CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP) AND ISLAM IN CHINA DURING 20TH CENTURY:
A CASE STUDY OF XINJIANG

 Ayjaz Ahmad Wani*

The Uyghurs of Xinjiang adopted Islam as their religion in 8th and 9th century, that became the binding force of the Uyghur society till the first half of 20th century. However, when Xinjiang became the part of Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and under the influence of communism, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started to erode the influence of Islam in the region under the system of Communism. Especially during the Cultural Revolution, however, CCP’s policies towards Xinjiang were liberalised, particularly towards religion and once again became a public affair from private affair. After 1985, Uyghurs started linking Islam with the pro independence sentiments and some even wanted to use Islam as a potential political force for resistance against the PRC. Since the mid 1990s not only separatist sentiment has grown, but the support of Islamic fundamentalism from other countries. The paper will analyse the brief history of Islam and institutions from 8th century and the Communist policy towards religion from 1949.

Key words: Shriat, Mullahs, Waqf, Ramadan, Islam, Cultural Revolution.

Xinjiang remained the hub of socio economic and political activities from the ancient time because of the regions geographical location and Silk Route trade. Different regimes ruled over Xinjiang and brought in their own religion in the region, (Foltz, 1997:96-97). Accordingly in the 2nd century AD Buddhism flourished in the region after Kushan dominance there and many of its areas like Khotan, Kashgar, Kucha, Turfan, etc found Buddhist establishments being raised to establish Buddhism firmly there (Bellew, 1872:17; Sykes and Sykes, 1920: 272; Beckwith, 2009:115). Side by side Turks nourished Shamanism and Chinese Manichaeism and others Christianity (Barthold, 1935: 50-52; Barthold,1958: 388). The literature they developed around 840A.D. pertained to these three influential faiths of Xinjiang (Menges, 1968: 45-46).

Islam in Xinjiang

Islam reached to Transoxania in the mid 7th century and its dominance was found there in the early 8th century. When Samanids (875-999A.D.) were ruling Central Asia, Islam reached Kashgar and adjoining oasis where it met a stiff resistance from the Buddhists. However, in the mid 10th century under Qarakhanids and Kashgars Satuk Bugra (920-960A.D.), one of their rulers, accepted Islam in 955A.D. as his religion to influence his people). After his death, his son, Musa (960A.D.), declared Islam as state religion and there upon, according to Ibn Miskawaih and Ibn Al-Athir, 200,000 tents of Turks living between Balasaghun and Bulghar accepted Islam (Bellew, 1872: 308-309; Samolin, 1964: 81). The scholarly work (of Uyghur’s) Kutadlgu Bilig or Wisdom of Royal Glory by Yusuf Khass Hajib of Kashgar, of 1069A.D., (and translated by Dankoff under the title of “Mirrors for Princes”) states that certain rules on administration, justice, manners were drawn from Quran and sayings of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) besides on the ideas drawn from Sufi literature show clearly that in the 11th century Islam played definite role in the governance of Xinjiang (Dankoff, 1983: 1-35; Millward, 2007: 54). In spite of that influence of the other faiths, like Buddhism, Nestorian Christians and others had not died down as they lived in the area under their own laws until the 14th century (Barthold, 1958: 387-388; Lattimore, 1962: 182; Wright and Erc, (ed.) 1854: 94) and whose traditions lingered till the 16th century in the northern parts of Xinjiang, like Urumchi-Turfan region, though spread of Islam in these areas started in the 11th century (Lattimore, 1950:192).  
Although Islam lost it political prominence during the rule of Qara Khitay and Mangols, it still made inroads in the new lands as well as made impact on the religion of these dynasties. Since Mongols favoured trade with the Muslim traders this indirectly helped to renew the Islamic faith (Allsen, 1989: 83-126). By the time Chingez Khan’s son ruled parts of Xinjiang, protection to Islam in preference to other religions helped Muslims to progress there.  In the 14th century mass conversions took place during the rule of Tughluq Timur following the prominence of Sufism in Turkestan when the Khoja Ahrar (1404–1490A.D.) became head of the Naqshbandi order to give boast to Islam that attracted people rather at a greater pace on the basis of sufistic thought of simplicity and piety. Thereafter, in the 15th and 16th century, sufism was not restricted to courts and sedentary areas only, it also operated among the nomadic areas and Islamic influence was clearly seen there (Hartmann, 1905: 201-202; Togan, 1905: 138).
It is reported that in the beginning of the 17th century people offered five time prayers without fail. Witnessed by Portuguese Jesuit Father Bento, in 1604A.D. in Yarkand, then the Capital of Kashgar kingdom, he found all people attending Friday prayers and those who failed were punished. Similarly Oscar Terry Crosbby found that Islamic law was very strong among the nomads as he found them attending basic pillars of the faith relentlessly and reported that, “so strong was the hold of Prophet’s Law that in the morning sun, looking into their cheerless camp, found all men in genuflexion towards Mecca”. Islamic culture got further impetus during the second half of 19th century, when Yakub Beg was ruling there, and marked change in the socio-religious life of Xinjiang was seen where upon sharí‘ah was enforced in governance and civil life (Boulger, 1878: 145).
On the eve of 20th century, Islamic culture played its role in shaping the religious orientation of the people in the region. Majority of the people performed the tenants of the faith like offering payers (Shaw, 1871:156, 465-466), fasting in the month of Ramadan mostly in rural areas, rich giving alms (Shaw, 1871: 368-369; Skrine, 1926: 185; Taylor, 1892: 239-240) or performance of Hajj by those who could afford it. Ramadan, Hajj, Eid-ul-Fitr and qurban bayram (Eid-ul-Duha) also brought in cultural ethos with religious festivity. During the month of Ramadan religious songs were sung at the evening and the end (Eid-ul-Fitr) was celebrated (Sykes & Sykes, 1920: 174). On this occasion people donned new clothes, offer Eid prayers, eat ceremoniously and visited the shrines. Similarly other religious festival qurban bayram (Eid-ul-Duha), the commemoration of Abrahams’ willingness to sacrifice his son performed during the month of Hajj, was celebrated with joy and valour. Similarly, on the departure as well as reception of Hajjis, songs were sung by women and other members of community.
 
