INDIAN FACTOR IN PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

Tehseena Usman*
                                                                                    
Abstract

India-Pakistan rivalry in Afghanistan is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it is deep rooted in history and accentuated by post-1947 developments.  Ever since partition of the Indian subcontinent, India and Pakistan have been jockeying for power and influence in Afghanistan. Historically, Pakistan has always viewed Afghanistan’s close relations with India as a major security threat. India, as an arch rival, is vying to draw Afghanistan in its sphere of influence. On the other hand, Pakistan as the smaller country desires to realize its national security objectives by forging closer links with its immediate western neighbor, Afghanistan.  The article begins by tracing the origins of Pak-India animosity and competing interests in Afghanistan. This is followed by dissecting post-Taliban India-Pakistan tussle for greater economic and political clout in the latter. The paper is, therefore, timely and topical as it analyzes India-Pakistan involvement in Afghanistan. This could be instrumental in encouraging regional based approach for ushering peace and stability in the war- torn region. Resultantly, this could set the stage for some positive developments in the tense and strained Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

Research Method

The research relies on descriptive analytical method to analyse different issues, events and development regarding the foreign policy stances of two arch rivals towards Afghanistan which directly impacts Pak-Afghan Relations. The Indian factor is very significant when studying Pak-Afghan relations. Therefore, different underlying factors have been interpreted which is stirring conflict in the pursuit of their conflicting objectives regarding Afghanistan.

Introduction

Since independence Pak-Afghan relations have been impacted by Indian threat perception, which made security an important determinant of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Security dilemma created mistrust between Pakistan and India, which impacted Pak-Afghan relations and highlighted quotient of mistrust in their bilateral ties. The security perception of Pakistan evolved by the experiences of freedom movement during which much of the blood was shed; strengthened the belief that India had not acknowledge the formation of Pakistan and will never leave an opportunity to undo it.
This psyche further reinforced when India captured Hyderabad, Junagarh and Kashmir. Muslim league which played an important role in the creation of Pakistan, its leadership who become refugees after partition, came from the areas which did not become part of Pakistan played an important role in creating India’s threat perception which influenced Pakistan-Afghanistan relations by making it a ground of India-Pakistan rivalry
India-Pakistan rivalry in Afghanistan is not a new phenomenon and has its origin in history. For much part of the history, Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan is influenced by fear of encirclement by India through alliance with the Afghan Government. India covertly supported Afghanistan on its demand for a Pashtun state carved out of Pakistan for more than three decades after Pakistan’s inception. Though the demand for Pushtun state weakened after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. But still it is considered a threat. After the partition of subcontinent, India maintained good relations with Afghanistan’s Zahir Shah’s reign than Pakistan except for a short rupture during 1965 Pakistan-India conflict. In addition, India maintained good relations with successive Afghan communist puppet governments because they did not share Islamist ideology shared by majority of Afghan Jihadi groups backed by Pakistan and US.
        There is no denying the fact, that both India and Pakistan used ethnic divides as a means to achieve their various objectives in Afghanistan. In 1990s during Afghan civil war, support network based on ethnicity came into view. Therefore, Afghan politics to a great deal has always been shaped by the politics of identity and the most important political identity is that of ethnic affiliation. For that matter, India has by and large developed its support network amongst non-Pashtun elite i.e. Tajik, Hazara, and Baloch Afghan leaders. To name a few, the well-known Tajik leader from Panjshir valley in northern Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Masoud had close ties to the Indian security establishment as a warlord.
       During Soviet Afghan war (1979-1988) India cooperated and supported Soviet Russia. After their withdrawal Dr. Najibullah (whose family was living in India during and after Afghan war) became head of state received Indian support. In 1992, Mujahidin took power in Afghanistan which forced Najibullah to take refuge in UN complex. He remained confined there for four years until Taliban captured power and hanged him to death. Meanwhile, Pakistan developed its patronage network among the Pashtun population. Traditionally, Pakistan chose to support Pashtuns in Afghanistan, not for the reason that there is large number of Pashtuns in Pakistan, but because of the association developed between well-known Afghan Pashtuns and Pakistani officials during the Soviet-Afghan war in 1979 and onwards.
India’s influence and diplomatic presence during Taliban era was marginalized because of Taliban’s anti India outlook and their support for Kashmiri Jihad by allowing jihadi camps in the areas controlled by them. About 80,000 to 10, 0000 Pakistanis were recruited in camps in Afghanistan for Jihad in Kashmir between 1994-1999. As a result, India started supporting Northern alliance.
The 9/11 Al-Qaeda terrorists attacks on US came as a blessing for India in terms of its bilateral ties with Afghanistan. The fall of Taliban in 2001 was seen by India as a golden opportunity to enhance the operations in Afghanistan many fold which was not liked by Pakistan because of the trust deficit between Pakistan and India. Pakistan contends that India has been struggling since the inception of the former to stop Pakistan and Afghanistan from keeping stable ties with each other. It was because of India propaganda that Pakistan would no longer exist as a country, Kabul polled negative vote at the United Nations on membership question of the latter. Latter on along with Soviet Union, it supported King Zahir Shah to support the Pushtunistan issue.
After Hamid Karzai government took charge of Afghanistan, India was the first country to send a diplomatic mission to Kabul, Ministry of external affairs and a medical team drawn from the armed forces landed at Bagram airfield in Parvan province of Afghanistan near Kabul in expression of India’s solidarity with the people of Afghanistan. S.M. Lamba special envoy to Afghanistan led the team. He explored the possibility of reopening the Indian embassy which was abandoned in Sept 1996, when Kabul fell to the Taliban. The embassy formal opening took place in Dec 2001 with Jaswant Singh, then India’s Minister for External Affairs, performing the honour, and terming the period of its closure as a painful gap. The pain he referred to had been inflicted by Pakistan. In India's point of view the speedy reopening of its embassy in Kabul represent the start of a new era in its relations with Afghanistan.
Given India’s ability to keep friendly ties with Afghanistan, Pakistan came up with its own strategies which impacted Pak-Afghan relations. The paper highlights India factor in Pak-Afghan relations which has the potential to either stabilize or ruin Afghanistan. In addition, it interprets India and Pakistan conflicting objectives in Afghanistan and their implications on achieving harmonious Pak-Afghan relations. Moreover, it highlights the significance of cooperation between Pakistan and India in Afghanistan which will lead the region towards peace and prosperity.

