SIACHEN GLACIER:
THE CONFLICT & FUTURE PERSPECTIVE

Faiz ur Rehman*

Abstract

The monumental elevations of the mountains have always been a test to the men capability to combat and endure in the extreme terrifying weather conditions since the history of wars. What forced India and Pakistan to fight the ever-highest battle on this planet? Definitely, its geo-strategic location as it lies at the cross-junction of China, India and Pakistan. It was the 19th Century, when the Great Game was played within its geographical compasses and now experiencing another power struggle since 1984 but this time the players are diverse. In most cases of war, the geography of the land and its wealth said to be a major cause, if it is factual then Siachen is the key model of it.
There have been a number of reconciliation efforts taken place since the beginning of the conflict but due to strategic advantage and the future design to enter into the Central Asia through that region, Indian Government has always used delaying maneuvers in signing any agreement over the viable resolution of Siachen conflict. On the other hand, after Gayari tragedy on 7th of April 2012, there is rising plea to declare Siachen as a buffer zone. The status quo will not serve either the State; however, the impact on the human, environmental and economic costs of this engagement will be shocking for both the nations in future.

Introduction

In Balti etymology, Siachen means black rose that broadly spread in the zone. Siachen Glacier (hereafter Siachen) is an undemarcated region and is a fundamental portion of Baltistan. It falls in the East of Karakoram/Himalaya and measures around 75 Km in length and 4.8 km in width and rises to approximately 7000 meters. Geographically, Siachen lies between North latitude 35º5' and East longitude 77º0. Positioned just northeast of the point NJ9842, Siachen is world's biggest glacier outside the polar region. There are number of gigantic summits and Indira Coli (the uppermost) that splits Central and South Asia. Siachen is a leading source of Nubra River that intersects the Shyok River, which is one of the offshoots of Indus River. The northern slopes of the Indira Coli Ridge lead to the Shaksgam valley. The average winter snowfall in this region is approximately 35 feet and temperatures can dip to −50 °C.
The Siachen passes had been the traditional passage between Indian Sub-continent and Central Asia that several convoys used it for many centuries.   In 1821 W. Moorcroft was the first who passed near the Siachen glacier’s threshold while Henry Strachey became the first Westerner who discover glacier. With the Russian occupation on Khanates states of Central Asia in mid 19th century, it became distressing for the British interest in Karakoram region that resulted with an emergence of a Great Game there. Siachen is ever highest and one of the most expensive battlefield on this planet as started in 1984 and cost the lives of the hundreds of soldiers mainly due to the punitive weather conditions but still there is no sign of any conflict resolution on it.
The decision to conquer the Siachen pinnacles taken by the Indian military and political leadership has raised many questions in the mind of a common researcher: Was it a short-term Indian strategy, likes to stop the Pakistani encroachment in that region as Indian claimed or a long-term vision of the greater India? Is war a solution to this issue or both the nations has to rely on its political settlement? Regarding any sustainable solution, what opinions both the adversaries have? If status quo exist there then what will be its impact on that particular region? Hence, this article intends to analyze the ground realities and future perspective of this complex issue.

