INDIA AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM: DEFENDING THE FRONTIERS OF INDIA
(1801-1838)

Salman Bangash*

Introduction

International conflicts are neither random inexplicable nor bizarre. They are extremely structured and arise from well-established international rivalries. The main bone of contention and conflict of interest between the rival states are territory, influence, status, and ideology. The amalgamation of potential danger, cognitive inflexibilities, and domestic political developments make strategic competition a powerful dynamic in world politics. During much of the nineteenth century the British government was obsessed and gripped by its apprehension of threats to the Indian sub-continent from European rivals such as the French and the Russians. India was one of Great Britain prize-worth possessions. India was not only important due to her own riches rather it was the base from where Britain established political and mercantile relationships with many states in Asia and Africa. The British could not afford to lose India. For this very reason the protection and security of India became the major component of the British foreign policy in order to safeguard the “Golden Sparrow” from its European rivals such as France under Napoleon Bonaparte and Czarist Russia which was strengthening its position by its policy of invasion and subjugation of Caucasus and Central Asia. This paper would critically evaluate the British concerns and its strategy to protect India from its European rivals in the just decade of the 19th century.

The Age of European Imperialism

From a world chronological and historical perception, the most perceptible development in the 19th century was the dominance and supremacy of Europeans over Non-Europeans. While empires have risen and fallen across the world since antiquity, imperialism assumed a unique form and occupied a paradoxical position in modernity. Modern imperialism was unique, because state powers centred in Europe, for the first time claimed to govern day to day affairs of far flung but non-contiguous territories and the peoples who inhabited them. Western Imperialism reached its pinnacle in the last 30 years of the 19th century when most of Asia and Africa was colonised by rival European powers. No part of the globe, nonetheless remote and inaccessible from them, was free from their preachers, entrepreneurs, explorers and adventurers. The European powers defended colonialism politically and morally with claims that Christian influences would civilize and enlighten the “savage” people who were conquered. It was the ‘responsibility of the civilized’ to govern the inferior races. Imperialism was intently defined as the ideological justification of colonialism. Almost all definitions of imperialism referred to the coercive amalgamation and incorporation of territories, along with their economies, social formations, and political systems, into wider structures of power dominated by foreigners. According to P.T. Moon imperialism means “domination of non-European native races by totally dissimilar European nations.”  
A variety of causes on modern day imperialism were identified by the scholars such as Great Power rivalries, military, technological and industrial superiority, and maritime advantages. Similarly imperialism was rationalised in terms of such concepts as the White Man’s Burden and the mission civilisatrice. Queries like how was all this possible? The ways and means, by which Empire was controlled and guarded, as well as the consequences and cost generated a vast literature. Political thinkers either justified or contested the systematic political inequalities between metropolitan powers and colonies.

What was British Imperialism?