India’s Objectives in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has always been focus of India’s regional policy because of its geo strategic location, its latent hostility towards Pakistan and for economic reasons. India has several aims in Afghanistan; some of the Indian objectives in Afghanistan are; to contain Taliban so as to neutralize Pakistan’s help to Kashmir Jihad. Secondly, to support democratization and pro-India government in Afghanistan which will contain resurgence of Taliban and other religious and extremist movements. Resurgence of Islamic independent movement and their success have the potential to undermine the social fabric of India by providing a vent to oppressed minorities particularly the Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims. Thirdly, to achieve leading position in Afghanistan and Central Asian republics by countering Pakistan’s sway in the region.
For this purpose India opened consulates near Pak-Afghan border i.e. Herat, Kandahar, JalalAbad and Mazar-e-Sharif. Diplomatic presence of India is larger than other countries in Afghanistan. Mostly consulates are opened along FATA and Baluchistan border. Pakistan is uneasy over the Indian consulates, in addition to the embassy in Kabul. Moreover, India sent 300 commandos to Kandahar to protect their citizens in post Taliban set up which was viewed by Pakistan with suspicions.  Pakistan’s concern has been that, reconstruction workers from other countries are also present in Afghanistan but it has not allowed commandos from other countries to protect them. Pakistan believe that India through these consulates is involved in covert activities such as terrorism in FATA, NWFP and in Baluchistan aiming at destabilizing Pakistan and it is building anti Pakistan scenario on Afghanistan’s soil, which is aggravating bilateral relations and spoiling the environment of trust. Consulates protect the commercial interests as well as protect and promote the interests of its citizens who are residing in that area. Indubitably, India is involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, but its trading activities as well as the presence of its citizens in the areas where the consulates are opened are minimum .
         In addition, some Pakistani circle highlighted that under US patronage these consulates suppressed Pushtuns by depriving them of their share of authority and were promoting the stakes of other minority groups such as Hazaras, Panjshiri, Tajiks and Uzbeks. This particular behavior could be gauged by officers’ posts in all the security services, particularly army and training for governmental posts. Minority groups especially Panjshiri Tajiks were preferred over Pushtuns and were given economic opportunities .
Moreover, in order to contain Taliban and Pakistan’s sway in Afghanistan, India built up the defense mechanism of the Northern Alliance by giving them high-altitude combatant equipment worth of $ 10 million via its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) as well as provided technical guidance to the Northern Alliance. Pakistan believes that some local and foreign elements inside Afghanistan are vigorously involved in backing the miscreants in Baluchistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province.
In this regard, Pakistan provided evidence of Brahimdagh Bugti (son of Akbar Bugti) staying in Afghan intelligence house in Kabul, Photographs of his visit to Delhi and some instructions which showed his links with insurgency in Baluchistan (The News International, 2008). Most of the people in Baluchistan are distressed over the induction of non-Baluchis in the developmental projects. They are also aggrieved over the unjust division of royalties produced from the natural resources in their province. India is exploiting the already fragile situation as it has interest in Baluchistan which is important future gas pipeline route, full of natural resources.