Strategic Significance

From strategic point of view, Siachen Glacier is located at an important location as it lies between the Saltoro Ridge and main Karakoram Range and oversees the tactical Karakoram Pass, which links Pakistan with China. Its mountainous pinnacles are the natural boundary between Pakistan and Central Asian states. Siachen can be approached by crossing the Saltoro Ridge through Sia La, Bilfond La and Gyong La. These passes are strategically imperative for sustaining control over the region whereas Pakistan controls Gyong La, which is to the West of the Saltoro Ridge. Here Saltoro Ridge is very vital as Indian rheostat over Saltoro can jeopardize the Sino-Pak road link in that area.
Indian military sources claimed that Pakistani switch in Karakoram would be a potential menace to Indian location in Ladakh in addition to Chinese positions in Aksai Chin. Maj. Gen. Sheru Thapliyal contended that as Corps Commander, “he updated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Sep-Oct 1983 about the strategic prominence of Siachen and Pakistan design to capture Khardung la   and overlook Leh by bringing artillery and rockets in Nubra valley and then link up with Chinese at Aksai Chin.” Pakistani analysts take the Siachen conflict in a relatively dissimilar scenario. General (R) Mohammad Aziz Khan pronounces that control of Siachen has been a part of Indian policy in its direct access to the Central Asian states via Wah Khan Strip in line with the Nehru hallucination of “Greater India” since 1947 and this might be the one of the foremost motives that India has always negotiated only on Jammu and Kashmir by eliminating Ladakh.
Professor Ahmad Hasan Dani claimed that Indian imperialism behind its mission into Siachen is assign to an intrusion from Nubra into Khapalu and Skardu and then to axe Baltistan away from Gilgit and thus to interpolate the Pakistan-China nexus in the Gilgit- Baltistan. Secondly, Pakistan control over Gyong La that overlooks the Shyok and Nubra river Valleys and Indian access to Leh district. It is to be said that the struggle in capturing the water reservoirs will result the World War III in 21st century. India is aiming to physique five hundred new dams in near future and the storing of Indus River water in Ladakh region by controlling the Siachen, which will be a severe blow for Pakistani agriculture and a threat to its energy generation capacity. The Kargil war of 1999 was an extension of the Siachen Conflict as its main objective was to get control of the region and check the communication and transportation from Srinagar, Kargil, Leh-Manali to Siachen. In case of Pakistani command over the Kargil statures, Indian could be forced to airlift the daily supplies of life, arms and ammunition that could cost them 20 percent more than the Pakistan in Siachen region.

Siachen Conflict

Pedigrees of the Siachen conflict originates in the non-demarcation of the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan, which loped North and northeast to the map grid point NJ 9842, near the Shyok River at the base of Saltoro range. The Karachi agreement signed on 27th July 1949 recognized a Ceasefire Line that observed by the United Nation Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and even at the time of Simla Agreement, it was acknowledged that there was no viability for any human endurance beyond this point. There was a polysemy in the agreement as it did not mention the clear status of the Siachen Glacier, stating that from the point NJ9842, the Line of Control would ensue "thence north to the glaciers.” Later, both the sides construed these words in their own ways just to prove their claim to control that region. 
Prior to 1984, there is no evidence of Indian or Pakistani perpetual presence in the area, however, the Indian sources claimed that from very first day, Pakistan had an eye on terrains in Ladakh and Shyok valley, which could let Pakistan to seize mountains and glaciers as well as Siachen. In 1948, the advancement of Pakistan army along the river Indus towards the Leh was the clear gesture of its future design in that particular region. After Pakistan-China border agreement in 1963, Pakistan had encouraged in yielding permits to the western mountaineering excursions. On 24th February 1975, Pakistan started allowing the foreign mountaineers to scramble to the Siachen Glacier where Pakistan army officer operated as a liaison officer.
Between 1975 and 1981, there had been 20 foreign mounting trips reported and for all those, foreigners had to acquire the authorization only from Pakistan. This was testing water for Indian retort; however, Indian did not counter promptly as it did at the time of Sino-Pak Agreement in 1963 but became alarmed and heedful over the Pakistani activities next to the Chinese frontier. Earlier, by 1956-57, the edifice of military road between Xinjiang and western Tibet through the Aksai resulted, the Sino-Indian war of October 1962. China occupied Aksai Chin in 1962 war whereas the Trans-Karakoram Tract was relinquished by Pakistan to China in 1963. Indian Government did not recognize the Sino-Pak agreement and sent protest letters to both China and Pakistan.
Earlier in 1975, United States Defence Mapping Agency indicated Siachen as a part of Pakistani Held Northern Areas (Now Gilgit-Baltistan), followed by National Geographic Society’s Altas of the World, Historical Atlas of South Asia and the Times Atlas of the World, London. The official Atlas of Pakistan that published in 1985 has changed the disputed status of Gilgit-Baltistan and presented the Pakistani borders along the line of United States Defence Mapping Agency’ map. The events started in mid 1970s to reinforce the Pakistani entitlement of Siachen, provided a chance to the India Government to advance its army in that region.

