FRONTIER ABLAZE: THE PAKHTUN UPRISING OF 1897-98

Salman Bangash*

Introduction

This research article expounds one of the most complicated frontier quandaries that were faced by the British Empire in India. The North-West Frontier region, defined topographically, by the British, as a strategic zone, always posed a complex defence problem for the British Imperialist power in India. The region was indispensable and central part of their grand strategy during the high days of the Great Game to counter their opponents in this part of the world and therefore, for the British, the protection and maintenance of this area inhabitant by warlike tribesmen was a geo-political and geo-strategic necessity.The British Raj in order to control the Pakhtun Belt was tied up in a sequence of difficult and dangerous military campaigns against the tribesmen.
Of all the military operations on the India's Northwest Frontier, the uprising of 1897-98 was the most threatening and worrisome to the British Empire. During the insurrection, the whole frontier line from Malakand to Kurram was ablaze. The year became one of the most troublous years in all Indian history. India was directly threatened and Britain's international prestige lowered.It took the British almost a year to crush the resistance of the tribes who rose en masse, motivated by tribal norms and values, religious zeal and passion. During the uprising, the British admired the professionalism and the fighting spirit of the tribesmen, and acknowledged some of their own weaknesses and shortfalls. This paper will critically evaluate the Pakhtun uprising of 1897-98, the difficulties that the imperial troops faced while fighting the tribes and the lesson that the British learnt from this great uprising.

Background

The British imperialist power in India throughout the nineteenth century was almost incessantly and unremittingly occupied in a string of complex and difficult military campaigns against the Pakhtun tribesmen in the North-West Frontier region of British India. These expeditions were nicknamed tip and run, butcher and blot, were also known to the army as ‘small wars’ to distinguish them from interstate warfare. Such campaigns were alternatively known as hill warfare, tribal warfare, and frontier warfare.
Tribal warfare exerted vital and significant influence on the organisation, equipment and training of imperial units and throw light on the aptitude and capacity of the British Indian army to counter its adversary. These military operations observed Philip Mason provided imperial troops with ‘perhaps more sustained practical experience of colonial warfare than in any other part of the British Empire.’ On the other hand the tribesmen resisted the British encroachment into the difficult belt of mountainous terrain they inhabited which commanded the strategic passes leading to Afghanistan. Tribesmen, who were accustomed to the use of weapons as part of their normal existence, lived by the ancestral code of Puhktunwali, which demanded, revenge and  retribution for any injury to his own or his clan’s honour.
For the British, retaining peace and stability along this sensitive border area with Afghanistan was a tactical and strategic obligation and compulsion. The Pakhtun borderland was adjudicated mainly upon military contemplations to protect and defend India. For the British, the area was a strategic zone of defence a no man’s land, a buffer zone, a buffer to a buffer, a bulwark and a first line of defence. The British Government undertook as many as sixty-two punitive expeditions and sometimes large scale military operations against the tribesmen in between 1849 and 1899  in order to control this strategic zone and to crush their resistance and love for freedom. The Umbayla Campaign of 1863, The Jowaki Operation 1877-78, The Miranzai Campaign of 1891, The Mahsud Campaign, The Chitral Campaign of 1895, are just some of the major campaigns which the British undertook in the North West Frontier.