Baluchistan is Pakistan’s strategic heartland making Pakistan one of the most strategically important and sensitive place in the world. Baluchistan is Pakistan solitaire diamond making it central to the heartland i.e. Central Asia and is part of Rimland i.e. Arabian Sea coastline. With Gwader and other ports of Baluchistan as part of Rimland, the southern strategic route to Central Asia originates from Baluchistan making it critical for India. By fomenting trouble and unrest in Baluchistan, the Indians are attempting to delink Pakistan, China and Gwader from Central Asia containing Pakistan’s strategic and economic potential because the future of Pakistan upcoming generations is in Baluchistan. (Khalil-ur-Rehman, 2013). Pakistan accuses India and Afghanistan for backing the Baluch National Army (BLA); whose aim is to attract world attention for their separation’s movement. Brahamdagh Bugti, the son of former BLA leader Nawab Akbar Bugti, is accused several times of recruiting militants in training camps in Afghanistan.
In the situation of large public suicide bombings in Baluchistan, KPK and other parts of the country, that causes large number of civilian casualties, one section of Pakistani population believes Indo-US-Israeli hand in sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan. They hold that the launching pad for carrying out such activities is Afghanistan and the aim is to weaken Pakistani compliance to exploit the minerals, metals gas and strategic wealth of Baluchistan thus to undermine it economically and politically;  roll back its nuclear program and to deprive  it from its nuclear asset.
Moreover, another important objective of India in Afghanistan is to tap Central Asian energy resources and to develop Afghanistan as a land bridge between Central Asia and India. Indian economy is growing by leaps and bounds with which comes growing energy demands. CARs oil and gas resources make it extremely important for India to forge a relationship with Afghanistan based on cooperation. In this regard, India is investing in constructing roads and infrastructure linking Afghanistan with Central Asian States. India proposed Salma Dam project in Herat province on river Hirarud along with constructing Dams on Kabul and Kunar River in northern Afghanistan which Pakistan believe is to deprive Pakistan of water resources. Pakistan believes that proposed dam will have serious implications for its water supply as it flows through Kabul River into the Indus at Attock.
In addition, Indian oil companies are active in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In March 2007, India completed the renovation of a military base at Ayani in Tajikistan: the renewal commenced in 2002 and completed at a cost of US$10 million. India is the fourth country after US, Germany, Russia to have a base at Central Asia, According to Indian journalist Suda Ramachandaran, maintaining a base at Ayani will let India respond quickly to any danger arising from unstable Afghanistan. It gives India important facility to insert Special Forces when situation demand on the occasion of military conflict with Pakistan. It will increase India’s ability to hit Pakistan from Tajikistan and will help India’s mounting interests in Central Asia. According to Indian intelligence sources, India after the fall of Taliban decided to maintain influence in Afghanistan and to counter Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan. For this reason it renovated a base at Ayani/Farkhor.
Pakistan doesn’t allow its soil to be used by India for transportation of goods to Afghanistan. Therefore, maintaining a base at Ayani will help India to air lift necessary relief items from Ayani to Farkhor and then to Afghanistan. Apart from Pakistan’s dimension attached to Ayani bases it will also help India to increase its influence in Central Asia. Many analysts believe that India’s role in Afghanistan through reconstruction projects and diplomacy is a source of anxiety for Pakistan. Because it could lead to a strategic encirclement of Pakistan. Indian presence is a source of worry for Pakistan’s geo-strategic and geo political reasons and can hamper efforts against terrorism. There are chances that India presence deteriorates regional tensions as Pakistan will not allow Indian strategic encirclement and can resort to counter measures.