Operation Meghdoot

Lt. Gen. M.L. Chibber, the Indian Commander of Northern Army revealed that after receiving the information on 21st August 1983 that Pakistan troops had occupied Bilafond La, Indian Government decided to take control of the area in September 1983 after a military briefing to Indira Gandhi then the Prime Minister of India. On 13th April 1984, Operation Meghdoot was propelled by dropping armed units at Sia La and Bilafond La, two main passes along the Saltoro Ridge and established enduring posts there, which oversees the Siachen glacier, along its western outskirt. Nevertheless, the matter of fact is that India directed a military training mission to Antarctica in 1982 to adapt under Siachen Glacier like conditions, aiming to take control on Pakistan-China strategic connection. This was the identical strategy that Soviet Union had used in Afghanistan before its invasion in 1979.
Exactly on the same year, Indian army positioned its troops at its highest and the most important points in Siachen. That move gave the Indian army an important tactical advantage, however, made dreadfully tough to sustain the supplying line to these frontward positions. Later, India started strengthening its military power and busy in preparation of blue-water navy and improving its missile technology by following the philosophy that power is itself a reason. Indian claims that it is its defence strategy against Chinese potential threat but in fact, China is out of its missile’s range, and eventually this all will go against Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Reaction

Pakistan swiftly reacted with its operation called as Ababeel (swallow) by troop deployments on the lower positions of Saltoro and confronted the Indian control at Soltoro Range.   Within a short period of time, the Indians were in control over the best of the glacier as Pakistan was late by just a week. Since then both sides have made numerous efforts to dislodge each other’s militaries but with petite achievement. The Indian army has stretched its control over much of the hilly region including the passes of the Saltoro Ridge to the West of the Siachen while Pakistan sustained control over the western directions of the range.

Violation of Peace Agreements

The direct control of Siachen was a clear violation of both the agreements signed between these two contenders in 1949 and 1972 respectively. Even some of the Indian analysts divulged that the autarchic military occupation of any part of the LoC, even if it was undemarcated, was an open violation of the Simla Agreement. “We swear by the Simla Agreement but merrily imply that it does not apply to Siachen since the LoC does not cover that region beyond NJ 9842 which is a wrong definition as Para 1 (ii) of the Agreement embodies an overriding commitment, independently of respect for the LoC.” As according to the Simla Agreement, both the countries are hypothetical to resolve their differences by nonviolent means through mutual dialogues. Pending the final settlement of any of the snags between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally revise the situation nor shall both thwart the organization, backing or inspiration of any acts malicious in retaining the peace and harmonious relations. Western sources claim that Siachen is the output of Kashmir conflict that resulted from Indian policy of imperialism in the Himalayan region in violation of the two agreements on Kashmir with Pakistan (Karachi agreement of 1949 and Simla agreement in 1972).