The British Empire was the most extensive and powerful of the modern European Empires. It is therefore hardly surprising that it has been the subject of great intellectual controversy. Questions have long been pondered why and how the British were able to accumulate and built up such a potent and powerful empire? And how they managed to supplant and step into the shoes of the Spanish, Portuguese and the Dutch Empires in the 17th and 18th centuries and successfully thwart and frustrated the French, Russian and German challenges over the 19th and early 20th centuries? For some, British imperialism was like an epoch in the annals of British history , but for others it was “essentially immoral.”
Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the necessity for protection and defence and the pursuit for prosperity and affluence forced the British to draw into the wider world. At its peak, the British Empire was one of the biggest and strongest empires that the world had ever recognized and accredited, determining the politics of the world. It was often said that “the sun never sets on the British Empire”. Britain was, as Helford J. Mackinder, had once put it, ‘the centre of the world’.
In the nineteenth century British imperialism was considered by many as a vehicle for enlightenment and civilization and was accordingly something to be proud of.  But interestingly imperialism was never clearly defined, and it was never one monolithic idea, or process: ultimately, the British Empire represented different things to different people. This variety meant that ‘the trajectory of British Imperialism did not fit precisely and specifically any single ‘model’ of economic, military, cultural or political theory of Empire.’ British Imperialism was based on Greed, patriotism, nationalism, jingoism, militarism, navalism, Christianity, humanitarianism, adventure, and a patriotic and profitable holy mission. The Empire was built up over a long period of the time, and territories were required for quite different reasons. The British protected its vast territories by its navy which was one of the strongest and largest in the world.
British prosperity depended on its commerce and the need to guard the trade routes which became inextricably woven with the question of national security. British commercial and mercantile competition and contention with other European countries developed into passionate and fervent political rivalry.
Those in charge and responsible for conducting the foreign policy of state were bound to work for ensuring the security of the land of their birth as well as for maintaining its Great power status and eminence. This conditioned their perceptions and consequently the manner and conduct of its relations with other powers. British diplomacy in the post-Napoleonic era was to maintain peace and security in Europe, to protect and safeguard its possessions overseas and to reinforce freedom of commerce everywhere.
British foreign policy by and large was both aggressive and defensive; one opted for military means and the other applied economic and alliances as instruments. Furthermore, being an Island, British foreign policy was all the time influenced and determined by its geography.
Interventionist policy was required time and again in the 19th century, to readjust the presumably altering balance of power and to promote British security. On the other hand, her colonial possessions were always in constant threat posing a multifaceted and complex problem of security together with the dilemma and quandary of ‘unstable Frontiers.’
Britain in the 19th century therefore manifested itself as a dichotomous picture of non-intervention against intervention, European interest against imperial interests and non-commitment against commitment. Britain’s foreign policy was influenced by innennpolitik that is domestic, political, economic, financial considerations, constraint and restraint.

 The Struggle for India: Defending the Frontiers of India

In the midst of its enormous and gigantic empire, India was one of its leading possessions. India because of its huge resources and the prestige associated with it was aptly termed the ‘brightest jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire. India became the symbol of alluring, prosperous, profitable, advantageous British Imperial greatness. Its protection from invasion became paramount. Preservation of British Dominion in the East was second only in importance to the security of the homeland itself. British governments irrespective of their party political affiliations acknowledged and considered the security of India as their top most priority and main concern. British Isles and India were the centres of their affluence, wealth, strength and power in the world. In Sneh Mahajan words ‘Next in importance, and second only to the security of the United Kingdom itself, comes the question of the defence of India.’ The British could not afford to lose India which was a symbol of British fortune, prominence and authority.
India was not only important due to her own riches but it was the launching pad from where Britain established political and mercantile relationships with the countries in the Asia and Africa. The British Indian Army was to underpin interests in these regions from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. To embark on a voyage and expedition to the East and partake of the riches and wealth of India remained a cherished and treasured figment of the imagination of European nations for centuries.
When the British imperialists consolidated their hold in India, they sought to protect it not only from neighbouring powers, but from European rivals. The British government made Herculean efforts to make sure that the Great Powers of Europe kept their hands not just off their empire in India but all the states located in the vicinity of India. France had been a rival of Britain for power and influence for centuries. In 1798, when the Revolutionary government sent Napoleon to Egypt, he thought it was the first step in the direction to conquer India.
French activities and behaviour in the vicinity of India and on the route to India were observed with great concern both in London and Calcutta ‘After Napoleon’s military venture to the Eastern Mediterranean,’ writes L. Carl Brown, ‘British statesmen never ceased worrying about the life–line to India.” In 1801 a serious threat emerged out of a joint communiqué issued by the rulers of Russia and France which stated that the sufferings which ‘the people of India are faced with,  had inspired the two leaders to unite their forces in order to liberate India from the tyrannical and barbarious yoke of the English.’ Lord Minto the Governor-General of India (1807 to 1813), worked strenuously and persistently to counter any invasion which might result from the Franco-Russian alliance during Napoleonic wars especially after the famous treaty of Tilsit in 1807.
The British observed with great concern and apprehension Franco-Russian rapprochement, French diplomatic ventures with Persia to get the support for an anti-British alliance, and also Franco-Persian overtures to the rulers of Sind were sufficient factors to cause alarm and anxiety. Lord Minto reacted by counter move by launching a diplomatic offensive to win over the rulers whose territories laid in the conceivable pathway of an invading army. Secret missions were sent to the capitals of Sind, Punjab, Afghanistan and Persia. By the time the treaties had been secured in 1809, the grand design had lost its exigency; the British took the advantage by capturing the islands of Reunion and Mauritius from the French in 1809-10. These islands had long been bases for flourishing commerce and had figured prominently in Napoleon’s dream of restoring French power in India. The Governor-General also took the opportunity to dispossess the Dutch, Napoleon’s allies, of the islands of Moluccas and Java, hence further strengthening India’s outlying maritime routes.
The British saw no option but to strain every nerve and muscle, in order to defend India. The first threat collapsed at Waterloo in 1815, and Napoleon took his dreams of conquering India into exile with him to St. Helena, where he died in 1821. Klemens Wenzel, Prince von Metternich of Austria stated: “Napoleon dreamt neither of the Porte nor of Asia, and if his hatred for England momentarily inspired him with the idea of attacking it in its Asian possessions, this project only existed as an eventuality depending on a combination of circumstances that were difficult to foresee.” The French menace gone into history with the demise of Napoleon but the British officials were still very much concerned and wanted to create a vast buffer zone to protect India  from European rivals in future.  Lawrence James elaborated this factor in these words:
Ever since e Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, British regional policy was guided by the need to create as cheaply as possible a vast buffer zone stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan, which would serve as India's defensive glacis. Its perimeter encompassed the Turkish Provinces…Persia and Afghanistan.

