POLITICS OF PATRIMONIALISM REVISITED: THE CASE OF AFGHAN STATE MAKING AND UNMAKING

Shahida Aman*

Abstract

By adopting the concept of ‘patrimonialism’ as an analytical framework, this paper attempts to decipher its role in the making and breaking of the Afghan state. Patrimonialism is synonym in literature with post colonial elite’s indulgence in patronage and predatory practices, whose fall out impact from mismanagement, corruption and rent seeking results in state failure. This paper argues that patrimonialism, which was embedded in the very creation of the Afghan state as a tribal polity, performed certain indispensable functions in maintaining the unity and longevity of the new state. However, its pervasive impact destabilized regimes, distracted long-term bureaucratization, hindered growth of legal constitutional basis of Afghan polity, prevented the rise of an extractable base of the economy, politicized the military and frustrated attempts at modernization. The frustration among the nascent Afghan intelligentsia and the educated with limited pace of modernization and continual patronage politics found its expression in support to radical leftist and rightist groups in the system, which had long-term destabilizing impact on Afghan state. The paper further argues that patrimonialism in Afghan case has been highly resistant to change and is manifesting itself in the post 2001 state building process in albeit new forms and shapes, which is in turn hampering the achievement of desired goals in the post 2001 state building exercise in the country.

Key words: Afghan state making, patrimonialism, patronage politics, rent-seeking, state building

Introduction

Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism, patronage politics, clientelism and rent seeking are terms used in literature to describe post-colonial elite’s mismanagement of their inherited polities through indulgence in corrupt and predatory practices. Such patrimonial indulgence is credited with generating economic mismanagement, political instability and conflict in their political systems, producing conditions for state failure. In this ‘inside out process of state failure,’ political elite’s mishandling of governance in their respective systems through patrimonial and corrupt practices, weakens the core or center of the state and pressure from the periphery forces in on the center, causing its failure. This paper explores the dynamics of politics of patrimonialism in the case of Afghan state formation and building. It is divided into five sections. The introduction is followed by an analysis of how patrimonialim, neopatrimonialism and rent seeking are understood in the context of developing states, including the nature of crisis generated by these and their contribution to state failure. The third section delves into the functioning of patrimonialism in the making and un-making of the Afghan state. The fourth section attempts to understand its working in post 2001 state building exercise in Afghanistan and the last section provides the conclusions.

Post-Colonial State Building: Patrimonialism, Neo-Patrimonialism, Corruption and Rent-Seeking

Neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, and patron client relationship, are terms that rely heavily on Max Weber’s contrast of patrimonial rule (observed in pre-capitalist societies), wherein, allegiance to a ruler is based on personal loyalty, charisma and traditional legitimacy, with ‘rational’ bureaucratic forms of governance (seen in modern capitalism). Neo-patrimonialism, is distinguished from traditional patrimonialism as a modern form of exchange, characterized by clients’ provision of political support to the patron in exchange for pay-offs that the patron will deliver after capturing public resources. Kraushaar and Lambach, differentiate the two by arguing that in classical patrimonialism, favours are distributed according to the whims of the ruler, in neo-patrimonialism, favours are dispensed behind the guise of national legal-statehood. It is described as a personal kind of social relationship between leaders and their followers, within the formal hierarchy of the state, complimented by personalized exchanges and little freedom of entry and exit. Leaders’ support is not dependent on ideology or law but personal exchanges, whose particularities include: transfer of economic and political resources of loyalty, votes and protection in a package deal; unconditionality and long-range credit; solidarity based on personal honour or spiritual attachment to the patron; a long term, but informal and tightly binding contractual understanding; and a relationship based on vertical and dyadic fashion, making the patron monopolize certain positions of vital importance for the clients. In short, it is largely seen as a form of exchange, wherein, personal favours of job distribution, licences and projects on patron’s behalf are reciprocated by the clients through mobilizing political support and other favours.
‘Rents’ and ‘rent-seeking’ terms are borrowed from the literature on economics to refer to the state practice of restricting market operations through licensing etc., to benefit certain sectors or firms. Neo-patrimonial favours assume rent forms and such rents are distributed by political patrons inside the government for obliging certain sections and firms. Khan, defines rents as incomes, higher than would otherwise be earned by individuals and firms, and rent seeking as activities, such as bribing, coercion, etc., to create, maintain or change rights and institutions on which particular rents are based. Rents are created when the state restricts market operations by rationing foreign exchange and imports, curbing free trade and prohibiting the introduction of new products for the purpose of benefiting some firms.
Corruption is one form both neo-patrimonailism and rent seeking assume in the patron’s quest for influencing and obliging followers and vice versa. It can be defined in Szeftel’s words as ‘the misuse of public office, public resources or public responsibility for private-personal or group gain’. Corruption functions when formal rules are transgressed by officials to allocate public resources in response to offers of financial gain or political support. Hence it is understood as a deviation encompassing violation of formal rules for gaining private financial gains. A characteristic that patrimonialism, corruption and rent seeking share is their resistance to change. These informal institutions may transform albeit slowly, in response to changes in formal state institutions and their practices in cases where their levels of efficiency are raised through state induced reforms and re-structuring. The evidence from many Third World countries suggests that such informal practices have been hard to replace and pervasively influence the formal in course of institutional restructuring. Even, European state making experience had a fair share of inefficient and patrimonial regimes that proved extremely durable and hard to replace. The evolution of non-patrimonial political structures was slow, complimented by monarchy’s successful extraction of domestic resources with the ability to provide justice to the people and concede some form of control over public purse to their representatives.
Post colonial elite’s indulgence in neo-patrimonial, corrupt and rent seeking practices is blamed to be a product of post independence inheritance of incongruent and weak polities, which forced the local elite in pre- and post independence period to use patronage politics to mobilize locals and legitimize their rule.  It is also considered to arise from the character of international state system in post Second World War period, anomalies in the economic structures of developing societies and from elite desire to create effective informal institutions in the face of formal ones being too costly to set up or in pursuance of some vested interests unable to be accommodated by the formal ones. Clientelism (patron-client politics), to Allen was generated in the last days of the colonial period, when colonizers in their eagerness to hold elections (prior to leaving) and ensure electoral support for pro-colonizer sympathizer parties (conservative parties as opposed to radical ones), made the indigenous elite offer cash, lands and other collective benefits to local influentials. Though, it ensured electoral mobilization in support of conservative parties, however, such techniques laid the basis for future basis of politics on patron-client relationship. Taking a similar line, Englebert blames neo-patrimonialism on the legitimacy deficit of post colonial political systems, itself a product of incongruence between post and pre-colonial state institutions and demarcation of boundaries that amalgamated distinct communities or divided long integrated political communities. Such legitimacy deficit made the elite take recourse to patronizing political alliances, rather than basing them on long-term ideological commitments. It is precisely for this reason that in the post independence period, the elite used it as a material inducement for inducing national and cultural assimilation.