Diplomatic Efforts

The two-day talks (11th-12th of June 2012) on the Siachen issue between India and Pakistan at the Defence Ministry in the Pakistani garrison city of Rawalpindi have once again concluded without any accelerative task, however, both sides endorsed their assurance in staying engaged in their mutual quest for an sustainable settlement of the issue that has been obfuscating their relations. Indian Defence Secretary Shashi kant Sharma and Pakistani Defence Secretary Nargis Sethi, have led their delegations respectively. Notwithstanding Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani's plea for the resolution on Siachen issue after Gayari tragedy on 7th of April 2012 where the death of 129 Pakistani soldiers and 11 civilians in an landslide, its conclusion was very much predictable in the absenteeism of reciprocally adequate procedure for demilitarization from Siachen where both fissionable opponents have positioned thousands of troops for years.
On 9th of June 2012, just two days before the talks, India's Defence Minister A. K. Antony said: “Do not presume any melodramatic declaration on an issue from one discussion, which is very imperative for us, especially in the milieu of national security.” Even the foreign sources were not expectant any breakthrough as James Clapper, the US director of National Intelligence, mentioned in his annual report on worldwide threats succumbed in January 2012, that “Less progress has been made in discussions over the complex border issues of Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek, and we assess New Delhi will uphold a go-slow attitude in these dialogues.” While other diplomatic sources termed it as old wine in a new bottle.
According to the media reports, the Pakistan ingeminated its plea for demilitarizing the Siachen glacier and pulling back troops to the pre-1972 locus and further called for the resolution of the issue under the provisions as discoursed in 1989 and 1992 while the Indian Government has made it clear that any settlement must comprise the validation and demarcation of contemporary military positions, the Actual Ground Line Position (AGLP) on Siachen. In their joint proclamation issued on 12th of June 2012, both the sides reiterated their understandings in making stern, sustainable and result-oriented efforts for seeking an agreeable solution of this throbbing issue.
Since 1985, when the diplomatic efforts to find out an enduring solution to the Siachen conflict started between General Zia ul Haq then the President of Pakistan and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, there have been thirteen series of discussions on the Siachen between the two countries. Apart from the fifth & sixth meetings, all the talks between India and Pakistan met with the same doom. During the fifth meeting when both the countries were close to sign an treaty as it was stated in a joint announcement issued on June 17th 1989 by the Pakistani Foreign Secretary Dr. Humayun Khan and his Indian counterpart Mr. S. K. Singh in Islamabad announcing that the Indian Government decided to shuffle armies to locations occupied at the time of the Simla Agreement. The exact position would be worked out by military specialists of both countries. Indian Foreign Secretary S.K. Singh held: "I would like to thank the Foreign Secretary, Dr. Humayun Khan, and validate everything he has said."
The term redeployment of forces rather than withdrawal was a Pakistani concession intended to enable Rajiv Gandhi to show the agreement to his military and to political rivals in an election year. However, the Pakistanis and others including media interpreted the word redeployment as military withdrawal from Siachen and the agreement was reflected a main triumph for Pakistan which provided a chance for Indian opposition leaders to use it a propaganda movement against Mr. Rajiv Gandhi who was going to contest the following election. The next morning, Indian Government condemned of any agreement with Pakistan over the joint departure of troops.
Later, during his trip to Pakistan in June 1989, Rajiv Gandhi publicized, “If only your Foreign Secretary had not stated the 1972 positions in talking of redeployment, we would not be having all this trouble." Obliquely, Rajiv Gandhi has admitted the breach of the Simla Agreement when he said on November 16, 1989 in Kolkata: "we have recuperated about 5,000 square kilometers of part from occupied Kashmir in Siachen. We will not relinquish one square kilometer of that."
Additional panorama was missed during the sixth round of talks from 2nd-4th of November 1992 when Pakistan decided to record the troops locations in an annexure with a provision that the positions evacuated would not be constituted by either side as a base for a legitimate claim or rationalize a political or moral right to the area specified. This was a clear sign of litheness that Pakistan had indicated in meeting the Indian plea for endorsement of AGLP. However, the Indian Government clogged its Defense Secretary N.N. Vohra (now the Governor of Indian Held Kashmir) from signing such agreement. Later Mr. Vohra disclosed, “We had concluded the manuscript of an agreement at Hyderabad House by around 10 P.M on the last day. Signing was set for 10 am next morning but later that night, directions were given to me not to go onward the next day but to clinch substances in our next round of talks in Islamabad in January 1993.” Of course, that day never came, Mr. Vohra added. “That's the way these things go.”
While Indian sources claimed that due to the Pakistani approach, the dialogues were resultless as Pakistan negated to move from its highly technical posture on the issue. Later, Pakistan drew its concession in 1994 and interrelated Siachen to Kashmir issue. The matter of fact was that the Indian attitude was not serious in solving the Siachen issue and just bargaining the time as Narasimha Rao (then the Prime Minister of India) had no such excuse in 1992.
A current avowal by the Indian Army Chief General Bikram Singh has exposed the inner mindset of Indian army when on September 19, 2012, he said that Indian military would not like to step down of the strategically vital positions for which a lot of blood has been lost and army has tendered its feelings to the Indian Government which has a ultimate authority in this regard and it is very imperative for India to grip that region. In order to strengthen its hold in the region, Indian Government has started the construction on the strategic Rohtang Tunnel, which will connect all weather roads between Leh and Manali. The tunnel will be decisive in upholding the supply lines to its forward posts in Ladakh and Siachen Glacier and also a strong hint of Indian future strategic planning regarding the Siachen.