Both Russia and Great Britain had emerged as formidable centres of power after the defeat of Napoleon. In Britain, as elsewhere, news of Napoleon’s demise was greeted with jubilation and euphoria. Alexander’s earlier deception and duplicity in joining forces with Napoleon against Britain was advantageously forgotten, ‘as relief overcame any other contemplation and consideration.’
During the 19th century the Russian forward thrust in Central Asia was a last phase in its advancement and expansionism already in progress over several centuries. Since the time of Peter the Great (1682-1725), the Russian endeavour had been  to gain access and contact via the Indo-Persian Corridor to reach the India Ocean, to set up and establish trade linkage with India and China, either by land or sea. The strongest inducement and motivation for Russia’s territorial expansion over the centuries has been access to the sea. The inspiration of Russian expansion toward the warm waters ports to the south, either on the Dardanelles, in the Persian Gulf, or in the Indian Ocean has often been traced back to the Testament of Peter the Great, the Testament left a stirring and thrilling ‘memorandum’ to the world concerning Russia’s predetermined progress and advance to Constantinople and beyond. While the testament helped to incite western Russophobia throughout the ages it contained, nevertheless, an ‘excellent synopsis’ of Russia’s past and potential targets. Richard A. Pierce, highlighted Russian intentions in these words:
By the early 19th century the Russian statesmen and military men had also begun to feel concern the British commercial and political penetration in Central Asia. There call for decisive action to guarantee Russian trade and to raise Russian prestige among the Asian Peoples…. Thus impelled by provocations, temptations and apprehensions acceptable enough before a world opinion, still uninhabited by question of aggression or disregard for sovereign rights, Russia joined the rivalry for colonial acquisition which dominated nineteenth century international politics.