The explanations for the rise of patronage politics in the post-colonial states as arising from pre-independence political and electoral context is inadequate for explaining why such trends have persisted for longer periods in the post-independence period. Patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism seem to persist, when local or national elites find it difficult to change formal rules, or create formal institutions. This happens, when in the absence of state institutions, it is too costly to establish formal ones, or when the elites focus on goals that are not legally acceptable locally or internationally. Corrupt and rent seeking practices are also blamed on the economic shortages of impersonal and transparent redistributive activities in the Third World. Weak economic structures in subsistence agriculture, petty production and trade, low levels of income and weak property rights, prohibit generation of surpluses for protection of assets and economic activities and results in clientelist practices of seeking redistribution by other means. To some scholars, such as, Clapham and Sorensen, politics of international state system in the post Second World War created artificial stability in the world, premised on respect to sanctity of state borders, absence of external threats and Cold War alliance politics. Such international guarantees of state’s inviolable borders and non-intervention created incentives for local elites to refrain from developing domestic institutions of stability or coercion and encouraged them to indulge in predation. This artificial stability from the international system is recently undergoing change since the end of the Cold War period, when international community has increasingly intervened for state building in unstable or weak and failed polities under the pretext of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘sovereignty as responsibility.’
Patrimonialism and corruption are largely seen in negative light, while rent seeking is a highly debated topic in social sciences literature, in relation to their productive employment (or otherwise) by bureaucracies for stimulating investment and growth in the developing societies. In defense of rent seeking, Boesen, cites Singapore’s successes as resting on informal as well as formal governance structures. He also mentions South Korea’s informal patron client processes to provide a major motivating push to its initial growth in the industrial sector. While rent seeking in corporatist states may have helped the cause of growth, corruption’s diversion of expenditure from development goals to private gains and resultant decrease in state’s tax revenues is widely known. Corruption at the official level is also blamed for slowing economic growth and development. In several econometric surveys of World Bank, corruption negatively correlates with development indicators of investment and growth rates.
Politics of clientelism and patrimonialism are causally related to state weakness and failure. These are argued to be retrogressively linked to factional competition and conflict over resources, ruler’s indulgence in corruption and predation, economic pitfalls, failure of democracy and reformist politics giving way to authoritarian politics, military intervention and civil war. Clientelism promotes factional competition over distribution of public resources and leads to politicization of ethnic, religious and kinship identities. Resource scarcity and fear of meager payoffs drives factions to indulge in corrupt and predatory practices. The resentment felt by the left out groups finds its expression in violent challenge to the state. And resultant repression by the regime for putting down opposition breeds violence and radicalism. Clientelism and patrimonialism are said to be negatively influencing democratization and reformation processes in the developing states. These informal institutions prevent the growth of mass political consciousness and participation by fortifying elite structures and politics of particularism.
Patronage politics is further blamed for the failure of reformist movements in African states. Reno, cites failure of reformist movement in Nigeria to argue that ruler’s manipulation over distribution of resources, including markets, conferred on them privileges to recruit and train young reformist revolutionary groups as personal militias to fight political rivals. It changed their character from reform movements to loyalists of particular groups in power. Patronage politics is further held responsible for authoritarian politics, military interventions and ruler’s indulgence in spoil politics. When patrimonial regimes are faced with limited resources for redistribution, they restrict competition over patronage benefits to certain groups and parties, especially in terms of distribution of employment benefits and denial of electoral competition. Denial of resources coupled with bad economic management and lack of mediation between the state and discontented groups (which resort to force and strikes and face government’s repression), create conditions of chronic political instability. This was evident in the case of breakdown of civil order in Uganda and Chad and regime/state collapse in Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zaire.
Scholars have also highlighted the negative fall-out of Patrimonialism and rent seeking on a state’s economy. It is argued, for example that the distribution of state’s resources to wide communal groups discourages capital accumulation and slows economic growth. The resultant lack of a capitalist class narrows resource extraction from the private sectors. Dwindling state resources also undercuts neo-patrimonial regime’s capacity to manage political change peacefully and the result is recourse to coercion, which undermines state legitimacy. In a number of African states, introduction of control regime (restrictions on trade, over-valuation of exchange rate to benefit industrialists and protectionist policies) for benefiting targeted communities imposed high costs on their economies and forced them to take recourse to IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The SAP’s structural reforms hit at these state’s regulatory capacity to control corruption, and provide services and employment. This led to a mushrooming growth of informal economy and populist demands for accountability and participatory politics. Regimes in such African states responded to these changes by indulging in more spoils, defaulted on loans and faced persistent instability. The ensuing non-performance of basic state functions, coercion and repression encouraged violence, civil war and state failure in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda and Zaire.
Patrimonialism, rent seeking and corruption have influenced the growth of states negatively and contributed to state failure. The debate on post colonial state building cannot be separated from the socio-political environment in which the elites of developing states operated. Their dilemma stems from dichotomy between promotion of stability and a sense of nationhood in the face of narrow financial base and heterogeneous society. Material inducements by way of patronage politics to factional leaders are largely extended to avoid instability and broaden the base of popular support to the party in power. Patrimonialism harms state building by promoting factional competition over meager state resources, partisan distribution of such resources and consequent resentment among the left out groups, authoritarian politics, spoil politics, economic retardation and violence, conflict and civil war. The next section understands Afghan state making and un-making in the context of patrimonial politics.