Human Cost

Pakistani Military sources claimed that out of the 8,000 combatants deployed at Siachen, about 3,000 Pakistani soldiers have been died since 1984, about 90 percent of them perished due to frostbites, avalanches and other technical hitches. Average, one Pakistani soldier is killed every fourth day while one Indian soldier is killed every other day. Lt. Gen. M. L. Chibber, says that this bleeding ulcer (Siachen Glacier) has cost us nearly 20,000 victims in over twenty years. However, the Indian Government has proclaimed that around 846 armed forces personnel have lost their lives in the Siachen sector since 1984 as Defence Minister A. K. Antony in a retort to a query in the Lok Sabha on 27th August 2012. Indian army did not distinguish between those who died in warfare and those who lost their deaths in snowstorms.

Financial Cost

Due to of the higher number of troops and deliveries are transported by helicopter, the cost of Siachen is projected about Rs. 48 million per day for Indian army, which is nearly three-four times more than Pakistan as most of its posts are at lower elevation and also abridged the logistical cost by constructing roads at its positions across the Siachen approaches. Whereas Pakistan sources claimed, that Indian logistic cost is ten times higher than that of Pakistan.

Environmental Issue

Global warming has had its worst impact there on Himalayas region. According to the initial findings of a survey by Pakistan Meteorological Department, the Siachen Glacier has been receding for the past 30 years and is melting at disquieting ratio. Since 1984, the presence of thousands of troops in the purlieu of the Siachen Glacier has affected severe environmental degradation of an ecosystem already affected by climate modification. The temperature rise at Siachen was reported at 0.2 degree Celsius annually in 2007, causes melting and avalanches. According to another study report, the glacier is retreating at a rate of 110-meter per year.
It is appraised that the Siachen Glacier will be reduced to about one-fifth of its current size by 2035. Chemical blasting for the purpose of constructing camps and posts will be the one of the mains motives of its retreat as thousands of tons of military trash and human surplus lie dumped in the area. It is assessed that due to burning of fuel for cooking, warming and transportation of men and material by land and air, about 200 tons of carbon dioxide is released into the air each day. Due to the extreme climatic conditions, this large amount of litter, empty bullets and parachutes dumped on the glacier, neither be decayed nor can be scorched. The region is home to intermittent species like snow leopard, brown beer, Marco Polo sheep and copious erratic floras are now at threat because of mammoth military existence in the region.

Current Situation

The Indian army has established control over the upper pinnacles of the Siachen and most its offshoot glaciers as well as the two of the three leading passes of the Siachen, Sia La and Bilafond La while Pakistan controls the Gyong La and successfully choked Indian access to Korakorum-2, the second highest peak in the world and other adjacent summits. The situation is that Pakistanis cannot get up to the Siachen glacier, while the Indians cannot come down. Indian sources claimed that more than 1,000 square miles of terrain has been taken by its military operations in Siachen since 1984. While Pakistan acknowledged that India seized almost 900 square miles of territory. Direct skirmishes have been terminated in that region but both the sides have sustained their sturdy military presence in the area since the ceasefire of 2003. Both, Indian and Pakistani military establishments validate that war is not a solution of Siachen conflict; however, war leads a way towards the conflict resolution.