Islam and Traditions

Side by side the practice of paying visits to the graves or Mazars of their ancestors and make a material offering there (Krader, 1963: 126; Kaw, 2005: 99-118) for one or other worldly gains as was also seen in Shamanistic practices (Aitpaeva, 2007: 414; Weese, 1994: 54). Shamanism, the earlier faith of most of the Central Asia including Xinjiang, popularised animal sacrifices at the grave sites (Younghusband, 1904: 176) which subsequently became commemorative with the erection of long poles hoisted with animal (mostly horse) tails (Basilov, 1987: 7–17; Stein, 1910: 839) This practice was so common in many parts of Xinjiang and Central Asia that commemorative horse and yak tails are still seen in the houses of Kazaks across the globe. Another change inflicted was that Shamans, seen at such grave sites where people visited for benefits, material gains or removal of diseases etc (Haden, 1909: 133: Sykes, 1916: 19; Sykes & Sykes, 1920: 310), were replaced by Muslims through Shiekhs and Bakshis or derveishs for similar purposes at Muslim shrines or Mazars associated with the Sufi faiths. They, therefore, were not orthodox in nature but practised a sort of popular Islam as they also went to faith healers for curing a disease (Haden, 1909: 133; Hann, 1997: 87-112)and wear amulets and tabises (Meakin, 1903:133) Whether or not all these things were achieved at these places but the blessing of Mullahs/ Shiekhs or Bakshis were abundantly available at such places that were omnipresent in each locality and among the tribes earning their livelihood in response to their jobs rendered to the visitors.

Islam and Judicial System

Islam as a cultural system and as a cohesive and vibrant force was not seen entirely as such in Xinjiang as it was not adopted purely or orthodoxilly at any stage. In spite of that in the 19th and early 20th century Islamic jurisprudence was prevalent in day to day administration, (Shaw, 1871: 401-402) and important matters were settled on the advice of the scholars of Islam. There is evidence that Qazi (Muslim judge), heading a court, was appointed on the basis of his merit and he was responsible for keeping the morality of the society and check on weights and thieves. Besides a dispute between a Muslim and a Chinese, was settled according to Muslim law. The crimes of high magnitude and the ordinary punishments, whipping, mutilation, and torture were inflicted by the order of the Dadkwah in consultation with the Qazi, (Henderson, 1873: 27) however, while capital punishment, during the time of Yakub Beg, rested with the sovereign (Boulger, 1878: 145). To keep checks and balances on the system of justice, everyone’s judgement was checked by immediate higher official and if there was confusion between lower and higher official, the matter was either referred to the sovereign for solution, or was permitted to fall through. (Boulger, 1878: 146; Shaw, 1871: 466)
On the other hand during the rule of Qing dynasty the rich offenders were fined while the poor was beaten by whip, however, sentences of imprisonment were given to both rich and poor for crimes like murder and officials were held responsible for crimes.