Patrimonialism, Neo-patrimonialism and the Afghan State

Afghanistan was born a patrimonial polity. It was created in October 1747 in a Jirgah (assembly) meeting of Afghan tribal leaders, when Ahmad Shah Abdali was elected as the leader of the new tribal polity and independence was declared from the Safavids of Persia. Afghan state formation was supported by Pakhtun experiences in governance under Safavid rule and the religio-political grievances they entertained, over taxes and mistreatment at the hands of Persian administrators. The de-facto nature of Persian control over Pakhtun and Afghan tribes, accompanied by historical precedents of successful uprisings and an opportunity provided by the death of Nadir Shah, were additional contributory factors to the rise of an Afghan state.
 Patrimonialism in Afghan state formation resembled the traditional patriarchal category of rulership, identified by Weber, as a hallmark of pre-capitalist forms of government, where allegiance to a leader is based on personal loyalty and traditional legitimacy. It was charismatic patrimonialism; personal loyalty to the king was inspired by his charisma and traits of bravery, intelligence and tact in handling tribal affairs. Support to the ruler’s person was secured through a policy of tribal accommodation; distribution of top state offices and land/jagirs to tribal chieftains, and exemption from payment of land and produce taxes were some benefits provided by the ruler to a selected group of tribal chieftains and their followers. Traditional patrimonialism sought obedience and legitimacy on religious grounds through symbolic acts and multiple invasions of India justified under claims of defending Islam against the infidels. Patrimonialism in Afghan case was paternalistic, consensual and reciprocal. It was paternalistic because the king was seen as a father figure who shared the booty of war with all who participated. It was consensual because the king consulted his Majlis (council composed of tribal chiefs) on all important issues and it was reciprocal because the favours (material and otherwise) from the king’s person were reciprocated by the tribes through provision of fighting men and obedience to his person.
Patronage based distribution of high state offices was a common practice under most Afghan rulers. Close kinsmen (Durrani Pakhtun elite) were awarded the most prestigious offices under all rulers, including Ahmad Shah and Sher Ali, who are credited with adopting a multi-ethnic accomodationist approach to government formation. A pro-Pakhtun bias in the distribution of state offices and other benefits, including exemption from taxes, not only made other groups more resentful, but also developed a fragile and limited tax base. Under Dost Muhammad, who was the immediate predecessor of Amir Sher Ali, all Majlis (Council) members with the exception of one were Muhammadzai and all provincial governors his own sons. Dost Muhammad favoured Muhammadzai tribe in distribution of state offices, but also used force against non-Durrani Ghilzai tribes for their failure to pay revenues, besides exploiting Shia-Sunni sectarian differences. Adoption of ‘Amir-al-Momineen’ (commander of the faithful) title and banning of un-Islamic practices paved religious legitimacy grounds for the Amir.
The practice of keeping influential family members engaged in court affairs continued under Abdur Rehman, but as a shrewd state making move, the king’s sons were not appointed as provincial governors for avoiding chances of rebellion against king’s authority. Coercive centralization and a claim to divine right to legitimacy were hallmarks of Amir Abdur Rahman’s reign. Patrimonial practice of benefitting close relatives and rewarding allies continued under Musahibeen rulers. Nadir Khan’s ten member cabinet comprised of very close kinsmen and other state offices were also divided among prominent tribesmen and religious leaders. Zahir Shah’s 1964 constitution was an interesting departure as royal family members theoretically, were barred from holding permanent public offices. In practice, the king by virtue of holding the highest executive office was empowered to appoint all high state functionaries and continuation of patrimonial nepotism in appointments flourished a culture of corruption in bureaucracy and harmed the prospects of an institutionalized growth of the same. The king’s prerogative to appoint the cabinet meant that a Prime Ministers’ average term in office did not exceed 2-3 years, replaced by Zahir Shah as soon as he felt insecure of their growing popularity. Government’s meddling in electoral results to prevent reformists entering the parliament, and frequent dismissal of Prime Ministers at the king’s pleasure, gave instability to the political system. Frustration with the slow pace of democratization and patrimonial distribution of state offices and resources led the intelligentsia and reformists to organize into leftist-communist, nationalist and religious parties. The Afghan bureaucracy could not develop institutionally under Zahir Shah’s regime, making it susceptible to corruption and patrimonial nepotism in appointments. Economically, the state failed to create jobs for growing intelligentsia and tied to it was the dissatisfaction of radicals, both leftist and Islamist with the slow progress of reforms. A decline in foreign aid coupled with poor government response to the famine of 1972, created conditions for take-over of the government by Daoud (in collaboration with leftist and nationalist elements of the army in July 1973). The new government after declaring Afghanistan to be a republic, disbanded the parliament, suspended the constitution and promulgated a state of emergency.
Under Musahibeen rulers, appointments in the military were subject to nepotism too because appointments above the rank of captain were exercised as kings exclusive prerogative. This meant young non-elite Pakhtuns officers found their road to promotions blocked by the favoured group of Pakhtuns with connections to the royal family, which frustrated them to join radical leftist PDPA factions. Politicization of army helped the cause of Daoud’s coup against Zahir Shah in 1973 and that of the PDPA against Daoud in 1978. Such politicization was responsible for harming military’s discipline, but also created problems for maintaining its unity under the PDPA regime. The reign of Musahibeen rulers demonstrated half hearted attempts at state modernization and reformation by the traditional Afghan elite. While tribal loyalty was secured through patrimonial favours and continued to be the main legitimacy ground for these rulers, Pakhtun nationalism and attempts at centralization assumed autocratic characteristics. Extension of education and limited liberalization experiments propped up an intelligentsia that was soon to become radicalized because of denial in power sharing and slow pace of modernization reforms. In post 1978 period, factional competition for state resources (high military and civilian offices), resulted in infighting between Parchami and Khalqi factions and after Parcham’s sidelining, personality clashes and conflict over resources within the Khalqi party invited intervention form the Soviet Union. From its inception, PDPA’s Khalqi and Parchami factions developed differences over the issue of distribution of important state offices, which had resulted in the Khalqi’s sidelining of the Parchamis. Such factional and personality clashes over state resources also helped to defeat the cause of reforms initiated by the Khalqi government in 1978-79.
Patrimonialism, in short has been a regular feature of Afghan politics and was used a tool of state making by not only the monarchs, but also by the so called republican leaders. Patrimonialism promoted tribal and factional competition over resources distribution. Undue favours to ethnic and tribal groups created conditions for social and political unrest. Ruler’s dependence on patronage resources for sustaining personal loyalty made the regimes susceptible to collapse, when patronage resources dried out. Patrimonial practices in Afghanistan proved extremely durable and hard to replace, deriving their strength from state dependence on external resources for state making and from an absence of participatory local politics (bodies) that could keep the patronage based patrimonial practices of the king in check as in European state building experience. The ethnic, factional characteristic of patrimonialism has re-surfaced in post 2001 state building exercise in Afghanistan.

