostrategic rivalry. The US newly elected President Ronald Reagan had apprehensions about Soviet furrows in the waters of the Mediterranean. He challenged the USSR in the Middle East, and Moscow was prepared to meet the challenge. For many years the Soviet military raised the issue of setting up a base in Syria. Damascus had deftly evaded the question and the decision was postponed, but during negotiations on November 8, 1980 in Moscow, President Hafez al- Assad unexpectedly gave his consent for a Soviet military base in Syria. In the mid of February 1981, the Soviet delegation headed by the commander-in-chief of the Soviet navy reached Syria and carefully explored the entire coastline and selected an spacious area between Latakia 77, and Tartus. The spot was perfect for a naval base, and it had an area behind it to build an airfield for base air cover.
It was an obvious fact that Soviet military could not compete with the US in number of bases in the Mediterranean Sea. However, setting up a base with an airfield in Tartus would provide a number of strategic advantages to the Soviet Union. Syria’s main concern was to guard itself with Soviet missiles in case of a war with Israel. However, Leonid Brezhnev was growing increasingly frail and he had little interest in bases. After the invasion of Afghanistan, he generally avoided radical changes in Soviet politics even the creation of Soviet military bases in Syria were not discussed at Politburo meetings.

Military and Economic Ties Between Soviet Union and Syria

The creation of Israel in the Arab lands sowed the seeds of insecurity among the regional countries. The Arab countries had an enemy with strong US and Western backing and to counter Israel, they needed arms. During the cold war period the two super powers were the promising source of military and economic aid and both were searching for satellite states to protect their military, economic and strategic interest in certain regions. In that crucial period Syria was the first Arab country to purchase arms from the Soviet Union. Since 1954, the USSR continued a close relationship with Syria through military weapons transfer. Moscow also promised Soviet support in the spring of 1955 when it was being subjected to pressure to join the Baghdad pact.
Another arm deal between Syria and USSR was known to have been concluded in early 1956. By the end of the same year, and with no connection to the Suez war------Syria, under the terms of the deal, had received from the Soviet bloc some 100 medium tanks, 100 armoured personnel carriers, 50-100 self-propelled guns, and about 100 other guns of various calibres. About 20 MiG-15 aircraft ordered by Syria were delivered to Egypt for assembly and then dispatched to Syria, and bombs and rockets for these MiGs were (possibly) delivered to Syria directly. The total value of this arms deals was estimated to be about Syria £ 20 million.
The Soviet Foreign minister visited Syria in 1956, where he had talks with Syrian leaders on the subject of Soviet economic aid to Syria, including aid in development projects, food storage facilities, and construction of a railway from Latakia to Jazira, as well as several air fields, and a Euphrates Dam. In the mid of same year, the Syrian Eastern Development Corporation was established for the purpose of handling “trade with Soviet bloc countries as well as to undertake the construction of industrial plants, develop shipping transportation agencies, and provide for other commercial services. The Government of the USSR also agreed in a friendly fashion to examine the question of granting credit to the Syrian Government to pay for the work connected with research and drawing up plans, supplying equipment and the expenses for sending specialists and providing other sorts of technical aid. The Soviet government declared that economic and technical cooperation will be carried out without any conditions of a political or analogous nature, on a basis of equality and reciprocal economic advantage, of non-interference in internal affairs and complete respect for the national dignity and sovereignty of the Syrian Republic.