Islam after the formation of PRC in 1949

CCP had not any kind of base and support in the Xinjiang in the beginning of the Communist Revolution in China. The Chinese government undertook cautious steps towards the religion of the Uyghurs with the fear that communist orientation may fuel hatred against the Chinese Communist government. The government, therefore, allowed religious freedom to the natives of Xinjiang and since most of them were Muslims by birth as such they got Chinese translation of the Quran printed, in 1952, by Commercial Press of Shanghai. What was much more interesting was they drew parallels between Islam and communism in such respects which were much more important for the later like in preface some verses of the Quran were highlighted to describe that Islam and Communism were not averse to each other. Along with this CCP membership was thrown open for natives with the caution that only those who had inclination towards Chinese in lieu of certain concessions were registered in it. These cadres were asked to respect the customs and habits of the natives in Xinjiang and implement policies according to local conditions. Besides in 1953, Islamic Association of China was founded to manage the religious affairs within the frame work of CCP to gain certain success among the people. The government sent for the first time a delegation of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca then.
Besides these little steps government also allowed mosques to retain their land on the approval of the local population even though their income was taxed. This concession was given as per the clause of the law and land reforms promulgated throughout the country in 1950, otherwise confiscated all land of landlords and distributed among the landless peasants. Since mosques in Xinjiang were not largely owners of large land properties therefore much was not achieved other than propaganda. On the other hand waqf lands were confiscated which were owned by landlords and religious institutes, and divided among the landless peasants.   Till then waqf  lands had provided financial support for the implementation of  Islamic administration, justice through Islamic courts, Islamic education through Maktabs (Islamic schools) and Madrassas (Islamic collages) as well as providing  base for Muslim culture in Xinjiang for quit long. Now, therefore, Islamic administered justice, through Shriat/Sharia law was replaced by people’s courts.
By 1954-55 the CCP cadres of Xinjiang had gained more control there and, therefore, they used the native leaders of former Eastern Turkestan Republic of Xinjiang to criticise such Muslims who had the centrifugal tendencies. For example Burhan, who was the founder member of “Islamic Association of China” and its first chairman (Bush, 1970: 271-273) started to issue dictates against Islamic rituals as he said, “Only legal religious activities will be permitted by the people’s government” therefore started a campaign of restricting the role of religion in one’s life. The real communist ideology started to come forward as CCP began attacking religious institutes and celebrations of Muslim holidays through media (Whiting, 1955: 174). All this was done calculatedly and carefully as their premier leader Mao Zedong had advised in June 1950, while addressing at the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee,
“Social reform in the regions occupied by the minority nationalities is a very important thing and must be handled carefully. Under no circumstances should we be impatient, because impatience will lead to mistakes. Where conditions are not ripe, we can’t carry out reforms….. Of course, this does not mean that we must not have any reform. According to the provisions of the Common Program, the customs and habits of the areas inhabited by the minority nationalities can be reformed. However, such reforms must be handled by the minority nationalities themselves”.

As advised, CCP cadres were built of the natives as well as that of Chinese migrants from the mainland of the Han and Hui populations. This allowed CCP get more control of the situation and especially during the “Great Leap Forward” of 1957-1958, for cultural homogenisation of all the native groups which allowed to take firm measures in cultural field to overcome the influence of Islam over the society more so far such a tendency where some people used Islam as tool for counter revolution that lead to some of them to revolt against the government and riot. The rioters attacked the troops engaged in agricultural activities and killed some of them. The government with help of CCP, used iron fist whereby many people were sent behind the bars and those who were stopping the work of CCP or had control over remaining waqf property were prosecuted (Dillon, 1999: 2-3; Debata, 2007: 127; Mcmillen, 1979: 115). Here after Muslim festivals were criticised by the members of CCP and people were stopped from celebrating them (Heberer, 1989: 26). The policy of criticism of local customs and religion continued for next five years as Islam was considered as a reason for all backward customs (Dreyer, 1976: 157-163). Xinjiang Islamic Association came also under the criticism on the ground that it placed religious interests above the state/party interests (Mcmillen, 1979:118-119).
The communist orientation of such religious policy was moderated after 1960s to a large extent in terms of allowing Uyghurs once again to celebrate religious festivals (Benson and Svanberg, 1998: 139). In 1963, the Uyghurs were again assured that their special characteristics will be taken into account. These moderations came into existence for various reasons including socio-economic problems, the general hatred against the growing influx of Hans from China proper and their organised settlement with initiatives for economic development including allotment of land for farm activities, the worsening of Sino-Soviet relation and thus to curb the Soviet influence in this contagious area, the Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the subsequent fall out on Uyghurs having tendency to arise against the Chinese, (Goldman, 1986: 149; Mackerras, 1999: 30) migration of thousands of Kazaks from Autonomous region of Kazaks in Xinjiang to Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan and sporadic Uyghur minority uprisings against PRC (Clubb,1964: 9). Other important reason was that during the 1960s China was active in making diplomatic links against imperialism and with the Islamic countries around the Middle East and Arab world.