Patrimonialism and Post-2001 State Building in Afghanistan

Interventionist state building in the new Millennium began in Afghanistan with the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, which not only outlined the framework of an interim authority in Afghanistan, but also provided for the convening of an Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) to decide upon an Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA), a Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) in 18 months for adopting a new constitution and elections within a year of the ELJ. It further reiterated international community’s commitment to building Afghan security and armed forces and till the creation of such forces, a UN mandated security force was to assist in providing security to Kabul and adjoining areas. The more than a decade long state building process has concentrated mainly on building formal state structures and improving their cope of functions, mainly focusing on Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the Judiciary, Public Administration and the Disarmament Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) efforts.
Patrimonialism and patronage politics has found its way into the post 2001 state building exercise in Afghanistan. Scholars note the presence of factions sponsored by rival ethnic or party leaders in the new security institutions. There are charges that rival patronage networks in the military are recruiting on ethnic or regional grounds. The two main rival patronage leaders identified in the military include, former Chief of Army Staff, Bismillah Khan, (coming from Tajik dominated Shura-e-Nazer) and Minister of Defense, Wardak. The differences between the two is said to affect decisions on appointments and control of staff, resources and operations. Scholars further note a friction between the Tajik and Pakhtun military officers and between the former Mujahideen (that fought against the Soviet invasion) and those officers having a root in the pro-Soviet army of the 1980s who constitute almost one-third of the total numbers in the ANA. There are also reports of officer’s involvement in corrupt practices, e.g., misappropriation of soldier’s pay, fuel and military equipment from warehouses, and their indulgence in narcotics and other illegal businesses. The factionalism in the present military is more harming than the one existing in the 70s and 80s army. It is because currently, factionalism’s defining character is ethnicity and not ideological differences as present in the earlier army.
Patrimonial factionalism in the Ministry of Defense has limited the effectiveness of Disarmament Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) implementation. Such factional politics was witnessed in the Jamait-i-Islami’s handling of the DDR process. This party is blamed for not only non-cooperation, but also maneuvering of DDR through selective choosing of units to be demobilized and through induction of large number of X combatants into ANP, which prevented these from being disarmed. The exclusion of Taliban fighters from the disarmaments process also resulted from political factionalism within the Ministry of Defense. Factionalism is affecting Judiciary’s performance in post 2001 period. Reported factional politics in the Constitutional Commission between Niamatullah Shahrani’s Salafist party and Massaud’s Shura-e-Nazar is blamed for weak judicial character of the Supreme Court and its domination by the powerful executive. Factionalism is afflicting judiciary at the at sub-national local nahia (urban administrative subdivision) level albeit in different forms. Influential elders at the nahia, influence the disputants to chose particular mediators for Jirga (to settle disputes informally), by virtue of exploiting their informal linkages and connections to the state actors. They act as brokers and gatekeepers between the state and aid agencies and the residents who depend on them for access to state and aid resources. These linkages assume negative proportions; using their privileges as gatekeeper’s to state’s resources, these informal actors influence the choice of mediators and jeopardize the built in accountability mechanisms of customary justice mechanisms. Additionally, interference by the executive and by powerful individuals in influencing judicial outcomes is pervasive. This is shown in reverse decisions made by the lower courts and at times, in failures to enforce judicial decisions.
The international state builder’s attempts at introduction of a rationalized bureaucratic structure, especially at the sub-national level have been frustrated by patronage politics of local power holders and corruption issues. Lister’s study of Public Administration Reform (PAR) in the provinces highlights problems over abuses, related to patronage appointments. She contends that PAR reforms implementation reflects local power holders changing patterns of interaction with the Afghan state. Their new roles involve influencing the state through non military means, such as becoming parliamentarians, or provincial council members, or by engagement in organized crime through connivance of state’s security agencies and its officials. This reflects that patrimonialism and patronage based appointments, which had stunted the growth of bureaucratization in Afghan history is still at works in harming the cause of reformation of public administration reforms in the post 2001 period.