In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, the governments of Great Britain and Russia had not marked one another out as a particular source of future danger, but Russian adventurism by crossing into Caucasus and the British advances in India were to have momentous and long-term consequences in their relations. Their preponderance and predominance in Eurasia made conflict and rivalry between them predictable and unavoidable. Initially Russia’s advancement in Central Asia was not only a question to be concerned about but rather appreciated by some in England as a white man’s burden to explore and civilise the barbarian. With India firmly and resolutely established as the jewel in the British crown – and the wellspring and fountain of the empire’s prosperity and affluence – British statesmen, diplomats and politician’s anxieties slowly focused on the continued and unrelenting expansion of Czarist Russia.
According to Norman Gash from the British point of view, the Russian menace extended beyond European frontiers to the overland route to India through the Red Sea. India’s weakest points were Persia and Afghanistan which were exposed to Russian penetration. In the Balkans, and across the Straits which formed the only channel from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, the obstacle and barrier was the Ottoman Empire with its declining dynasty, its paralytic administration, and its restless tributary states. After the Congress of Vienna, the significance of Turkey began to be more and more appreciated by European diplomats. Its survival became even for many liberals as European necessity and obligation. To strengthen the Middle East and keep in check Russia therefore became the basic principle of British foreign policy.’ Charles Marvin an anti-Russian believed that ‘the chain of conflict zones, consisting of the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Central Asia.’ In this political wrangling the Central Asian States were mere pawns on the chessboard of colonial rivalry between the two European imperialist Powers.
Russia’s expansionist policies in Central Asia by the early 1830s were seen by some British as a new and dangerous threat to their Indian possessions. In this regard many books were available to the public, one and all discussing, temperately or extravagantly but always seriously, the most likely direction of the Russian advance. One British official warned about the threats which the British could face from the Russians in a report entitled “An enquiry into the means of attack on British India by Russia and of defence to be posed to it.”
Russia possesses sufficient resources for effectively carrying on her operations in that quarter, without diminishing the strength of her European armies, or improving her means of resistance to any combination of allies, which it may be in the power of Great Britain to array against her upon her western frontier….Russian and Persian army once established on the Indus…would possesses such tremendous means of arousing all the  disaffected Powers of India, uniting them in an attack upon British Power, that the event of the struggle might become uncertain, even with the most numerous levies got together to meet the general assailants. It will therefore be of the utmost importance to the Indian Government to meet the enemy if possible on the Indus, by securing the warlike Afghans as allies…

By the end of 1837 Russophobia was a major element in a segment of British public opinion. It was in a real sense Lord Palmerston, the then foreign Secretary and later on the Prime Minister, of Great Britain began his campaign against the Russian threat by vigorously contesting Russian influence and sway throughout western and Central Asia and in the capitals of Europe. Captain Arthur Conolly (1807-1842), of the Bengal Cavalry, credited with being the first to describe the nineteenth-century jousting between Imperial Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia as “the Great Game,” even though it was Rudyard Kipling who popularised this “jolly-sounding reference to intrigue and derring-do in his Victorian romances of empire” in his famous novel Kim. P.J. Brobst termed it ‘A grand chessboard and a contest for mastery in Asia.’   Count Nesselrode, Russian Foreign Minister, had fashioned his own term for this conflict, ‘Tournament of Shadow’, but it was the ‘Great Game’ that caught the popular imagination.
The year of 1838 was quite significant for both Russia and Great Britain as the Great Game for Central Asia was about ‘to burst into open warfare, with India the prize and Afghanistan the playing field.’ The British made the justification to invade Afghanistan to counter Russian moves in that country in order to maintain the balance of power in its favour.  After two years of occupation and massive waste of money and blood the British left the country in failing to achieve its objectives in its first adventurism to dominate the mountains of Hindu Kush. The coming decades were marked by the influence, deception, valor, affectation, gallantry, viciousness and occasionally pure wildness that now go under the name of Great Game.

 Conclusion

To protect and safeguard the frontiers of India and its routes was an unquestioned maxim of British foreign policy. The British policy makers concentrated and focused on the containment of any threat to their interest in the region. The British developed a policy which called for a greater consolidation of British power in India and expansion of British political influence and sway in neighboring countries through an ostentatious and well-planned system of buffer zones. The British Empire made enormous efforts to make it sure that the western imperialist powers not only kept their hands off their empire in India but also the neighbouring countries of India. As a result, the whole area from the wild Central Asian plain down to the Arabian Sea in the south and the Persian Gulf in the southwest had been exposed to the most delicate and difficult diplomatic game, known as the ‘Great Game’ among the imperialist powers of the day (France, Great Britain & Russia). The British were apprehensive that any approach to her frontiers could lead to an outbreak of general revolt against their rule in India which they wanted to avoid at any cost. On the other hand, the British were, also very much keen to extend their influence, and if conceivable, control over the neighboring countries.

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