SINO-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING AND POLICY ANALYSIS

 

Muhammad Khan * Arshmah Jamil **

 

Abstract

 

      In a rapidly changing world, China’s close ties with Russia have aroused curiosity particularly due to the nature of their relations in the past. The Sino-Russian bilateral relationship restored and strengthened after years of mutual suspicions. After the cold war, geostrategic realities and converging interests have brought Russia and China closer in an attempt to bring a change in the global structure; the uni-polar model of world. Institutions in this regard, are playing the decisive role in enhancing the converging policies of the two countries. The paper therefore, aims at analyzing the role of institutions in advancing the rapprochement between these former communist giants. The paper also elaborates the importance of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in becoming an effective platform to address the regional concerns of these two. Furthermore, this rapprochement is viewed in the context of United States and the distinct policies it must adopt to tackle the Sino-Russian alliance. The institutionalization of bilateral relations between Russia and China should be used as an example for countries that have ongoing conflicts with their neighbors.

 

Introduction

 

      The post-cold war geostrategic developments at the international arena have impelled re-establishment of closer linkages between former Communist powers; Russia and China. Rather making use of ideological bases and commonalities, this time, linkages through institutions played a key role in bringing Russia and China closer to each other. Over the years, many multilateral and bi-lateral institutions have emerged playing a key role in bridging the past gap and meeting the future strategic challenges of the contemporary world. This network of institutions, takes into consideration all aspects of Sino-Russian bilateral relationship as well as multilateralism, which is a common concern for rest of the world, apart from these two global giants. The contemporary warmth in the bilateral relationship owes a lot to the coordination mechanism, which has gone through a dormant phase, due to conflicting situation, took place in late 1960s to a firm institutional shaping from 1996-1997 onwards. In the past fifteen years, a comprehensive mechanism of regularized exchanges between the two countries have gradually expanded.

This paper explores the significant role of institutions in promoting interaction and cooperation between Russia and China. The paper would also objectively analyze, as to how this institutional structures has brought an extraordinary change, in the approaches of Moscow and Beijing for greater cooperation and coordination at the international arena. Besides, the institutional strength and sustainability of these institutions to support the rapprochement for a long period would also be scrutinized.

The process of institutional building commenced in China, once Beijing made a formal start of opening up of its markets for the rest of world, especially the West. With the enhancement of Chinese integration into the international community, its demand and reliance on foreign policy actors for reliable information also increased. The role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in being an important multilateral institutional link as well as its importance in enhanced Sino-Russian dialogue will be evaluated.

What remains to be discovered is the role of multilateral institutional networks in promoting bilateral rapprochement between the two countries. Moreover, the convergence and divergence of the policies towards the region will be assessed. This would lead us to question whether institution building between the two counties was a symptom or factor for this Sino-Russian rapprochement and whether its impact on the conduct of bilateral relations has actually been felt. Furthermore the rapprochement will be analyzed in the context of United States. The policies United States must adopt to counter the challenges posed by the two countries will be evaluated.

The theoretical approach employed in this paper is Neoliberal Institutionalism theory which stresses on importance of regularity, consistency of interactions within the institutional framework . According to Neoliberal Institutionalists such as Keohane , institutions enhance confidence between states by guaranteeing regular movement of information between governments through regularized exchanges. Resultantly, it allows an environment where both sides can have expectations of ensuring peace. Institutions are advantageous in enhancing interaction as they monitor the implementation of agreements, raise the costs of negligence and deception and reduce the reasons of change in policies to occur midstream which enhances the credibility of the commitments between states.  Consequently, the problems of credibility are reduced when international bargaining occurs due to the presence of formal international institutions.

 

The Institutionalization of Sino-Russian Relations

 

Since 1950s, institutions played a key role in establishing various inter-party and inter-agency contacts between China and former Soviet Union. These institutions provided linkages between senior officials and decision makers to meet regularly and work for the better cooperation and collaboration between both ideologically similar states.

A two branched Sino-Soviet friendship society was established post Cold-War . Ever since the formation of the Chinese and Russian part of the society in 1949 and 1957 respectively, a significant change was observed in the bilateral relations between the two countries. These societies promoted cordial relations despite being separate entities . A disruption in the cordial relations occurred in the 1960’s due to various reasons. The problem analyzed as the cause of the swift deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations was an augmentation of mutual suspicions and failure to understand each other due to cultural barriers. In the 1960’s China and USSR were the leading proponents of communist ideology. It is argued that the division occurred when Chinese Communist Party denounced the Soviet variety of communism and deviated from the core Marxist ideology in 1961. Further research reveals that the full scale split occurred when Khrushchev succeeded Stalin and his peaceful approach towards the United States incensed the Chinese leader Mao Zedong . The situation was exacerbated when Khrushchev ordered Soviet technicians working in China to return to Russia. The Sino-Soviet split (1960-1989) can be seen as the worsening of both political and ideological relations.