There are scholars who prefer to look at the ethnicity issue in Afghanistan in post 2001 period as an extension of neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and patron-client relations. Between 2001 and 2004, the central government’s high offices came to be almost completely dominated by Tajik and Uzbek dominated Northern Alliance, which had helped the US to win the 2001 invasion. This problem of Pakhtun alienation (from the East and South) and that of Shia Hazaras (from the centre) was highlighted by several scholars. Starr, notes an immediate legitimacy crisis for the interim government because of disappointment among the Pakhtuns for being sidelined in state building attempts. It manifested in refusal by locals to cooperate with state administrators in the North East and North Central regions and resurgence of Taliban influence in these areas. Wimmer and Schetter, argue about state’s legitimacy being challenged through regional domination of the Panjsheri troika (Younus Qanuni, Abdullah Abdullah and Muhammad Fahim) and to the appointment of non-Pakhtuns to important state offices. This happened despite the fact that the interim cabinet that took office on December 22, 2001 was headed by Hamid Karzai, a Popalzai Pakhtun and included representation to reflect the ethnic composition of the population. Attempts were made in post 2004 period to form a broad base representation of all ethnicities by creating new ministries (not aligned with the Northern Alliance) and also replacing lower government staff, half of the provincial governors and three quarters of all local police chiefs with locals enjoying legitimacy in their areas.
Ethnic and regional imbalance in composition as well as recruitment of the security forces abounded in the initial years of state building. Ethnic representation figures in various reports show Tajiks over represented in relation to their population figures, whereas Pakhtuns roughly equal to their population figures and Hazara and Uzbek groups lesser in numbers than their population estimates. ICG report also cites regional imbalance in ethnic representation among the officer corps, e.g., in Zabul, though 95 % of the population is Pakhtun, but 75 % of the officer corps is Tajik. In such circumstances, allegations of favouritism are rampant. The policy of ethnic underrepresentation in the make-up of the new government in post 2001 period is seen by scholars as an extension of clientelist and patron client networks in the country. It is also historically a challenging position because prior to 2001, Pakhtun elite have traditionally dominated the government and have been the major recipients of patrimonial favours by the various monarchs and Amirs.

Conclusions

Patrimonialism has been a permanent feature of state making in Afghanistan. It was embedded in the very character of the state when it was born in October 1747. The reason was obvious; it came into being as a tribal creation and as a tribal polity. Its very survival depended on tribal elder’s loyalty to the monarch, which was retained through special privileges and favours flowing through the King. In that manner, patrimonialism performed an important function of providing stability to the nascent empire. But the foundation of such a system’s stability lay on precarious grounds. Loyalty to the king’s person were retained through perks and privileges, however, any decline in resources to patronage groups resulted in immediate withdrawal of loyalty resulting in conflict and war. This happened in the Sadozai as well as Mohammadzai reign. Regime dependence on patrimonial support prevented the growth of constitutionalism and stunted bureaucratization. It also gave a very fragile tax base to the Afghan economy and made other groups resentful towards special privileges of Pakhtun tribes and elders. Patronage politics also defeated the cause of modernization and reformation of the system. Politicization of the military and frustration with preferential treatment of regime loyalists found expression in radicalization of the society into leftist and rightist ideologies. Factional fighting over distribution of state resources acted as a prelude to Soviet invasion and subsequent conflict, war and state failure in Afghanistan.     
Patrimonialism as an informal institution has been highly resistant to change and has found its way into the post 2001 state building exercise. It has assumed party and ethnicity based factionalism characteristics. The army, for example, is discredited with charges of rival patronage factions, belonging to different parties influencing recruitments, staffing and resource allocation decisions. This factional competition is credited with slow implementation of the DDR reforms and with weakening the judicial character of the Supreme Court. At the sub-national level also, introduction of bureaucratization reforms were frustrated by patronage politics of local power holders and strongmen. These strongmen have discovered new ways of influencing the Afghan state, by electing themselves to the parliament and by engaging in organized crimes through collusion with state security higher ups and officials. Ethnic and regional imbalances abound in the composition and recruitment of security forces with rampant allegations of favouritism resulting in fueling ethnic tensions and creating legitimacy deficit for the interim and post interim set-up.