Islam and Cultural Revolution

By the middle of 1960s PRC announced a new policy of homogenisation of culture to introduce communist doctrine of “togetherness” of all societies into a “whole unit”. The ten-year programme of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976 A.D.), operated in whole of PRC and natives of Xinjiang became its main target. As the programme attacked on four olds; customs, ideas, cultures and habits, which had ominous significance for the natives of Xinjiang than, the migrant Hans. Since the natives of Xinjiang were having the centrifugal tendencies (Heberer, 1989: 25-27) they were targeted the most and, in fact, Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, considered them as foreign invaders and aliens for they were not Chinese but Turks (both Uyghurs and Kazaks) and were condemned as reactionary class of enemies (Mackerras, 1994:152). A poster in Beijing in 1966 autumn urged the authorities to, “close the mosques, disperse religious associations, abolish the Quaranic studies, abolish marriage within the faith and abolish circumcision” (Maclnnis, 1972: 292). Han migrant radicals who were settling in large numbers in Xinjiang by then criticized the local leaders and even attacked their houses for not doing all that they thought was important for complete sinization and cultural transformation of the natives in line with Communist ideology. During the period of 10 years there were reports that at many places in this “New Province” of the PRC the holy scripts of Quran burnt, mosques, which were at every nook and corner of the urban centre’s of Xinjiang were destroyed (Mcmillen, 1979:196), or closed or else were used for pig breeding. Sufi shrines, Madrassas were either shut down or treated with contempt. The religious leaders, mullahs and Qazis and even sometimes the bearded elders were paraded through the streets and were cursed with the derogatory words (Mcmillen, 1979:196; Rudelson, 1997: 83). The effect of such harsh embargoes was that 54,575 Imams/religious leaders in Xinjiang in 1949 were reduced to 27,000 by the start of Cultural Revolution and because of the fear of repercussions only few were active during the Cultural Revolution (Dillon, 2012: 382). The fasts of the holy month of Ramadan and Muslim holidays were criticized and prohibited. (Mcmillen, 1979: 196) The radicalisation of the situation was more evidently noticed after the new migration wave of radical communists (Mcmillen, 1981: 79) from PRC proper to Xinjiang after 1966, highlighted that the Muslim religious festivals and ceremonies were causing damage to work culture. To silence their ‘cause of concern’ a decree was passed on March 17, 1967 by which the Eid-Ul-Duha ritual and celebrations were cancelled on the pretext that spring plowing had entered into a critical stage and Muslim inhabitants of Xinjiang were also asked to greet each other not by Islamic obligation of ‘Asalam-u-alakum’- may the peace of Allah be upon you, but by sayings aloud in Chinese “long live Chairman Mao” (Bovingdon, 2010: 52; Mcmillen, 1979: 213).