Despite the contact between the two countries getting re-established in 1983 after 19 years of non-interaction, the intergovernmental consultations between the foreign ministers of the two countries remained weak. The meetings in 1984 between the foreign ministers of the two countries also followed a similar pattern. Gradually, the relations warmed up in 1989 after Gorbachev’s visit to China which was reciprocated by Jiang Zemin in 1991. China-Russia elevated the status of their relations to the level of ‘constructive’ partnership only after 1994 when an interdepartmental protocol was signed. This protocol was pertinent as it was the basis on which regular consultations between the two countries occurred.

The Bilateral Commission for the Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Head of Governments was the first significant step that triggered the pace of mutual cooperation between the two countries. These commissions facilitated the frequent meetings between Russian and Chinese heads of state on regular basis. The success of these institutions has been credited to the presence of various bilateral sub-commissions and working groups. These institutions filled an important gap which existed in the institutional interaction between the two countries, whether it was on the question of security, anti-terrorism, migration or dialogue between the top level officials.

The regularity of these meetings was a remarkable achievement of these institutional channels. In fact the ‘Agreement on Establishment of Organizational Basis of the Mechanism of Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government of China and Russia’ ensured consistency of these meetings. In the past when only two meetings occurred annually between the two countries, increased to eight meetings by 2009 as a result of institutional linkages. The presence of international institutions in enhancing the rapprochement between the two countries cannot be undermined. The multilateral institutions lead to a persistence of increasing interaction of high level contacts between Chinese and Russian officials .

The most important institution in terms of multilateral interaction of China and Russia is Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It must be analyzed whether SCO only enhanced the bilateral relations between the two countries and the member states or whether it became a platform for addressing essential regional issues.

 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Regional Importance           

 

Since its inception, Shanghai Cooperation organization played a pertinent role in reduction of armed forces in contentious regions and enhanced confidence building in border areas between the two countries. The dimensions of the discussion at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) gradually increased to fighting the three key problems i.e. terrorism, separatism and religious fundamentalism. The institutional structure also went through rapid transformations with the creation of specialized organs and committees.  The structural organization of the institution   lead to regularization of meetings between the SCO’s heads of government since 2001 and formulation of practical policies to address the various challenges faced by the two countries . 

The SCO structure composed of SCO Secretariat and Regional Anti-terrorism structure played an essential role in the effective collection and distribution of intelligence related to suspect terrorist groups present in Central Asia.

In terms of its regional role SCO’s role has not been limited to one geographic area, but focuses on the holistic peace and security. Korea is one country where both China and Russia pursued independent but parallel policies. The converging position of the two countries during Korean War was evident in their support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime. Russia on one hand provided support in the form of armaments and military advisors and China on the other hand provided thousands of armed volunteers. The SCO became a platform where the converging concerns of China and Russia regarding North Korean security were articulated. China and Russia dreaded North Korea’s disintegration as they did not want it to cause instability in East Asia resulting in cross-border migrations. The two countries also opposed North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapon but they also wished to influence the regime out of “self-destruction isolation” . In 2013, SCO Summit, it was highlighted that discussions and negotiations are the drivers to stability and peace on the Korean peninsula .

On the other hand, SCO has been inefficient in reducing the weariness with which Japan is viewed due to the troubled relations of both countries with Japan.  China’s military modernization has threatened Japan and they have an ongoing Senkaku (Diaoyu) island dispute. Russia-Japan relation in contrast is equally problematic as they had a history of territorial disputes over what Russia term as their Southern Kurils and Japan term as their Northern Territories. These Islands (Kunashir, Shitokan, and Habomai) were in Moscow’s control at the end of World War II and have now become the bone of contention between the two countries due to claims of control of these Islands .

When it comes to Iran, the SCO became a platform for China and Russia to address their concerns regarding its nuclear program. Regarding sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, both countries proposed to soften the sanctions if Iran adhered to the provisions of NPT. In 2013, during SCO Summit, China and Russia noted their concern towards Iran's nuclear program but were against the threat of military force and one-sided sanctions of individual governments and this was noted in Bishkek Declaration.

The SCO also became a platform for Sino-Russian partnership to address their concerns regarding the troubled region of Syria.  Previously both countries had pursued significant level of coordination in the United Nations Security Council to prevent a UN mandate for a military strike on the Bashar al-Assad regime. But a significant convergence of their policies regarding Syria was observed when ‘The Bishkek Declaration’ was issued at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on September 13, 2013. The declaration was pertinent as it pointed towards conflict resolution in Syria. The solution identified by them was a political dialogue between the authorities and the opposition without prerequisites on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué of June 30, 2012.