The establishment of United Arab Republic (UAR) on February 1, 1958, opposed Soviet penetration into Syria, a country that earlier “had moved closest to the Soviet Union. Moscow welcomed the new state as a step forward towards “further strengthening of the unity of the Arab peoples. On the other hand, when Syria seceded from the UAR on September 29, 1961, the USSR was the first great power to recognize the re-establishment of the Syrian state only nine days after the coup. The new regime was friendly to Moscow but on March 8, 1963, a new coup brought the Ba’ath Party to power. Soviet assistance increased greatly when more radical wings of the Ba’ath Party won power in two subsequent coups in January 1965 and February 23, 1966. The radical neo-Ba’athists declared socialism as their goal and intended to modernize the economy, to build a strong army and to oppose the Western powers as well as Israel. The neo-Ba’athists had strong backing of Moscow and in the same year it offered Damascus new credit amounting to $ 120 million for infrastructure development. More economic and military assistance was coming to Syria, and until President Hafez al Assad took office in the eleventh month of 1970, Syria was seen as the most radical Arab nation with the closest ties to Moscow. Between 1970 and the advent of Gorbachev’s perestroika in the late 1980s, Syria greatly benefited from an uninterrupted stream of Soviet military equipment and a tremendous variety of civil goods and services.
After the Israeli intrusion of Lebanon in 1982, the number of Soviet tanks, fighter planes, artillery, and surface to air missiles in the Syrian arsenal expanded by about one-third. Syria received advanced weapons, including SS-21 missiles in 1983, just one year after their deployment in Soviet bloc countries. This sophisticated military hardware brought in an additional 2000 Soviet advisers and technicians to train and assist the Syrian army, which had doubled to 400.000 men.
It was exceptional that when most of the countries condemned Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, Bashir al Assad was among the few world leaders, who firmly stood with the Soviet Union during 1979-1989. Indeed, his act reflected that he joined the Soviet camp of his own volition and not as a satellite. The Soviet strong support partially integrated Syrian military into the Soviet system, particularly with regard to navy, air force, and short-range ballistic missiles. Because of the strength of Soviet-Syrian defence relations, in 1985 the US Department of Defence dubbed Syria “the centrepiece of Soviet Middle East Policy.” To maintain balance in its relation the Soviet Union began trading with Syria of second-rate goods as a source of safe cultural products.
In fact relationships between countries cannot remain same they change according to the domestic, regional and global circumstances, same happened with the Soviet-Syria relations. The USSR long involvement in Afghanistan in the decade of 1980s brought economic turmoil in the Soviet Union. Economically, confronted with its own resources crisis, the USSR from the late 1980s insisted on the repayment of Syria’s largely military debt which over the years had reached some $ 10-12 bn. In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to power brought a noticeable change in Soviet policy towards Syria as well as Middle East. Moscow decided to improve relations with Israel and play a meaningful role to resolve Arab-Israeli conflict. The new policies were unflappably received in Damascus. Distant Soviet-Syria relations in Gorbachev’s period produced a gradual reformation of Syrian foreign policy, it reduced rely on Moscow and enlist the support of regional states like Iran and radical Lebanese and Palestinian groups. Since the decline of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy reduced support for Syria on the basis of global political considerations.
In 1990, politically and economically debilitated, Soviet Union bowed out of the race with the US and Soviet president Gorbachev gave the US President George Bush his backing in the Allies’ efforts to end the Iraq occupation of Kuwait. The Syrian regime was the first in the Arab world to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and asked for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces. It was difficult for the Assad government to participate in a war against another Arab country, particularly against Iraq, whose president appeared to be the one Arab leader standing up to Israeli intransigence. In that Gulf war Syria fought alongside Americans who had been castigated over the years as imperialists and allies of Zionism.