India Role in Afghanistan Reconstruction: Indo- Pak Competition in Afghanistan

Pakistan altered its Afghan policy under pressure rather than its will. Apart from US pressure, Indian factor which is very important in Pakistan security calculus played a role in shaping Pak-Afghan policy. India, immediately after 9/11 offered to provide unconditional support to US in a global war against terrorism. Indian then prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in a letter to US president expressed that India would provide whatever support the US wanted, including military bases in its global war against terrorism.  Soon India declared its offer of providing support in war against terrorism which alarmed Pakistan. Moreover, after 9/11 India was pressurizing US to declare Pakistan a rouge state and to take action against freedom fighters in Kashmir which India considers terrorists.
To discourage Indian efforts, Pakistan changed its Afghan policy and aligned itself with US. Pakistan still wants to have pliant regime in Afghanistan but it is apprehensive of growing Indo-Afghan friendship. As growing Indian influence in Afghanistan will limit Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. Although, Afghanistan and India established trading relations and Pakistan has allowed both countries to trade but has refused to allow transit route to India because of mistrust between them for transportation of its goods to Afghanistan. Pakistan asserts that Indian commodities to Afghanistan via its territory will have serious security implications and would lay negative impact on the Kashmir policy of Pakistan. In addition, to prevent smuggling it cannot allow goods to be routed through Pakistani territory that have lower import duties than Pakistan in Afghanistan.
India is playing a major role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and is the sixth major donor to Afghanistan. It presented buses and airplanes to Afghanistan, sponsoring lunch programs in schools, undertook the construction of the parliament building in Kabul as well as strategically important new roads. The Afghan government enjoys outstanding ties with New Delhi which has added to Pakistan’s paranoia. After the fall of the Taliban government India entered Afghanistan to get back its influence in Afghanistan which it lost during Taliban rule. For this purpose it adopted policy of soft power. According to Joseph Nye soft power is the capability to obtain what one desire through attraction rather than intimidation or money. It crops up from the charm of a country’s political ideas, policies and culture. When ones policies are considered as justifiable in the opinion of others, soft power is increased. Applying this definition on India’s role in Afghanistan one can gauge that India is struggling to increase her influence in Central and South Asia. The demonstration of India pursuing soft power can be seen on several fronts which is viewed by Pakistan with suspicions.
India pledged 100 million dollars in aid at Tokyo conference on reconstruction of Afghanistan held in Jan 2002, at the same time it also offered help in the improvement of rail-road links, hospitals, schools and information technology. In Dec 2001, before the interim government officially took power, plane loads of aid from New Delhi had been send off to Kabul. Besides medicines, grains and other commodities the cargo carrying relief goods also contained Hindi films and music cassettes, signifying India’s longing to use its culture weapons in the fight for authority in Afghanistan. India also pledged to export million tons of wheat by the end of 2001 and its airlines recommenced flights to Kabul and Mazar Sharif. Several Indian training programs were initiated for the Afghans in journalism, accounting, and policing. India moved in Afghanistan, without any delay with humanitarian assistance after the departure of the Taliban from Kabul.
In corruption, the Afghan government is one of the world’s most corrupt governments. Transparency International ranked Afghanistan on 175th position which is the lowest position, besides Somalia and North Korea. Regardless of this poor monetary record, India transferred aid monies to the Kabul administration without any conditionality attached. Amar Sinha, the Indian ambassador to Kabul, said to Reuters, “We have no reason to believe that the money will be wasted.” The direct funding have achieved  a broader political strategy i.e. Karzai has become aggrieved of the orders he has been receiving from Western donors, and the refusal to impose terms on its aid has allowed India to set itself apart.
Things started moving fast on political front too. A number of senior members of the Afghan interim arrangement, such as Interior Minister Younis Qanooni and Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, paid a visit to India before the interim administration started functioning. Mr. Qanooni is said to have demanded India's help in setting up a national security force in Afghanistan even.