The Frontier Uprising of 1897-98

Hardly two years after the famous Chitral Campaign of 1895, occurred the most potent and formidable insurrection ever witnessed by the British in the tribal land. Many factors were responsible for the upheaval of 1897: The delineation of the Pakhtun territory in 1893, the setting up of the five Political Agencies with its administrative peculiarities, the forward  move of the troops through Pakhtun territory and the establishment of British garrisons in Chitral, Chakdara, and Malakand. A part from this, the activities and propaganda of the Mullahs, the Greeko-Turkish War, Pan-Islamism and false and exaggerated hopes of moral and material support from the Amir of Afghanistan, also augmented the flames of revolt.
During the summer, autumn and winter of 1897–98 large-scale risings broke out along the length of the Frontier region. The year became “surely one of the most troublous years in all Indian history.” With astonishing rapidity the conflagration spread and the whole frontier line from Malakand to Kurram was ablaze. The uprising took the British by surprise. In H. Woosnam Mills words ‘for the first time in our frontier history we have seen the most powerful Pathan tribes from Boner to Bolan take the field in unison and flaunt defiance at the Sirkar.’
Fighting started when on 10 July 1897 a British Political Officer and his military escort were unexpectedly attacked by Wazir tribesmen during a jarga at Maizar in North Waziristan. ‘The killings at Maisar’ remarks J.W. Spain, ‘touched off a flame which spread all over the Frontier and culminated in the uprising of 1897, the greatest the British ever had so.’ He further said that in Waziristan, ‘great and proud  men have tasted defeat and humiliation.’ The British sent troops immediately into Waziristan to punish those implicated in the attack, and to prevent unrest spreading along the frontier.
On 26 July the isolated fort at Chakdara at Malakand was surrounded by thousands of Swati tribesmen, who then attacked the British garrison at the Malakand Pass. This attack was organised by Saddullah, known to the British the ‘Mad Mullah’, together with mullah Najmuddin , popularly known as Hadda Mullah took the British by surprise.31
The initial assault overran part of the position, but heavy fighting continued for possession of the remainder between 26 and 30 July 1897. H.L. Nevill's, an experienced frontier military officer wrote that the ‘desperate and  repeated attacks on the garrisons of Malakand and Chakdara are conspicuous examples of the savage side of the methods of war practised by the Muhammadan tribes inhabiting the north-western borderland of India.’ The tribesmen were defeated after a hard fight. Acknowledging the fighting abilities of the Swatis T. H. Holdich another of British military man wrote, ‘We need not think of the Swatis as a degenerate and cowardly race. They fought like the Arab races of the Sudan-like Zulus-like Afridis; and we may be thankful that they were not armed like Afridis.’ Lord Elgin, the Viceroy on 2 August 1897 sent a congratulatory letter to General G.S George White and appreciated the success of the British troops in defeating the tribesmen.
Lord Elgin was very much concerned about the spreading of the uprising and the strategy, which his government should adopt in order to stop such happing again. On August 7, 1897, he sent a letter to W. Mackwork Young Lt. Governor of  the Punjab and explained to him that ‘The very completeness of the dispersal of the rising at the Malakand increases the difficulty of the question, what is to be done next….What is necessary to prevent the recurrence of these outbreaks, and to make clear our power and determination to put them down.’ On the other hand, General G.S White had his own apprehension fearing the spread of the insurrection all over the Pakhtun belt.
An attack on the fort of Shabkadr in Peshawar District on 7 August by 5000 Mohmands tribesmen suddenly widened the scope of hostilities. The attack was ‘an audacious act on the part of the tribesmen.’ While operations were in progress in Mohmand country unrest spread southwards to affect the Afridis and the Orakzais who inhabited the strategically important area between the Khyber Pass and Kurram Valley, they were led by a mullah of Tirah known as Sayed Akbar. The Government of India showed great concern because the tribes were well-armed as C.C. Trench stated that they had acquired by ‘theft, capture or purchase from Afghan soldiers a fair number of modern weapons.
On 23 August Afridi lashkars or war party attacked outposts and forts in the Khyber Pass held by the locally recruited levies. The Khyber Rifles fought their own brethren and proved their loyalty as Robert Warburton, who served 18 years as Political Officer in Khyber Agency acknowledged by saying ‘they had eaten White Queen’s salt.’ Thomas Holdich’s acknowledged Afridi devotion in defending the Khyber Rifles at Landikotal and criticized the British response to this particular event; he said ‘Whilst the Afridi fought for us we failed to fight for ourselves.’
The fall of Ali Masjid and LandiKotal, and the securing of the Pass was generally held to be the most awful blow the ‘British prestige could suffer on the north-west frontier.’ In the plains of India ‘no one ever dreamed that Khyber Pass could fall into the hands of the tribesmen.’ In Macmunn words “It was a day of shame and humiliation for every Briton”. Regarding the rising of Afridis, Warburton wrote, ‘it makes me quite sad to think how easily the labour of years- of a lifetime- can be ruined and destroyed in a few days.’ He believed that the trouble could have been avoided had the government acted quickly enough to resolve minor local grievances.
As clashes continued  in the month of September, the British started to believe that the uprising was stimulated and encouraged by the mullahs and was religious and fanatical in nature. On several occasions during the operations, the fighting capabilities of the tribesmen were acknowledged. Writing on 7th of October 1897, Bindon Blood admitted ‘the superior smartness of the enemy.’
As the uprising spread some British believed that tribesmen insurrection was well- coordinated and planned.  There was a great deal of trepidation and apprehension among the high ups in London and Calcutta that the way the uprising started, foreign involvement can’t be ruled out and one of their apprehension was the potential role of pan-Islamic sentiment within the tribesmen. As a result, attention and concentration fixed on Amir Abdur Rehman, and the role and support of Afghanistan. Robert Warburton, the long-serving Political Agent wrote in May 1897, that ‘reports were circulated in Peshawar that an agent from Constantinople had  reached Kabul had  meeting with the Amir, and he asked the mullahs to go to their homes and preach a religious war.’
C.C. Davies also blamed the Afghan Government and said “It has been Afghan intrigues, either instigated directly from Kabul with the full cognizance of the amir, or carried on by his local officials”. Olaf Caroe believed that Afghanistan provided fodder to the tribes for continual agitation, including financial and emotional support. The political agent of the Malakand Agency, Harold Deane also blamed the Amir of Afghanistan for the uprising. But Viceroy was not convinced and believed that the British had no concrete proof of Afghanistan’s involvement in the uprising.