Russia-Syrian Formal Ties in the Unipolar World

The disintegration of Soviet Union confined the strategic significance of Russia and abandoned its status of superpower in international politics. In the unipolar world Russian foreign policy reduced support for Syria on the basis of global political considerations. In Syria the end of the Cold war exercised a greater influence on political change than elsewhere largely because of material and moral support from the pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union had enabled the regime to ignore demands for the respect of Human Rights in particular. In their universal definition Human Rights were not a priority in the old USSR. Syrian relations with the Soviets were now only a matter of formality. The military and economic aid provided by the former USSR was no more provided by its successor, i.e. Russia. However the Russian submarine base Tartus still maintained its existence and Russian generals continued to be the military and strategic consultants of the Syrian army. Founder of the “new” Russia, Boris Yeltsin had presided over an erratic, messy, incomplete transition from the failing Soviet system to an entirely different society struggling to implement democratic and free market reforms.
During Yeltsin period Russia adopted a pro-Western line and deliberated Syria, Iraq and Iran-old allies -----to be more of an economic burden than a benefit. However, Boris Yeltsin mended ties with Syria’s neighbouring countries---Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey but Syria was kept at a distance and viewed with more suspicion. The Syrian leadership realized that the USSR was moving in a different direction and it was not going to assume its earlier role as Damascus’ patron and protector any longer. The Russian arms supply to Syria was declining steadily and Hafiz Al-Assad changed his country’s foreign policy to look for new allies and sources of assistance. On the other hand, earlier ties with Moscow did not disappear completely; in fact, eventually resumed in a different form.

Russian Re-Emergence on Global Stage in Putin’s Period

Russia re-emerged in global politics when the former member of KGB* Vladimir Putin took the rein of Russia in 2000. He fastened Russian economic recovery. Under Putin, state coffers brimmed over with oil and natural gas profits, the middle class begin to grow, improvements were made in the health care and education system, and Russia actually resumed its position as a major player in international affairs in the second term of Putin’s presidency. The distant relations between Russia and Syria owing to Russian economic crisis of 80s and Syrian huge military debts to Russia revived in that period. He began attributing an importance to Syria when he uncluttered Russia and began a strategy of return to the old days. The solution to the debt question with Syria undoubtedly had to wait until Russia was far enough along in its economic recovery that collecting debts became less important for Moscow than reasserting a position of influence in a neighbouring region of strategic importance. After a long period of coolness dating back to the closing years of the Soviet Union, Russia-Syria relations sharply improved in 2005 owing to Moscow’s desire to regain its Soviet-era position as a leading arm seller in the Middle East. As mentioned earlier that the Soviet Union was the main arm supplier to Syria in the cold war period and due to these supplies Syria’s debt swelled around $13.4 billion by 1990 and in the post-cold war period there was a constant demand by Russia for the recompense of debt. The issue was settled when Russia overcame its economic crisis in Putin’s tenure. In May 2005 through an agreement signed between Russian finance minister with his Syrian counterpart, Russia wrote off 73 Percent of $13.4 billion Syria’s debt.  According to another agreement signed in 2008, Russia agreed to sell MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Syria.
Vladimir Putin presented its challenge to the US and wider Western ‘hegemony’ in the international system in terms of principles, legality, and compliance with the UN Charter system. Putin called for the democratization on interstate relations, which essentially amounted to a levelling down of hegemonic power. Russia attained this position with the economic and political recovery. In 2008 Russia was one of the world’s most rapidly growing economies, had paid down its foreign debt, and was rebuilding its military from the chaos into which it fell during the 1990s. Now Russia became more uncomfortable partner for the US than was the weak, cowed Russia of the 1990s. Russia was keen to strengthen its muscles. Its only naval base at Tartus was a symbolic and largely vacant logistic facility, certainly, a remembrance of former Soviet Union.
By the finale of Vladimir Putin administration in 2008, Russia renewed its relations with the states that opposed US interests and the US believed that they were posing threat to global stability, such as Iran, Syria, Venezuela and Hamas. Russia signed fresh arms agreements with Syria in 2007-2010 and their value was more than doubled — to $4.7 billion from $2.1 billion.  Putin re-elected as a president for third term in 2012. He made it clear on many occasions that Russia aspires to traditional great-power status and actions, and Putin became a leading voice in opposition to the US dominance at institutions such as the UNO.