On the economic front, India designed a preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan to encourage the supply of Afghan products to India, as well as to assist Indian private companies to take part in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. According to the terms of agreement India planned to build a 130-200 km road from Chahbahar port in Iran to Kabul to speed up the transport of Indian commodities to Afghanistan and to export three items from Afghanistan: i.e. fresh fruits, dry fruits, medicine and herbs.
The road was completed in 2009 to connect Dilaram in South-western Afghanistan to Zahidan and Chahbahar on the Arabian Sea to give the landlocked nation access to maritime trade through Iran thereby reducing Afghanistan’s dependence on Gwader port in Pakistan. Pakistan felt threatened by the construction of strategic routes by India which undermines Pakistan struggle for Central Asian prospects. Here the point to be noted is that India reconstruction policy for Afghanistan is well targeted, designed in such a way to increase sway over every sector of Afghan society, to win heart and minds of Afghans, gain the highest political advantage and to undermine Pakistani authority.
Afghanistan is important for both India and Pakistan for economic, security and strategic reasons. India considers Afghanistan its strategic ally and considers it cheaper to engage Pakistan in Afghanistan rather than in Kashmir. The former believes that in the name of reconstruction India wants to capture its markets, resources and encircle Pakistan by establishing civil and military relations with Afghanistan.
Accusations that Afghanistan is the place of rising Indo-Pakistan proxy war are common. Afghanistan is very much significant for the security and economic prospects of the region, and India has constantly achieved its interests through cultural and soft diplomacy. By signing several agreements of bilateral significance, offering aid and taking active part in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, India has remarkably supported Karzai and his government. And this strategy of using soft power has paid off. In November 2011, a group of Indian public and private companies won a proposal to mine in three states in Afghanistan which is a rewarding project with an estimated investment cost of $10.8 billion.        
India and Pakistan both are struggling in post Taliban Afghanistan for gaining greater say and influence in Afghanistan. India is enhancing its influence in Afghanistan through its development investment and has undertaken capital intensive projects. It pledged for constructing Dams, developing Afghanistan communication infrastructure and linking Afghanistan trade corridor with Iran. Therefore, India in lieu of these financial investments and capital intensive projects gained political influence, came closer to Afghanistan government and may be getting greater support for its permanent seat in UN Security Council from the latter in the future. Alternatively, Pakistan is using its geographical contiguity, transit trade, financial aid to enhance its influence in Afghanistan. In this regard, it is preventing India to gain similar kind of advantage by denying it the right to use Pakistani territory for exporting its goods to Afghanistan.
Pakistan considers Afghanistan its immediate neighbour which gives it a natural right to have more say in its politics and considers India its arch rival in Afghanistan. Pakistani military president, General Zia in 1988 said that Pakistan being a frontline state have earned the right to have a friendly power in Kabul. In addition, it we will not allow a return to the pre-war situation, where there was large Indian and Soviet influence in Afghanistan, who supported claims on Pakistan’s territory. After the laps of twenty years, this quote still identifies how Pakistan analysis its link with Afghanistan.
In addition, there is reluctance on the part of Afghanistan and US to curtail Indian growing influence in Afghanistan which has created mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as between US and Pakistan. India believes that it can reach Central Asia through Afghanistan since air route is not viable. To achieve this goal, its working since Taliban ouster to gain influence in Afghanistan, by strengthening ties with Afghanistan war lords and will go to any extent to prevent Islamic militancy, Taliban governments which is threatening its regional ambitions and security, protect its interests and contain anti-India block. While Pakistan believes that supporting Pushtun is the one of the few options available to gain influence in the Afghanistan.