Bibliography

Alejandro, Gaviria., [February 2010]: The Effects of Corruption and Crime on Firm Performance: Evidence From Latin America. Retrieved from http://rru.world.org/Documents/PapersLink/Effectsoncrime.pdf, accessed on 13/05/2010
Allen, Chris., [September 1995]: Understanding African Politics, In Review of African Political Economy 22(65).
Amin, Tahir., [1982]: Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan. Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad.
Arnold, Anthony., [1983]: Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism Parcham and Khalq. Hoover Press Publications, Stanford.
Bates, Robert., [2008]: When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late Century Africa. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Boesen, Nils, [December 2006]: Governance and Accountability: How do the Formal and the Informal Interplay and Change. In International Seminar on Informal Institutions and Development-What do we know and what can we do?, Input Paper for Session B: Governance, Accountability and Capacity Development (11-12 December 2006). Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-development/37680055.pdf, accessed on 12/03/2012.
Bradsher, Henry S., [1985]: Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Duke University Press, Durham.
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle., [July 1994]: Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa. In World Politics, 46 (4).
Canas, Vitalino., [2011]: Governance Challenges in Afghanistan: An Update. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Special Report, October 2011. Retrieved from http://www.nato-pa.int, accessed on 05/04/2012.
Clapham, Christopher., [2002]: The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World. In Development and Change, 33(5).
Conference on the Relationship Between State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan.” (2006). Briefing Paper, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 10-14 2006. 
Deng, Francis et al., [1996]: Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Brookings Press, Washington D.C.
Dreher, Alex., and Thomas Harzfeld., [2005]: The Economic Costs of Corruption. Retrieved from accessed http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0506/0506001.pdf, accessed on 13/05/2010.
Edwards, Lucy Morgan., [December 2010]: State Building in Afghanistan: A Case Showing the Limits. In International Review of the Red Cross, 92(880).
Eisenstadt, S. N. and Roniger., [January 1980]: Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange. In Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22(1).
Englebert, Pierre., [March 2000]: Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa. In Political Research Quarterly, 53(1).
Ertman, Thomas., [1997]: Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Evans, Peter B., [December 1989]: Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State. In Sociological Forum, Special Issue- Comparative National Development: Theories and Facts for the 1990s, 4(4).
Gregorian, Vartan., [1969]: The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Grisson, Adam., [September 2010]: Making it up as we go along: State Building, Critical Theory and Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. In Conflict, Security and Development, 10(4).
Guistozzi, Antonio., [2000]: War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992. Hurst & Company, London.
 Guistozzi, Antonio., [2010]: The Afghan National Army. In The Rusi Journal, 154(6).
Guistozzi, Antonio., [June 2008]: Bureaucratic Façade and Political Realities of Disarmament and Demobilization in Afghanistan. In Conflict, Security and Development, 8(2).
Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky., [December 2004]: Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. In Perspectives on Politics, 2(4).
Hentz, James J., [2004]: State Collapse and Regional Contagion in Sub-Sahara Africa: Lessons for Zimbabwe. In South African Journal of Military Studies, 32(4).
Hutchcroft, Paul D., [1997]: The Politics of Privilege; Assessing the Impact of Rents, Corruption, and Clientelism on Third World Development. In Political Studies, 44(3).
ICG., [2010]: A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army. In International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 190, May 12, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/ ~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments% 20-%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.ashx, accessed on 15/03/2011
ICG., [2010]: Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary. In International Crisis Group Asia Report No 195, 17 November 2010. Retrieeved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx, accessed on 17/11/2010.
ICISS., [2001]: The Responsibility to Protect, (Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty). International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.
Ignatieff, Michael., [Winter 2006]: Intervention and State Failure. In Dissent.