Islam after Cultural Revolution

This contemptuous attitude towards the Muslims of Xinjiang by Hans and PRC government was by and large resented and thus it was hard to wipe the Islamic culture from the lives of the people there(Goldman, 1986: 148). In fact, to protect themselves, mullahs went underground and continued their activities secretly or openly in areas where Muslim dominance was enormous. It was because of them that 1400 mosques were active during the period of 10 years of Cultural Revolution. Sometimes, very openly to instigate the radical Hans, and sometimes very secretly they also cermonised their festivals and associated rituals (Goldman, 1986: 148). Where CCP had not any kind of base or strength, as in many of the rural areas like in southern Xinjiang Cultural Revolution could not penetrate deep while in many of the northern areas the effect of Cultural Revolution was noticed and resented.
On the whole Muslim reaction in Xinjiang was that of hatred against Han radicals and PRC government, both at local and central level. In this backdrop there was a general policy shift after the death of Mao when PRC started to review her policies in the 3rd Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, held at Beijing in 1978 and started the first liberalized attitude. Deng Xiaoping, therefore, made the fresh attempt to win over the alienated Muslims of Xinjiang and began an era of moderations (Christoffersen, 1993: 136). In 1980 the Xinjiang Islamic Association was re-established and Wang Enamao was once again made the First Party Secretary in Xinjiang and replaced Saifudin (Mcmillen, 1981: 83; Millward, 2007: 276-277). It was to effect a change in the attitude of government towards Muslims of China in general and accordingly for these of Xinjiang as well. Article 36 on religious affairs of new constitution, adopted in December 1982, incorporated that “the State protects normal religious activities” which was an assertion of the Central Committee of the CCP official order of March 1982 which stated that Marxism-Leninism should be applied flexibly among the minorities (Muslims in case of Xinjiang) since it was declared for the first time, that “nationality and religion was one and the same thing” (Mackerras, 1998: 28-46).
The Muslims of China especially Uyghurs welcomed the new religious and cultural policy of CCP and henceforth started to rebuilt their culture and religious identity more freely. The natural corollary was seen in the construction of new mosques and renovation of the shrines even some large ones were repaired with the help of special government finances. Within a year by 1983, Xinjiang had some12,000 mosques besides around 15,000 clergy (New York Times, 15 June 1983; Goldman,1986: 151). This reconciliation policy continued and native Muslims of Xinjiang continued to enjoy freedom of religion and thus there was substantial increase in the number of mosques- a symbol of Muslim identity and religious culture. Their number had reached to 17,000, 43,000 places were used for Madrassas and sufi shrines by 1990 (Dillon, 2012: 374) which further rose to, by May, 2003, 23, 753 mosques a figure corresponding more than 2/3 of total mosques in China (White Paper, May, 2003; 19; Debata,  2007: 127). The construction, maintenance and renovation of mosques and shrines were sponsored by the government through financial subsidies. The government also helped in the translation of Quran in the local language for those who could not read the Arabic. Islamic literature once again became available to the Muslims of Xinjiang in local book shops (Mcmillen, 1984:576-577). Apart from domestic reasons of winning over the Muslims, PRC also started policies of spreading her influence world across and in the Muslim world as well. In addition China-Pakistan relations strengthened to such an extent that for Chinese goods and merchandise Pakistan provided a good and easy corridor to reach to the Arabian Sea and thus to the Middle East. This allowed the opening up of the southern regions to the religious and cultural influence of Pakistan after 1980 and religious literature (Rudelson, 1997: 81-82) became available and the mullahs from Pakistan started educating the Uyghurs in their Madrassas (Christoffersen, 1993: 136-137). A change atmosphere was seen everywhere in Xinjiang and  not only the common masses but also the Muslim cadres of the CCP were reported to had attended Friday mid-noon congregational prayers  as well as occasions they attend the prayers several times a day. In May 1996, the Xinjiang Party Committee, however, barred party members and cadres from such practices and issued a dictate, “not to believe in any religion or take part in religious activities”. Even today people in Urumchi people are seen in great numbers on Friday mid-noon congregational prayers while in the southern Xinjiang in Kashgar, Khotan, Yarkand and other rural areas there number is still higher even on ordinary days also. The prayers contribute towards the upkeep of the mosques on Fridays while they also give money to the beggars after the prayers.