 

SCO: Catalyst To Improving Indo-Pak Relations

 

On July 10th, 2015 President Vladimir Putin announced acceptance of India and Pakistan as members of SCO at the annual summit . The inclusion of Pakistan in SCO will have a broader implication for the harmony and stability for South Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The spirit of SCO restrains from coercion in international affairs and due to its consent based decision making process, it instills assurance in members.  This will be a new development in the context  of Eurasian Regionalism where all four members of SCO i.e China, Russia, India and Pakistan favor regional collaboration while operating under the umbrella of the organization to resolve the major issues of security due to the problems caused by terrorism, extremism and separatism, The distinctive style of regional cooperation based on Shanghai Spirit provides and important platform to involve regional powers in South Asia in a permanent cooperation on the basis of mutual principles.

The strengths of this organization are based on its aims to bring consensus amongst the members regarding decision making and to prevent belligerent neighbors (Pakistan and India) from bilateral disputes. Undoubtedly, no regional organization can replace bilateral relations that countries utilize nor are able to resolve long-standing tensions between confrontational neighbors. However, even in the most optimal situations, European Union which is one of the most accomplished regional organizations has not been able to completely align the western and central European nations economic and security policies . SCO on the other hand has tremendous potential in reducing tensions between conflicting parties by utilizing diplomatic methods to influence the group actions. The fact that both Pakistan and India have been admitted together in SCO manifests that SCO members especially China and Russia realize the sensitivities of India and Pakistan. The strength of the SCO is that it’s leading members’ i.e China and Russia share a unique relation with India and Pakistan. While Russia has closer ties with India, China has closer relations with Pakistan and they would not desire to offend either while being part of SCO. The simultaneous membership of Pakistan and India will also make SCO a South Asian organization.

It is lucid that both India and Pakistan are victims of extremism, terrorism and separatism the three core concerns identified by SCO. The fact that most terrorist organization work through strong transnational networks, it is difficult to combat them single-handedly. SCO has an added advantage in this regard as it has been engaged in countering terrorism through a coordinating point known as Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) established in Tashkent and Uzbekistan in 2003 .  The inclusion of Pakistan and India in RATS will facilitate formulation of a joint counter terrorism strategy to dismantle the safe havens of terrorism in both South Asia and Eurasia.

In addition to enhancing cooperation in counter-terrorism, SCO can also play a pertinent role to facilitate economic cooperation between the two countries whose trade ties are weak and prone to disruptions.

 

The U.S Dimension of Rapprochement

           

An interesting dimension of Sino-Russian rapprochement is their common desire to respond to the influence of United States and NATO expansion in the region . During 1999, opposition to the emerging world order was considered Raison d’etre, in 1999 which lead to the strengthening of China-Russia cooperation. During this period, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov approached China proposing the formation of a "strategic triangle" with the purpose of counterbalancing the hegemony of United States. Boris Yeltsin (Russia’s first President) had opposed NATO’s 1999 military operations against Serbia and his visit to Beijing was for the purpose of holding military consultations and formulating multiple responses to Anti-Ballistic Missile Plans of the United States .

Despite the U.S opposition not being part of the official rhetoric of both countries, it certainly was an important dimension to the rapprochement. This was evident when Russia and China were unified in their opposition to the anti-ballistic missile plan and a Joint statement on the question of Anti-Ballistic missile plans were issued in July 2000 as well as 2003 invasion of Iraq . A noteworthy bilateral document known as the Sino-Russian treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was signed in July 2001, signifying their close cooperation . Their views regarding the structure of Post-Cold War international order were also similar. Both wished to strengthen a 'Multipolar World Order’ in the joint statements as well as the statements issued by high-ranking foreign policy officials. This was also articulated in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed in 2001. The statement issued in July 2005 by SCO urging Washington to set a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Central Asia demonstrates their convergence of policies regarding United States .

The economic policies adopted by China and Russia independently also indicate their desire to respond to the economic dominance of United States. American economic success seems pale in comparison with China’s economic rise in the past decade. Whether it was pursuing private equity in western markets or investing in Africa’s vast natural resources , China has actively enhanced its global influence through economic integration. While Russia’s economy cannot be compared to that of mighty Chinese it is pursuing its interests with renewed vigor. Despite its gas dominance being challenged by United States fracking , Russia is actively engaging former Soviet neighbors to join Eurasian Economic Union in order to reduce its dependence on the Western Markets.

In essence, United States has to formulate an adequate response to address the challenges posed by the China–Russia Axis.

 

United States’ Response towards China and Russia

 

China’s Rise and it’s rapprochement with Russia is observed with caution by United States. Chinese booming economy will further strengthen, once Russia meets its energy needs. One of the key challenges that United States might face is loss of primacy to China which would undermine the national security interests of United States . Therefore, the objective of United States policy would be to prevent this from happening.