Russia’s Response to the Arab Spring

The self-immolation of Tunisian citizen Mohamed Bouazizi opened a new chapter in the Arab world that united populaces against their authoritative rulers. The masses raised the slogan that “the people want to bring down the regime.” The mass movement known as Arab uprising successfully toppled autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The Russian reaction on the Arab uprising was not very different from the west. In most of the countries where the uprising succeeded, people elected Islamists, allied to the Muslim Brotherhood. A relatively peaceful movement in Tunisia and Egypt posed little risk to Russian interests, and enabled Russia to show a pro-democracy, pro-populist voice in the international platform.
However, Moscow’s response was not similar to the West when uprising spilled over Libya where Russia had deep investment in various projects. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi strongly resisted rebellions and appeared on the edge of crushing them. It seemed that the defeat of rebels was not acceptable for the planners of Arab uprising. The west, vigilant on the Libyan situation, showed worries about human rights violations and began discussions about the possibility of military intervention against Qadhafi. It was certainly too much for the Russian leadership. Medvedev, the then President of Russia forewarned about the upsurge in power of “fanatics” in the Middle East and also warned of “fires for decades and the spread of extremism” there. Vladimir Putin, the Prime Minister of Russia also stated in a same manner that “external interference” could lead to the rise of Islamists, and the rise of Islamists in North Africa could adversely affect other regions, including Russia’s North Caucasus. Although Russia had invested billions of dollars in arms, oil and construction agreements in Libya but to somehow gave a green signal for western military intervention in Libya by abstaining from a vote on a United Nations Security Council resolution in March 2011. Despite that as the NATO forces entered in Libya, Moscow continuously accused them for air strikes and exceeding their mandate to protect civilians, as they were favouring anti-Gadhafi forces in the civil war.  Human Rights Watch entirely ignored the wish of the Libyan authorities to investigate the brutal killing of Qadhafi on October 20, 2011 near Sirte and punishment to the responsible.