The Tirah Expedition

In order to conduct operations against the Afridis and Orakzai tribesmen the British assembled and deployed one of their largest force The Tirah Expeditionary Force (TEF), under the command of General Sir William Lockhart, consisted of  two divisions, which  includes infantry, cavalry and mountain artillery totalling 34,506 troops, 19,858 non-combatant followers and 34,000 assorted pack animals to transport and supply it in the field. Since that time, few outsiders have penetrated  into the Afridi’s land. It was believed that the two tribes with an approximately fighting strength of 40–50,000  men would offer strong resistance as they were relatively well armed.
During the campaign the British troops faced determined and well-trenched tribesmen, fought a guerrilla war and who gave a tough time to the British and Indian troops. As one officer observed in his memoirs that a good number of the imperial forces did not realise that they were apposed by active and alert enemy, ready to grab every chance for turning the tables on his enemy. When the British Army entered the Maidan Valley, the heart of Tirah valley on 31 October 1897; the British thought that the Orakzais and Afridis would now submit. However, the tribal lashkars continued fighting the British. Many British officers admired the skill with which the Afridis fought. General Lockhart admitted ‘It must be remembered that the Force is opposed to perhaps the best skirmishers and best natural rifle-shots in the world; and that the country they inhabit is probably the most difficult on the face of the globe.’
The foraging operations mounted from Camp Maidan during November 1897 dramatically exposed  insufficient training and limited knowledge about the peculiarities of hill warfare in both British and Indian regiments, as against the watchful tribesmen ready and willing to exploit the slightest mistake. On 18 November 1897 a rough ad hoc guide was distributed to the rest of troops which was an open admittance that the imperial troops lacked proper training for the operations.
Despite large scale destruction and demolition of houses, villages and large quantity of foodstuffs in Tirah and a blockade of tribal territory, the Tirah operation dragged on into 1898, but a number of Afridi sections continued to oppose the imperial troops, by attacking outposts, military convoys and destroying telegraph lines. On 29 January 1898, the 36th Sikhs and the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry suffered heavy casualties at Shinkamar. The Tirah Campaign proved the most difficult and protected  military operation during the rising. This campaign was one of the serious encounters that the imperialist troops faced in India since the Mutiny of 1857-58. Hutchinson who took part in the Tirah operations admired the fighting spirit of the Afridis and Orakzai. He said ‘they are enterprising and bold, and thoroughly understand how to make the best use of the natural advantages which their woods and mountains and a rocky defile… gives them. Such a foe is to be treated with respect.’