Johnson, Thomas H., March-June 2006]: Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: the State of the State-building after the War. In Central Asian Survey, 25.
Khan, Mushtaq H., [2000]: Introduction. In Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development, edited by Mushtaq H. Khan and Kwame S. Jomo. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Khan, Mushtaq H., [December 2005]: Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the Case for Democracy in Developing Countries. In Democratization, 12(5).
Krasner, Stephen D., [2004]: Governance Failures and Alternatives to Sovereignty. Centre on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law CDDRL Working Paper No. 1, Retrieved from http://cddrl.stanford.edu. , accessed on 1/02/2010
Kraushaar, Maren and Daniel Lambach., [December 2009]: Hybrid Political Orders: The Added Value of a New Concept. The Australian Centre for peace and Conflict Studies Occasional Paper Series, Number 14, retrieved from http://www.issr.uq.edu.au/acpacs-publications, accessed on 12/10/2011
 Lister, Sarah., [July 2009]: Changing the Rules? State building and Local Government in Afghanistan. In Journal of Development Studies 45(6).
 Lund, Michael S., [1996]: Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy. US Institute of Peace Process, Washington D.C.
Maley, William., [2003]: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Malleson, George B., [1984]: History of Afghanistan: From the Earliest Period to the Outbreak of the War of 1878. Peshawar.
Matinuddin, Kamal., [1991]: Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush: Afghanistan 1978-1991. Wajidalis Pvt. Ltd., Lahore.
Misdaq, Nabi., [2006]: Afghanistan: Political Frailty and Foreign Interference. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London.
Najumi, Naematollah., [2002]: The Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan Palgrave Publishers, . New York.
Newell, Nancy Peabody and Richard Newell., [1982]: The Struggle for Afghanistan. Cornell University Press, London.
Newell, Richard S., [1972]: The Politics of Afghanistan. Cornell University Press, New York.
 Noelle, Christine., [1997]: State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan 1826-1863. Curzon Press, Richmond Surrey.
Rais, Rasul Baksh., [1994]: War Without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition after the Cold War. Oxford University Press, Karachi.
Reno, Willliam., [2002]: The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States. In Development and Change, 33(5).
Roy, Olivier., [1985]: Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rubin, Barnett R., [1995]: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Yale University Press, New Heaven and London.
Saikal, Amin., [2006]: Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, . London.
Schetter, Conrad., [2003]: Ethnicity and Political Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Joint CSP/ZEF (Bonn) Symposim, 30 May- 1 June 2003, Bonn, Germany.  Retrieved from  http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/arg/arp/schetter.pdf., accessed on 16/03/2010.
Singh, Ganda., [1959]: Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern Afghanistan. Gosha-e-Adab, Quetta.
Sorensen, Georg., [December 1996]: Development as a Hobbesian Dilemma. In Third World Quarterly, 17(5)
Starr, Frederick S., [2006]: Sovereignty and legitimacy in Afghan Nation Building. In Francis Fukuyama, ed., Nation Building, Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Sultan Mahomed Khan., [1980]:  The Life of Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan, Vol. 1. Oxford University Press, Karachi.
Szeftel, Morris., [September 2000]: Clientelism, Corruption & Catastrophe. In Review of African Political Economy, 27(85).
The Bonn Agreement 2001, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.” Retrieved from http://www.unamaafg.org/docs/_nonUN%20 Docs/_Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bo., accessed on 02/09/2009.
TLO., [2009]: Linkages Between State and Non-State Justice Systems in Eastern Afghanistan: Evidence from Jalalabad, Nangarhar and Ahmad Aba, Paktia. Tribal Liaison Office, May 2009. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ROL/state-and-non-state-justice-systems-in-eastern-Afghanistan.pdf., accessed on 12/05/2010.
United Nations., [2004]; A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
Weber, Max., [1970]: From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Translated, Edited with an Introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Wimmer, Andreas and Conrad Schetter., [2003]: Putting State Formation First: Some Recommendations for Reconstruction and Peace-Making in Afghanistan. In Journal of International Development 15.
 Younossi, Obaid., Peter Dehl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M Solinger and Brian Grady., [2009]: The Long march: Building an Afghan National Army. CA., Rand Corporation Report, Santa Monica.