Indian Opinion

India echoed that the current locations of both armies on the Siachen along the AGPL should be demarcated after a joint survey which will be a reference point in case a dispute arises in the future. India draws a line from North to northwest from NJ 9842 that runs towards the glaciers along the crunches formed by the Saltoro Range, which according to the Indian stance, is a recognized international standard of border delineation. Indian claim that the Siachen glacier lies within the Jurisdiction of Indian Held Kashmir based on the logic that Kashmir is the integral part of India. Later India wishes to apply the identical code with its disputed Himalayan border with China.

Source: http://im.rediff.com/news/2005/may/26siachen.gif

Pakistani Opinion

Pakistan pulls a straight line in a north-eastern direction from NJ 9842 up to the Karakoram Pass on its border with China. Pakistan claims based on the ground that the Siachen glacier falls within the Pakistani-administered area of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir called Gilgit-Baltistan and declined to endorse the AGPL and demanded that both the countries should simultaneously withdraw their troops from Siachen to the pre-1972 positions. Chinese factor is also very important in this conflict as China supports Pakistani standpoint on Siachen and both the countries have their strategic interests. Sino-India war of 1962 followed by the Sino-Pak border agreement in 1963, brought Pakistan and China closer to each other.
In 1960s, China had no intension to play any specific role in this region but now China has emerged as a challenging economic and military power; and needs to find new markets, new sources of energy and new active role. In that context, China wants to have a further authority in regional matters. In order to feed its growing economy; China has its energy-driven interest in the Middle East. China strategic control over Gwadar Port and ballooning Pak-China military and economic ties would be an anxiety for India. On the other hand, direct oil supply line from Middle East to China via Gwadar Port would be vexing for the United States. The Middle East is also a strategic logistics and trade hub for China’s exports and market access in Europe and Africa as the European Union has become the leading Chinese trading partner. While United States wants Gwadar to become the next Dubai, which could act as a base for the United States Navy as well as a marketable port to trade oil and shelving Iran’s significance within the region. It is not likely that India and America would endure hushed viewers and provide China a free hand in the region. It seems that Pakistan would have to face some proxy wars in near future.

Conclusion

Several high-level meetings have been organized between Pakistani and Indian defence and foreign secretaries as well as senior military personnel to talk a pacific end to the twenty-eight years old Siachen conflict that caused thousands of sufferers, mainly due to hostile climatic conditions and harsh terrain, however, there have been some key differences over the modalities of withdrawal of the troops since the establishment of suave efforts. Indian attitude remained unchanged since its occupation of Siachen Glacier. Even after an elongated confrontation, the armies of both countries divulge that the military solution is incredible and these two nations have to rely on the political settlement of this fundamental issue.
Now Pakistan is interested in resolving the issue, however, Indian using the adjournment tactics as its involvement in diplomatic talks is the consequence of international pressure. The withdrawal of the Indian army from Siachen or to declare a buffer zone, will be a crucial decision for Indian Government as what riposte it has to satiate the Indian civil society while billions of dollars have been smoldered away since its occupation whereas linking Ladakh with Wah Khan Strip and to maintain control over Karakoram Highway will be a hard nut to crack as Siachen is a complex issue which involves not only India and Pakistan but also China, which it is directly and indirectly involved in this issue as China has its own economic interest with Pakistan and beyond. Chinese interest and involvement has strengthened the Pakistani position on Siachen but on the other hand, Chinese desire to control Gwadar port would involve Pakistan into very multifaceted situation as United States and India would not like the Chinese presence there. Here Pakistan needs more focus in strengthening Baluchistan security, as Gwadar will become the one of the most important ports in the world in future.
The best way forward is that Pakistan and India should enter into a pragmatic arrangement by declaring Siachen as a buffer zone by pulling their armies back to pre-1972 positions through the proposals of 1992, which should be acceptable for the Indian Government to gratify its civil society otherwise the status quo will not serve either the nation and in case of any forward campaign in that region by Indian army will jeopardize the peacemaking efforts as seeds of clash are still there. Likewise, the military presence in the region will cost huge financial and human loss and melting glacier will result a climate change causing exceptional cataclysm in the rivers’ system.