Critically Analysis

Throughout the spring of 1898 fighting continued while a settlement was negotiated at a series of jargas attended by Lockhart and tribal Malaks or elders. Finally after a year of incessant, relentless, unremitting and costly fighting, the tribes subsided, into an uneasy quiet, while thousands of British troops remained in tribal territory.
The Frontier risings of 1897-8 invigorated and rejuvenated the debate on the hill warfare both in British India and United Kingdom. For some, the lessons of fighting were significant for gaining information and knowledge of the possible nature of future war in the region. Colonel Thomas Holdich observed that the frontier uprising taught the English new ways and means of the war and all ‘this puts an entirely new complexion on our little frontier fights of the future.’
H.L. Nevill argued that the root of the whole matter was a misunderstanding regarding the Durand mission and the subsequent demarcation of the frontier and religious beliefs of the tribesmen. Winston Churchill acknowledged that the extension and consolidation of the border with Afghanistan were correctly considered by the tribesmen as a danger to their sovereignty and freedom. In any event, he maintained, was futile to argue against a policy which, like a ship in a storm, was ‘dictated by circumstances rather than men.’ General Lord Roberts Fredrick believed that it was breakdown of the frontier policy. George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India was of the opinion that ‘in governing Orientals an assertion of strength and fighting power is periodically necessary.’
 General Sir George White, also insisted that it was militarily unthinkable that the Indian government could tolerate on its borders 200,000 ‘of the most turbulent and finest fighting material in the world, unrestrained by civilised government and fired by fanaticism’.
Another of British officer admitted the need for the imperial troops to prepare properly for the future war in the frontier region and he warned that any weakness would result in disaster. Captain F.M. Edwards admitted that the difficulties which the Britiish  faced during the Tirah campaign and the casualties they head to bear had caused a substantial chorus of disapproval against the conduct of operations.   One British official in his argument emphasized that the imperial troops must be thoroughly educated to face their enemies, and the troops stationed in India should be trained not only for European warfare, but ‘also in the irregular methods of fighting which must be adopted against uncivilised races.’
For some British officials religious fanaticism was the core cause of the uprising and they blamed the mullahs mainly responsible for that. But there were others who rejected this notion and considered  many other factors for the uprising. General J.G. Elliot admitted that in reality; the 1897 uprisings attracted various section of the populace, and not all of them backed the mullahs on religious grounds. Robert Nichols says that colonial views of religious fanaticism became ‘justification for conquest, repression, and, often, the indiscriminate destruction of villages and communities.’ In his opinion religion would have been just one of the many more inspiring dynamics added to a multifaceted social movement of resistance against the British imperialist. S.S. Thorburn gave a more critical evaluation of the situation: “Fanaticism” was merely the inspiration to brave deeds,..when they saw us giving bribes to their leaders, marching troops through their countries, surveying and mapping their hills, and erecting cairns of stone along the Afghan side of their hinterlands. The natural reaction would have been resistance.
Arnold Fletchar also argued that, “Nevertheless, such tribal fanaticism was exaggerated by British writer, who often confused nationalist opposition with frenzy. The tribesmen were Moslems to a man, and their leadership often came from among the articulate semi educated priests; but without question the major cause of their resistance was a desire to preserve their old tribal independence.”
Fraser Lovat pointed out that the British should learn from its mistakes in order not to repeat it in future. He said ‘we shall discover the results of our carelessness in the tale of the dead and wounded  if we ever again have to send a big expedition into the hills between the Khyber and  the Gomal.’ Lord Curzon, who took charge as a Viceroy in 1899 condemned the campaigns as wasteful act without any durable solution.
In short the general uprising of 1897 was evidence not so much of religious fanaticism as of a socio-political event that although used common religious idioms.   In 1900 the Quarterly Review also emphasized the need to learn from the famous uprising.
We believe that the lesson to be learnt from the history of our Indian frontier policy during the past thirty years is to keep our powder dry, to strain every nerve to prefect our defences on the border of the Indian Empire,..The fate of the Empire is in the lap of the god; …But there must be none of that deplorable lack of common-sense preparation on the part of our statesmen, none of the dilettante treatment of vital questions, of which they have so recently been guilty. From a defeat at Magersfontein or Colenso the nation can recover, but a crash at Quetta or at the mouth of the Khyber might bring down the Empire in India.

Conclusion

The frontier Uprising of 1897-98 was a paramount event in the history of Frontier wars.  It took the British almost a year to crush the resistance of the tribes who rose en masse. The revolt having socio-politico and religious dimensions, shook the foundation of British Empire in India. During the fighting the British admired the professionalism and the fighting spirit of the tribesmen and acknowledged some of their own weaknesses and shortfalls. As Churchill acknowledged ‘Every man is a warrior’. The uprising generated great debate in the British Parliament and the Military Junta in order to sort out plan and strategy in case of similar uprising in future. The immediate result of the uprising was the seperation of Pakhtun land from the rest of Punjab and the formation  of a new province: the North West Frontier Province in 1901 and a separate administrative structure for the Tribal Areas. The British military machine managed  to crush the resistance of the Pakhtun tribesmen for the time being but further deepen the animosity, enmity and hatred between the two contending groups which continued till the end of British Raj in India.

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