Russian Strong Support to Syria: A Loyal Ally in the Arab World

The successful dethroning of Qaddafi in Libya by NATO made Western countries more enthusiastic about their assertive role in the Arab uprising. After Libya the eyes of international community turned towards Syria where people stood up against Bashar al Assad. Russia could not allow the west to treat Assad as they treated Muammar Gaddafi, a long-time Moscow ally. Since the uprising began in Syria Russia explicitly supported the regime that remained a loyal ally of Russia after Second World War and with whom it has smooth political, military, and economic ties. Syria remained loyal to Russia when Egypt went in the US camp in 1970s. It is not merely an incidence that China and Russia did not approve NATO and the U.S. to intervene in Syria's internal matters. Both countries disappointed with western role in Libya, did not cast their vote for the resolution, which could formally endorse sanctions, but actually could give right to kill Syrian leadership.
The Assad’s use of chemical weapons against the rebellion brought the Middle East at the verge of great conflict. The US was determined to attack Syria against the mass killing of civilian through suspected use of chemical weapons that reportedly killed about 1, 429 people in Damascus suburb on August 21, 2013. Russia successfully blocked international action against Syria. In the G-20 summit held in St-Petersburg in the same month, Mr. Obama called for immediate military action against Syria but Mr. Putin used the summit to publicly endorse the conspiracy theory that Syria’s alleged chemical weapons strike was actually a provocation planed by the rebels in hope of getting additional backing from their external backers. The usage of chemical weapons has been prohibited by the 1952 Geneva protocol and considered war crime according to the International Criminal Court. The UN Security Council can refer such war crimes to the international criminal court even if the accused are citizens of a state that has not ratified the court’s statute.
Moscow averted the planned US-led bombing by persuading Damascus to eventually destroy the chemical weapons and be a full member of the Organization for the prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Syria followed Russian advice by ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 2013 and agreed to the destruction of chemical weapons under the supervision of OPCW. Furthermore, the US and Russia reached to an agreement for the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles by the mid-2014. The agreement was a high diplomatic achievement of Moscow in the sense that it diverted international focus from the bloody civil war to the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria.
The Syrian chemical weapons destroyed under the auspices of OPCW and the UN in August 2014 but suspicions and doubts prevailed in the Middle Eastern and global politics.
Russia remained an important actor in the greater Middle East politics because of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; it can use veto power to block resolutions opposed by the countries Moscow wishes to shield. The political lever became important since the US and many Western European countries found it domestically prudent and often essential to obtain a UN seal of approval for peacekeeping operations that involve their troops under a NATO umbrella. Moscow’s veto power, nevertheless, one of the few restraints it has on Washington’s ambition to manage developments in the Balkans and the Middle East---- areas of residual interest to Russian leaders. The Russian veto power in the UN Security Council lingered a constraint but the presence of Russian naval base at Tartus remained a matter of concern for the West. It has been reported by many English newspapers on June 26, 2013 that Russia has vacated the Tartus base. However, on the very next day Russian defence ministry categorically refuted those reports and stated that Tartus was still an official base for Russian vessels in the Mediterranean and carrying their routine task.   
The Arab uprising remained a centre of global politics from the time when it entered in Tunisia and its successful resistance in Syria since March 2011. The upsurge of Russia forces in Ukraine shifted the global focal point and pushed the Syrian conflict in the background. The Ukrainian crisis became more important for the world than Syrian unrest.
On the other hand the Syrian President had repeatedly warned of the threat of Islamist extremists to Syria and the wider region since the beginning of the uprising. The same concerns had been shown by the Russian President and Prime Minister. The Western powers initially dismissed Mr. Assad and Putin, but became increasingly concerned by the rise of Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda’s affiliate al-Nusra Front. Both of them pose a great threat to the US and Middle East peace.
The western support of rebellions or anti-government forces during the Arab spring resulted in the emergence of Daesh. Daesh is an Arabic term for the Islamic state (IS) group.  The rise of Islamic State (IS), the Jihadist militant group that has seized large parts of Syria and Iraq, has sent shockwaves around the Middle East and North African region and beyond. The IS emerged as a combined enemy of the US, Russia and Syrian government.
Since the beginning of insurgency in Syria the West had a great pressure on president Bash-al-Assad to surrender power, who was going to complete his presidential tenure in 2014. In spite of the demands he contested Presidential elections held on June 3, 2014 and won landslide victory securing 88.7 percent of the vote. The electoral victory gave him a third seven year term in office despite a raging civil war in his country. The Assad’s government has also been suffered heavy losses against the Islamic State, which killed hundreds of soldiers and pro-government fighters in recent months as it overran oil fields and military bases.
To eliminate the terrorist threat the U.S. decided to wage a war against the IS network without getting approval from the UN Security Council. It attacked the Islamic State network in Iraq in August 2014 and afterwards in Syria with its five Arab allies including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates on September 22, 2014. Although the IS also emerged as a threat for Russia but it responded over the US attack on Syria in a definite displeasure and warned the US for violating international laws which would further deteriorate the situation. Putin firmly stated that such strikes should be carried out with the approval of the UN Security Council and the consent of the Syrian government. It is noteworthy that International Law requires warning before attacking a country.  
The Russia-Syria relations that began in 1944 remained distinctive for number of factors: the first and perhaps the most important factor, is the Syrian army, still largely equipped with Russian weapons, needed a continuous supply of spare parts and repairs by Russian experts.  Due to both political and strategic reasons Syria also found it difficult to buy new weapons in the west or Far East and consequently tried to get them from Russia.
The second reason concerned the huge Syrian debt estimated at $7.11 billion. The timing and forms of the debt’s repayment has been a constant subject of Russian Syrian negotiations.
The third factor is Moscow’s desire to play a significant role in the Arab-Israel “peace process”, and knowing that the Arab (Palestinian)-Israeli track had been was outside its power and influence, wanted affirmation at the less politically sensitive Syria-Israeli dimension of the “Peace Process”. A Russian analyst noted that if Russia succeeded in bringing about peace between Jerusalem and Damascus, it would boost his country’s prestige and crisis-prone Russia liked this scenario. Last but not least, there are deep-seated ties between Syrian and Russian leaders and, Damascus has been powerful friends in Moscow who proved to be very helpful in the continuity of mutual cooperation despite ideological and geopolitical change. Besides the above mentioned reasons there has been a soft influence of Russia in Syria because of the intermarriages of Syrian males with Russian females.