Bibliography

Published Books
Action Aid., [2010]: Natural Resource Management in South Asia. Pearson Education.
Ahmed, S., & Varun, S., [1998]: Freezing the Fighting: Military Disengagement on Siachen Glacier,  Cooperative Monitoring Centre Occasional Papers. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque.
Akhund, I., [2000]: Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto.  Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Clapper, J.R., [2012]: Record on the Worldwide, Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  National Intelligence, USA.
Daniel, M., [2012]: “Pakistan,” in Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis. Edited by Daniel Moran. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, March 2012.
Dixit, J. N., [1995]: Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo-Pak Relations 1970-1994. South Asia Books, New Delhi 1995.
Eric, S. M., [2001]: War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet. Routledge, New York.
Ganguly, S., [2004]: Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947. Columbia University Press, New York.
Gupta, K. R.,[2008]: Encyclopedia of Environment Global Warming, Vol.6. Atlantic Publishers & Distributors.
Iqbal, I., [2000]: Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto. Oxford University Press,  USA.
Kapadia, H. K., [2010]: Siachen Glaciers: The Battle of Rose, Rupa & Co. New Delhi.
Lyon, P., [2008]: Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO.
Musharraf, P., [2006]: In the Line of Fire: A Memoir. Free Press, New York.
Peter. L., [2008]: Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO, 2008.
Raghavan, V. R., [2002]: Siachen: Conflict Without End. Viking Books, New Delhi.
Samina, A., and Sahni, V., [1998]: Freezing the Fighting: Military Disengagement on Siachen Glacier. Cooperative Monitoring Centre Occasional Papers. Albuquerque.

Periodicals
Abbas, A., [20th April 2012]:  In The Express Tribun. Islamabad.
Christina Lin, [April 2011}: The New Silk Road: China’s Energy Strategy in the Greater Middle East, Policy Focus 109, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington.
Daudpota, I., and Arshad. H. A., [16th June 2007]: Exchange Siachen Confrontation for Peace, The Hindu.
Duparcq, E., [11th April 2012]: Siachen Tragedy – day 5: Bad Weather Dogs Avalanche Search Efforts, In The Express Tribune.  Islambad.  Retrieved from  http://tribune.com.pk/story/362986/siachen-tragedy-day-5-bad-weather-dogs-pakistan-avalanche-search-efforts/
Khosa, R. S., [1999]: The Siachen Glacier Dispute: Imbroglio on the Roof of the World, In Cotemporary South Asia, no.5.
Lodhi, M., [6th May 2012]:Kia Baraf Pigal Sakti Hai [Can Ice Melt?], In The Daily Jang. Islamabad.
Markey, D.,[2012]: Pakistan, In Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis. Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C. 
McGirk, T., and Adiga, A., [24th August 2005]: War at the Top of the World, In Time Magazine.
Nair, P. [2011]: Unending Fiasco in the Siachen Glacier, In Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai.
Raghavan, V. R., [2002]: The Siachen Impasse, Siachen: Conflict Without End, no.19(23).
Sheru, T., [2006]: Strategic Importance of Siachen. In Indian Defence Review, no. 21(1). Retrieved from http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/strategic-importance-of-siachen/ 
Thapliyal, S., [2006]: Strategic Importance of Siachen, In Indian Defence Review, no. 21(1). Retrieved from http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/strategic-importance-of-siachen/
Tim, M., Aravind, A., [24th July 2005]: War at the Top of the World. In Time Magazine.
Wirsing, R. G., [1991]: The Siachen Glacier Territorial Dispute with India, In Pakistan’s Security under Zia 1977-1988. St Martin’s Press, New York.