The various options that have been explored in the past by United States have remained counterproductive. The first option was centered on suppression of China through deliberate force and is not feasible in the contemporary era. The Second option based on changing the 'internal character of China itself' by the process of democratization  is not clear in its purpose and would result in creating tensions between the two countries.. The third approach was the Cold-War style containment, which is outdated in the contemporary era and remains inappropriate in the Chinese context. In the contemporary era, Chinese imperialism and ideology is viewed differently by United States as compared to Russia , so specific policy approaches must be formulated in this regard

The adequate approach would be to balance Beijing's growing capabilities by pursuing policies that simultaneously increase China's stake in the existing global system. The advantage of balancing is that it will not require United States to try to stop China's economic expansion. This balancing is composed of four key elements. Firstly, it requires supporting the rise of states around China. The increasing coordination and collaboration between these states will enhance their ability to resist misuses of power by PRC in the region. Secondly, this balancing should include the selective deepening of globalization which would be carried out by involving the states of the Pacific Rim in a network of trade and investment liberalization agreements including the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). The success of this approach is based on the proposition that China should be kept out of these regional free trade agreements for as long as possible. The Third element of balancing strategy would involve the military which will be used as deterrent force to reassure U.S allies and dissuade PRC's heavy handedness with its neighbors. In essence, the military superiority should be maintained indefinitely. The fourth element of strategy is revitalization of the domestic economy through fast paced technological change and economic innovation which is the key to economic capacity, productive efficiency and long term growth. It is recommended that the serious competitive strategy with China would involve the promotion of highest level of technical change 'across the spectrum of civilian to military endeavors' .

With Respect to Russia, an altered policy must be adopted by United States. The U.S imposition of sanctions due to the Ukraine issue and record-low oil prices has already built pressure on the Russian economy . One key aspect that United States must look at, while dealing with Russia is the impact of free markets and free trade on this situation. Russia gains its strength by controlling energy supplies and distribution systems in this region. The key elements of United States stratagem would be to decrease Russia’s economic influence in this area.  This could be done by liberalizing global energy markets as well as lifting restrictions on exporting LNG and crude oil.  For the broader liberalization of global markets, United States needs to encourage private sector development and enhance market-driven U.S production. Despite the fact that the approval of the process of lifting gas export restriction would take a considerable amount of time and might not lead to immediate impact on the Ukrainian crises, it would be a long term strategy that capitalizes on power derived from control over energy interests. Greater energy supplies for the global market and diversity of suppliers would be a result of opening markets and would benefit the economy of both United States and Ukraine and a way to challenge Russia’s position in the global markets.

 

The Way Forward     

 

While United States adopts distinct policies to maintain its influence in the region, China and Russia continue to strengthen their alliance through institutions. The institutional structures between China and Russia have greatly enhanced and stabilized the implementation of cooperative mechanism. Nevertheless, there is a strong need to strengthen these policies in the areas pertaining to economy, defense and educational sectors. Sino-Russian rapprochement due to the presence of effective institutions can be used as a model by Pakistan and India where institutional cooperation must be strengthened to enhance mutual trust, confidence and to provide mutual reassurance. This can also be applicable in the economic and energy sector where there is minimal cooperation between the two countries (India and Pakistan). As Shanghai-Cooperation Organization enhanced the trust between Russia and China with the latter playing an active role in it, China should be given the status of full membership of SAARC. China as a SAARC member, could play an active role in alleviating tensions between India and Pakistan and greater regional peace and stability.

 

Conclusion

 

The rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing owes a lot to the bilateral and multilateral institutional set of connections. These institutions formed an infrastructure of interaction between the two countries and facilitated the implementation of the cooperative bilateral policies. They also enhanced mutual reassurance and open exchange of information. The expansion of SCO's functionality encompassing various issues beyond border security and confidence building is an evidence that regional institutional links have expanded between China and Russia. The institutional dynamics of Russia and China must be considered in this broadened context. What remained to be determined was whether institution building between the two counties was a symptom or factor for bilateral rapprochement. Besides, it has to be observed, whether its outcome has impacted on the conduct of bilateral relationship of the two major powers. With respect to practical and policy impact these institutions worked in accordance with the central themes of Neoliberal Institutionalism which lay emphasis on the significance of monitoring rules, pacts, agreements, and standards within the institutional framework. The fundamental contribution of these institutional linkages and channels have been the promotion of enhanced communication of the long term policy goals intentions of both sides as well as transfer of exact information to the higher officials and policymakers. These institutions have led to more functional, sustainable and dependable Sino-Russian relations and altered the nature of cooperation between the two countries productively.

 

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