The religious education in the Madrassa was therefore restored after 1980 where parents found it beneficial to rekindle the faith in them which were found at many localities in southern Xinjiang, like 722 in Yarkand in 1989, Kashgar, etc (Millward, 2007: 282) by the Pakistan clergy and the imported literature from there (Christoffersen, 1993: 136-137; Roberts, 2004: 226-227). Nevertheless, government allowed only small numbers of students to attend these illegal Madrassas, working underground in villages as well as in Kashgar, Khotan and Yarkand. Those that have been allowed by the government are still large and in fact in northern Xinjiang Turfan Madrassas were established by the Muslim population living in great numbers there where all age groups from small children to young ones go to get some primary education on Islam. The government has not created any hindrance on their establishment or education except when it perceives political threat or instability in the region (Mackerras, 1999:44; Rudelson, 1997: 81-82). Since the state schools are not providing any education about Islam. Therefore, Madrassa education whether legal or underground has became to large extent common and therefore to have some kind of control over the religious activities and mosques, government allowed opening of Islamic Madrassa in Urumchi, in 1987 run by the government where students are trained according to the provisions of CIA. The students from Urumchi school help the government to implement the state law and policies in the region after the completion of courses and help the state in the integration and assimilation process in lieu of payment made by the state (Mackerras,1999: 43-44; Shichor, 2005: 128).
The relaxed environment has allowed Muslims of Xinjiang to keep fasts, celebrate Eid festivals along with rituals with joy as it was the case in the pre 1949 era (Benson & Svanberg, 1998: 109). The CCP government is giving all Muslim employees of Xinjiang government day off on the first day of the festivals. In rural areas people still rare sheep for the Eid-ul-Duha obligation of sacrifice and some use these to sell them on higher prices for such ritual (Hann, 1997: 95). There are also reports that an increasing number of people are performing pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca and these are still venerated and revered in the society especially in the south
While all this revival of religiosity has been noticed by the people of Xinjiang as well by the scholars because of change of religious policy after the death of Mao, it is also a fact that what Islam has banned is also prevailing there. Say for example many Uyghurs and Kazaks Muslims besides Hui drink wine both local and imported on the parties along with Hans, dance in clubs and some even take drugs especially heroine. Most of the Uyghurs, both elders and young are seen in the bars in the evenings at Urumchi as well as Kashgar. Mullahs attribute it weakness in their faith, while they consider themselves true believers and drink only for the enjoyment on holidays with friends. Nevertheless they are proud to have very proud to have local beer which is extensively used along with local brands of alcohol and red wine in parties, whether official or private including in marriage parties thrown lavishly by the Uyghurs where western style dances have become popular with pop music developed locally. In fact most of “official parties” is a culture developed and founded by CCP cadres in order to develop a kind of popularism that Hans have developed over the years in order to wane the influence of Islam and has picked up throughout Xinjiang, as in marriage parties in urban areas, both in north and south in spite of the fact that in the rural areas the drinking habit is very low (Mackerras, 1994: 116;Yanji, 1991: 230-231).
Since the majority of the Han population of Xinjiang migrated from different areas of china after the formation of PRC they have faithfully not attached themselves with any faith and in essence have followed communist ideology in the letter and spirit. Accordingly during the Cultural Revolution they were in conflict with the faith followers when the government encouraged them to do so. These conflicts between the natives and migrants were thus a cause for the former to develop a kind of hatred against the latter, irrespective whether or not they strictly adhered the religion. For them drinking and dancing is just a habit to entertain themselves and relax, and thus they participate in whatever kind of parties, in large numbers, and lure the native Muslims to enjoy like them. Even though most of them do not speak Uyghur or Kazak yet many others have learned to inter mingle with locals to create a mind set in consonance with that of theirs. Therefore whatever the religious policy of government, whether for or against, these people have created their own set of culture and most often such natives are far away from Islam and Islamic fundamentals except of course taking part in celebrations associated with the faith; one would even see them going to shrines –a custom that has prevailed in the region for centuries, to proclaim themselves Muslims
The relaxations that were granted by the government in Xinjiang have also created a class of people among Uyghurs, who have used religion, more so after 1980, for uprisings against ‘what they call it illegal occupation of Xinjiang by Chinese’ thus seek liberation to form Eastern Turkistan. The religious awakening has taken place after missionary groups, as dawa groups, from Malaysia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were allowed entrance in Xinjiang and such groups on the whole have taught fundementals of Islam and some of them have also interpreted Jihad in their own way to excite the people in the wake of Afghanistan situation after Soviet occupation there. Many of the Uyghur joined mujahaden faction of Afghanistan to fight there on behalf of Northern alliance or Taliban, in particular for the latter. Such groups have posed the possibility of the infiltration of similar politico-ideological dynamics into Xinjiang (Clarke, 2011: 90). Separatist tendencies of such groups apart, anti Muslim sentiments have also played definite role increasing an atmosphere of separatism. Although there were incidents in 1980, 1981 and 1985, 1987 against the Chinese rule in Xinjiang, however, CCP government used no weapons against the agitators were used. Government also took strong action against those who wanted to