Discussing the above scenario Amit Ranjan in “Afghanistan quagmire: is there a way out?” wrote: “Two countries that have been pro-active in Afghanistan are India and Afghanistan. Since 1947, they have been engaged against each ‘other’ in Afghanistan. At present too their rival ‘strategic’ interests have pitched them against the ‘other’...Is there any solution to the forthcoming predicament? Yes, there is. The ‘only’ ‘effective’ solution to deal with the post-2014 mess is cooperation between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan.”
India is an emerging global power but it cannot achieve its goals unless it has friendly relations with neighbours, especially Pakistan. Pakistan cannot get out of plethora of problems unless a compromise is achieved at least on some aspect of its relations with India. As long as they look at their relations in the prism of zero sum game, South Asian region as a whole will keep on suffering. Now the question here arises is India and Pakistan antagonism in post-2014 Afghanistan inevitable? Not necessarily, especially if both adopt the adverse partnership model (formulated by Professor Carol Bell).
      In fact, Afghanistan can, be the first stepping stone towards a more prosperous South Asia and a more successful peace process. The model highlights that, whenever in any situation of conflict costs overshadow profits, the players involved should agree to an adverse partnership. Professor Bell by “adverse partnership” does not “mean to entail anything chiefly friendly or trusting but only recognition between the leading players, that they have concrete common interests as well as sharp differences.” Implementing this model in their policies towards Afghanistan would better serve their interests.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, Afghanistan has been a victim of regional and extra-regional interference since past centuries. Regardless of the existence of international coalition forces and the pledges of neighboring countries to support its autonomy, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, the country is still prone to intervention by its neighbors. This could destabilize Afghanistan’s future peace and stability.
 Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan should be analyzed in the context of South Asian security web in which the latter is the offshoot of Pakistan’s policy towards India. Therefore, there is a regional dimension attached to Pak-Afghan relations. India and Pakistan have turned Afghanistan into a center stage for settling their past scores and for enhancing regional standing in the post-Taliban set up.
The research paper demonstrates that Pak-Afghan mutual mistrust has deepened with the Indian presence in Afghanistan. India is viewing Afghanistan as a lucrative and productive investment country as well as an “extended neighborhood.” This raises Pakistan’s angst and prevents Pak-Afghanistan harmonious relations. Actions by one country to exert influence in Afghanistan would cause a corresponding counter reaction by the other neighbor that may complicate the Afghan imbroglio, especially when the US withdrawal is imminent.
The Indian reconstruction activities, educational-cultural contribution to Afghan society, training and weaponry to the Northern Alliance, clandestine activities of consulates and marginalizing Pushtuns have exacerbated mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite some efforts in détente in India-Pakistan relations in the wake of series of confidence building measures, the Indian activities in Afghanistan pose a threat to Pakistan “strategic depth” policy, its reliance on non-state actors bear the potential to render Afghanistan again into a proxy battlefield.
India has gained a foothold and endeared to the Afghan people through the quantum and nature of investment policies which have surpassed that of Pakistan. Needless to say that Indian investment and social security initiatives are not born out of mere generosity but on realpolitik considerations to become an established “regional power” and make further inroads into Central Asia. Hence, Pakistan needs to prepare a robust counter-strategy based on enhancing its economic interests for national objectives. Further, destabilizing Afghan state is neither in the interest of Pakistan nor that of India -- as both will not remain immune to spillover effect of political turbulence. It is high time that both need to revisit their foreign policy objectives and reconcile their long standing differences in Afghanistan. An appropriate way could be by inking agreements on regional connectivity amongst Pakistan-Afghanistan and India. These will prove to be a harbinger of regional synergy and shall be in tune with regional collaboration policies adopted by many countries in this age of globalization.

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