Russia’s Soft Influence on Syria

Experts of Russia-Syria relations found another reason for their intimate relation which is beyond the politics. Syria is important for Russia owing to its economic, geo-political and strategic interests including arms agreements sum of $700 million a year as well as a little port in the Mediterranean Sea established in the cold war period by the Soviet Union now the Russian’s only military base. Apart from this a human factor is also involved in their relations that have a history of past 50 years when social contacts began among the young generation encountered in colleges. Currently, there are certain number of people in government ministries or corporate headquarters in Syria who passed their 20s in Russia and many of them married Russian females. Consequently their children brought up by Russian speaking mothers. In Syrian elite circles influence of Russian wives can be felt easily that is apparently soft but actually strong influence.
Syria has Russian population owing to the policies planned in 1963, when the socialist Baath Party took the reign of Syria. In the meantime Moscow launched a scholarship program to the top students from Asia, Africa and Latin America. The foreign students got education with their Russian classmates, soon their association turned to friendly relations and evenings were spent together. The Soviet Union had a clear objective, to establish international pro-Soviet intellectual elite class. During 40 years of Assad family’s autocratic rule thousands of Syrian military officers and educated professionals had been studied in Russia. Most of them were funded by the government. The educational and training programs resulted in marriages and mixed families. In the past the Soviet collapse in December 1991 also followed a wave of intermarriages, as young Soviet females found a better escape from economic decline.
As the civil war in Syria seems close to a diplomatic solution, there are concerns over the future of about 30,000 Russian citizens mainly women and children living there. Moscow has encountered such an issue when Soviet disintegration left Russian citizens stranded. But that issue was not aggravated at this level. Particularly in the era of social media, when matters can be discussed everywhere only earn embarrassment to Moscow. The most delicate issue is that after 50 years of intermarriages it is difficult to draw a  line between who is Russian and who is not, if the line exists at all.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Syria a year before the end of World War II. Some divergence has been observed in their relations for a short period of time during cold war period; however, they have never remained completely cut off. Both countries supported each other at the time of international pressure and isolation whether it be the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the uprising in Syria. The distant relations during the post- cold war period were decently bridged in the second tenure of Vladimir Putin by writing off Syria’s 73 percent debt. Russia was able to do so because of its remarkable economic development and the wish to revive old relations.
Since the fall of bi-polar world, the world affairs have been settled unilaterally by the sole super power----- the US. However, after two decades of domination Russia, a former rival of the US, became able to balance its hegemony. In Syrian crisis Russia has emerged as a strong state having ability to play a decisive role in international politics, armed with a clear strategy over the world issues. After the signing of Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel in late 1970s owing to the US mediation, Russia also wished to play a significant role in the Middle East politics. The Russian desire has been satisfied in the recent Arab uprising in which Russia emerged stronger than the US. Furthermore, Russia also justifies that in Egypt and Libya after the fall of regimes, life turned chaotic and it might be worst in the post Bashar al Assad Syria because of the sectarian diversity and spread of extremism. Russian stratagem has also proved to be far-sighted specifically over the issue of chemical weapons used by Syrian government on its civilians. Syrian readiness of the destruction of chemical weapons was another triumph of Russia. The global eyes turned towards the Ukrainian crisis by the beginning of 2014 but Syrian issue remained alive. Late on the armed victories of the Islamic State became a common threat for Russia, the U.S. and Syria. Again at this juncture Russia emphasized that behind any action against the Islamic State the US should take approval of the UN Security Council. Now Russia has a strong standing in international politics. It has earned a reputation of maintaining relations with old allies and Syria is an example. There is general uncertainty and insecurity in the world and the recent global developments require greater cooperation against militancy, respect of international organizations and support of legitimate governments.

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