incite the sentiments as happened in 1989 when protest against the book of sexual customs (Xingfengsu), which made some objectionable assertions about the Muslim sexual customs (Toops, 1992: 77-99) was banned and its authors and private printers were severely punished. The situation changed once Soviet Union failed to exist and Afghan mujahedeen gained power in their country. Separatism in Xinjiang gained some kind of momentum and demonstrations erupted in certain places there causing death of many of the Uyghur demonstrators in Urumqi, Kashgar, Khotan, Kucha, Aksu and Artush (Dreyer, 1994:50; Millward, 2004:16) and ultimately culminated into Baren incident of 1990, where a group of Uyghurs criticised local government policies and started a mass protest to wage jihad against the Chinese to establish East Turkestan state (Dillon, 1997:133 – 148). These people used weapons and on April 6th used bombs and pistols against police and government officials. The Chinese government considered this incident a well planned and highly organised operation and believed that most of the people were recruited from the prayer meetings in the mosques and were helped by some foreign elements including USA (Dillon, 2004: 62) that provided them with the weapons (Becquelin, 2000: 69). Since some Uyghurs who were living in exile in different countries like USA, Germany and Turkey also played a part. In 1993, a bomb exploded in Kashgar, ten persons were killed or injured and was considered by government as calculated attack on the government officials by the separatists. Same incidents happened in Gujla in 1995.
The state came heavily on these separatist activities and stepped up its control over religious activities as certain elements used religion as an instrument to create regional discord. The state under this backdrop implemented a “three no's' policy” toward national splittists –‘no concessions, no compromises, and no mercy’ (Clarke, 2011: 93).  Because of such activities fought on the basis of religion, government banned all form of dawat groups coming from other countries in Xinjiang and stopped religious activities, of such Madrassas which were preaching jihad separatist tendencies (The Guardian, May. 25, 1990). All mullahs appointed by the government to lead the prayers in the mosques were asked to write loyalty letters for the CCP government in Xinjiang and other religious leaders not appointed by government were prohibited to preach Islam. Thus banning the underground activities and also enhancing the surveillance procedure including fixing cameras at vital places for complete documentation of the activities of everyone(Dillon, 2004: 73; Karrar, 2009: 74) Along with these it was ensured that all cadres of CCP did not engage in religious activity. The party also increased the reach of the state at the local level, to monitor all people by sending better party member cadres and PLA soldiers to improve the vigilance as well as train the local people to defend the unity of the nation(CCP, Document, 7; point: 3, 2, 4). It was for the first time thought, apart from curbing the religious activities that need better developmental policies to lure the native people and keep them away from separatism and thus started development schemes to the undeveloped parts of the Xinjiang especially in Southern Xinjiang for political stability. Consequently in the 9th five year plan, from 1996 to 2001 there was sharp rise in subsidies that increased from 5.9 billion Yuan in 1996 to 18.3 billion Yuan in 2001(Karrar, 2009: 75).
Taking a new look on the policies including on religious one allowed the PRC government to curb some of the “free lancers” to preach in particular  the ones who were acting against the PRC government/policies. Only such groups therefore operate, both domestic and foreign, more the government trusts and ensures peace is not disturbed. Even though some of the separatists ran away from the country to Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan etc but PRC managed arrest of some of them (from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) yet there have been found occasional demonstrations/killings. Accordingly the present religious situation looks peaceful only because of the non visible surveillance of the activities of all in Xinjiang including the foreign travellers from Muslim areas of the world.

Conclusion

The PRC never banned religion of the Uyghurs except for some period in Cultural Revolution and people are free to profess their religion under the guide lines of the PRC constitution. Since after 1991, Xinjiang regained it lost geo strategic glory after the fall of Soviet Union and came under the influences that of some religious/radical elements of Pakistan, Afghanistan and especially to Central Asia, which is evident from the rise of unrest in the Xinjiang after 1990. PRC although had taken many steps to curb the separatism in Xinjiang but such activities are on the rise day by day as seen in the last two decades or so. As it is the problem of centrifugal tendencies and reasons for this historically speaking are the events in the neighbouring countries which borders with Xinjiang will have direct influence on the economically marginalised Uyghurs of Xinjiang. As people in these neighbouring countries use Islam as a political force for meeting their interested ends, same can be seen in Xinjiang where people are marginalised by the Chinese through many economic, social and migration policies. To lessen the centrifugal tendencies and influence of political Islam, PRC should address the socio-economic grievances of Uyghurs by giving them more chances in the socio-economic transformation of the region and stop migration of the Hans from inner parts of the China.

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